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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore how personal therapy influences experienced 
psychodynamic psychotherapists’ ways of being clinicians, and, by implication, their 
professional development. A hermeneutic research method, which also drew upon aspects of 
grounded theory methodology, was therefore devised to explore and examine how personal 
therapy and professional practice relate to each other and to the therapist’s development, and 
to deepen this descriptive account into a more differentiated and theoretically viable 
understanding. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with eight 
psychodynamic psychotherapists who were working as clinicians and who were concurrently 
in therapy. Keeping the research objective in mind, a list of questions was developed from the 
interview material through which the data was re-read and edited. In accordance with the aims 
of the study, and as suggested by the results of the initial phase of the textual analysis, 
intersubjective theory, mainly that of Jessica Benjamin, was used to generate a conceptual 
framework through which the interview material was further interpreted. This foregrounded 
the shifting power distributions and the varying processes of identification between the 
treating therapists and the participants. The Jungian notion of the wounded healer was 
intersubjectively reconfigured as indicating a therapist whose (often unacknowledged) needs 
and vulnerabilities engender a proclivity to relate to patients as objects rather than subjects. 
The participants could all be described as having started out their professional lives as 
wounded healers. The effects of personal therapy on their clinical work were conceptualised 
in terms of increased abilities for subject-to-subject relating. These were linked to augmented 
capacities for reflective and symbolic thinking and an enhanced openness to the implicit, 
unformulated and opaque aspects of experiences in the therapeutic space. Finally an 
intersubjective model of personal therapy and development as a therapist was generated. It 
was concluded that because of the focus on the therapeutic relationship as the vehicle for 
change in psychodynamic psychotherapy, as well as the current increasing emphasis on the 
use of the therapist’s subjectivity, the therapist’s capacity to engage in and sustain subject-to-
subject relating and, by implication, the therapist’s personal therapy, are of pivotal importance 
for all therapists doing the work of psychodynamic psychotherapy. 
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But where and how is the poor wretch to acquire the ideal qualifications which he 
will need in his profession? The answer is, in an analysis of himself, with which his 
preparation for his future activity begins. 
                                                                                            (Freud, 1937, p. 248) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But to develop, it is necessary to liberate ourselves from our parents, our analysts, 
and our teachers. 
                                                                                         (Klauber, 1981, p. xxi) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PROLOGUE 
This research marks both the beginning and the end of a personal journey. It began years ago when 
I first trained as a clinical psychologist. I trained at a university where at that time the student's own 
therapy was not seen as being a part of the training. It was, in fact, frowned upon as indicative of 
serious emotional problems, and the general consensus among students was that if one was in 
therapy, that would probably compromise one’s chances of being admitted to the course. 
When starting out as a psychotherapist, I was aware that I was struggling to keep to my “brief” to 
“be genuine, to have unconditional positive regard for patients” and to communicate my “accurate” 
understanding of patients’ experiences to them in an empathic way (Rogers, 1957). Being 
“genuine” and having “unconditional positive regard” were often quite incompatible and “accurate” 
understanding was always dubious. There was also the rather unrealistic and unhelpful idea that the 
therapist’s feelings and values should not impinge on or impede the process of therapy. But there 
were feelings - patients’ and mine - getting entangled and messy, for which I had neither a 
conceptual framework nor the emotional resources. Although matters improved as I became more 
experienced as a therapist, I was always aware of some lack in my understanding and thinking, of 
not being able to go far or deep enough. 
 
And so my wanderings into and disillusionment with different theoretical paradigms began. It 
ended when I came into contact with the South African Institute for Psychotherapy and commenced 
the Diploma in Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. One of the course requirements was personal 
psychotherapy. 
 
The course and the therapy opened up a rich world of possibilities. Of course the theoretical input 
was also important, and went hand-in-hand with the therapy and supervision. As far as the therapy 
went, I realised that there was a whole dimension of experience and understanding that I had never 
known before. I also came to recognise in a very real way how handicapped I had been as a 
clinician in not having started working with at least some therapy behind me, to make theory alive 
in the therapy room and also to be more receptive to and have a clearer way of thinking about what 
actually happens in therapy. Through having my own therapy, I came to know the therapist’s self-
understanding as an essential aspect of the paradoxical therapeutic task of being both willing and 
 2
able to be thrown into sensing and experiencing that which occurs between therapist and patient, 
while remaining able to reflect upon and to conceptualise that which is experienced. 
 
In working as a psychotherapist and being in my own therapy, I was struck by the intricate 
intermingling of those two sets of experiences. Sometimes the dyad of therapist and patient in my 
consulting room became a triad. Unexpectedly and without necessarily being thought of, my 
therapist would enter and become a vital third presence in the form of his words, his ways of 
thinking and his interpretations. He would support and guide me at precarious moments and be 
critical when I made mistakes. His failures became warnings and reminders of what not do in my 
work. As I got to know my own vulnerabilities and what being in therapy is like, my patients 
became others like me, rather than being those who are injured, weak and cannot cope with life’s 
vicissitudes.  
 
I took these altered experiences of being-a-therapist back to my own therapy to explore. I wondered 
how this apparent conflation of therapists and therapeutic spaces worked and how it all fitted 
together, but I could never quite unravel the strange and baffling mixture of therapy and therapy, of 
being in personal therapy and doing the work of therapy. Reading about and around the topic of 
therapists’ own therapies and asking colleagues questions about their own therapies, and about 
being therapist-patients and therapists, only added to my curiosity. So this research journey got on 
its way inadvertently and almost unnoticed. 
 
At present I no longer idealise the therapist’s personal therapy. It is only part of the process and 
work of being an accountable and (I hope) an effective therapist and it can only take one so far.  
Therapy may (as I know from both my own experiences and from colleagues’ accounts of their 
own therapies), even when the patient is a psychotherapist, at times be an indifferent or negative 
and even harmful experience. Taking all of this into account, I still believe the therapist’s own 
therapy to be an essential aspect of being-a-clinician. This is certainly true for the beginning 
therapist and while therapists may not need to be in “interminable” (Freud, 1937) therapy, they do 
need to be in therapy for a significant part of their professional lives.  
 
So I do not come to this research taking a “neutral” or “objective” stance on this issue; that is, I am 
not debating the question whether or not personal therapy should be a part of training as a 
psychotherapist and if it is a necessary part of being a therapist. My interest rather lies in gaining 
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some understanding of what happens when a therapist is actually in therapy and how this influences 
and changes his1 being-a-therapist.  
 
Personal therapy and the linked changes of working as a clinician produce a somewhat different 
picture at a later phase in the psychotherapist’s professional life than when the therapist is a trainee 
or a novice. Although I certainly consider therapy to be an indispensable part of the initial training, 
my questions about personal therapy rather concern how it affects being-a-therapist in a more 
ongoing way and when the therapist is past the first flush of initial training or being a novice 
therapist. 
 
1.2 PERSONAL THERAPY AND THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHODYNAMIC 
       PSYCHOTHERAPY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
For the purposes of this study the term “psychodynamic psychotherapy”2 is understood as 
encompassing a variety of therapies3 where the focus of work and possibility for change are to be 
found in the therapeutic relationship, that is, in the transference-countertransference matrix. 
Psychodynamic psychotherapy includes some version of the notion of there being unconscious 
aspects of human existence, that is, Freud’s (1917, p. 143) decentring from the illusion that “the 
ego … is master in its own house”. While there is a fundamental premise that understanding the 
unconscious meaning of human mental activity offers a powerful potential for change (Stokoe, 
2000), there is also an acknowledgement that what is unconscious is by definition “outside 
conscious awareness and control” (Flax, 1993, p. 96) and that such an understanding will 
consequently always be partial and provisional (Flax, 1994). 
 
Rather than being marked by specific techniques, psychodynamic therapies are underpinned by a 
sensibility, an attitudinal stance that the therapist brings to his work. Ivey (1999, p. 4) writes about 
this “analytic attitude” as being “a deeply-rooted, coherent, professional mind-set that incorporates 
philosophical, ideological, psychological and ethical concerns”. “Rules” and “techniques” are 
subordinate to the analytic attitude and may be conceptualised as its concrete and lived expression 
                                                 
1 When the flow of the sentence allows it, I have used “his or her” and “he or she”. When this has seemed too clumsy, I 
have used “he” or “his” in the generic sense; that is, it is not a reflection of an insensitivity to the possibility of bias, but 
is done to facilitate ease of reading.  
2 Psychoanalysis “proper” and psychodynamic psychotherapy (which has its origins in psychoanalysis) are not separate 
paradigms, but overlap and exist on a continuum. Their fundamental assumptions and thought about the work of 
therapy are not significantly different. Differences rather lie in intensity and emphasis. Psychoanalysis takes place three 
to five times a week lying down on the couch and there is a greater prominence given to the role of insight and 
interpretation (especially of the transference) in bringing about change. Psychodynamic psychotherapy is possible with 
sessions once or twice a week, lying on the couch or face-to-face. There is also sometimes more of an emphasis on the 
supportive elements of therapy (Prochaska & Norcross, 1999). 
3 I shall use the terms “therapy” and “analysis”, as well as “therapist” and “analyst” interchangeably. 
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in the therapy room. The analytic attitude extends into and is related to the analytic task, process 
and setting. The task of psychodynamic psychotherapy is “to facilitate a greater degree of 
psychological freedom though the insightful resolution of unconscious conflicts” and the process is 
the unfolding of this task over time (Ibid.). The analytic setting or “frame” (Langs, 1982) has to do 
with the therapist’s provision of the “literal and metaphorical” space in which the work of therapy 
is possible and may be safely contained (Ivey, 1999, p. 5). 
 
The historical origins of the idea that the psychodynamic psychotherapist’s personal therapy is a 
necessary experience in becoming and in continuing to be a competent clinician can be traced to the 
beginning phases of the psychoanalytic and Jungian movements. Within the confines of these 
paradigms a personal analysis or training analysis is, together with supervision and academic 
requirements, presently still considered a pivotal and compulsory aspect of training (Sinason, 1999; 
Kirsch, 2000). In the wider psychotherapeutic culture, personal therapy for therapists is a much 
more controversial issue: the importance attached to it tends to “vary according to personal belief 
and theoretical orientation”, but within the domain of psychodynamic therapy it is seen as desirable 
and necessary (Macran & Shapiro, 1998, p. 13).  
 
While surveys indicate that in the United States and the United Kingdom “between two-thirds and 
three-fourths of therapists” have had personal therapy (Macran, Smith & Stiles, 1999, p. 419), such 
information is not available on South African psychotherapists. Personal therapy is not stipulated as 
either an entry or a training requirement in the training of clinical psychologists (who form the 
greater part of the population of psychotherapists in this country) at South African universities, but 
those universities with psychodynamic orientations (estimated at five in number) encourage their 
students to have personal therapy and may even facilitate this process (Malcolm, 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, even if initial training may make them aware of the fundamentals of psychodynamic 
psychotherapy and may sometimes contribute towards their initial development as therapists, all 
clinical psychologists are not psychodynamic therapists. Being a psychologist, even a clinical 
psychologist, also does not necessarily imply being a competent psychotherapist.  
 
According to Ivey (1992, p. 31), humanistic and cognitive orientations lack an emphasis on the 
“transference-countertransference dimension of therapeutic relating”. In 1992 he (Ivey, Ibid.) 
contended that there was a predominance of humanistic and cognitive orientations within 
psychology departments at South African academic institutions and that this was largely 
responsible for fostering a specific and problematic aspect of “countertransference pathology” 
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commonly found among South African psychologists.4 He (Ivey, Ibid.) ascribed this negative 
therapist attribute to the psychologist/psychotherapist’s unworked-through proclivity towards 
enacting his own unconscious and unacknowledged needs and desires, which leads to his claiming 
the space of therapy for himself while ostensibly yielding it to the patient. Although this is a 
problem that most psychotherapists sometimes grapple with, it would certainly be exacerbated if its 
non-recognition were not just personal, but also institutionalised. Adherence to a theoretical model 
that does recognise the existence and meaning of transference and countertransference, and, by 
implication, the importance of supervision and, especially, that of therapy, may not eradicate such 
countertransference enactments, but they do provide a means of addressing such a potentially 
iatrogenic aspect of being-a-therapist and of transforming it into a useful part of the therapeutic 
process. 
 
However, in considering the above, it has to be taken into account that Ivey wrote from a strictly 
psychoanalytic/object-relations viewpoint. He also did not actually research either the question of 
the specific theoretical paradigms adhered to by psychology departments at South African 
universities or that of how this may relate to countertransference problems and enactments among 
South African psychologists. Since what may one call Ivey’s unresearched and speculative opinion, 
nobody else has researched these pertinent issues. Further research would certainly be valuable to 
explore and clarify these matters, since Ivey expresses a viewpoint which was and still is probably 
held by the majority of South African psychologists who practise psychodynamic psychotherapy, 
and which may or may not be true. 
 
In South Africa psychodynamic psychotherapy is also practised by members of other professional 
groups, for example, by social workers, psychiatrists, ministers of religion, and so forth.5 As Milton 
(2000, p. 75) points out: “Psychotherapy, by rights, is the domain of psychotherapists - who may or 
may not be psychologists … Psychology, in fact, came late in the day to the practice of 
psychotherapy.” Getting an idea of the actual practice of psychodynamic psychotherapy in South 
Africa and of how the individual psychotherapist may equip himself sufficiently to practise 
responsibly and competently under the auspices of the analytic attitude, accordingly requires going 
beyond the entry into and confines of any of these professions. 
 
                                                 
4 “This thesis is based on the alarmingly high incidence of informal reports, from both psychotherapy patients and 
fellow clinical psychologists, of questionable behaviour by practising clinicians and counselling psychologists” (Ivey, 
1992, p. 37). 
5 I am only describing the situation and am deliberately avoiding becoming entangled in the quagmire of debates about 
whether a specific professional group is or is not competent and qualified, and should or should not be legally 
sanctioned to practise psychotherapy.  
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Specialised post-qualification training in in-depth psychodynamic psychotherapy is presently 
developing in South Africa and is being offered by a range of centres, institutes and various 
professional groups that could be broadly described as being engaged in furthering education and 
training in psychodynamic in-depth therapy (SAFPP, 2001). These all support the necessity of 
personal therapy for therapists. While there is currently no formal psychoanalytic training available 
in South Africa, the Southern African Association of Jungian Analysts (SAAJA) provides a Cape 
Town-based accredited training for Jungian analysts. In Cape Town there are also, for example, the 
Cape Town Society for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy (CTSPP), the South African Institute for 
Psychotherapy (SAIP), and the Self-Psychology Group. These groups all provide workshops, 
courses and meetings that support the development of theoretical and clinical knowledge. In 
addition, the members are required to have had a certain amount of personal therapy. Among the 
members there is also an underlying assumption that being a psychotherapist in a responsible way 
means that even if the therapist does not have therapy or supervision on an ongoing basis (which is 
seen as being optimal), these will be sought when necessary.  
  
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW: THE VALUE OF PERSONAL THERAPY FOR 
PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 
The necessity of personal analysis for those “who want to apply psychoanalytic technique” (Freud, 
cf. Benedek, 1969, p. 437) had already been expressed by Freud in his 1910 discussion of 
countertransference. While the idea that personal therapy should be a requisite aspect of becoming 
a psychotherapist is traditionally attributed to Freud (1910, 1937), it was actually Jung who 
instituted the practice of the training analysis while he was still a Freudian psychoanalyst (Freud, 
1912; Freud & Ferenczi, 1994; Kirsch, 1995). Originally it was hoped that the training analysis 
would enable the analyst to develop a spontaneous capacity for self-analysis (Beiser, 1984; 
Chessick, 1990), but later Freud (1937) became more pessimistic about analysts’ abilities to engage 
in self-analysis and “recommended periodic formal re-analysis for psychoanalysts every five years” 
(Chessick, 1990, p. 312). 
 
The training analysis purports to be a way to acquaint the would-be analyst with the nature of the 
analytic process and to be “the most direct route to the analyst’s subjective apprehension of 
psychoanalytic phenomena”, especially unconscious processes, resistance, transference and 
countertransference (Meisels, 1990, p. 112). It is also seen as familiarising analysts with their own 
unconscious and neurotic propensities, their unresolved anxieties and defences, and helps them to 
deal with these (Chessick, 1990). These aims of personal analysis have also become part of the 
rationale for personal therapy for psychodynamic psychotherapists. 
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Norcross, Strausser-Kirtland and Missar (1988, pp. 36-37) identify some of “the recurring 
commonalities in the literature” about the ways in which personal therapy is regarded as enhancing 
the therapist’s clinical work. Personal therapy “improves the emotional and mental functioning” of 
the psychotherapist and makes him more able to bear the “emotional stresses and burdens” inherent 
in doing the work of therapy. It deepens his understanding of “personal dynamics, interpersonal 
elicitations” and thus makes countertransference enactments less probable. Having his own 
experience of the  “transformational power” of psychotherapy “establishes a sense of conviction 
about the validity of psychotherapy”. The experience of also being a patient facilitates empathy, as 
the therapist becomes sensitised “to the interpersonal reactions and needs” of their patients and 
more respectful of the difficulties and struggles of their patients. Personal therapy also provides an 
opportunity to observe the treating therapist at work and to use him as a model. 
 
As far as actual research about personal therapy is concerned, surveys in the United States and the 
United Kingdom have indicated that the majority of psychotherapists in those countries have had 
therapy (mostly psychodynamic) (Macran & Shapiro, 1998). Macran and Shapiro (Ibid., p, 15) 
comment that although “a not insignificant minority” had negative therapy experiences (and some 
of those had still regarded therapy as necessary), therapy had mostly been a useful and helpful 
experience which had made the respondents more aware of the patient-therapist relationship, both 
on a personal level and as it pertained to the transference-countertransference dimension. 
Respondents had also reported that personal therapy had increased their tolerance, empathy and 
patience when working with patients (Ibid.).  
 
As indicated by the most recent national survey in which 84% of the respondents reported having 
been in therapy, the United States appears to be the country where the highest number of therapists 
(in this case psychologists) have made use of personal therapy (Pope & Tabachnick, 1994). A 
recent international survey on therapists’ “current and career professional development” was 
conducted by Orlinsky and the Society for Psychotherapy Research (SPR) Collaborative Research 
Network (Orlinsky, Rιnnestad, Ambühl, Willutzki, Botermans, Cierpka, Davis, & Davis, 1999, p. 
203). About 3,900 therapists (who were not only psychologists) in about 17 countries (which did 
not include South Africa) participated in this. Although this varied from country to country, about 
78% of the respondents indicated having had therapy (Wiseman & Shefler, 2001).  
 
One of the interesting findings of this study was that that “the therapists’ sense of experienced 
growth did not decline as a function of years in practice, but remained at a generally high level, 
even among those who had been in practice for more than two decades” (Orlinsky et al., Ibid., p. 
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212). Orlinsky et al. (Ibid.) ask themselves whether this has been due to a “collective myth” of 
continuous “personal growth” among therapists, but decide against this explanation, because there 
was a significant degree of variation in currently experienced growth. They therefore make the 
hypothesis that “the therapists’ currently experienced growth reflects a renewal of the morale and 
motivation needed to practice therapy, a replenishment of the energy and refreshing of the acumen 
demanded by therapeutic work”. This “restoration” is needed “as a consequence of the continuous 
investment that therapists make in their work rather than as a result of their inexperience”. Orlinsky 
et al. (Ibid.) link this with what is denoted as “continuous professional reflection” (Skovholt & 
Rønnestad, 1995, p. 105). The importance of the therapist’s having a sustained “reflective stance” 
(Skovholt & Rønnestad, 1995, p. 107) foregrounds the importance of therapy in a more ongoing 
way, rather than just as pertaining to the trainee or inexperienced therapist. 
 
Does having personal therapy result in therapists’ being more effective clinicians? The results of 
studies that attempt to determine the relationship between personal therapy and patient outcome are 
inconclusive. In reviewing the relevant literature, Clark (1986) and Greenberg and Staller (1981) 
found seven studies in which no indications of such a relationship could be found. Only two (Guild, 
1969, cf. Greenberg & Staller, 1981; Kernberg, 1973) supported the notion that personal therapy 
increased therapist effectiveness. Unfortunately therapist experience was not factored out in the 
Kernberg study. A study by Garfield and Bergin (1971) with trainee therapists showed a negative 
relationship between personal therapy and patient outcome, but this may have been due to the 
therapists’ inexperience. The results of these studies therefore neither support nor are evidence 
against the notion that personal therapy has a significant positive effect on therapist efficacy. 
Beutler, Machado and Neufeld (1994) argue that therapists enter personal therapy for diverse 
reasons and the effects on therapist efficacy are thus also varied, so that no significant conclusions 
are possible. 
 
There have also been some studies about the impact of personal therapy on aspects of the therapy 
process with patients. Some of the findings were that there were indications that personal therapy 
had some positive impact on empathy (Strupp, 1958); genuineness and empathy (Peebles, 1980); 
and countertransference awareness (MacDevitt, 1987). Wogan and Norcross (1985) found that 
therapists who had had personal therapy tended to place more emphasis on their relationships with 
patients, while those therapists who had had no therapy tended to highlight the use of techniques. 
On the other hand, Wheeler (1991, p. 193) found a negative relationship between the amount of 
personal therapy and the “measure of therapeutic alliance achieved”. The findings of these studies 
provide a measure of support for the notion that personal therapy is associated with the therapist’s 
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capacity to relate to the patient with genuineness, empathy and warmth (Rogers, 1957). However, 
as Macran and Shapiro (1998) point out, these studies suffer from methodological shortcomings 
such as small sample sizes and a lack of adequate controls, and their findings are therefore also 
inconclusive if evaluated in a logical positivist frame.  
 
It is not surprising that these quantitative studies (especially the outcome and process ones) have 
such methodological problems and struggle to “measure” even aspects of the complex phenomenon 
constituted by the therapist’s therapy, his work, and the relationship between these two, and that 
their results are accordingly generally inconclusive. This seems to be an impossible task full of 
variables that cannot be “controlled” or “factored out”. It is also clear that if one really wants a 
meaningful and encompassing view of what it is that actually comes to pass in a therapist’s work 
when he is in personal therapy and how this happens, any quantitative study will fall woefully short 
in capturing the rich depth and intricate nuances of this complex phenomenon. There are certainly 
more useful questions than simply whether or not therapists’ personal therapies lead to greater 
therapist competence. Examples of those would be how the experience of concurrently being 
therapist and patient changes the therapist’s manner of working and influences his development as 
a professional. Such questions bring us into the domain of qualitative research, where very little has 
as yet been done. 
 
In South Africa, Straker and Becker (1997) conducted a qualitative study with participants who 
were simultaneously therapists and patients. Their study concerned facets of what was experienced 
to be therapeutic in therapy by participants who were both therapists and patients, from the 
different perspectives of patient and therapist. They found being-a-patient and being-a-therapist to 
be different but related positions, but did not explore the complexities of the relationship between 
these. 
 
There are only a few qualitative studies about how personal therapy affects therapists’ work as 
clinicians (Mackey & Mackey, 1993; Macran, Smith & Stiles, 1999; Wiseman & Shefler, 2001). 
The main findings of these studies are briefly stated and there will be more detailed references to 
their results in the later discussions of the interview material. 
  
In Mackey and Mackey’s (1993, p. 101) study of the value of personal psychotherapy to clinical 
practice, the data yielded three themes:  
(1) “[T]he therapist as model” (that is, identification with the therapist). 
(2) “[U]nderstanding the therapeutic process”.  
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(3) Integrating the professional and personal aspects of life. 
 
In conceptualising the results of their multiple case study on the effects of personal therapy on 
therapists’ practice, Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999) found twelve themes emerging from their 
analysis of the interviews. They further organised these themes into three broader domains, which 
were not totally separate or independent (Macran, Smith, & Stiles, 1999, p. 429):  
(1) “Orienting to the therapist: humanity, power, boundaries” they see as concerning “the 
therapist as a person and as a social role”. 
(2)  “Orienting to the client: trust, respect, patience” as pertaining to the “therapist’s attitude 
towards the client and the consequences of this attitude for the client’s attitude towards 
himself”. 
(3)  “Listening with the third ear” as relating to “the understanding of communications and 
meanings that go beyond the denotation of spoken words”; that is, at a deeper and more 
unconscious level. 
 
Wiseman and Shefler (2001) did a multiple case study about psychoanalytically oriented therapists’ 
narrative accounts of their personal therapies and the impacts of these on professional and personal 
development. They (Ibid., p. 140) identified the following domains (each containing a number of 
categories): 
 “(1)  Importance of personal therapy for therapists: Past and current attitudes … 
(2)  Impacts of personal therapy on the professional self: Identity … 
(3) Impacts of personal therapy on one’s being in the session: Process … 
(4) The therapist as patient: Past and current experiences … 
(5) The therapist as patient: Self in relation to the personal therapist … 
(6) Mutual and unique influences of didactic learning, supervision and personal therapy.” 
 
These qualitative studies depict some of the many and diverse effects of personal therapy on 
clinical work, and their findings provide some useful insights of how these come about. However, 
while conceptual language is (to a certain extent) used to portray and explain the results of these 
studies, which are expressed in terms of various themes or domains, this takes place at a level that 
is primarily descriptive. There is a lack of a further interpretive level going beyond this to relate 
and knit together these themes or domains in such a manner that it would be possible to understand 
and think about this phenomenon both as a whole and in terms of an individual therapist. It 
therefore appeared that there was a need for a theoretical account that is more satisfactory in the 
sense of coherently and comprehensively encompassing and incorporating the many interwoven, 
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different and changing aspects (that is, intrapsychic, intersubjective and possibly systems elements) 
that are involved in this complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. This pointed the way towards the 
possibility of using an intersubjective theoretical framework, particularly one that would allow 
considering the research participants’ experiences of their therapies, work and the relationships 
between those on both intrapsychic and intersubjective levels, in developing an interpretive account 
of the interview material. 
 
1.4 THE AIMS OF THIS STUDY 
Against the background of the literature review and in the light of my research interests spawned by 
my own experience of being-a-therapist and being-in-therapy therapy, the aims of this study were: 
(1) To explore how personal therapy influences experienced psychodynamic psychotherapists’ 
ways of working as and being clinicians, and, by implication, their professional development. 
(2) To depict this phenomenon constituted by the therapist’s personal therapy and the related 
changes in working as and being a clinician. 
(3) To deepen this descriptive account into an understanding that is also theoretically viable, 
comprehensive and coherent.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1    CONTEXTUALISING THE RESEARCH METHOD  
The aim of this study was to provide an understanding (and in some instances interpretations) of 
psychodynamic therapists’ subjective experiences of how their personal therapies influence their 
work and development as clinicians and to broaden and deepen this understanding through linking 
it with theory.  
 
The contemporary postmodern approach to qualitative research is marked by “a refusal to privilege 
any method or theory” (Richardson, 1997, cf. Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 4). There consequently 
are no “prepackaged designs”(Crabtree & Miller, 1999, p. xvi) for qualitative research. The 
researcher needs to be an “interpretive bricoleur”6 (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 4) who pieces 
together representations of the phenomenon being investigated in order to create a coherent picture 
of it. The emergent “bricolage” or “solution” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 4) is no photograph of 
what is being investigated, but is rather like an impressionistic painting or a collage created by 
superimposing different images over one another. 
 
However, an “anti-positivist orientation” and “methodological flexibility” do not imply 
degeneration into “methodological indifference” and a kind of conceptual anarchy (Bryant, 2002, p. 
25). Keeping in mind that the research question and context determine the research methodology 
(and not vice versa), the onus is on the researcher to select, adapt and create his own research 
methodology from the multiple available options. For this he is answerable and of this process he 
should therefore leave a clear audit trail (Kelly, 1999a).  
 
The purpose of the study was both to describe and interpret participants’ experiences of how their 
own therapies influence their work and also to explain (that is, to develop a theoretical perspective) 
of what it is that happens and how this happens. I would therefore locate the research methodology 
used within the paradigm that Kelly (1999c, p. 398) termed “interpretive research” or 
“hermeneutics in action” which may be contrasted with a more positivistic research paradigm.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 “A Jack of all trades or a kind of professional do-it-yourself” (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 17). 
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2.2   AN INTERPRETIVE OR HERMENEUTIC APPROACH TO RESEARCH  
A hermeneutic approach to the research process goes “beyond phenomenology” in that its goal is 
“to use the interpretation of lived experience to better understand the … context in which it occurs” 
(Miller & Crabtree, 1999a, p. 28). As the “theory of understanding” hermeneutics concerns both the 
question of what is involved in the process of understanding and of what understanding essentially 
is (Palmer, 1969, p. 130). An underlying assumption of the hermeneutic approach is that living 
interpretively is fundamental to human existence (Heidegger, 1962). “Hermeneutics as a 
methodology of interpretation for the humanities is a derivative form resting on and growing out of 
the primary ontological function of interpreting” (Palmer, 1969, p. 130).  
 
Ricoeur (1981) draws an analogy between “reading and interpreting texts” and “interpreting 
meaningful human action” (Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, Miller & Argyris, 1989, p. 145). He 
(Ricoeur, 1981) uses this “model of the text” to address the tension between understanding 
(verstehen) and explanation (erklären) in acquiring knowledge about complex human phenomena 
by interpretive means. Dilthey (1900/1976) contends that, unlike in the natural sciences, in the 
human sciences verstehen is the only appropriate interpretive method. Ricoeur (1981) extends 
Dilthey’s notion by arguing that “understanding of a situation needs to be developed both from 
being in the context (empathy) and from the perspective of distanciation, using interpretation” 
(Kelly, 1999c, pp. 400-401). This means an ongoing dialectic between verstehen and erklären when 
the text is “read” (Ricoeur, 1981). 
 
The research approach used in this study involved complex and multiple layers of interpretation. 
While the researcher should take care not to override the participants’ self-accounts, his 
understanding would remain rather limited if it remained at the level of the participants’ 
understanding of their realities (Kelly, 1999b). From an interpretive perspective, even the 
interviews themselves are not seen as direct representations of what is being investigated, but as 
representations that are being co-created by researcher and participants. Transforming the 
interviews into transcripts also implies further and successive levels of interpretation. The text7 that 
I used for further interpretation (that is, specifically for the textual analysis), consisted of both the 
actual recordings of the interviews and their transcriptions. 
 
The nature of the interpretive process (and accordingly that of the various circular, iterative 
interpretive processes employed in this study) may be clarified by considering the concept of the 
                                                 
7 “A text is any record of life held over after the moment of its production for later comprehension and interpretation” 
(Kelly, 1999b, p. 379), and is therefore “the basis for analytic work” (Miller & Crabtree, 1999b, p. 129).  
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hermeneutic circle.8 The researcher engages with the process of meaning-making by entering this 
“paradoxical” circle, where the whole can only be understood in terms of the parts and the “parts 
only acquire their proper meaning in the context of the whole” (Brown et al., 1989, p. 144). 
Meaning, which is arrived at “through a questioning responsiveness to the matter being 
encountered”, comes to locate itself within this circularity (Palmer, 1969, p. 165). Such 
understanding is always situated and it is never an immutable and final truth, but is a continual 
creation and re-creation of the whole by extrapolating on the basis of partial understanding. The 
interpreter “ … projects before himself a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial 
meaning arises in the text” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 236). 
 
The researcher aims to gain “legitimate access” to the circle by adopting an “appropriate 
perspective” (Packer, 1989, p. 103). Since interpretation is “never a presuppositionless grasping of 
something” (Heidegger, 1962, par. 150), this appropriate perspective should be a viewpoint that is 
informed in the sense of the researcher’s existing knowledge and attitudes being reflected on and 
(as far as possible) being articulated.  
 
Once the researcher has entered the broader hermeneutic circle of developing an interpretive 
account, there is a continual and reciprocal dialogue between the researcher and the text comprised 
by the interview material. This dialogue is constituted by the many microprocesses of the “flip-
flop” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 135), back-and-forth movements of the researcher between 
the “data” and his own interpretation of the “data”, which may, at different moments, be his 
understanding, thinking, reflections, theorising, questions, and so forth.  
 
At this point I should like to briefly comment on the use of the term “data”, which is so commonly 
used when writing about qualitative research. As I did in the above instance, the term “data” is 
usually employed for “ease of explanation” (Terre Blanche & Kelly, 1999, p. 127). However, its 
use is somewhat problematic. “Data” gives the idea of “bits of discrete information” rather than that 
of “richly interrelated material” (Ibid.). There also is a sense of “data” being linked to a mechanical 
process of analysis rather than to a creative interpretive process of textual analysis. 
 
To return to the evolving interpretive process: In the forward arc of the hermeneutic circle the 
researcher is thrust into and immerses himself in a certain way of seeing and understanding by 
which he is moved and transformed. In the backward arc the researcher gathers himself in 
reflection, uncovering and evaluating his understanding (Packer & Addison, 1989a). This may be 
                                                 
8 A concept introduced by Schleiermacher and also used by Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer (Palmer, 1969). 
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thought of as providing a way to “analyse texts in a way that incorporates both experience-near and 
distanciated perspectives” (Kelly, 1999c, p. 408).  
 
The hermeneutic circle should not be seen as a “vicious one” (Heidegger, 1962, par. 153), where 
what is expected and already known is re-affirmed in a solipsistic turning in on itself, but as one 
where both interpreter and text are continually and mutually re-invented and re-created and each 
understanding becomes a misunderstanding as it evolves into a renewed expansion of meaning 
which replaces the previous understanding.  
 
2.3   STARTING THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
I was aware that I had not come to the research process as a tabula rasa and that my “initial 
conscious, acknowledged, or foregrounded assumptions” (Addison, 1999, p. 147) would be the lens 
through which I would make discoveries. I also expected that I would, as the research process 
unfolded, learn more about my “unconscious, unacknowledged, or background assumptions” 
(Ibid.). 
 
In being (and having had been) both therapist and patient, my perspective was very much that of an 
insider. I knew that my curiosity about and my reasons for choosing to research this particular topic 
probably had a lot to do with having this perspective and with my belief that one cannot practise 
psychodynamic psychotherapy in an effective and responsible way if one has not had one’s own 
personal therapy. After all, meaningful research questions do often arise out of our “values, 
passions, and preoccupations” (Mareck, Fine & Kidder, 1997, cf. Russell & Kelly, 2002, par. 19). 
 
I came to this research not only informed by my own experiences and beliefs, but also by the 
popular lore among therapists about why they choose this profession and how their own therapies 
contribute to their development. For example, most psychodynamic therapists are very aware of the 
whole idea of therapists’ being “wounded healers”; of the role that this plays in coming to this 
profession and how pivotal one’s own therapy is in moving to a place in one’s work where (even if 
one is not necessarily “healed”), one may no longer be so prone to use patients to fulfil unmet 
needs. In the background there were also colleagues’ stories about their own therapies: some were 
about experiences of being transformed, growing and developing; others were about being hurt and 
damaged by negative therapy experiences; others were about therapy being rather indifferent and of 
little specific significance. 
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Seeing that I had not wanted to “reinvent the wheel”, I had also read the available literature around 
the research topic. For example, I had read about the history of the training analysis and of how this 
tradition had become part of psychodynamic therapy. As far as research goes, it was clear that 
quantitative research could not really say anything conclusive about the effects of personal therapy 
on clinical work. The few available qualitative studies did give a more satisfactory picture of what 
changes about the therapist’s clinical work when he is in therapy, of how this happens and of some 
of the ways in which he may develop as a professional as result of this. However, although 
theoretical concepts were used to describe and make sense of the findings of these studies, these did 
not quite cohere in a way that made theoretical sense of the phenomenon as a whole. 
  
There seemed to be both a space and a need for developing a theoretical framework for thinking 
about this aspect of being a psychotherapist. In order to do this (and as I have outlined earlier), I 
have used an interpretive or hermeneutic approach (Kelly, 1999c) to the research process and 
(within this context) also employed some useful aspects of grounded theory (Addison, 1989, 1992, 
1999; Charmaz, 2000; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003).  
 
2.4   THE PARTICIPANTS 
To test the Interview Guide and to familiarise myself with actually conducting the interviews, I 
conducted a pilot study with two female psychotherapists whom I know on a collegial level. I 
listened to both interviews and decided to include the second one (done with Therapist BP) in the 
main study.  
 
My aim was to focus on learning about what was central and crucial to the phenomenon that I was 
investigating, that is, the ways in which being-a-patient impacts on and confers meaning to being-a-
therapist. In order to allow aspects of this phenomenon to emerge clearly, it was necessary to select 
participants who had had some depth of experience with this phenomenon; that is “exemplars” 
(Mishler, 1990) and who were (in some respects) relatively similar (Rennie, Phillips & Quartaro, 
1988; Hill, Thompson & Williams, 1997). It was also important that the participants should be 
articulate enough to give rich or “thick” descriptions (Geertz, 1973); that is, thorough descriptions 
of the “characteristics, processes, transactions and contexts that constitute the phenomenon being 
studied” (Terre Blanche & Kelly, 1999, p. 139) and that they would be “willing to give complete 
and sensitive accounts” (Wilson & Hutchinson, 1991, p. 269). 
 
Participants who were concurrently in therapy or analysis and practising psychodynamic therapy 
were therefore purposefully sought and selected from (and were all members of one or more of) the 
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following local professional groups: the Cape Town Society for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy 
(CTSPP), the South African Institute for Psychotherapy (SAIP), the Southern African Association 
of Jungian Analysts (SAAJA) and the Self-Psychology Group.  
 
For the purposes of this study, I did not consider it necessary to draw a distinction between 
“therapy” and  “analysis” or between “therapist” and “analyst”. This was both for pragmatic 
reasons (locally there only being Jungian training which has analysis as part of it) and also because 
I did not think that this kind of distinction was important to what was being investigated. I 
accordingly subsumed both the kinds of therapies that the participants were doing and were 
undergoing under the rubric of “psychodynamic psychotherapy”. 
 
I knew that participants’ accounts of events would inevitably involve a certain amount of “narrative 
smoothing” (Spence, 1986, 1987). Kelly (1994, p. 56) describes “narrative smoothing” as “the 
process whereby the inchoate and fragmented moments of life … are transformed into sequential, 
coherent, unambiguous accounts of experience”. According to Spence (Ibid.), this is an inevitable 
feature of any attempt to represent the world. I thought that this would happen to a lesser degree 
and that the participants would be less inclined to give theoretical reconstructions of what had 
happened if their accounts were of more recent events rather than of the more abstracted and 
“smoothed” memories of their past experiences. I therefore decided to limit the study to participants 
who were presently concurrently working as clinicians and in therapy. 
 
Gaining cooperation from therapists to participate in any research project can be problematic 
(Henry, Sims & Spray, 1971; Vachon, Susman, Wynne, Birringer, Olshefsky & Cox, 1995; Hill, 
Thompson & Williams, 1997). According to these authors, therapists are often reluctant to 
participate in such studies because of time constraints and because of feeling that the information 
sought is too personal and an invasion of professional privacy. However, Hill et al. (1997) did find 
that therapists seemed more willing to participate when studies were about topics that were 
personally relevant and where a limited amount of time and involvement was required. 
 
 The process of actually finding participants was indeed lengthy and difficult. The research is in an 
area that I also have experience of, that is, I have been and still am both a therapist and a patient.  
This probably made it easier for me to imagine what being asked certain questions might be like 
and alerted me to the fact that I was entering an area which is very private: in a sense I would be 
treading on “holy ground” which needed to be treated with the greatest respect. It was also my 
impression that psychotherapists generally do not easily or lightly talk about this aspect of their 
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lives. As in many instances in this study, I was also aware that these were my own assumptions and 
that participants’ feelings about participating in such a study might in fact be quite different from 
what I anticipated them to be. 
 
To find participants, I wrote a letter (Appendix A) in which I explained the purpose of the research, 
what would be required of participants, and briefly addressed the issue of confidentiality. I am a 
member of the CTSPP and when I told the chairman about my planned research, he kindly offered 
to e-mail the letter to group members. As the various branches of this group meet on a regular 
basis, I also had the opportunity to inform group members personally about my research and ask for 
volunteers.  The deadly and uncomfortable silence that followed my first “talk” at the main group 
meeting of the CTSPP confirmed my worst fears about not finding a sufficient number of 
volunteers. Two members did make some encouraging remarks, but only one therapist (B) 
volunteered. At later meetings of the other branches of the CTSPP there were a few therapists who 
were interested, but who were not in therapy at the time. One therapist (D) had already volunteered 
after receiving the e-mailed letter.  
 
I then mailed letters to those members of the CTSPP who were not present at these meetings and 
who did not have e-mail, as well as to members of the other three groups previously mentioned. 
After a rather tense week of waiting there were some responses: some were again from therapists 
who were interested, but who were not in therapy at that time. One therapist volunteered, but later 
withdrew, because she felt that her circumstances would make her too recognisable. Two further 
therapists (A and E) volunteered and I started feeling more optimistic about finding enough 
participants. Another week passed and two more therapists (C and F) volunteered. I also had a 
discussion about my research with G, who is also a member of the CTSPP. As I knew her to be an 
articulate person, and she was interested in the research, I asked her to consider actually taking part 
and she agreed. 
 
At this point there were eight volunteers and I had already started the process of setting up and 
doing the interviews. 
 
Six of the eight participants were self-selected and two agreed to participate after I had approached 
them. Two were men, six were women; their ages ranged from twenty-nine to fifty-four years and 
all of them were white, middle-class and mostly working in private practice. Seven were English-
speaking and one was Afrikaans-speaking. These details may convey something about who is 
actually doing in-depth psychodynamic psychotherapy in Cape Town, South Africa.  
The participants were all doing in-depth psychodynamic work as well as being in in-depth 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. The length of time during which they had been psychotherapists doing 
in-depth psychodynamic psychotherapy varied between four and eighteen years (some of them had 
also had a number of years’ experience doing other kinds of therapy or “counselling”). There were two 
social workers and the rest were all clinical psychologists. I had a previous collegial acquaintance with 
four of the participants and the other four I met for the first time when doing the research. 
 
Four of the participants described their therapists’ theoretical orientations as “Jungian”, while the rest 
of the treating therapists consisted of one who was “psycho-analytic” and three who had “object-
relations”1 as their primary theoretical orientations. Two of the participants (who also had “Jungian” 
therapists) described themselves as being “Jungian”; one was “intersubjective”; one had an “integrative 
psychoanalytic” approach and the other four described themselves as having “object-relations” 
theoretical orientations. Only one participant described herself as “purely” Jungian: the others all had a 
“mix” of a primary theoretical orientation with some other theoretical perspectives added in.  
 
The length of time that the participants had been in their present therapies varied between two and 
eleven years. Three of the participants were still with their original therapists: the others had also had 
different therapists and therapies. Three of the participants were still in the therapies they had entered 
as part of training; one had entered his present therapy with the kind of therapist he had wanted to 
become very much in mind, and the others had all entered therapy because of some personal issue or 
crisis. Even for these latter four participants the specific therapists they had gone to had been very 
important in terms of their knowing that those therapists would have a significant impact on 
themselves as clinicians. Whether they had entered therapy for more professional or personal reasons 
had, in fact, not made much difference to the focus of therapy, because those two domains were 
essentially interwoven. 
 
The interviews were conducted in English. The Afrikaans-speaking participant did not find this a 
problem. Like most Afrikaans-speaking psychotherapists who work in Cape Town, she is completely 
bilingual. 
 
 
                                                 
1 In Cape Town an “object-relations” theoretical orientation usually means a Kleinian one. Winnicott is also a strong 
influence in local object-relations thinking. 
 20
Most of the participants did have some concerns (such as time constraints, about not being “good 
enough” and about confidentiality) about entering the research process, but all of them also saw it 
as a valuable opportunity to reflect upon this aspect of their lives. Although several of them had 
also had some negative therapeutic experiences, they had all found their own therapies to be a 
pivotal aspect of becoming and being a therapist. All of them had strong feelings (in some cases 
almost “missionary zeal”) about the necessity for therapists to have personal therapy and it 
appeared (at least on a conscious level) that it was primarily those feelings that had led them to 
participate in the research process. 
 
2.5   ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The ethical concerns raised by qualitative research overlap with, but are also different from, those 
involved in the more “formal and socially distant methods” that constitute positivistic and 
quantitative research (Punch, 1998, p. 177). In qualitative research the aim is “to understand and 
articulate the meanings of people’s experiences rather than formulate general laws of behaviour” 
(Hadjistavropoulos & Smythe, 2001, p. 163). The interaction between researcher and participant is 
consequently highlighted in qualitative research methodology, as well as the notion that the person 
of the researcher, rather than any method used, is the research instrument (King, 1996). In fact, a 
research interview may sometimes come dangerously close to being like a therapeutic session and 
the researcher who is also a psychotherapist should keep in mind that the objectives of these are 
very different (King, 1996; Kvale, 1996). In-depth interviewing, especially, can evoke powerful 
emotions and make participants vulnerable (King, 1996). This foregrounds the tension that may at 
times exist between the researcher’s quest for knowledge and his ethical responsibility towards the 
participants (Kvale, 1996). 
 
Since this study was conducted with colleagues, it did not start out from an inherent “hierarchical 
relationship” (Miller & Crabtree, 1999c, p. 92) between researcher and researched, but rather 
concerned what has been termed “studying sideways” (which may be contrasted with “studying up” 
and “studying down”) (Shrijvers, 1991, cf. Kelly, 1999b, p. 386). The participants were not “naïve 
subjects” and their consent to take part was both informed and voluntary (Durrheim & Wassenaar, 
1999). They were interested in the topic of the research, had strong feelings about it, were attracted 
to the study because they wanted the opportunity to reflect on their own experiences of the 
influence of their therapies on their work and felt that they could make a contribution to knowledge 
about this aspect of being-a-therapist that both they and I considered to be so pivotal.  
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In the initial letter inviting psychotherapists to participate, I had set out what this would entail and 
additional information was divulged and questions answered when the interviews were set up. At 
the beginning of each interview and before the interview proper started, the participants had a 
further opportunity to discuss any concerns or ask any questions. At this point confidentiality was 
also negotiated. The research topic was clearly a sensitive one. The participants would be talking 
about themselves and while the research emphasised their work, the personal and professional are 
so interweaved in this profession that the interviews had the potential of being personally revealing 
and vulnerable-making. The participants would also be talking about third parties 
(Hadjistavropoulos & Smythe, 2001), that is, about both their patients and therapists. The latter 
group was especially problematic in terms of confidentiality. The community of psychodynamic 
psychotherapists who practise in Cape Town is quite small and “incestuous”. I therefore knew that 
the treating therapists could be recognisable, even if pseudonyms were used. Four of the 
participants had chosen to withhold their therapists’ names. However, through little, seemingly 
insignificant details that slipped through one of these participants’ accounts, I became aware of who 
his therapist was. I took cognisance that this meant being very careful with any of the interview 
material that could become publicly available.  
 
Confidentiality meant anonymity for participants and those individuals that they talked about. 
Identifying details were changed when doing that did not alter the meaning or were omitted if it 
did. After each interview I enquired if there were any details or parts of the interview that the 
participant wanted left out of the transcription. As a further precaution I also scrutinised the 
excerpts from the interviews that were used in the discussions of interview material for details that 
could compromise anonymity. As had been agreed with the participants, I did the transcription of 
the interviews myself. I also undertook that the interviews in their entirety would not be published 
or made publicly available in any way. This meant that they could only be read by the supervisor 
and examiners and would be destroyed at the end of the study. 
 
The participants had always had the choice of whether or not they wanted to talk about something, 
but there had been moments when they had revealed aspects of themselves and their histories that 
had been very personal. Although their feedback about the impact of the research process indicated 
that they had experienced it as interesting, valuable, focusing, clarifying, and so forth, three of the 
participants had also found it more exposing and vulnerable-making than they had anticipated, and 
one wondered whether the interview had been satisfactory from my perspective. Two participants 
also questioned what would be done with the material that they had provided. 
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I was very aware of the trust that the participants had placed in me and had the firm resolve not to 
betray that. This had been relatively straightforward in terms of confidentiality and being respectful 
of what they were divulging. However, there were also other aspects of the interviews and later 
data analysis where the ethical domain became much murkier and where there were sometimes no 
clear answers. There were moments when an interview did not remain at the level of the 
participant’s talking about his therapy, but where it took me and the participant straight into the 
heart of the closed container of his therapy. This did not necessarily always happen in a negative 
sense. Here I recall a specific instance where the participant’s insight into his therapy might even 
have provided useful grist to the therapeutic mill. My concern rather lies with how such a research 
interview may breach and have an impact on the closed space of therapy.  
 
This also pertained to the analysis of interview material. I was aware that the participants were 
likely to read the dissertation once it was finished and to be curious about their own part in it. I was 
also conscious that while the actual interview relationship had been a mostly egalitarian one, where 
meanings had been negotiated, the participants had no say or power in my actual interpretations of 
what they had told me. I therefore speculated about the impact of these on the participants 
themselves and on their therapies that were still ongoing. This especially concerned those parts of 
the discussion of interview material that had to do with issues of power between participant and 
therapist or instances when the negation of the participant by the therapist had never been resolved 
satisfactorily. In this regard, I had the sense of moving on a really slippery slope. On the one hand 
the participants were also therapists and should be able to know that my interpretations were not 
“truths”, but only my interpretations, and could be useful comments on their therapies. On the other 
hand, these interpretations could also invade the space of therapy, do real damage there and also 
undermine the participant’s ability “to interpret his experience in his own way” (Hadjistavropoulos 
& Smythe, 2001, p. 164).  
 
This matter could to some extent have been addressed if there had been a second round of 
interviews where aspects of the data analysis and the participants’ reactions to these could have 
been explored. I would not have seen this as a way of validating the “correctness” of my 
interpretations, but rather as a means of empowering the participants to share in the meaning-
making process at a further level. 
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2.6   INTERVIEWS 
2.6.1 Interview Guide and process 
 “With qualitative research we are always throwing a net to see what we can catch. If we throw a 
fine-meshed net we will probably catch lots of small things, some important and some less so. If we 
are lucky, once in a while we may find a pearl. If we throw a large-meshed net, we will miss many 
of the smaller findings, but we may get a better look at the larger issues. There are always choices, 
and it is [the researcher] who makes those choices” (Meek, 2003, par. 14).  
 
To cast the “net” of the research, an Interview Guide (Appendix B) was developed. This was based 
on the relevant literature, my own experiences as therapist and patient, and discussions with a 
colleague who shared my curiosity about this particular aspect of being-a-therapist.  
 
To ease the participants into the interview situation, the Interview Guide commenced with a few 
“warm-up”, mostly factual questions. After that followed the main or “grand tour” (Miller & 
Crabtree, 1999c, p. 98), broad and open-ended question:  
“Could you describe as fully as possible how your own therapy or analysis influences your work as a 
therapist? Please try to describe this in terms of your own experience rather than just giving a theoretical 
explanation of what happens. Where possible, could you also try to describe specific instances of this?”  
 
Further questions about the participants’ own therapies and how these and other aspects of their 
being-therapists related to their being-clinicians followed. Prompts were used if the participant was 
unclear about what a question meant or felt unsure and needed encouragement. Probes were used if 
I thought that an answer needed further exploration and elucidation. 
 
Research interviews are not “neutral tools of data gathering” (Fontana & Frey, 2000, p. 646). It is 
doubtful that the researcher can put himself aside by “bracketing” (Denzin, 1989, cf. Miller & 
Crabtree, 1999c, p. 102) his pre-suppositions and own subjectivity in order to be pristinely “value-
free and objective” (Russell & Kelly, 2002, par. 4). Just as in the analysis of the interview material, 
the researcher’s “fore-structures of understanding” (Bleicher, 1980, p. 108) play a role in the 
interview questions that are asked and the aspects of answers that are picked up on and further 
explored. This highlights the necessity of the process constituted by the “iterative cycle” (Miller & 
Crabtree, 1999b, p. 131) of “reflective reflexivity” (Addison, 1999, p. 152) previously described in 
Section 2.3.  
 
Such a process continued throughout the duration of this research and also involved my keeping 
notes or memos about my observations, thoughts, feelings, “insights”, and so forth. It also entailed 
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my “keeping my critical voice active” by questioning, looking for ambiguities, contradictions, 
inconsistencies and omissions (Addison, 1999, p. 156). As far as the “self- reflexive loop” (Miller 
& Crabtree, 1999b, p. 131) specifically pertained to the interview process, I was conscious that just 
because I shared a profession, theoretical language and the notion of personal therapy as a 
necessary requirement for being-a-therapist with the participants, I could not assume that I knew 
what they were talking about. This meant listening attentively and carefully “for what’s said and 
not said, listening for the silences, the cracks between words, the hesitation, the contradictions, the 
glorious expositions” (Stamberg, 1993, cf. Dilley, 2000, p. 134). And when listening did not 
suffice, to pursue and clarify what the participants meant in greater detail.  
 
From a hermeneutic perspective the research interview is viewed as a “special type of partnership 
and communicative … event” (Miller & Crabtree, 1999c, p. 91), where the interaction between 
researcher and participant leads to a “fusion of [the] horizons” (Gadamer, 1975, p. 358) of 
understanding between them. This results in a negotiated “coconstruction of [their] experience and 
understanding of the topic of interest” (Miller & Crabtree, 1999c, p. 93). The researcher is therefore 
an active participant and co-author of the research process and the text that results from the 
research interview is not a mere reflection of the participant’s “reality”. Of course this does not 
mean that there is not such an external reality, but rather that what “is captured in the text” of the 
interview is constructed “out of the flow of information and interpretation” between researcher and 
participant (Russell & Kelly, 2002, par. 13). 
 
Taking the above into account, my aim was also that the nature of the interview context would be 
such that the participants would be sufficiently empowered to be “speaking subject[s]” (Benjamin, 
1998b, p. 9), so that their “voices” would be heard as clearly as possible. The questions were open-
ended to allow participants to use their own words to describe what they considered to be most 
meaningful or salient. Apart from the “warm-up” and main questions, the interview questions did 
not necessarily follow in any specific order and I tried to find answers to the questions by, where 
possible, picking up on and further exploring what the participants themselves were already 
speaking about. Tracking the participants rather than leading in the interviews meant that I had to 
memorise the Interview Guide before the start of the interview process. 
 
The actual interviews were preceded by two pilot interviews, one of which was also used in the 
main study. This was followed by a few minor changes to the Interview Guide. Subsequently an in-
depth, semi-structured interview of one-and-a half-to-two hours was done with each participant. 
Each interview was recorded and later transcribed. The participants had the choice of where the 
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interview could take place. Six were done in the participants’ consulting rooms, that is, their 
everyday work-places and two took place in my consulting room. To avoid cluttering up the 
interview space and time, I sent the participants a pre-interview questionnaire (Appendix C) in 
order to obtain some basic information about their therapies, work, professional lives and 
development before the actual interviews. 
 
As indicated in Appendix A, I had originally intended to go back to the participants after a six-
month interval with further questions based on the initial analysis of the interview material. 
However, this proved unfeasible. The sheer volume, nuanced richness and depth of the interview 
material obtained in the first round of interviews were quite adequate for the purposes of this study. 
Of course a second round of interviews with these participants (or with other suitable participants) 
with questions that were more theoretically focused, would have been interesting and significant. It 
would also have meant the research project’s moving on to the stage of theoretical sampling 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2000; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003). However, that would really 
have entailed another study, since it would have taken me far beyond the limits of what was 
practicably possible to do within the confines of one research project. 
 
3.6.2 Recording and transcription of interviews 
To ensure good sound quality, the interviews were recorded digitally (Sony Portable MiniDisc 
Recorder MZ-R55) and then transferred to audiocassettes. One of my undertakings to the 
participants had been that I would do the transcribing of interviews myself. Together with a voice 
recognition program (Dragon NaturallySpeaking Professional V5), I used these audiocassettes in a 
transcribing machine with a foot pedal (Sanyo TRC-8800 Transcribing System) to transcribe the 
interviews. After completing the transcription of each interview, I used the digital recording to 
make corrections and to listen to parts that had not been clear on the audiocassette. To protect the 
confidentiality of the participants, identifying details were changed. When participants asked that 
specific details be changed or I thought it necessary to change such details which could not be done 
without changing the meaning, those details were omitted and were indicated as being omitted. 
 
The translation of spoken discourse into written text is problematic (Kvale, 1996). Even if 
technically “correct”, transcriptions are only partial accounts of a much richer interaction 
experience (Poland, 1995). The process of transcribing therefore implies construction as well as 
analysis at some level (Lapadat, 1999). 
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According to Kvale (1996, p. 166), researchers should ask themselves: “What is a useful 
transcription for my research purposes?” and make decisions accordingly. My intention was to do 
the data analysis at the level of the participants’ actual words. However, these words are often 
spoken in the context of nonverbal behaviour (e.g., pointing), non-language utterances (e.g., sighs, 
laughs), and paralinguistic elements/verbal fillers (e.g., “you know”, “okay”, “mmm”), tone of 
voice and so forth. These may sometimes be important in making an interpretation. Although I did 
not transcribe these in minute detail, I did give some indications of these “contexts” of the words 
and endeavoured to do so in a consistent manner.  
 
During the process of doing the transcriptions I made the decision (see Section 2.7.1) to use QSR 
NUD*IST N510 software for data analysis. In transcribing I also had to keep in mind in what way 
the interviews needed to be prepared to be imported into N5. Word processed documents have to be 
saved as “text only” to import them, which means that formatting is lost (Richards, 2000). 
Therefore the interviews had to be transcribed in such a way that they remained intelligible even 
when this happened. 
 
The transcription of interviews was time-consuming (six to eight hours per interview), but it also 
afforded me a means to begin engaging with the data in a very immediate and direct way, thus 
immersing myself in the interview material and starting with a tentative process of data analysis 
from the beginning of data collection.  
 
2.7   UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING THE INTERVIEWS 
 
2.7.1 The decision to use Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) 
As I commenced the interviews, I became aware of how complex and disorganised the material was 
and what a daunting task it would be to carry out the mechanics of analysis. This would consist of 
constructing an organising scheme, that is, a way to identify similarities, differences and 
relationships between different text passages, so that text segments could be retrieved from 
different parts of the text corpus (manually or by using a word-processing package). Therefore I 
started thinking about using a CAQDAS program and about some of the methodological 
considerations which this would entail. It soon became obvious that controversy and debate 
surround this issue, with little clarity for the researcher. Consequently I took a pragmatic approach 
to this metaphorical “can of worms”, which is discussed below.  
 
                                                 
10 This was later upgraded to QSR N6, which, although it has more functions than N5, is basically the same as N5. 
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The question of whether and how to use computer programs as an aid to data analysis, foregrounds 
the researcher’s ontological and epistemological assumptions concerning meaning-making and 
textual interpretations, and also holds certain design and contextual considerations (Baptiste, 2001).  
A closer look at the philosophical and epistemological roots of interpretive research and the nature 
of hermeneutic verstehen evokes a certain caution against the use of computer software for text 
analysis (Kelle, 1997). This begs the question whether using computer technology “does not seem a 
huge distance away from Dilthey’s suggestion that empathy is the foundation of epistemological 
practice in the human sciences” (Terre Blanche & Kelly, 1999, p. 142). 
 
Could the use of CAQDAS programs not lead to researchers adopting “a new orthodoxy of 
qualitative analysis” (Kelle, 1997, par. 1.1) that could enforce analysis strategies that go against the 
constructivist and postmodern methodological and theoretical approaches? Is the use of CAQDAS 
not contrary to the tendency towards pluralism and polyvocality that present-day qualitative 
researchers see as the hallmark of their work? Or may it rather be that the software does not 
represent a developing orthodoxy, but rather “the multitooling of qualitative researchers, making 
available to them … a wide range of different analytic strategies”? (Lee & Fielding, 1996, par. 2.2). 
 
According to Kelle (1997, par. 1.4), the use of terms such as “computer-aided qualitative data 
analysis” or “software program for theory building” may give the impression that the use of 
computer programs as tools for the analysis of textual data could be directly compared to software 
packages that perform statistical analyses. On the one hand this could lead to over-optimistic 
forecasts that computers could make the research process more transparent and rigorous, and on the 
other hand this could also inspire fears of the “dark side of the technological advance” (Barry, 
1998, par. 2.1), the computer becoming a kind of archetypal “Frankenstein monster” taking over 
the analysis. 
 
Many qualitative researchers (even some of those involved in the development of these programs) 
have therefore expressed concerns that the use of computers could alienate researchers from their 
data (Kelle, 1997). As Kvale (1996, p. 174) warns: “The current emphasis on coding may lead to 
the analysis of isolated variables abstracted from their context in live interpersonal interactions.” 
Barry (1998) argues that there are always researchers who produce an analysis after just “a 
superficial brush with the data” (par. 2.3). In the case of the use of CAQDAS, this could mean that 
the researcher would only read the text in context during the initial coding. Then again, the same 
could happen when manual methods or word processor functions are utilised, thus also leading to 
analyses “lacking in rigour and depth” (Ibid.). 
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Lonkila (1995) suggests that aspects of grounded theory may have been overemphasised in the 
development of qualitative data analysis software, leading to a glib association between CAQDAS 
and a kind of simplified “grounded theory” analysis, linked by an emphasis on data coding 
procedures. Grounded theorising is more than coding, and standardised, often mechanistic 
procedures are no substitute for genuinely “grounded” engagement with the data (Coffey, Holbrook 
& Atkinson, 1996). “It may be that some kind of coding is needed in most qualitative research, but 
it is also possible that coding is overemphasized, given the fact that a large part of the researcher’s 
work consists of interpretation and a fine-grained hermeneutic analysis” (Lonkila, 1995, p. 49). 
.  
However, Kelle (1997, par. 1.5) argues that the basic operations of “coding and retrieval” (indexing 
and comparing text segments) should rather be seen as representing an “open technology” (i.e., 
“open” to whatever way the researcher may use or misuse it), which can be a creative and fruitful 
part of hermeneutic work. He further comments that even the newer, so-called “third generation 
software for qualitative analysis” (par. 2.6) does not provide a totally different logic of textual data 
management from the simple code-and-retrieve programs, but is only a more complicated extension 
of code and retrieve facilities.  
 
Kelle does caution researchers that if the newly developed coding and retrieval techniques are 
applied without taking the necessary methodological underpinnings into consideration, software for 
the management of textual data may indeed exert a harmful influence on the qualitative research 
process. This danger pertains mainly to the recently proposed methodological strategies for 
qualitative “theory building” and “hypothesis examination”, which sometimes draw on the 
positivistic methodology and rhetoric of classical hypothesis testing without having observed the 
necessary prerequisites. The application of  “strict rules” to “vague and fuzzy” codes could easily 
lead to the production of artefacts (par. 6.2). 
 
Qualitative researchers also need to be circumspect about what a computer can and cannot do on a 
practical level: there are aspects of the use of software that may or may not be problematic, but that 
definitely should be kept in mind in terms of how the use of the program may enhance or constrain 
the analysis process. Some of these are: 
 Although CAQDAS provides tools, which may “explicitly support … intellectual efforts, 
making it easier …  to think coherently about the meaning of … data” (Weitzman & Miles, 
1995, p. 330), it cannot actually “build theory”. These programs do not know how to search 
creatively for associations between different aspects of an account, nor can they formulate 
or reformulate research questions.  
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 The ease and speed with which operations can be carried out could tempt qualitative 
researchers to do “‘quick and dirty’ research with its attendant danger of premature 
theoretical closure” ( Fielding & Lee, 1991, p. 8).  
 The researcher should be aware of the conceptual assumptions underpinning a specific 
program or program functions he or she intends to use.  An example of this may be that the 
program allows the researcher to directly represent hierarchical relationships among codes, 
but not non-hierarchical relationships (this is the case with NUD*IST), which may 
encourage the researcher to think in this way and not circularly or in a less structured way. 
The researcher may therefore choose to use another program (such as ATLAS/ti) or if he or 
she still wishes to use the program (as I did), he or she could, if necessary, work around the 
underlying assumptions in the program by, for example, also keeping a separate non-
hierarchial code map.  
 
This process of grappling with these issues and debates left me with the caveat of being cautious of 
whatever uses that I would or could make of any CAQDAS program (which is, after all, just a tool 
with its accompanying faults and benefits) and with the clear idea (Kelle, 1997, par. 6.3) that these 
programs should probably primarily be seen as software for “data administration and archiving” 
rather than as tools for “data analysis”, although they may (it was hoped) also be of help in the data 
analysis.  
 
This brought me to the point of considering which program would be suitable for my research 
purposes and needs.  On a practical level the novice researcher is confronted with an interesting but 
confusing array of computer software that could be an aid to the research process. It is clear that 
there is no one “best program” and that one has to find a program suitable to the structure of one’s 
data and one’s analysis plans, as well as a program that one feels comfortable with and is able to 
use and afford (the last being especially important in a country where the currency is continually 
losing value!).  
 
Some of the functions that these programs can be used for (Weitzman, 2000, pp. 805-806), and in 
which I was specifically interested, are: 
 Storage: Organising a database and keeping text within that. 
 Coding: Attaching “key words or tags” to text segments “to permit later retrieval”. The 
speed and flexibility with which coding and other operations can be achieved should free 
time up for other analytic tasks. 
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 Data “linking”: Connecting “relevant data segments” to one another and forming 
categories, thus providing more complex ways to look at data. 
 Search and retrieval: Locating relevant words or segments of text and “making them 
available for inspection”. It was important that the program would allow me to keep close 
contact with the original text of interviews, not just with text segments as part of categories, 
but also with each interview as a whole and that any decontexualised text segment could 
immediately be recontextualised, not just within a category, but also within the original 
interview. 
 Memoing: Providing a formal structure for writing “reflective commentaries” on aspects of 
the data, theory or method “as a basis for deeper analysis” and for storing these memos. 
 Theory building: Developing systematic explanations of findings as an aid to conceptual 
and theoretical thinking about the data. (I did have some reservations about this.) 
 
My requirements meant that I would be looking at obtaining one of the so-called “Code-based 
Theory Builders”, the “third generation software for qualitative analysis” (such as AnSWR, 
Atlas/ti, NUDI*ST, and winMAX) (Weitzman, 2000). These programs have special features (such 
as representing relationships between codes, building higher-order classifications and categories, 
formulating and testing theoretical propositions, powerful memoing functions and sophisticated 
search-and-retrieval functions) that go beyond the functions of code-and-retrieve programs 
(Weitzman, 2000).  
 
Although I briefly did look at software such as AnSWR (which can be downloaded free from the 
Internet, but which at first glance looked difficult to use) and winMax (its newer version Maxqda, 
into which rich text can be imported was not yet available at that time), the main focus of my 
investigation about the “right” software for my purposes and my personal needs was on Atlas/ti and 
NUD*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising), which seem to 
be the most serious contenders in meeting the needs of researchers (Weitzman & Miles, 1995; 
Barry, 1998). To help me make the decision, I downloaded demonstration versions of Atlas/ti, and 
NUD*IST’s N4 Classic, N511 (the newer version of N4) and NVivo from the Internet and 
experimented a bit with them. 
 
There are many similarities between Atlas/ti and NUD*IST (or Nudist, as it is sometimes referred 
to). The main differences are that “Nudist represents a sophisticated coding and theory building 
                                                 
11 During the course of the study N5 was upgraded to N6. Although N6 has some added features, the two programs are 
intrinsically the same. 
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package and Atlas/ti is more of a hypertext package …. Atlas/ti operates in a more visual and 
spatial medium with data and software functions organised in pictorial form, while Nudist’s 
operation is predominantly verbal” (Barry, 1998, par. 6.2). In these two packages software structure 
is therefore “dichotomised between structured, sequential, verbal versus visual, spatial, 
interconnected modes of operation” (Barry, 1998, Abstract). 
 
I had to decide which one I felt more comfortable using and decided that NUD*IST was more 
compatible with the way I think and work; I especially found its more structured ways of working 
reassuring and less anxiety-provoking. However, I was not sure that I would be able to make full 
use of its more sophisticated functions, because there are few training courses in these software 
packages available in South Africa and I was also not sure what kind of support was available. 
 
An e-mail discussion with Dr Lyn Richards, one of the developers of NUD*IST, helped me to 
decide which version of the software would adequately perform the basic functions that I needed it 
to do, keeping in mind that I would probably only have the available literature and Internet support 
as recourses; and I finally decided to buy QSR NUD*IST N5.12 I was very aware that buying this 
software package entailed a calculated risk: I could not really know at the moment of making the 
decision whether it would be viable in terms of financial cost or in terms of the time and effort it 
would take to learn to use it and to prepare the data. 
 
2.7.2 From transcribed interviews to QSR NUD*IST N6 
The interviews were transcribed into individual Microsoft Word files. After being saved as Text 
Only files, they were put in the RAWFILES folder of the N6 project named PERSONAL 
THERAPY. From the RAWFILES folder these interview files were imported to become documents 
in the N6 project and in this way the interviews became available for coding and further data 
analysis. 
 
When importing the documents into the project, the interviews were divided into text units, using 
sentences as the text unit type.13 The interviews that were used in the textual analysis were 
individually obtained from the N6 project by using the function REPORTING ON ONE 
DOCUMENT and saving each interview as a file in Microsoft Word.  
 
                                                 
12 QSR NUD*IST N5  (Student Edition) bought from QSR International (www.qsrinternational.com) in September 
2001 at a cost of £141. Because I had originally bought N5 product maintenance at £40, I later received the N6 upgrade 
free of charge.  
13 I did, in a few instances, for grammatical reasons or for reasons of clarity, put more than one sentence in a text unit. 
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2.7.3 Quoting from the interviews 
In quoting from the interviews, my aim was to have the participants speak for themselves in their 
own words. However, for the sake of clarity and brevity, some slight “cleaning up” of the quoted 
extracts was done. Repetitions of words, irrelevant phrases, and some of the “contexts” in which 
the participants’ words were spoken in the transcriptions (such as nonverbal behaviours, non-
language utterances, and paralinguistic elements/verbal fillers, tone of voice and so forth) were 
omitted in the extracts without an indication that they were omitted.  
 
For Microsoft Word documents to be compatible with N6, they must be in Text Only format. This 
means that there are restrictions on the fonts that may be used. When a participant emphasised 
something, I used capital letters. When I later wanted to emphasise something in an extract, I used 
bold lettering. A pause was indicated by the ellipsis … . 
 
When using extracts from the transcribed interviews, a letter denotes both the interview and the 
research participant. Numbers indicate the text unit. For example, A, 133, means interview A and 
research participant A, text unit 133. After every excerpt the specific participant concerned is 
indicated, for example, (A). *R indicates the researcher.  
 
In the extracts the text unit number appears to the left of every text unit. 
 
Identifying details were changed (when that did not change the meaning) or omitted. Omission was 
denoted as [omitted]. 
 
Because the extracts appear in the form of numbered text units, it is quite clear to see when a text 
unit has been omitted. In the case of a single text unit, it is usually one of the above “contexts” that 
has been left out. Because the researcher’s questions and comments were used as sub-headers 
(Richards, 2002) in N6,14 there is also an “empty” text unit after every text unit ensuing from the 
researcher. 
 
When some text units (rather than just one) have been left out (because of conciseness and/or 
because I thought it to be irrelevant or not contributing to what had gone before or followed), that 
was not specifically indicated, because the numbering of text units makes it clear that those units 
were left out. Because I tried to be as flexible as possible in asking and following up questions, the 
participants talked about the same question in different parts of the interviews (that is, they did not 
                                                 
14 By indicating the researcher as *R (rather than R). 
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necessarily complete a specific aspect of or answer to a question “in one go”). Therefore the same 
excerpt pertaining to one participant may contain text units from different parts of his interview. 
This is also clear from the numbering of text units.  
 
2.7.4 Developing an interpretive account of the interview material 
Within the framework of a hermeneutic approach, the researcher’s interpretive methods may be 
located on a continuum that ranges from “experience-near (contextually derived) to experience 
distant (theoretically led)” (Kelly, 1999c, p. 405). Since both “theory which is not grounded” and 
“description which is not theorised” will lead to a interpretive account that is unsatisfactory and 
limited, the research methodology should preferably include both these perspectives and hold the 
tension between them (Ibid., p. 406). Kelly (Ibid., p. 405) views the grounded theory approach 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1994, 1998) as “spanning contextual and 
theoretical orientations”; that is, it is a “system for developing theoretical accounts whilst keeping 
close to the phenomenological ‘ground’”. On a practical level grounded theory does provide the 
researcher with clear and explicit guidelines of how go about doing the actual data analysis by 
clearly setting out how the “development, refinement and interrelation of concepts” take place 
(Charmaz, 2000, p. 510). This is rare in qualitative methodology and very reassuring to the novice 
researcher.  
 
However, there are some inherent problematic aspects to some of the underlying assumptions and 
requirements of this method. While the more traditional Glaserian and Straussian views of 
grounded theory methodology have in some ways taken up conflicting positions in what grounded 
theory is and should be,15 both “remain imbued in positivism, with its objectivist underpininings” 
(Charmaz, 2000, p. 510). Glaser and Strauss’s perspectives lean towards the notion of the 
researcher being a neutral observer gathering data about an external reality. This kind of positivistic 
stance is not compatible with the ideas underpinning an interpretive or hermeneutic view of the 
research process and has also become largely discredited in contemporary thinking about 
qualitative research (Bryant, 2003). 
 
Henwood and Pidgeon (2003, p. 134) ascribe these positivistic inclinations to the concealed 
“epistemological tension” within grounded theory. This relates to what Hammersley (1989, cf. 
                                                 
15 Glaser (1992) parted ways with Strauss primarily because he saw Strauss as “forcing” data into preconceived 
categories, which (according to him) does not lead to the emergence of grounded theory, but rather to “a forced, 
preconceived, full conceptual description” (Ibid., p. 3). Since then Glaser has expended a great amount of time and 
energy on discrediting those “dissidents” bent on eroding (his version of) grounded theory. An example of this can be 
seen in his impassioned and rather vitriolic comments about Charmaz ‘s (2000) ideas about a constructivist version of 
grounded theory (Glaser, 2002). 
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Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 134) calls the dilemma of qualitative method, where the researcher is 
simultaneously committed to realism by directly reflecting the participants’ accounts and 
viewpoints and to “generating new understandings and theory”. The latter cannot just “emerge” 
from the data, but is created by the researcher by means of his interpretations of the data. Such 
interpretations are furthermore inevitably constructed within the context of the pre-understandings 
that the researcher brings to the research process (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003). Rennie (2000, cf. 
Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p.134n1) elaborates on this idea by suggesting that grounded theory 
actually involves a “double hermeneutic”, since both theory generation and the data that has been 
collected are subject to “preinterpretation”.  
 
Charmaz (2000), as well as Henwood and Pidgeon (2003), therefore suggest a constructivist 
reading or revision of grounded theory. This would encompass both the “systematic rigor in 
analysis with the essentially creative and dynamic character of interpretive research” (Henwood & 
Pidgeon, 2003, p. 135). Thus grounded theory could move beyond the “soft” positivism of 
assuming that research is a process that reveals phenomena that already exist (Madill, Jordan & 
Shirley, 2000). From the constructivist perspective, theory is not waiting in the data, but 
constructed through the dialogue between researcher and data and analytical work “is done in the 
interplay of the original text with the conceptual structure used for and created by its exploration” 
(Richards & Richards, 1992, p. 5). Theory is therefore generated from instead of being discovered 
in the data. The researcher’s development of increasingly focused and deeper conceptualisations 
also does not simply imply an inductive process, but a “flip-flop” movement between data and 
theory-making, where the one illuminates and informs the other (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, 
p.135).  
 
While I did have some reservations about grounded theory, I decided to take up Charmaz’s (2000, 
p. 510) suggestion that we “can use grounded theory methods as flexible, heuristic strategies rather 
than as formulaic procedures”. In this section I shall therefore describe how I employed these 
useful methods within the more general context of an interpretive or hermeneutic approach to the 
research process. In devising this research methodology I drew on Addison’s (1989, 1992, 1999) 
grounded hermeneutic approach, Charmaz’s (2000) constructivist grounded theory, and Henwood 
and Pidgeon’s (2003) constructivist revision of grounded theory, because these (rather than the 
more traditional grounded theory methods) seemed more compatible with the methodology suited 
to this study. 
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As could be seen in the section about the interview process, the analysis of the interview material 
begins long before the commencement of the formal data analysis. Data collection and data analysis 
are not discrete processes. They exist on a continuum where there is a point where there is a “fading 
out” of data collection and a “fading in” of data analysis (Terre Blanche & Kelly, 1999, p. 139). 
The researcher accordingly has to decide how to approach and relate to the data; that is, on an 
organising style (Miller & Crabtree, 1999b) to guide the data analysis. I should therefore like to 
consider how such organising styles were deployed in this study.  
 
Sometimes my engagement with the interview material would consist of repeated immersions in 
the interviews in their entirety by listening to and reading them with, for example, questions or 
theoretical sensitivities16 in mind. Out of these repeated “vertical passes” (Borkan, 1999, p. 186) at 
the interview material, I would be able to develop a listening or reading guide (Brown et al., 1989; 
Kelly, 1994, 1999c; Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg & Bertsch, 2003), through which the interviews 
could again be listened to and read. According to Kelly (1994, p. 78), the Listening or Reading 
Guide Method is “a method of textual interpretation developed for extricating from a text those 
features of the text which clarify the data in terms of the particular questions one wants to ask of 
it”. As the researcher proceeds with the research process, he is continually formulating new 
questions, refining and condensing these into a list through which the material may be listened to or 
read. In this sense research may be thought of as leading “not so much to findings but to further 
questions” (Kelly, 1999c, p. 411).  
 
Questions, ideas, theoretical sensitivities, and so forth, were also used as part of the “horizontal 
passes” made at the interview material by my reading, listening to and subsequently editing the 
interview material through them. Such a deployment of the editing organising style of analysis 
(Addison, 1999; Miller & Crabtree, 1999b) further meant that my questions and conceptualisations 
were used to “fracture” (Dey, 1993) the interviews by identifying and segmenting relevant 
interview material into categories “which captured uniformities in the data” (Dey, 1999, p. 4). 
Segments or excerpts of text were categorised or assigned codes. Such categories were a means of 
linking and clustering text segments, and were refined into sub-categories to which codes were also 
assigned. Categories were also linked and related to one another. 
 
QSR NUD*IST (N6 or sixth version) software was used to perform these editing organising 
functions. As described before, the interviews had already been imported into N6 and were 
                                                 
16 “Theoretical sensitivities are qualitative researchers’ way of approaching the analysis of data: Rather than being held 
as true until found to be false, such sensitivities are viewed as tools that can be vision-making or vision-blinkering … ” 
(Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 135).  
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available as numbered text units. Categories or nodes were created and the coding of interview text 
was done according to these. Nodes were created to label and organise so-called “base data” about 
participants (N6 Reference Guide, 2002; Richards, 2002). Further nodes ranged from those at a 
descriptive level to those that were more abstract and conceptual. Definitions were written for each 
node and memos were often added. Although sometimes inclining more towards the one or the 
other, coding was never solely “top down” (deducted from my questions or theoretical thinking), 
nor “bottom up” (inducted from the interview text), but was rather the result of the iterative 
movement between these two.  
 
During the process of data analysis, coding could be deleted, added, reformulated and merged. 
Coding and nodes were not regarded as “fixed” but rather as “heuristic devices” in the evolving 
understanding and multi-layered interpretations of the text (Seidel & Kelle, 1995, p. 54). The nodes 
were further refined by also coding them and creating “child” nodes below a “parent” node (N6 
Reference Guide, 2002; Richards, 2002). The initial unrelated or “free nodes” were arranged into 
hierarchical “parent” and “child” “tree nodes”, forming a system of index trees. In the end this 
resulted in the creation of 210 tree nodes. The nodes made it easy to retrieve relevant text excerpts 
according to categories or sub-categories; that is “decontextualizing data in order to recontextualize 
by topic” (Tesch, 1990, cf. Richards & Richards, 1992, p. 3). It was also possible to return directly 
to the original text from the nodes.  
 
Exercising coding made it possible to implement grounded theory’s constant comparative method 
of analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Addison, 1999; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003) to identify 
conceptual similarities, differences and relationships between different text passages within, 
between and across nodes. Practically this had entailed comparing data from various participants 
(for example, their accounts, actions, views and experiences); comparing data from the same 
participant that referred to experiences at different points in time or at different stages of therapy or 
professional development; comparing data with nodes; comparing nodes with other nodes; and so 
forth (Charmaz, 2000). This methodological strategy is a pivotal aspect of “dense conceptual 
development” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, p. 140).  
 
N6 certainly facilitated the ease of “archiving and administration” (Kelle, 1997, par. 6.3) and some 
exploration of the interview material. However, the usefulness of N6 to take the data analysis 
beyond the level of just doing coding and retrieval, thus making N6 more than a “filing cabinet” 
(even if a very sophisticated filing cabinet), was more questionable (Richards & Richards, 1999, p. 
3). Applying a code is not the same as exploring a concept (Richards & Richards, 1992). The 
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hierarchical coding system meant that other ways had to be found to link text concerning theorising 
and concepts that were not related in this way, for example, text units pertaining to the nature of the 
participant’s identifications with his therapist and those relevant to the power differential between 
participant and therapist. In that instance (and in other similar ones), my solution was to have two 
“child” nodes that were identical in the sense of containing the same excerpts from the interviews, 
but appeared with different names under the related “parent” nodes. A “child” node called 
“Identification” was therefore created under “Power”, and one called “Power” under 
“Identification”.  
 
Text searches (for words or strings of words) were sometimes helpful, for example, when I 
remembered that a participant had used a specific word or a particular expression, but could not 
remember who had used it or where or when it had been used. It was also useful to locate instances 
where participants talked about something specific like “supervision”. However, asking the 
interview text more tentative or intricate questions and doing coding via text searches were of 
limited use. Mostly this was because what I was asking or looking for was too complex or only 
became evident through my interpretations of the data. For example, I could do a text search for a 
concept like “countertransference” and find some instances of it. However, while the word 
“countertransference” itself may not have been used, I could have interpreted the participant’s 
description as signifying that. Practically this had meant that although N6 was used for coding 
throughout the research process, conceptual explorations of the interview material usually required 
returning to the original interviews. While being time-consuming, this had caused the analytic work 
never to take place only by using discrete fragments of text or on the level of dry abstractions, but 
to include a continual involvement with the living words of the participants and the textured 
nuances of the interviews in their entirety. 
 
Even taking into account that my skills with the more complex N6 search functions would probably 
have been better had I been able to receive some formal training, all of this points to the fact that 
such a software program is only a tool and not ultimately the interpreter of data or the creator of 
theory. I furthermore had to keep in mind that using a program like N6 is never “methodologically 
innocent” (Richards & Richards, 1999, p. 6). This had meant not being deterred from doing what I 
could not do with it and not being seduced into doing too much of what was easier to do with it 
(Ibid.).  
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2.7.5 The final analysis 
Data analysis “proper” is ushered in by the researcher’s gaining access to the meaning-making 
hermeneutic “circle of understanding and interpretation”, which constitutes the interpretive process, 
from “an appropriate perspective” (Packer, 1989, p. 103). Kelly (1994, p. 94) reminds us that “the 
data does not speak without being asked questions” and in this study my point of entry consisted of 
a list of questions, that is, of the following listening/reading guide:  
1. What effects did the participants’ being patients have on their being therapists?  
2. What kinds of experiences of the participants’ being patients made a difference to their being 
therapists? 
3. What was the nature of the processes that linked the participants’ being patients and their being 
therapists? 
4. How did the participants’ choice of profession come about? 
5. What role did personal therapy play in the participants’ becoming and developing as therapists? 
6. What was the relationship between the theoretical perspectives held by the participants and their 
personal therapies?  
7. What was the relationship between their experiences of supervision and those of their personal 
therapies?  
8. What kinds of issues were generated or highlighted in the therapeutic relationships because the 
participants were also therapists? 
9. What were the ideas/opinions/beliefs about training and of developing as therapists that the 
participants held and how were those influenced by the experience of their own therapies? 
 
These questions had crystallised out of my immersing (Borkan, 1999) myself in the interviews 
through repeatedly reading and listening to them, while keeping the purpose of the study in mind. 
They were formulated as initial ways of thinking about the phenomenon, comprised of the 
participants’ personal therapies, clinical work and the relationship between these. I used these 
questions in conjunction with the editing organising style of analysis (Addison, 1999; Miller & 
Crabtree, 1999b). The interviews were listened to and read through the questions and also “edited” 
with the questions serving as the point of departure for further coding of the text. As described 
before, N6 was used to perform these functions.  
 
The “picture” that emerged from this “pass” at the interview material was rather loose and very 
much at a descriptive level. A more comprehensive and focused way of thinking was clearly 
required. The nature of the findings of this initial engagement with the data pointed me towards 
relational and intersubjective theorising, and specifically to the work of Jessica Benjamin and her 
notion of intersubjectivity as the development of subject-to-subject relating. 
 
This landed me in the confusing and still ongoing debate about the use of pre-existing theory, 
which has its origins within the more classical versions of grounded theory. Even Glaser and 
Strauss do not expect the researcher to enter the research process as a tabula rasa (Henwood & 
Pidgeon, 2003). But they (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 46) warn that the use of “preconceived 
theory” can be a serious impediment to the development of the theoretical sensitivity that would 
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enable the researcher to “conceptualize and formulate a theory as it emerges from the data”. Glaser 
and Strauss (Ibid.) concede that there may be “some existing” concepts that are “clearly useful”. 
However, the “use of theoretical literature to sharpen the initial focus” of research has been 
problematised in grounded theorising, because it is feared that this may result in the “open-ended, 
explanatory research activities” that maintain “sensitivity to relevance in the data” degenerating 
into “theory verification” (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003, pp. 137-138). According to Henwood and 
Pigeon (Ibid., p. 139), this may be prevented and it is possible to generate theory “which is well-
grounded” in the data “if the use of the researcher’s own imagination and theoretical sensitivities” 
happens in tandem with and is “disciplined by the requirement that codes and categories provided 
should fit (provide a well-recognizable description of the data)”.  
 
At this point a colleague with an interest in and knowledge of intersubjective theory and Jessica 
Benjamin’s theoretical ideas also became involved in the research process. Categories or nodes and 
the fit of coding to the relevant excerpts which were used as part of deepening and focusing 
conceptual development were extensively discussed in a number of consultations with this 
colleague. 
 
As a next step in the various circular, iterative, “flip-flop” interpretive processes, I proceeded to 
commence writing the chapter17 about the conceptual underpinnings of this study with the 
interviews and the results of the first round of data analysis very much in mind. In its turn, this was 
brought back to the interview text. In addition, some secondary literature pertinent to specific 
aspects or themes that had emerged during the course of the initial data analysis was also brought in 
and, where possible, dialogued with the existing theoretical framework and made part of it. For 
example, by drawing on Benjamin’s thinking, the Jungian concept of the wounded healer was 
reconfigured in terms of compromised subject-to-subject relating. These further conceptualisations 
were also dialogued with the interviews as theoretical sensitivities through which the interview text 
was once more “edited”. 
 
 A “voice” that had not been clearly audible in my initial encounters with the interviews, was that 
of the discourse of power between participant and therapist. The fundamental place that the role of 
power occupies in Benjamin’s thinking served to foreground the shifting and changing power 
differentials between therapists and participants and made power a central organising concept in 
this study. This, in its turn, sharpened the theoretical lens offered by concepts like recognition and 
                                                 
17 See Chapter Three. 
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negation and led to a more differentiated understanding of processes like the evolvement of subject-
to-subject relating and the participants’ identifications with their therapists.  
 
The data analysis further resulted in the identification and conceptual elaboration of the particular 
therapist skills that were enhanced and developed during the course of the participants’ therapies. 
By situating the findings of the interpretive process within the more encompassing and distanciated 
context of a systems perspective, an intersubjective model of personal therapy and development as 
a therapist was also generated. 
  
2.8 THE QUESTION OF RIGOUR IN THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
Qualitative research produces “a distinct form of knowledge” that cannot be judged by 
“conventional measures” of validity (that is, whether the research findings accurately reflect some 
underlying reality) and reliability (that is, whether the same findings may be reproduced by 
repeating the research procedures) (Mays & Pope, 2000, p. 2). As Kelly (1999a, p. 423) points out, 
the emergence of interpretive research as a reaction to positivism has been accompanied by the 
“rejection of positivist notions of reliability and validity”. Standards of rigour for interpretive 
researchers are therefore currently still in flux, not agreed-upon and evolving. In this section I shall 
consider a few of the ways in which I have endeavoured to render the research process trustworthy 
(Stiles, 1993), that is, to maintain a measure of rigour in an ongoing way.  
 
Apart from the supervisor (and occasional discussions with other colleagues with an interest in 
research), two colleagues were also involved in the research process. One was interested in the 
research topic and I discussed the development of the Interview Guide with her. The other one was 
part of the study for a longer period and the coding of the interview material and the emerging 
theoretical account were the main areas of our discussions. This was not done to have a kind of 
“inter-rater reliability” (Yardley, 2000, p. 218) to ensure my interpretations of the data to be 
“correct”, but rather to have another perspective, a dialogue that would make it less likely that the 
“circularity of understanding” (Packer & Addison, 1989b, p. 34) of the interpretive inquiry would 
be an insularly solipsistic one. 
 
I made a concerted effort to sustain a questioning attitude towards and a critical perspective on the 
research process and methodology by (as has already been described) being reflectively reflexive 
(Addison, 1999). Devising a research methodology that I considered appropriate to the research 
question did consequently not imply an indiscriminate combination of methods and strategies that 
seemed useful. It meant being aware of the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of any 
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method, so that I could take underlying contradictions into account. I therefore endeavoured to be 
thoughtful of what I was and was not doing.  
 
For example, although I drew on grounded theory methodology and consider the theoretical 
account that was developed in this study to be grounded in the data, I never used a grounded theory 
method in its entirety and never developed a grounded theory as an answer to the research question. 
However, I made extensive use of grounded theory’s constant comparative method. But apart from 
the later reading that I did to make sense of the interview material, I also did a conventional 
literature review before starting the study as a means of situating it in the relevant body of 
knowledge. This is certainly recommended in other qualitative research paradigms, and it also 
made intuitive sense to me (since I did not want to “reinvent the wheel”). For Glaser (1992) this 
would definitely put my research beyond the pale of what he would consider constituting grounded 
theory. Conversely, other and later grounded theory adherents do not seem to condemn such a foray 
into the literature so roundly. More serious in making my research method not a grounded theory 
one (according to the strict parameters of what constitutes grounded theory), is the matter of its 
never “progressing” to the stage of additional theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Charmaz, 2000; Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003). The reasons for this I have explained earlier.18 While 
a grounded theory study often starts off with data being collected on other grounds than theoretical 
sampling (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2003), Charmaz (2000, p. 519) emphasises that “a solid grounded 
theory [cannot be produced] through one-shot interviewing in a single data collection phase”. 
 
I have attempted to leave a research trail which “signposts” the “conceptualization phases and 
practical contingencies” that culminated in the final product (Bong, 2002, par. 5). This audit trail 
does not provide a “smooth and seamless” account (Kelly 1999a, p. 426), but also reveals the 
research journey’s struggles, flaws, contradictions and limitations. While I grounded the theoretical 
account in examples from the interviews, such examples were subject to my interpretations of the 
“fit” between data and theory. Because of reasons of confidentiality I could not, unfortunately, 
include the interviews in their entirety (as an appendix). But in other ways I have endeavoured to 
document a transparent and detailed account of both what I omitted to do and what I did, and also 
of the perspectives from which I thought, made decisions and acted. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 See p. 25. 
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At the end of the literature review it was suggested that there was a need for a deeper and more 
encompassing theoretical framework than those employed in the existing qualitative studies. I had 
thought that this would be useful to clarify, understand and interpret the interview material and to 
take the textual analysis beyond a descriptive to a more conceptual level. During the course of this 
chapter it was shown how my attention was drawn to the thinking of Benjamin and related 
theorists. A conceptual framework was subsequently generated by drawing upon the work of these 
thinkers. Secondary literature pertaining to specific themes that had emerged during the data 
analysis was also incorporated into this. In the following chapter I shall therefore outline the main 
concepts that were used in the textual analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE TEXTUAL ANALYSIS  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS AN INTERSUBJECTIVE FOCUS 
In this section the main theoretical focus of this study will be introduced. This will be further 
outlined and elaborated in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. These three sections constitute the general 
theoretical framework that was used throughout the analysis of the interview material. 
 
3.1.1 The therapist and the participant-patient  
In psychodynamic psychotherapy, the “patient’s world is to be examined in the open, while the 
[therapist’s] is essentially private, or masked, except at a few contact points with the patient”; that 
is, the subjective positions of patient and therapist are different (Kennedy, 1998, p. 204). Aron 
(1996) points out that though the therapeutic relationship is mutual (that is, there is a system of 
reciprocal influence and mutual regulation between therapist and patient), it is also asymmetrical 
(in terms of roles, functions, responsibilities and the distribution of power).  
 
According to Mitchell (2000), it is therefore the analyst’s task to constantly keep the analytic 
relationship analytic. Exactly what this means may vary (according to the specific theoretical 
variant of analytic therapy underpinning the therapist’s work), but there is an overarching 
assumption that the patient is asked to surrender to “an analytic constructed irresponsibility”; that 
is, he is free to experience, to feel and think and discover himself and is not responsible for 
accomplishing all kinds of goals, especially those pertaining to the therapist’s needs and desires 
(Ibid., p. 131). This enables the patient to enter the room confident of having the therapeutic space 
for himself and the therapist to himself, and to be assured that the therapeutic dyad is a bounded 
and private container. And, of course, from an ethical point of view, this is correct. 
 
 However, although the therapeutic encounter is supposed to be primarily shaped by what the 
patient brings to it, the subjectivities of both therapist and patient come into play (albeit in an 
asymmetrical way) in creating the third unconscious subject of analysis (Ogden, 1994). Knowingly 
and unknowingly - consciously, preconsciously and unconsciously - the therapist introduces 
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personal and professional discourses19 into the therapeutic dyad. This is usually unknown to, but 
often sensed by the patient. However, this is frequently not the case when the patient is a fellow 
professional (Berman, 1995; Crastnopol, 1999a). Berman (1995, p. 532) describes how such a 
patient, who is in the same professional community as his therapist, may be “flooded with 
information and impressions about the [therapist’s] personality, life, and functioning in various 
professional contexts”. The therapist is often primarily chosen because of what the therapist-patient 
knows about him as a professional. This knowledge is usually not only based on reality, but also 
involves the therapist-patient’s fantasies about the therapist as a professional. 
 
3.1.2 Contextualising the intersubjective focus of this study 
The theoretical focus of this study is on intersubjective thinking, specifically the work of Jessica 
Benjamin and her notion of intersubjectivity as the development of subject-to-subject relating. 
While there are references to the work of other relational and intersubjective theorists, I primarily 
draw on Benjamin’s work in developing a theoretical framework for thinking about the nature of 
therapist-patients’ relationships with their therapists and the influence of therapists’ personal 
therapies on their work. As indicated in the previous chapter, the use of Benjamin’s version of 
intersubjectivity, which is underpinned by the notion that therapy holds the possibility of 
engendering subject-to-subject relating, and in which facets of the therapeutic relationship such as 
recognition and negation, power and identification are elucidated, was suggested by the results of 
the initial round of the data analysis and lent itself to the further interpretation and 
conceptualisation of the interview material. (A further and more comprehensive discussion of the 
value of Benjamin’s ideas for this study, which relates to its data-driven nature, will follow in 
Section 3.1.5.) 
 
From an intersubjective perspective, some of the questions posed by this study were therefore about 
how the participant’s being-a-patient could be conceptualised as an evolving process in the 
intersubjective third of his personal therapy (the therapeutic third) and how this would relate to his 
being-a-clinician in the intersubjective third of his work as a therapist (the clinical third). This also 
included exploring the nature of the Thirds20 that participants’ personal therapies formed to their 
work as clinicians.  
                                                 
19 Flax (1994, p. 2) defines a discourse as “a system of possibilities for knowledge, practices, and power” and adds that  
“[d]iscursive  formations include sets of usually tacit rules”. Harris (1998, p. 48) sees discourse as “a layered set of 
codes, regulatory practices, rules both obligatory and optional, [which] all arise in both local, familial conditions and in 
wider, ideologically laced practices within the culture and come to be the forces through which experiences of 
individual life and body life are constituted as subjective experience”. 
20 I shall use Third specifically for a third perspective that triangulates the dyad and third to denote all other instances 
of “thirdness” (that is, primarilty the “intersubjective” third) that is constellated between the two members of the 
therapeutic dyad). See also p. 57. 
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As Ogden (1994, p. 105) notes, both “the term and the concept intersubjectivity is not a 
contribution of contemporary psychology; rather, it is an idea that for centuries has been used in 
philosophy”. Benjamin’s (1995) thinking is located within the domain of current intersubjectivity 
theory that forms part of the wider relational perspective, which is presently in the foreground of 
psychoanalytic thinking in the United States. Although “there is no one hegemonic discourse or 
technical practice that defines current relational theory or the intersubjective turn” (Gerhardt, 
Sweetnam, & Borton, 2000, p. 7), it is useful to contextualise intersubjectivity by briefly 
considering relational theory in terms of its origins and main lines of thought.  
 
The origins of relational theory can be situated within the long-standing and increasing discontent 
with both the classical and the interpersonal paradigms. According to Aron (1996, p. x): 
“Relational theory is based on the shift from the classical idea that it is the patient’s mind that is 
being studied … to the relational notion that mind is inherently dyadic, social, interactional, and 
interpersonal … [where] the analytic process necessarily entails a study of the intersubjective field. 
The distinction between the classical and relational views … is often discussed under the 
problematic rubric of a shift from a one-person to a two-person psychology.” Aron (1996) later 
argues that while contemporary classical theory has also moved in a relational direction, it is still 
significantly different from relational theory. 
 
Whereas relational theory emphasises both external interpersonal relations and “intrapsychic, 
internal, fantasized, and imaginary relations”, interpersonal theory (Sullivan, 1953) has been 
criticised for referring only to external relationships between “real” people (Aron, 1996, p. 13). 
Benjamin follows this line of thought (that is, that both “internal” and “external” relationships 
should be taken into account) even further. For her (1990, p. 186), intersubjectivity “refers to that 
zone of experience or theory in which the other is not merely the object of the ego’s need/drive or 
cognition/perception, but has a separate and equivalent center of self”; that is, “where objects were, 
subjects must be” (1998b, p. xii). 
 
Relational theory has therefore developed out of multiple theoretical points of view such as object 
relations,21 self psychology and interpersonal trends, and it has also been influenced by postmodern 
psychoanalytic thinking, such as the ideas espoused by social-constructivism and American 
psychoanalytic feminism (Benjamin, 1995; Berman, 1997b; Mitchell & Aron, 1999a). The 
relational trend was first specifically formulated by Greenberg and Mitchell (1983). They identified 
                                                 
21 The term object-relations theory refers “to a group of psychoanalytic theories holding in common a loosely knit set of 
metaphors that address the intrapsychic and interpersonal effects of relationships among unconscious ‘internal objects’ 
(i.e. among unconscious split-off parts of the personality)” (Ogden, 2002, p. 768n1). 
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two major traditions within psychoanalytic thinking: “drive/structure” and “relational/structure” 
(Berman, 1997b, p. 195). The latter relational trend was explicitly set out in Mitchell’s (1988) 
attempt at integrating Sullivan’s thinking (the interpersonal model), British object relations and self 
psychology. 
 
Current relational thinking draws on and tries to integrate “ideas from object relations theory, self 
psychology, interpersonal psychoanalysis, neo-Kleinian theory and certain currents within 
contemporary Freudian (post-ego-psychological) thinking” (Aron, 1996, p. x). “Relational 
psychoanalysis” is therefore not a “school” of thought as such but “rather a broad integrative 
orientation focusing on Self and Other”, where interpersonal history is seen as the primary 
determinant of personality (Berman, 1997b, p. 185; Frankel, 1998a). Aron (1996, p. 18) calls it “a 
contemporary eclectic theory anchored in the idea that it is relationships (internal and external, real 
and imagined) that are central”.22 All of this makes “the relational turn” in psychoanalysis richly 
diverse, but the “relational stew” (Aron, 1996, p. 37) is sometimes also quite confusing, and, at 
times, theoretically obscure and inconsistent. 
 
According to Benjamin (1995, p. 3), “the relational perspective has added to object relations theory 
an insistence that psychoanalysis be viewed as operating in a two-person rather than a one-person 
field, so that two subjectivities, each with its own set of internal relations, begin to create a new set 
between them”. This brings us to the domain of intersubjectivity. It lies between subjects and is the 
realm of common engagement, action and communication, where “subjectivity is articulated and 
defined” and “in which we encounter ourselves” (Malpas, 2000, p. 591). It is therefore clear that, 
within relational theory, intersubjectivity represents a new and different way of articulating and 
conceptualising transference/countertransference. 
  
A distinguishing feature of Benjamin’s version of intersubjectivity, which was pivotal in 
developing an understanding of the results of this study, is that she (Benjamin 1998b) does not only 
use intersubjectivity to indicate that there are two individuals creating an interpersonal field. By 
using and elaborating the notion of mutual recognition23 (which she conceptualises as part of 
evolving thirdness within the therapist-patient dyad), Benjamin addresses the issue of how two  
                                                 
22 Aron (1996, p. 29) identifies Stephen Mitchell’s (1988, 1993, 1995; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983) relational-conflict 
model as the “most systematic, comprehensive, and compelling of the various relational integrations”. Mitchell (1997, 
2000) later developed his ideas (also about intersubjectivity) further.  
23 See pp. 61-62 for a further discussion of this. 
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human beings sharing a psychic space (in this instance the space of therapy) may both relate to each 
other and achieve/retain an independent existence.24  
 
3.1.3 The relevance of the therapist’s subjectivity in relational and intersubjective thinking 
The emphasis on the use of the therapist’s subjectivity (which particularly concerns this study) is an 
important facet of both relational thinking and intersubjectivity. It may therefore be useful to briefly 
consider some of the ways in which the term subjectivity is used. Flax (1996) points out that 
postmodern thinkers prefer to use the term subjectivity rather than self. For them, subjectivity is a 
more general term, referring to “a person’s way of being in the world” (Fairfield, 2001, p. 223), 
where the subject is continually being constituted in a unique way and where multiple positions (for 
example, being both “agent and object”) are possible (Flax, 1996, p. 578).  
 
There are also other and more specific views of subjectivity. Frankel (1993, pp. 229-230) 
summarises Ogden’s (1986) notion of subjectivity: “Subjectivity is defined by the feeling that one 
is the creator of the forms by which one perceives the world. One feels oneself to be an interpreting 
subject, the subject of one’s own experience; one does not feel simply reactive, an object of other 
people, or helplessly driven by one’s impulses. Being fully subjective is more than simply being 
conscious. One is aware of oneself as the ‘I’ who is doing, being, experiencing.” Kennedy (1998) 
emphasises that analytic subjectivity is a specific form of subjectivity, marked by receptivity to the 
unconscious and the ability to tolerate uncertainty, ambiguity and paradox. Gerhardt and Stinson 
(1995) understand analytic subjectivity in terms of the capacity to adopt a self-reflective stance.  
 
Historically the “tradition of interest in the analyst’s subjectivity” (Harris, 1998, p. 40) may be 
traced from Ferenczi (1932) through Winnicott (1947) and Green (1975) to a wide range of 
contemporary analysts such as Aron (1996); Benjamin (1997, 1998b, 2000a); Bollas (1992, 1999); 
Ogden (1986, 1994, 2001).25  
 
The idea of “using the therapist’s subjectivity” begs the question about what we actually mean by 
this rather impressive-sounding but also quite generic notion. Highlighting “using the therapist’s 
                                                 
24 This grappling with the question of relating to “the other’s independent consciousness” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. xii) is 
not unique to Benjamin or to psychoanalytic thinking, but has also been an issue raised by philosophers (such as Hegel, 
whose ideas have been fundamental in Benjamin’s theorising), and has been evocatively described by poets and 
novelists. For example, George Eliot (1872, p. 243) writes about how much easier it is to devote ourselves submissively 
to the other and to imagine that we may become “wise and strong in his strength and wisdom, than to conceive with 
that distinctness, which is no longer reflection but feeling … that he [has] an equivalent centre of self, whence the lights 
and shadows must always fall with a certain difference”.  
25 Both Bollas and Ogden depict the ways in which the therapist’s openness to his own subjectivity facilitates 
unconscious communication and the creation of an unconscious intersubjective third between therapist and patient. 
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subjectivity” is certainly not confined to relational thinking. The prominence given to the 
therapist’s subjectivity may more generally be linked to the expanding view of countertransference, 
which includes the notions that countertransference may usefully inform the therapeutic process 
instead of just being an impediment to it and that transference and countertransference are 
intricately interrelated.  
 
Benjamin (1997, p. 794n2) points out that there are “crucial differences among those that believe in 
using one’s subjectivity … we can delineate a difference between the self psychological use of 
subjectivity to resonate and create empathic participation, the Kleinian use of subjectivity to receive 
projective identification and the relational-conflict use of subjectivity to analyze a co-created 
relationship of mutual influence”. Mitchell (1993, pp. 76-77) suggests how these different views 
could be complementary rather than just oppositional; that is, seen in this way, theories that 
describe and track “the patient’s subjective experience can provide a useful corrective … where 
there is a tendency to drift into a preoccupation with the analyst’s participation”, while “thinking 
about the analyst’s participation serves as a corrective experience for those … who believe that they 
… know what the patient needs”. Within intersubjective thinking there is also an increased 
understanding of the complex ways in which the subjectivities of patient and therapist come 
together to create the intersubjective therapeutic third. 
 
While there may be various ways of viewing the therapist’s use of his subjectivity, the ability to do 
so in a thoughtful and responsible way can be linked to certain therapist attributes (such as being 
open to one’s dreams, reveries, fragments of thoughts and images, affects or bodily states and 
reactions without becoming overwhelmed or self-absorbed; being able to represent these and think 
about them and so forth) which may emerge and/or develop during the course of the therapist’s 
personal therapy.  
 
3.1.4 Some implications of the emphasis on the therapist’s subjectivity 
If the therapist is regarded as being subjective, what happens to his authority and power? One of the 
prominent precursors of the relational position in object relations and self psychology has been the 
opposition to and replacement of the notion of the analyst as the “one who knows” (espoused by 
“classical” North American theory) by the idea of the analyst as “the one who knows me”, thus 
“embracing the maternal ideal of holding or mirroring in contrast to the phallic image of the 
penetrating knower” (Benjamin, 1997, p. 793).  
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This still implies “knowing”, even if the “knowing” is hermeneutic and mediated through being 
“subjective” rather than “objective”. But how can one be “subjective” and still “know” and what 
can be known from this perspective? Does this mean giving up the intellectual, theoretical side of 
the work and becoming a caring “healer-redeemer” (Benjamin, 1997, p. 796)? 
 
In current relational thinking, “the role of the authoritative analyst” is deconstructed even further – 
it is, in fact, eschewed and replaced with “a view of the analyst as a coparticipant involved in a 
mutual if asymmetrical endeavour” (Aron, 1996, p. 258). Mutuality speaks of the impact of the 
therapist on the patient (and not just vice versa), and the new asymmetry speaks of the burden that 
the therapist must assume by giving up the positivistic “God’s eye view” of his “aperspectival 
objectivity” and certainty, while retaining the responsibility and power subsumed in the position of 
being the therapist rather than the patient (Aron, 1996, p. 261; Benjamin, 1997).  
 
There is an ongoing tension between asymmetry and mutuality (Aron, 1996; Benjamin, 1997, 
1998b). The therapist now no longer has the authority of the old objectivist position to fall back on. 
What also has to be kept in mind in this interplay of mutuality and asymmetry, however, is the fact 
that even if the therapist himself has personally abnegated the classical position of authority, there 
remains a power differential between therapist and patient, just because of the therapist’s being in 
the position of therapist. In this regard, Hoffman (1998, p. 203) discusses the ongoing dialectic 
“between the patient’s perception of the analyst as a person like himself or herself26 and the 
patient’s perception of the analyst as a person with superior knowledge, wisdom, judgement and 
power”.  
 
The postmodern relational opening up to the possibilities of multiple realities and multiple truths 
that foregrounds the role of the therapist’s subjectivity in shaping, expanding and limiting the 
analytic relationship, could bring new freedom of thought and action to the therapeutic endeavour. 
One now further has to ask whether the “decline and fall of the blank-screen analyst” (Gabbard, 
1997, p. 15) and related ideas such as the therapist’s being “irreducibly subjective” (Renik, 1998, p. 
487), “poetic-philosophically uncertain” (Böhm, 1999, p. 493), with “misunderstanding … being 
the natural state of affairs” (Stern, 1991, p. 56) have, as reversals of positivistic objectivity, not also 
become problematic in themselves.  
 
It is certainly “a corrective to the old authority relationships to promote identification with the 
relational models of mutuality and uncertainty” and the therapist’s use of his own subjectivity 
                                                 
26 That is, a like subject (Benjamin, 1995). 
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(Benjamin, 1997, p. 797). However, this also begs the question if throwing away “the book” has 
not perhaps become “the book” (Hoffman, 1994, Slavin & Kriegman, 1998b). Idealising this new 
position (which includes “not-knowing”) could, for all its appearance of almost anarchistic 
freedom, become just as narrowly dogmatic and prescriptive as the old one. Slavin and Kriegman 
(1998b, p. 278) accordingly warn that the “idealization of therapeutic spontaneity” could in itself 
become “a new agenda” … “biased towards the needs and views of those who come to advocate 
it”. Within postmodern theorising there is an acknowledgement that “the problem of authority and 
of unjustified privileged claims to know” has not been resolved (Harris, 2002, p. 1004). In fact, 
“authority can easily be mystified in apparently democratic and healing practices” (Ibid.) Taking up 
the negative of positivism also does not “resolve the dilemmas that gave rise to the old authority 
position” (Benjamin, 1997, p. 797). These predicaments are the difficult and painful realities of the 
therapist’s experience of his own limitations in working as a clinician: the sense of always lacking 
in some respect and of never knowing enough; the fear of failing to heal the patient; the sense (even 
if it is not all that conscious) that what he thinks and what he does are always suffused by his own 
subjectivity.  
 
How then may the tools and knowledge of the old “objective” position not necessarily be 
renounced, but rather be redeployed without the negatives of either the necessity of “removing” the 
therapist’s subjectivity or reverting to “the stultifying self-assurance of dogmatism and orthodoxy” 
(Hanley, 1995, p. 907)? And if there is “mutuality” and if the therapist’s subjectivity (which 
includes the power brought by the position as therapist and also the therapist’s inevitable lacks and 
limitations) is to be acknowledged as being part of and actively and deliberately used in the 
therapeutic enterprise, we have to ask how this may happen without compromising professional 
integrity, responsibility, expertise or discipline. This again brings the therapist’s own therapy (and 
all the questions already posed) to the foreground. 
 
Some relational thinkers have grappled with these questions and have made attempts to answer 
them. Aron (1996, p. 261) urges that “dialectical objectivity” (which “is informed by subjectivity 
and includes within itself reflection on the subjective”), would be a better option than “radical 
relativity and undisciplined subjectivity”. This resonates with Mitchell’s (1997, p. 268) idea that 
“good analytic technique” pertains to continual “hard thinking” rather than aspiring to “correct 
actions”. He sees this “hard thinking” as being part of the therapist’s engagement in a process of 
“self-reflective responsiveness of a particular (psychoanalytic) sort” (Ibid., p. 193).  
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Another pertinent matter is the possibility that the relational and intersubjective emphasis on the 
therapist’s subjectivity, while correcting the “one-sidedness” of the notion of a neutral and 
objective therapist, could lead to highlighting the relational reality of the therapeutic dyad 
(Bernstein, 1999, p. 278). This holds the possibility of the intersubjective remaining at the level of 
the interpersonal and a focus on the conscious aspects of intersubjectivity, which has been debated 
within relational theorising and is also a criticism that has been levelled at relational thinking 
(Bernstein, 1999, 2001; Greenberg, 2001; Ringstrom, 2001a). If we accept that the therapist does 
influence the therapeutic process on a personal level, we also have to take Bernstein’s (1999, p. 
280) warning that “countertransferentially guided interpretations [could] constitute an elegant 
disguise for an analyst’s narcissistic gratifications” seriously. After all, one of the fundamental 
tenets of psychodynamic psychotherapy, which is also ethically relevant, is that the space of 
therapy belongs to the patient and not to the therapist and should not be crowded by the therapist as 
an individual with needs and desires. 
 
The impact of the therapist’s subjectivity should also be seen as going beyond the purely 
interpersonal level of mutual reciprocal influences into the symbolic aspects of unconscious 
intersubjectivity. Gerhardt, Sweetnam and Borton (2000, p. 8) consequently see a therapeutic 
relationship that stays at the level of “mutual reciprocal influence” as reflecting a collapse of the 
therapeutic space. Crastnopol (1999a, p. 460) further notes that instead of mutuality always just 
becoming a “truncated end in itself”, it could actually provide “a secure base for going beyond it”. 
 
Benjamin (2000a, p. 45) clarifies the notion of going beyond the “merely interpersonal” (Gerhardt, 
Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 8) by differentiating “subjecthood” (that is, “how we come to accept 
alterity, otherness”) from “personhood” or subjectivity (that is, “personal subjectivity”). Being self-
expressive (which the therapist inevitably is) does not necessarily imply any deliberate self-
disclosures. The nature of the presence of the therapist as a separate and different other, that is, his 
alterity, should further depend on where the therapy and the patient are at in a specific moment.  
 
According to Bollas (1999) (and this is similar to Benjamin’s thinking), there is a difference 
between being subjective and being personal. Indeed, a focus on the therapist’s “personal response” 
may sometimes “unwittingly evacuate[s] the work of subjectivity in the name of being personal” 
(Ibid., p. 51).27 Ogden (2001, p. 42) clarifies this distinction between the therapist’s being personal 
and his using his subjectivity within the transference-countertransference relationship in his 
                                                 
27 Bollas has been criticised for “undertheorising” his own impact on the analytic process (Renik, 1995; Aron, 1996). 
See also p. 108n77. 
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evocative description of how he (Ogden) attempts to speak to the patient from his reverie 
experience rather than about his experience of reverie.28 The intersubjective encounter should 
therefore be seen as also taking place at the level of unconscious internal processes, where the 
therapist “is being composed by and is in turn composing the patient’s material”, rather than just in 
mutuality or reciprocal effects (Bollas, 2001, p. 96).  
 
3.1.5 The intersubjective focus of this study 
There were specific reasons why intersubjective thinking, and particularly the brand of 
intersubjectivity espoused in the works of Jessica Benjamin, was used to deepen the more 
descriptive results that ensued from the initial data analysis into a conceptual account. It was clear 
that such a theoretical account would need to encompass both the intrapsychic and intersubjective 
aspects of the participants’ experiences of being in therapy, working as therapists and the links 
between those. This is precisely what Benjamin’s thinking made possible, as will become evident 
later in this chapter, and in the next one where the textual analysis is discussed. 
 
Benjamin’s (2000a, p. 44) description of evolving thirdness “in developmental terms as a kind of 
intersubjective trajectory”, or what could be called a trajectory of thirdness,29 within the therapeutic 
dyad, where there is a movement towards mutual recognition and subject-to-subject relating, 
contributed towards envisaging the participants’ professional development as changes that are both 
wrought within the therapeutic third (between participant and therapist) and constellated within the 
clinical third (between participant and patient). Features of therapy, such as the power differential 
between therapist and patient, idealisation and identification, which are (to a greater or lesser 
extent) present in all therapies, but that were foregrounded in this group of participant-therapists’ 
therapies, are fundamental tenets of Benjamin’s conceptualisation of intersubjectivity as the 
evolvement of subject-to-subject relating. 
 
While inclusive of different theoretical viewpoints (which she often creatively reconfigures in 
terms of her own ideas), Benjamin (1995) locates her intersubjective perspective within the 
relational domain. Benjamin’s work has a strong philosophical grounding and she (Benjamin, 
2000b, p. 293) succinctly states that her current notion of intersubjectivity, which is “based on a 
dialectic of recognition and destruction”, grew out of an “unlikely resonance between Hegel and 
Winnicott”. While thinking intersubjectively, Benjamin retains strong links with object relations 
theory and that of Freud (and with some references to Lacan).  
                                                 
28 See also pp. 209-211. 
29 This will be discussed in Section 3.3. 
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The main theoretical grounding of this study has therefore been Benjamin’s relational conception of 
intersubjectivity. The rich (and sometimes confusing) intricacies of her theoretical voice are her 
own, but through and within those a diverse range of theorists, including philosophers, feminists 
and psychoanalytic thinkers appear (or may be glimpsed), are critically considered, sometimes 
assimilated and sometimes turned away from. I have also employed the thinking of some of those 
psychoanalytic theorists, such as Lewis Aron, Christopher Bollas and Thomas Ogden, where this 
“fills out” or elucidates and helps to unpack Benjamin’s theorising. I have limited the use of these 
“other thinkers” to those whose work was not only specifically useful for the purposes of this study, 
but whose ideas are also theoretically compatible with (and/or add to) those of Benjamin. That is, 
those who broadly fall within the spectrum of relational psychoanalytic theorists or those whose 
notions of intersubjectivity are congruent with that of Benjamin.  
 
Aron (1996) is probably more of a relational than an intersubjective thinker, but has also written 
about the Third that a therapist’s relationship with his professional identity forms to his relationship 
with patients (Aron, 1999). He (Aron, 2000) has utilised Benjamin’s ideas in his own theorising 
and has collaborated with her in the development of an intersubjective rendition of the ability to 
think reflectively (Benjamin & Aron, 1999). Strictly speaking, Ogden (1994, 2001) and Bollas 
(1999, 2001) are intersubjective rather than relational thinkers. One could call Bollas (Ibid.) a neo-
Freudian, as well as a Freudian intersubjectivist. While Ogden (Ibid.) makes extensive use of 
Freud’s ideas, he also uses the work of object-relations theorists, such as Bion, Klein and 
Winnicott, in developing his ideas concerning the “analytic third”. In some regards Ogden could be 
considered to have “intersubjectivised” Klein. 
 
To “capture” the interview material at a phenomenological level, the point of departure of the 
conceptualisation of the data took place in terms of the intrapsychic and intersubjective. Particular 
emphasis was placed on Benjamin’s notion of intersubjectivity as the development of subject-to-
subject relating, that is, as an expansion of the therapist-patient’s “capacity for appreciating the 
different subjectivity [or selfhood] of [his] therapist, [as well as that of his patients]” (Buirski & 
Haglund, 2001, p. 41). Ogden (1994) also addresses (albeit somewhat differently) some aspects of 
subject-to-subject relating in his conceptualisation of the “subjugating third”, a negative variant of 
his “analytic third”. In this study, subject-to-subject relating pertained both to what was happening 
between the participant and his therapist (the therapeutic third) and between the participant and his 
patient(s) (the clinical third).  
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Benjamin (1998b, 2001) and Ogden (1994, 2001), as well as, to some extent, Bollas (1992, 1999, 
2001) and some relational and Lacanian theorists, elaborate their intersubjective thinking in terms 
of specific and detailed conceptualisations of thirdness (the intersubjective third) and Thirds (third 
points of reference outside the therapeutic dyad).30 This was used to clarify and explore the notion 
of thirdness and Thirds,31 which became a central part of making theoretical sense of the interview 
material and sharpening the conceptual focus. 
 
In the final phase of the data analysis, a systems perspective, which depicted the interplay of the 
therapeutic and clinical thirds with each other, as well as with other Thirds, was employed to 
develop an intersubjective model of the development of the psychodynamic psychotherapist. In 
doing this, I moved from an intersubjective model (which encompassed both the intrapsychic and 
the intersubjective dimensions of experience) to a “systems lens” (Coburn, 2002, p. 657). As 
Coburn (Ibid.) points out, this may be indicative of a movement from a more phenomenological to 
an increasingly explanatory level of conceptualisation, rather than suggesting the introduction of an 
untenable merging of contradictory models.  
 
For the reason that I wanted to avoid this kind of indiscriminate “model-mixing”, and because I 
deemed the intersubjective approaches already mentioned to be more suitable for the specific 
proposes of this study, I have mostly omitted a large and significant body of intersubjective theory, 
that is, “intersubjective systems theory” (Stolorow, 2001, p. xii) from the theoretical discussions. 
The focus of this approach is “on the field created by the coming together of subjectivities of both 
patient and therapist” (Buirski & Haglund, 2001, p. 22). 
 
Stolorow and his colleagues (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984; Stolorow & Atwood, 1992; Stolorow, 
Atwood & Brandchaft, 1994) introduced the term “intersubjectivity” into psychoanalysis and, 
together with other like-minded theorists, developed this notion further into the contextualist or 
systems intersubjective approach (Orange, 1995; Orange, Atwood & Stolorow, 1997; Buirski & 
Haglund, 2001). Although Stolorow (1992) asserts that his notion of intersubjectivity did not grow 
out of self psychology, but rather developed parallel to it, the thinking of Stolorow et al. is clearly 
underpinned by self psychological concepts. Intersubjective systems theory further “draws heavily 
on the hermeneutic tradition, … [where in] … a continuously interpenetrating process, meaning 
influences subjectivity and subjectivity selectively organizes context” (Buirski & Haglund, 2001, p. 
13).  
                                                 
30 Bollas, and especially Ogden, add to Benjamin’s notion of thirdness by their emphases on the unconscious aspects of 
the intersubjective third. 
31 See Section 3.2. 
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Although Benjamin (2000b) acknowledges some influence of Kohut (1977) on her early work, the 
epistemological roots of Benjamin’s notion of intersubjectivity and that of Stolorow et al. are quite 
different. There are some similarities in their underpinning assumptions, but a careful reading of 
their theories reveals an epistemological divergence. 
 
In both approaches there is an emphasis on the subjectivities of both patient and therapist, as well 
as on the notion of a therapeutic relationship that is asymmetrical, but where mutual regulation 
takes place between therapist and patient (Aron, 1996; Buirski & Haglund, 2001). In relational 
theory, relational history is seen as the primary determinant of personality (Berman, 1997b; 
Frankel, 1998a). Relational theory is therefore “anchored in the idea that it is relationships (internal 
and external, real and imagined) that are central” in shaping experience (Aron, 1996, p. 18). 
Intersubjective systems theory is concerned with the way in which people structure their 
experience, that is, the structures of experience (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984) that emerge from 
“formative relationships” with caregivers and significant others (Buirski & Haglund, p. 31).  
 
However, the conceptual approach of intersubjective systems theory is more specifically systemic 
or contextualist than that of relational theory, where thinking often happens in terms of the 
intrapsychic and the interpersonal. According to Stolorow (2001, p. xii-xii), from the 
“intersubjective perspective, clinical phenomena … [are understood] as taking form at the interface 
of the interacting experiential worlds of patient and therapist … Experiential worlds and 
intersubjective fields are seen to mutually constitute one another”. Relational theory is also more 
broadly eclectic (Aron, 1996), while intersubjective systems theory is imbued with self-psychology 
concepts and language.32  
 
Apart from the other reasons (which were previously mentioned) for particularly using Benjamin’s 
intersubjective version, I considered the more explicitly and detailed notions of thirdness and 
Thirds33 to be more useful and suitable for the purposes of this study than Stolorow and colleagues’ 
theorising, which takes place in terms of a general intersubjective field, that is, “a system of 
reciprocal mutual influence” (Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandchaft, 1994, p. 37). I did use the notion 
of fluid and interpenetrating systems, also espoused by intersubjective systems theory, in 
developing an intersubjective model of the psychodynamic therapist’s therapy, but this was done at 
the level of the interplay of Thirds, rather than at that of the subjectivities of therapist and patient.  
 
                                                 
32 For example, according to Buirski and Haglund (2001, p. 40), “patients are at the deepest level seeking a selfobject 
relationship in which their developmental strivings can be repaired”. 
33 See Section 3.2. 
 56
Of course Benjamin, Aron, Bollas and Ogden differ in their areas of theoretical interest as well as 
in their emphases on specific concepts, but their work also often links up and overlaps. For all of 
these relational and/or intersubjective thinkers, “the analyst’s conscious and unconscious 
participation constitutes an ineradicable part of the analytic exchange” (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & 
Borton, 2000, p. 8). This means that the therapist’s presence and subjectivity are explicitly 
theorised (albeit in somewhat different ways) as a basis for knowledge in the task of patient and 
therapist’s co-constructing subjective and intersubjective meanings in the therapeutic 
intersubjectivity. However, in this regard it is not the issue of the therapist’s self-disclosure (that is, 
if he self-discloses or not) that is primarily important, but rather how he or she becomes a “voice” 
in the therapeutic space when speaking from a subjective position without necessarily speaking of 
that position (Ogden, 2001). Speaking from a subjective position does therefore not mean being 
inappropriately self-revealing and indiscriminatingly disclosing of personal material. According to 
Benjamin (1997, p. 796), what is of primary importance is “how we think about our use of our felt 
responses and how we make access to our thinking available to our patient”. Mitchell (2000, p. 76) 
concurs with this: “Among the most important judgements the analyst has to make are those 
concerning what he says about what he feels and does.” 
 
Thinking points to the presence of a psychoanalytic consciousness,34 variously named by these 
theorists. This psychoanalytic consciousness (rather than a “technical stance”) becomes a way for 
the therapist to tolerate working “within a situation that, as Bion said, ought to inspire fear” 
(Benjamin, 1997, p. 796). The psychoanalytic consciousness exists in dialectical tension with the 
therapist’s immersion in his own experiences of the therapeutic intersubjectivity, that is, with the 
psychoanalytic unconscious (Spezzano, 1993, p. 212). It is therefore important for the therapist to 
be able to remain open to the “indeterminate shapes” of these “unformulated experiences” (Stern, 
1997, p. 196),35 even when they appear fragmented and idiosyncratically subjective, and to be 
capable of turning the lens of his psychoanalytic consciousness on them for reflective (but non-
pejorative) scrutiny (that is, to be aware, to think, and reflect). In this way the therapist’s presence 
could become a “third mediating voice” (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 8) that 
triangulates the dyadic encounter and opens up possibilities for further analytic work. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Gerhardt, Sweetnam and Borton (2000, p. 9) use the term analytic consciousness, but since the theoretical “lens” I 
am using is psychoanalytic rather than Jungian, I think that psychoanalytic consciousness would be the more accurate 
term. 
35 Stern (1997, p. 187) highlights that the therapist’s “primary problem is not to select a correct interpretation… [but] is 
how to sense that there is something there to interpret”.  
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3.2 THIRDNESS AND THIRDS     
 
In this section I shall, as precisely and concisely as possible, attempt to provide an outline of the 
current (and ongoing) debates surrounding thirdness and Thirds. Illustrations of some of these 
points will be used in the chapter where the analysis of the material is presented. 
 
3.2.1 Contextualising thirdness and Thirds 
Thirdness refers to the psychoanalytic third, which is also referred to as the analytic third, or just 
the third or the Third. This concept was introduced into psychoanalysis by Lacan (1988), whose 
work Benjamin (1998a) acknowledges as being influential in the evolvement of her thinking and 
who developed the notion of intersubjectivity outside of relational theory (he and his followers 
described how subjectivity emerged in the context of and through the mediation of language and 
other cultural structures). It is a useful, relatively new concept that is commonly used in 
intersubjective and relational thinking, and also by those theorists with strong Lacanian leanings 
(Benjamin, 2001; Ringstrom, 2001a). From a semiotic perspective, Hervey (1982, p. 24) asserts 
that a “given thing is a ‘third’ if its nature (in fact its overriding purpose … ) is to mediate a 
particular, otherwise non-existent, relationship between two further things”. He also calls this the 
“hierarchically highest level of existence”. 
 
Unfortunately, as Ringstrom (2001a, p. 743n9) points out, within psychoanalytic thinking, this 
concept is “riddled with all the vagaries and multiplicities of meaning that beset other high-level 
abstractions such as the concepts of transference and projective identification”. While the idea of 
thirdness is readily appropriated and used, it is often not clear exactly what is meant by it.  
 
The matter of denoting thirdness as third or Third is also frequently confusing and inconsistent. 
Thirdness is referred to as the Third within the context of the Lacanian notion of thirdness, where 
the Third is seen as an independent, pre-existing, “culturally bound structure” that grounds the 
patient-therapist dyad (Ringstrom, 2001b, p. 5). Outside Lacanian theory, it appears that third is 
usually used to refer to the emerging thirdness co-created between the members of the therapeutic 
dyad, while Third is used to indicate an outside perspective (like the therapist’s professional 
allegiances) that triangulates the therapeutic dyad (this can be positive or negative). To complicate 
matters even further, both the co-created intersubjective third and a third perspective may also 
sometimes become a structuring Third. When possible, I shall attempt to distinguish these forms 
according to their function, using third for the intersubjective third and Third for a third vertex that 
triangulates the dyad. 
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Different theorists understand and use the notion of thirdness in a variety of related ways. Bollas 
(2001, p. 93), who focuses “on what we may think of as the intersubjective within the Freudian 
frame of reference”, where the aim is the unconscious communication of the “Freudian pair” (Ibid., 
p. 95) of therapist and patient, is an example of how even the same theorist may do this. He (Bollas, 
1992, p. 112) sees “the third intermediate object” as being created in a similar way that Ogden 
does. In his theory of unconscious intersubjectivity, the idea of the preconsciously rendered 
material from both patient and analyst being available for “free-associative recollections” or “links” 
in an “intermediate space” between patient and therapist may be interpreted as constituting a third 
(Bollas, 2001, p. 96). However, his notion of thirdness also hints at a more Lacanian tilt, when he 
conceptualises the analytical process as “a third object”, mutually recognised by therapist and 
patient, as holding the analytical couple, preceding and outliving them (Bollas, 1999, p. 6).  
 
To explore and elucidate this concept, it is useful to attempt to categorise its meanings and uses, 
even if the resulting categories are not all that clear-cut and tend to overlap. 
 
3.2.2 The meanings and uses of thirdness and Thirds 
3.2.2.1   Co-created thirdness  
For some theorists, the third is an “unconsciously, co-created state” of intersubjectivity (Ringstrom, 
2001a, p. 743n9). Used in this way, thirdness refers to “the property of intersubjectivity [that 
concerns] the creation of something that no longer identifiably emanates from one person or the 
other but mediates between them” (Benjamin, 2002, p. 49). Thirdness further denotes “a state of 
optimal subject to subject relating, wherein the engagement of the two parties in the dyad is 
ineluctably mutually influential” (Ringstrom, 2001b, p. 6). It is newly created in every therapeutic 
couple; that is, it ensues from a specific therapeutic relationship and its nature depends on the way 
that the members of the specific therapeutic couple relate to each other. It is also continually 
changing within the context of a specific therapeutic dyad. 
 
3.2.2.1.1. Ogden’s analytic third 
This idea of the third is explicitly and comprehensively described in Ogden’s (1994, 1997, 2001) 
theorising around the analytic third. Ogden’s original notion of the psychoanalytic third (also 
referred to as the analytic third) is the culmination of his elaboration on the work of Freud, Klein, 
Bion and Winnicott into a “radically intersubjective” vision (Mitchell & Aron, 1999b, p. 460). 
Ogden perceives the analytic situation  “as generating a profound form of unconscious connection” 
(Ibid.) between therapist and patient; that is, the analytic third, which is therefore “an emergent 
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construct arising intersubjectively” (Cooper, 1999, p. 34n1) with “a life of its own” (Ogden, 2001, 
p. 11).  
 
Because the concepts of “dialectic” and “dialectical interplay” are so central to Ogden’s work and to 
intersubjective thinking (and will be referred to again), it is useful to digress at this point and to 
consider what he means by these notions. He (Ogden, 1994, p. 14) defines the term dialectic as 
follows:  
 
A dialectic is a process in which opposing elements each create, inform, 
preserve, and negate the other, each stands in a dynamic, ever-changing 
relationship with the other. Dialectical movement tends toward integrations 
that are never achieved. Each potential integration creates a new form of 
opposition characterized by its own distinct form of dialectical tension. That 
which is generated dialectically is perpetually in motion, perpetually in the 
process of being created and negated ... In addition, dialectical thinking 
involves a concept of the interdependence of subject and object  ... One cannot 
begin to comprehend either subject or object in isolation from one another.    
 
In Ogden's version of the dialectic, the idea is to maintain a tension, not to resolve a contradiction 
in favour of a “synthesis” (Benjamin, 1999b, p. 397). This is similar to Winnicott's (1971) 
understanding of paradox: “that it is never finally resolved”; that is, it “persists as a tension” 
(Benjamin, 1999b, p. 397). Benjamin (Ibid.) notes that Hegel conceptualised the dialectic as a 
linear process where the synthesis of contradictory polarities would repeatedly be dissolved, 
creating a new contradiction that would once again lead to a new synthesis, “thus abandoning the 
old positions and moving forward in a linear way toward final telos”. Ogden's work therefore 
“represents a transformation of the dialectic as conceptualised by Hegel in a direction suggested by 
more contemporary thinkers” (Ibid.). 
 
Therapist and patient create one another as subjects of analysis and as “partners” (vertices of 
experience); in the tension of this dialectical process they exist and can be conceptualised and 
understood only in terms of each other. Ogden conceptualises the ever-changing unconscious 
intersubjective analytic third as a third subject of analysis that is generated in the same moment that 
therapist and patient are created as subjects of analysis. Benjamin (2001, p. 18) calls Ogden’s 
analytic third “a kind of co-created subject-object”, a “pattern or a relational dynamic that appears 
to form outside our conscious will”. 
 
The analytic third is “a product of a unique dialectic generated by/between the separate 
subjectivities” of therapist and patient (Ogden, 1994, p. 64) that is unconsciously, jointly but 
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asymmetrically, co-created by the individual subjectivities of patient and therapist and may be 
thought of as “the unconscious representations of the interaction of the analytic pair” (Cooper, 
1999, p. 34n1). Ogden (2001, p. 19) sees therapist and patient as both contributing to this 
“experiential base”, which he calls “a pool of unconscious experience”. While therapist and patient 
both draw on the third in generating their experience of the therapeutic relationship, it also stands 
“in dialectical tension” with them as separate individuals (Ogden, 2001, p. 12).  
 
The analytic third is given form by and in its turn also shapes the therapeutic relationship (in an 
enriching or constricting way) and transforms patient and therapist (and is transformed by them). 
Ogden’s thinking about the third means that whatever patient or therapist experiences must be 
understood within the context of the dialectic of individuality and intersubjectivity. It is with the 
intricate fluidity of the complexity of this dialectic that the therapist needs to grapple: what belongs 
to whom is never quite clear or self-evident. 
Ogden (1994, p. 94) emphasises that the work of analysis does not constitute “a democratic process 
of mutual analysis”; that is, in the analytic discourse it is the conscious and unconscious experience 
of the patient that is privileged and the analyst’s experience of the third is a means of understanding 
this. He (Ogden, 2001) therefore highlights the importance of the therapist’s close attentiveness and 
attunement to the fine contours and textures of what happens in the therapeutic space. “Experiential 
shapes” (such as the therapist’s reveries, the patient’s dreams or mutual enactments), “the 
psychological purposes” served by them being generated and the manner in which they are linked 
together, open the way towards “an expanded sense of the fundamental nature of the third” (Ogden, 
1999, pp. 488-489). 
 
In his thinking about the subjugating third, Ogden focuses on the dialectic between “the 
subordinating relation and the recognizing third” (Benjamin, 1999b, p. 398). He (Ogden, 1994, p. 
97) describes the subjugating third in terms of projective identification, which is “a form of 
intersubjective thirdness” that is underpinned by “the interplay of mutual subjugation and mutual 
recognition”. Ogden sees the “negating moment” as being essential and “breakdowns” as also 
having creative potential (Benjamin, 1999b, p. 398). 
 
This means that the “relational third can be experienced either as a vehicle of recognition or 
something we have to submit to” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 18). Within the dialectic of mutual 
subjugation and mutual recognition, the potential space of thirdness may collapse and the 
individual subjectivities of therapist and patient may be subsumed by the subjugating third (that is, 
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both patient and therapist have submitted to it), but their subjectivities may also be reappropriated 
as transformed when thirdness is reinstated. For Ogden (1994, p. 106), the “act of mutual 
recognition” (and re-established thirdness) happens through the therapist’s “interpretation of the 
transference-countertransference” and the patient’s use of this interpretation.  
 
3.2.2.1.2 Benjamin and thirdness as the evolvement of subject-to-subject relating 
There are similarities between Ogden and Benjamin’s thinking about the intersubjective third. 
However, as Benjamin (1998b, p. xv) points out, Ogden (1994) posits the analytic dialogue itself as 
a “third”, but her meaning is “limited to an internal mental space created through a dialogue that 
recognizes the other”; that is, where subject-to-subject relating becomes possible. Benjamin and 
Ogden’s theorising specifically overlaps in Ogden’s (1994) conceptual elaboration of the 
subjugating third (which has already been discussed).  
 
She (Benjamin 1995, p. 28) posits recognition as the process of being acknowledged by the other 
“as an equivalent center of experience”. Recognition “begins with the other’s confirming response, 
which tells us that we have created meaning, had an impact, revealed an intention” (Benjamin, 
1995, p. 33)… and “makes meaningful the feelings, intentions, and actions of the self. It allows the 
self to realize its agency and authorship in a tangible way” (Benjamin, 1988, p. 12). 
 
Benjamin (1998b, p. xv) conceptualises the third position as coming into being in the 
“communicative relationship, which creates a dialogue, that is an entity in itself, a potential space 
outside the web of identifications”. While Benjamin (Ibid.) sees the patient and therapist’s 
identifications with each other as possible bridges to thirdness and mutual recognition, the patient 
and therapist may also get entangled in the “web” of identifications (or in the transference-
countertransference matrix).  
 
Benjamin comments (1998b, p. xiv) that in current relational theory the therapeutic dyad, that was 
previously seen as being constituted by “knowing subject and object of knowledge”, is 
reconfigured to a dyad where both therapist and patient are subjects. Therefore both the subjectivity 
of the therapist is acknowledged (that is, the therapist’s subjectivity as a “fallible being” is 
restored), and the patient is elevated “to the position of a subject who collaborates and knows” 
(Benjamin, 1998b, p. xii, p. xv). However, Benjamin’s (1998b, p. xv) theorising about the creation 
of thirdness goes further than this reversal and “reintegration of subjectivity and mutuality” in 
envisaging thirdness as a space which holds the possibility for both subjects to “recognize the 
difference of the other”, that is, for the evolvement of mutual recognition (Benjamin 1998b, p. xii). 
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Benjamin (1988, p. 40) emphasises the relational nature of mutual recognition: “Mutual recognition 
cannot be achieved through obedience, through identification with the other’s power, or through 
repression. It requires, finally, contact with the other.”  
 
The idea of mutual recognition holds a paradox: in order to exist as an autonomous being (who can 
have an impact on an other), one is dependent on the recognition of an other, who should also be 
recognised as an independent being (Benjamin, 1988, 1995). Ogden (1994, p. 104) notes: “It is 
only through the recognition by an other who is recognized as a separate (and yet interdependent) 
person that one becomes increasingly (self-reflectively) human.” Dependence and independence are 
no longer seen as oppositional dichotomies, but as being held in tension in an interactive system 
(Benjamin, 2002). “Thus, at the moment when we become agents, we lose a sense of our own 
absoluteness and omnipotence. We become vulnerable to the impact of an ‘other’”(Pollock & 
Slavin, 1998, p. 863). And further: “At the very moment we come to understand the meaning of I, 
myself, we are forced to see the limitations of that self” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 37). Intersubjectively 
viewed, mutual recognition is therefore constituted by “two active subjects … [who] … may 
exchange, may alternate in expressing and receiving, cocreating a mutuality that allows for and 
presumes separateness” within the dialogue that develops into thirdness (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 29). 
 
Pollock and Slavin (1998, p. 866) highlight the similarity between what they call “reciprocal 
agency” and Benjamin’s concept of mutual recognition. “In the classical/structural model, agency 
was represented by the capacity to be, in some sense, the owner and master of one’s drives and 
motives … ”, but they reconfigure the idea of agency, which may accordingly be understood as 
“the internalized experience of being able to have an impact on one’s relational world” (Ibid., p. 
861), in the context of relational theory (rather than just in terms of “internal impulses”) (Ibid., p. 
858). Thus the apparent opposites of dependence and independence may become reconciled by the 
notion of “agency within an interactive system” (Benjamin, 2002, p. 45). A “mature sense of 
agency”36 (Pollock & Slavin, 1998, p. 861) further implies a “certain level of self-other 
differentiation” (Ibid. p. 863) and the ability to trust one’s own perceptions.  
 
According to these authors (Pollock & Slavin, Ibid. p. 861), a mature sense of agency is a 
prerequisite for an individual to be able to construct “a cohesive and coherent sense of self”. Their 
emphasis is on the constructed nature of this coherent sense of self; that is, this does not mean that 
                                                 
36 “In mature agency, the individual becomes capable of moving between the pole of self-awareness, characterized by 
the capacity to recognize the distinctions between one’s own and someone else’s agenda, and the pole of reciprocal 
connection, in which the individual can recognize, affect, and let oneself be truly influenced by another person” 
(Pollock & Slavin, 1998, p. 864). This resonates with Benjamin’s notion of there being a dialectic of recognition and 
negation. 
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“a single consistent identity” is developed, thus also supporting the postmodern relational notion of 
“multiple self-states” (Ibid.). This may be clarified by considering Flax’s (1990, pp. 218-219) 
criticism that in post-modern thinking the notions of a “core” self (that is, “a sense of continuity or 
‘going-on-being’”) and a “unitary” self are often conflated. To this one may add Layton’s (cf. 
Pizer, 1998, p. 153) comments: “In the relational paradigm, ‘core’ does not mean innate, nor does it 
imply a true self … But ‘core’ does imply something internal that recognizably persists even while 
it may continuously and subtly alter…” Benjamin (1995) further points out that the usage of the 
term subject in psychoanalysis does not denote a unitary self and needs to retain some notion of the 
subject’s unique idiom (Bollas, 1992), which would include the idea of the self as “a historical 
being that preserves its history in the unconscious” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 13). Rivera (1989, cf. Aron, 
1996, p. 74) gives an eloquent description of the idea that “our understanding of subjectivity should 
include both ‘identity’ and ‘multiplicity’”:  
 
[It is] not the silencing of different voices with different points of view – but 
the growing ability to call all those voices “I”, to disidentify with any one of 
them as the whole story, and to recognize that the construction of personal 
identity is a complex continuing affair …  
  
The idea of mutual recognition may be further elucidated by differentiating between “the subject’s 
relationship to others and objects” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 80). This necessitates distinguishing 
between object and other, or between “an ‘inside’ versus an ‘outside’ perspective on otherness” 
(Gerhardt, Sweetnam, & Borton, 2000, p. 10). Benjamin (1995, p. 6) uses Winnicott’s (1969) 
distinction between object relating (that is, relating “to the other as an object of 
identification/projection”), where the object remains subjective, and object usage (that is, relating 
“to the other as an independent outside subject”) in developing her thinking about the 
differentiation between object and other. Object therefore refers to the role of the “intrapsychically 
cast” other “as constituted by the unconscious phantasy, need, wish and defense” and other to the 
way one relates to the “real” external other (Gerhardt, Sweetnam, & Borton, 2000, p. 11). Although 
some object relations theorists (for example, Fairbairn, 1944) do take account of the formative 
effect of early significant others in a child’s life, the main focus in object relations theory is on the 
role of the other as the “object of internalization, identification and projection”, that is, on the other 
rendered an internal object constituted by “the self’s omnipotent phantasizing” (Gerhardt, 
Sweetnam, & Borton, 2000, p. 11).  
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Benjamin (1995) specifically links intersubjectivity with not just relating to the other as an object, 
but also recognising the other as an equivalent but different centre of being; that is, a subject.37 
Identificatory processes are involved in acts of recognition, but when identification only takes place 
in the context of “relating to the internal object” (that is, becoming the other’s object or casting the 
other in the role of one’s object), this could impede recognition (Benjamin, 1999b, p. 396). 
Recognition concerns the destruction of the other as object and his survival as subject.38 
 
Benjamin’s notion of thirdness therefore concerns that quality of intersubjective relating wherein 
both persons in the dyad can be more fully acknowledged, more fully mutually recognised. Within 
the space of therapy, therapist and patient may therefore come to exist as like subjects, each with 
his own version of “power, freedom and desire” (Benjamin, 2000a, p. 46). Nonetheless, for 
Benjamin (2000a), intersubjectivity is not to be found in the “achievement” of mutual recognition, 
but rather lies in the process where mutual recognition is constantly being lost and found in the 
dialectic of recognition and negation. Recognition therefore cannot exist without negation, and as 
“a moment of self-assertion, directed towards the other”, negation is an essential counterpart to 
recognition (Benjamin, 1995, p. 210). Recognition and negation are indeed mutually and 
reciprocally constitutive of each other Benjamin (Ibid.) adds: “Any act of the subject that has an 
impact ‘negates’ the other … the other is no longer exactly what she or he was a moment before. 
Negation is also “irreducible to the subject’s own mental world … ” (Benjamin 1998b, p. 94). The 
change in the other furthermore constitutes “the recognition the subject seeks …” (Benjamin, 1995, 
p. 210). The “negative moment” then becomes reintegrated “to create a sustained tension rather 
than an opposition” (Benjamin 1995, p. 23).  
 
For the patient to feel recognised, the therapist therefore “has to change” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 24). 
For that reason the ”fundamental quality of therapeutic recognition – whether conveyed in verbal, 
gestural, or tonal form, is that the therapist is making an internal adjustment to the patient; the 
therapist is registering the imprint of the patient’s state even while striving to preserve personal 
integrity and equilibrium” (Pizer, 1998, p. 130). 
 
                                                 
37 Frankel (2003, p. 516) comments that Benjamin’s notion that we need to recognise (that is, value) the other in order 
to gain the recognition that “will give meaning to our own subjectivity”, highlights that “the analytic [and therapeutic] 
endeavour is a moral undertaking” (Ibid., p. 514). 
38 According to Winnicott (1969), “the recognition of the other involves a paradoxical process in which the object is in 
fantasy always being destroyed”; that is, “the object must be destroyed inside in order that we know it to have survived 
outside; thus we can recognize it as not subject to our mental control” (Benjamin, 1988, p. 38). It is when this sequence 
fails, that internalisation happens (Benjamin, 1998b). 
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Benjamin (1998b) postulates a dialectic between recognition and negation that incrementally lends 
itself to the formation of a new intersubjective structure wherein the participants are able not only 
to relate as subject-to-object, but also in a more subject-to-subject manner. According to Ogden 
(1994, p. 104), “an intersubjective dialectic of recognizing and being recognized serves as the 
foundation of the creation of individual subjectivity”. Benjamin (2002, p. 49) further compares this 
evolving thirdness to “following a shared theme in musical improvisation … that two … partners 
simultaneously create and surrender to”.  
 
Therefore “the third is that to which we surrender, and thirdness is the mental space that facilitates 
or results from surrender” (Benjamin 2001, p. 1). As Benjamin (2001) indicates, surrender is a 
term that has been extensively discussed by Ghent (1990, 2001). By surrender, Ghent means 
“transcendence and acceptance”, and a willingness to embrace the unknown rather than subjugation 
to dominance and control (Mitchell & Aron, 1999a, p. 212). Ghent (1990, p. 220) contrasts 
surrender with its “ever available lookalike” submission. He sees submission as “losing oneself in 
the power of the other, becoming enslaved in one or other way to the master”. The therapist should 
therefore not confuse his “collusive participation in the subjugating, negative third with surrender 
or empathic recognition” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 20). While resignation is what accompanies 
submission, acceptance is a part of surrender. 
 
Benjamin (2001, p. 2) thinks of surrender as implying recognition, that is, being both connected to 
somebody and accepting his “separateness and difference” without trying to control or coerce him. 
For example, for the treating therapist one way of dominating the therapist-patient is to be the one 
who knows by “invoking the rank of theory” (Ringtrom, 2003, p. 199). Surrender does not mean 
“giving in” (that is, submitting) to somebody, but rather a “letting go into being” with him 
(Benjamin, 2001, p. 2). While the therapist should not submit to the patient, his surrender to the 
patient’s way of being (that could be variously described as attunement, empathy, acceptance, and 
so forth) and the recognition of the patient that this brings are fundamental components of the 
evolving trajectory of thirdness, as well as what “potentially reanimates intersubjectivity” in the 
difficult moments of impasse (Ringstrom, 2003, p. 199).  
 
For the therapist this could mean recognising or accepting the patient as he is, rather than trying to 
help or change him (Ghent, 2001). It could also mean surrendering to the negating experience of 
immersing himself in being empathically identified with a patient who is filled with hostility and 
rage at a particular point in time. However, Benjamin (2001, p. 11) cautions that the therapist’s 
surrender to the patient should not be confused with an “ideal of ‘pure empathy’”, which could just 
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mean the therapist’s complying with and submitting to the patient’s view of what is happening. As 
Frankel (2003) points out, there is sometimes a very fine line between surrender and submission. 
Alterity (in various degrees) is always present and the therapist’s subjectivity cannot be denied as 
the therapist becomes “part of the problem and not just the solution” (Mitchell, cf. Benjamin, 2001, 
p. 17). 
 
Like transitional experience (Winnicott, 1971), the co-created thirdness (that belongs to neither 
therapist nor patient and to which both therapist and patient surrender) is paradoxically both 
discovered and invented (Benjamin, 2002). It is in the tension between recognising the other and 
asserting the self that the thirdness that makes reflective thinking and the transitional space 
(Winnicott, 1971) of analytic “play” possible, is constellated (Benjamin, 1990, 1999a, 1999b).  
 
Since all “negotiation of difference involves negation” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 96), what one would 
expect in an ongoing therapy that is good-enough, is that thirdness would show itself in the shifting 
moments of the dialectic of recognition and negation that are also “repeatedly realized and failed 
moments of intimacy” between therapist and patient (Ringstrom, 2001b, p. 11). Mutual recognition 
is never finally established, but continually disrupted and reinstated. In terms of Benjamin’s 
musical metaphor this would be where the two dialogic partners are (even with there being some 
discordances), on the whole, attuned to the co-created pattern of the shared musical theme, 
improvising together and are managing to keep the improvisation going.  
 
When negation is not survived, the dialectic collapses into “breakdown” or “full rupture” 
(Benjamin, 1998b, p. 96); “unassimable difference” (Benjamin, 2000a, p. 44) may ensue and 
thirdness may (sometimes irrevocably) be compromised, leading to the ongoing constellation of a 
negative third (Benjamin, 2001, p. 19). The opposites of recognition versus negation are therefore 
not exactly the same as that of mutual recognition versus breakdown: the “first tension can exist 
within the second” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 96). Benjamin’s negative third is similar to Ogden’s 
(1994, p. 97) subjugating third,39 which is  “a negative of the third … [that] controls us, robs us of 
our subjectivity and eludes our efforts at mental formulating” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 18).  
 
While thirdness makes reflective thinking possible, the therapist’s ability to think reflectively and 
symbolically may also generate and contribute towards reinstating thirdness in the therapeutic 
space. Of course, as Benjamin (1995, 1999a) points out, it is not just the therapist’s ability to think 
                                                 
39 See p. 60. 
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that re-establishes mutual recognition and intersubjective space.40 The subjectivities of both 
therapist and patient may, in various ways, also be involved in the processing of ruptures. In this 
study the focus will be both on the therapist’s (that is, the participant’s therapist and the participant-
as-therapist’s) and on those of the participant-as-patient’s efforts to restore and preserve thirdness. 
 
In a long-term, good-enough therapy (where, by implication, there is an evolving trajectory of 
thirdness), both therapist and (especially) patient would become more and more able to trust the 
therapeutic process and to surrender to it (and the overarching and developing “tune” of thirdness), 
rather than having the feeling of submitting to each other’s desires and demands. This would also 
underpin the increasing ability of the therapeutic pair to survive the unavoidable negating moments 
and even breakdowns of enactments and impasses. 
 
3.2.2.2   Thirds 
Rather than referring to thirdness co-created within the dyad, a Third is “an independent theory of 
mind” (Ringstrom, 2001a, p. 743) that “creates another point of reference outside the dyad” 
(Benjamin, 2001, p. 1). Examples of such pre-existing Thirds are “the language, culture, and 
values” that contextualise therapy, “the theory and procedures that define the task of therapy”, and 
the “therapist’s professional world and professional identifications” (Frankel, 2003, p. 516). Thirds 
therefore concern both “the realties out of which the treatment is constructed” and “the ideals that 
guide it” (Ibid.). 
 
Such a Third may structure, anchor, frame and inform the work of therapy in a way that takes it 
beyond the merely interpersonal elements of the dyad and in so doing sustain the therapeutic 
relationship. It may also open up possibilities for meaning and thinking and that may move the 
therapeutic process to a higher and more complex (meta-level) of understanding.  
 
On the other hand, the therapist may sometimes relate to such a third vertex (for example, theory, 
supervision, the therapeutic community, his own needs, desires, unresolved issues, and so forth) in 
such a way that the patient’s stake in the therapeutic space is reduced (that is, in Benjamin’s terms, 
the patient is negated). In this instance it may be useful to think of this as an antitherapeutic dyad 
being formed between the therapist and the third reference point so that this third point is no “true” 
Third, but actually truncates the intermediate therapeutic space in a way that forecloses the 
possibilities for symbolic and creative therapeutic play. 
                                                 
40 This would not just involve the therapist’s capacity to think reflectively, but thinking reflectively interspersed with 
(that is, existing in a dialectical tension with), for example, what ensues from the therapist’s psychoanalytic 
unconscious. 
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3.2.2.2.1 The symbolic Third that structures and grounds the dyad  
The Lacanian Third needs to be understood within the context of Lacan’s (1981, 1988) emphasis on 
the essential alterity of the Freudian unconscious. This highlights the “alienation of human 
consciousness from self-knowledge, and the corresponding margin of separateness that 
characterizes even the most profound connection between persons” (Hamburg, 1991, p. 347). 
 
Those theorists (Bernstein, 1999; Muller, 1999), who are strongly influenced by Lacanian thinking, 
see intersubjectvity as being mediated by a Third, the symbolic realm41 of differentiation and 
separation, which Lacan equates with language and the law, that is, the symbolic father or phallus. 
Since Lacan argues that “the unconscious is the discourse of the Other” and that speech originates 
in the Other (which is “outside consciousness”), it follows that speech and language shape 
consciousness (Evans, 1996, p. 133). According to Ogden (1999, p. 488), the Lacanian Third, “the 
chain of signifiers constituting the language with which we speak … mediates and gives order to 
the relationship of the subject to his lived sensory experience and to his relations with others”. 
 
The Other,42 the symbolic order, is therefore a third subject that pre-exists the analytic dyad and 
through which the two subjects relate to each other. The members of the analytic dyad are subjected 
to the unconscious “rules” of this Third that affect them in ways unknown to both of them and that 
also structurally ground the dyad (Ringstrom, 2001a, 2001b). The Third prevents the dyad from 
collapsing into either the seamless merger of the oneness of the imaginary order where difference 
cannot exist or into the power struggle that ensues when difference is split into opposing polarities 
(Hamburg, 1991; Benjamin, 2001). 
 
According to Muller (1999, p. 474),43 “the analyst can be said to have one foot in the dyad and one 
foot in the Third … [which] is the point from which one can get a perspective on what is happening 
in the dyad”. The Third or Other, while it is unarticulated, is not “an abstraction, but an observable 
structure” (Muller, 1999 p. 477), “a semiotic field” of the preconscious and unconscious 
                                                 
41 The symbolic order is signified by the “Name-of-the-Father” (Nom-du-Père) (Evans, 1996, p. 119) and it can be 
contrasted with the imaginary order “that structures our need for likeness and our need for identification with an other” 
(Bernstein, 1999, p. 291). 
42 Freud uses the term “other” when speaking of both der Andere (the other person) and das Andere (otherness). Lacan, 
following Hegel, distinguishes between other and Other. Being inscribed in the imaginary order, the other is not really 
other, but a reflection and a projection of the ego; is simultaneously the counterpart and the specular image. The Other 
is indicative of “radical alterity … which transcends the illusory otherness of the imaginary, because it cannot be 
assimilated through identification”… The Other is “thus both another subject, in his radical alterity … and also the 
symbolic order which mediates the relationship with that other subject” (Evans, 1996, p. 133). In general (that is, not in 
the strictly “Lacanian” sense), other indicates another person, another consciousness (who may or may not be 
recognised as having a separate existence from oneself), while Other (which may be internal or external) denotes 
alterity and difference in a more abstract, symbolic sense.  
43 Muller’s (1996, 1999) work is a synthesis of the thinking of Jacques Lacan and Charles Peirce (who wrote about 
semiotic codes). 
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“resonances of history and culture” (Muller, 1996, p. 189) that contains the work of therapy by 
clearly delineating the roles and structuring the unconscious formations of therapist and patient.  
 
The meaning of the Other as another subject is secondary to that of the Other as symbolic order: 
this means that a subject may, by occupying this position, be the Other (Third) for another subject 
(and as such the therapist may be conceptualised as being the Other for the patient) (Evans, 1996). 
Although the therapist can therefore never be identical to the Third, he can “represent it as its 
delegate in [his] speech and [his] actions” (Muller, 1999, p. 477).44 The therapist’s speaking from 
the Third moves the dyad beyond solipsistic insularity, the “pull” towards “dyadic regression” and 
the accompanying “power struggles over the control of recognition” into the symbolic (Muller, 
1999, p. 475). 
 
In speaking from the position of the Third, the therapist may recognise the patient as a subject by 
means of a “performative speech act” (Muller, 1999, p 473). In Lacanian terms this means 
recognising the patient’s desire (Muller, 1999), that is, his subjectivity (Crastnopol, 1999a). While 
empathy can lead to the experience of recognition, Muller (1999, p. 472) primarily sees it as “a 
form of coerced mirroring” that produces sameness. He contrasts empathy with recognition, which 
posits difference (that is, not “seeing the other as an extension or repetition of oneself”) (Muller, 
1996, p. 24). For him recognition is most often found in accurate and well-timed interpretations. 
For Lacan the intersubjective third is therefore “constituted by recognition through speech, which 
allows difference of viewpoints and interest” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 4).  
  
Ogden (1994, p. 64n2) explicitly differentiates his analytic third from the Lacanian “name-of-the-
father”, which he sees as an “oedipal/symbolic third” and (Ogden, 1999, p. 488) “which, as the 
representative of law, culture and language, creates a space between mother and infant”. He 
(Ogden, 1999, p. 488) adds that there are many ways in which “the unconscious internal object 
father” plays a pivotal part in both the formation and function of his analytic third. 
 
Benjamin (1998a) gives Lacan credit for his idea of the Third being influential in her own thinking 
about thirdness. However, she (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 28n5) further argues that, contrary to Lacianian 
thinking, the way out of the “dyadic trap” (which Lacan equates with the maternal and the 
imaginary) is not only the intercession of the “outside” Third (the symbolic father or phallus). She 
                                                 
44 Although this appears to be what Muller actually means when he talks about the Third from a Lacanian perspective, 
he also (and quite confusingly) says that the “structuring Third” (Muller, 1999, p. 474) has been called by various 
names in psychoanalytic literature, citing Ogden’s analytic third (which is quite different from the Lacanian Third) as 
one of his examples. Crastnopol (1999a, p. 459) notes that “Muller and other Lacanians use the idea of the Third in 
somewhat diverse ways depending on the context of their discussion”. 
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(Benjamin, 1998a, p. 593n1) asserts that “what is problematic in Lacan’s formulations is the 
persistence of the equation of the dyad with the maternal, the third term with the father’s oedipal 
intervention, and the Symbolic with language”.  
 
For Benjamin (1998b, p. 28n5) the third intersubjective space could also be understood as being co-
created in terms of the dialectic of recognition and negation between two subjects, that is, “the 
dialogue of the maternal dyad”. In only equating “the maternal dyad with imaginary twoness”, 
Lacan is therefore overlooking the early origins of thirdness within the maternal (or therapeutic) 
dyad (Benjamin, 2001, p. 6). Hamburg (1991, p. 358) also points out that Lacan “failed to consider 
the intricate manifestations of difference that precede the linguistic and oedipal symbolic order”. In 
fact, by exclusively linking maternal empathic attunement with the “pre-symbolic”, Lacan is 
placing it “beyond discourse” and understanding (Hamburg, 1991, p. 358). From the perspective of 
Benjamin’s developmental take on thirdness, Lacan’s “symbolic representation of the father, … the 
thirdness of speech” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 6) results and emerges from “preceding” positions of 
thirdness within the therapeutic dyad rather than endowing the dyad with thirdness.  
 
3.2.2.2.2 The Third as a third element that intersects the dyad 
This concerns the fact that while therapist and patient do meet alone in the therapy room, they are 
seldom two individuals meeting in isolation in a solely personal encounter (Aron, 1999). There is 
often another element that forms a third point of reference to the dyad that takes the dyad beyond 
the personal (Ibid.).  
 
While this Third is somewhat similar to the notion of the symbolic Third in that it can also structure 
and ground the dyad, the emphasis is on the way that the patient and (especially) the therapist relate 
to it and whether this personal allegiance to the Third adds to or becomes a loyalty and focus that 
detract from the process of therapy (that is, whether it contributes towards or constricts the evolving 
trajectory of thirdness within the dyad). Although this Third is usually seen as something “outside” 
the dyad that the therapist relates to (for example, his professional allegiance), it could also 
(mostly) involve the patient or both therapist and patient. In fact, within the same dyad, there may 
be different patient-therapist-Third triangles and “several charged, shifting vectors of relations 
among them” (Aron, 1999, p. 8). Here one may think of how, when the patient is also a therapist, 
both therapist and patient have their own personal relationships to theory as a Third. 
 
For certain relational theorists (Hoffman, 1994, 1998; Spezzano, 1998; Aron, 1999; Crastnopol, 
1999a, 1999b), this Third seems to be specifically about the way that the therapist relates to his 
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professional association or professional identity; that is, it is about the professional and theoretical 
discourses that he unconsciously or preconsciously introduces into the therapeutic space. This 
Third pertains to how the therapist’s relationship to these discourses becomes alive in relation to 
the therapeutic dyad, where it may involve the therapist in “some form of symbolic oedipal 
partnership” which needs to be explored within the therapeutic dyad (Ringstrom, 2001a, p. 743n9).  
 
According to Crastnopol (1999a), the issue of this kind of Third often comes to the fore when a 
patient comes up against the boundaries of the therapist’s personal involvement with him or her. 
These boundaries are usually largely determined by the therapist’s loyalty to certain professional 
discourses. These beliefs (often unconscious and preconscious) on the therapist’s part, which 
include discourses about theory, power and commitment, may often be inconsistent and 
contradictory in ways that the patient may find confusing and disturbing.45  
 
One of the most significant debates in relational theorising has been around the issue of restraint 
and expressiveness on the part of the therapist, that is, the tension between asymmetry and 
mutuality. The therapist is no longer hiding behind the blank screen, and rather than seeing restraint 
on the part of the therapist in terms of neutrality, anonymity and abstinence, it can be thought of as 
implying “disciplined self-reflection” (Mitchell, 2000, p. 127). Hoffman (1994, 1998) 
conceptualises this issue in terms of the ongoing paradoxical dialectic between analytic “ritual” (the 
role-determined, formal and hierarchical aspects of the relationship) and “spontaneity” (the more 
informal, personal and egalitarian aspects of the relationship), with both poles working in tandem, 
“the one potentiating the impact of the other” (Ibid., 1998, p. 234). Ringstrom (2001a) uses the 
evocative metaphor of the classical and the improvisational theatre as a way of juxtaposing the 
“prescriptive” and “improvisational” aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice. In commenting 
on Ringstrom’s paper, Knoblauch (2001, p. 793) notes that it is important to remember that 
“effective psychoanalytic improvisation is based on years of continuing analytic study and 
practice”. 
                                                 
45 Lindon (1991, p. 31) notes that there are two sets of theories: “those based on metapsychological abstractions” and 
“those based on experience-near clinical observation”. This resonates with Sandler’s (1992, p. 190) distinction between 
the explicit “public face” and the implicit “private” aspect of psychoanalytic practice. Analysts (even those doing 
“good” analytic work) often work from a framework of part-theories that are largely unconscious and that do not 
necessarily cohere. However, as long as they remain “unconscious”, Sandler does not see contradictions among these 
part-theories as problematic, and even considers them as probably more useful and appropriate than “official” theories. 
When these part-theories come together in a way that is acceptable to consciousness, they may give rise to new theory 
in the more public domain. 
Hamilton’s (1996) empirical study of the theoretical and technical preferences of 65 experienced British and American 
analysts of diverse orientations also indicates that the professional realm (and therefore the “analytic preconscious” 
from which the therapist works) is varied and internally inconsistent, even among those clinicians with the same 
declared theoretical orientation or even among those who share an institute affiliation. She found the most cohesive 
groups to be the London Kleinians and the American self psychologists. 
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This specific idea of thirdness (that is, the Third formed by the therapist’s professional allegiances 
and stance) therefore represents a constructive effort to grapple with this ongoing issue of the 
deviation from the old authority position and to find “a new sensibility” representing “a higher 
level principle” rather than another set of rules (Slavin & Kriegman, 1998b, p. 278).  
 
While the professional discourses that the therapist introduces into the therapeutic situation are the 
main focus of debate and theorising around this specific conceptualisation of the Third, they are not 
always limited to these aspects, but may also be seen as extending to the “wider … social and 
historical culture in which the dyad is embedded”, albeit in a different way to that in which it is 
conceptualised in Lacanian thinking (Aron, 1999, p. 6). According to Aron (Ibid.), thinking of the 
analytic situation in this manner therefore does not necessarily “entail imposing an oedipal 
triangular structure”. However, taking “account of the context within which the dyad operates” 
(which points to a wider context beyond the two individuals), may mean thinking of the “contextual 
Third” as well as the “oedipal third” (Ibid.). 
 
For example, Ringstrom (2001b) describes the noxious Third (similar to Benjamin’s negative third 
and Ogden’s subjugating third) which may arise from the therapist and patient holding 
contradictory values owing to cultural differences. When this is not thought and talked about, a 
silent and unacknowledged power struggle about whose reality should prevail could ensue. 
(Considerable work needs to be done in contexts such as contemporary South Africa about the 
kinds of Thirds resulting from cultural and class differences between therapist and patient.) 
 
3.2.3 The significance of thirdness and Thirds in this study 
In this study I have used the multidimensional ways in which thirdness and Thirds may be 
conceptualised for understanding the participants’ descriptions of the effects of the therapeutic 
third on the clinical third. The different aspects of the participants’ experiences of their personal 
therapies could be understood in terms of the emerging and evolving trajectory of thirdness in the 
therapeutic third or linked with the intersubjectivity constituted by the dialectic of recognition and 
negation between the participants and their therapists. The participants’ being both patients and 
therapists was a theme that was always (to a greater and lesser extent) in some ways – consciously 
and unconsciously, implicitly and explicitly – part of the work with their own therapists. In the 
participants’ experiences of their own therapies, the difficult moments of impasses and enactments 
(that is, when there was negation and breakdown), also involved the possibility of the presence of 
an antitherapeutic dyad between the treating therapist and a third reference point. 
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The ways in which the therapeutic third could be linked to the clinical third (that is, the effects of 
personal therapy on clinical work) were also explored. In this regard the research participant’s own 
therapy could be conceptualised as forming a Third to his or her work as a clinician. Of course the 
same may be said for anything that the participant held in mind that triangulated the dyad(s) of 
participant and patient(s). It was kept in mind, however, that some kind of uneven developmental 
trajectory as a therapist, certain professional and personal discourses, as well as spill-overs from the 
research participant’s life events rather than just the research participant’s own therapy per se, 
could have been involved in determining the nature, function and role of the Third that his own 
therapy appeared to form in relation to his being-a-therapist.  
 
Benjamin (2001, p. 1) posits that thirdness should not primarily be thought of in terms of the 
“things” (and, as already indicated, there may be a variety of them) that may serve as Thirds, but 
rather in terms of the “psychic capacity” to use them as such. In this sense, thirdness concerns “a 
quality of mental space” and “intersubjective relatedness” (Ibid.). Therefore one way of thinking 
about thirdness in regard to the participant’s own therapy, was that one should only think of the 
participant’s therapy as being a Third to the clinical third of his work if (at that particular moment 
in time) the therapist-participant is capable of using it as a Third in keeping the improvisational 
dance of the therapeutic pair (consisting of him and his patient) to the tune of their co-created third.  
At this point the clinical third could be understood as depicted in Figure 3.1 (overleaf). 
 
It was also considered that when the participant’s own therapy was a third vantage point to the 
participant and his patient without there being thirdness within the dyad of the participant and his 
therapist, the participant’s therapy might form an antitherapeutic dyad with him in relation to his 
work as clinician. One of the questions that this brought forth is that of what about the participant’s 
own therapy (or what events or moments in his own therapy) made it a Third rather than just a third 
reference point that could also form an antitherapeutic dyad with the participant. These two ways of 
conceptualising the relationship of the therapist’s own therapy to his work as a clinician (that is, as 
a Third or as a kind of malignant dyad that invades and restricts the therapeutic space) might also 
be an oversimplification of a much more complex phenomenon. It may be more useful to think of 
the therapist’s own therapy as not “being or not being” a Third to his work, but as always holding 
the possibility for just that. This third vantage point of the therapist’s own therapy could therefore 
be seen as involving more or less thirdness, and thirdness itself as something that is never finally 
achieved, but as ebbing and flowing. 
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Figure 3.1 
 
The co-created third and some other possible Thirds involved in a participant-patient dyad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this way even the participant-therapist’s use of his own therapy or the imagined other of his own 
therapist in quite a concrete way (which may be what the participant-therapist needs and may be all 
that he is capable of at that particular moment),46 may be thought of as holding a kind of proto-
thirdness and as being part of a movement towards thirdness rather than being designated as just 
indicating the absence of “true” thirdness. Another question that this would bring is how one could 
conceptualise “more or less” thirdness in the way the therapist’s own therapy relates to his work.  
 
                                                 
46 Of course this begs the question of what he would use at such a moment or what would happen if the space of his 
own therapy (and this “space” may be the result of more than one therapy) were not there. 
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The questions raised in this section clearly relate to what has been discussed and certainly need to 
be addressed. While this study will attempt to do some of this, it may also be that the complexity 
and depth of these issues may go beyond what is possible within the scope of this work. 
 
3.3 THE TRAJECTORY OF THIRDNESS 
 
This section also forms part of the conceptual background used in the discussions of interview 
material; it will specifically be used to develop an understanding of the participants’ descriptions of 
their experiences of their own therapies. 
 
3.3.1 The trajectory of thirdness and clusters of thirdness 
The main focus in Benjamin’s (2000a, p. 45) account of thirdness is on the “crisis of recognition” 
in which “the difference in desire, meaning, and perspective” between therapist and patient “has to 
be negotiated”. This process of negotiation is conceptualised in Benjamin’s (1995, 2000a, 2001) 
description of how both emerging thirdness and the linked mutual recognition evolve in the 
therapeutic space. She (Benjamin, 2000a, p. 44) sees this process in terms of phases constituted by 
certain markers which she calls “hallmark points” or “key moments of transformation” within a 
“developmental trajectory of intersubjectivity” (Benjamin, 1999b, p. 396), where the “core feature 
is recognizing the similarity of inner experience in tandem with difference” (Benjamin, 2000a, p. 
44). I should like to use the term clusters of thirdness for denoting these “markers”.  
 
The term clusters is a way of describing consecutive and different foci of thirdness that cohere 
loosely into phenomena within the therapeutic dyad and a means of clarifying thinking about what 
could be called the trajectory of thirdness and its evolvement. While these clusters are useful for 
describing and conceptualising a certain developmental progression or a trajectory of thirdness 
within the therapeutic dyad, they cannot, of course, be quite so exactly and neatly classified and 
also do not necessarily follow one another sequentially. 
 
An example of this developmental progression would be the idea that “symbolic thirdness” is 
founded on there already being a “nascent pre-symbolic thirdness” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 16). This 
means that the dialogue between therapist and patient may have the appearance of symbolic 
thirdness (that is, there may be “interpretations” and “insights”), but this may be what Benjamin 
(Ibid.) calls “a mere simulacrum of thirdness”, unless there are (and have been) earlier clusters of 
thirdness that ground the dyad in an evolving trajectory of thirdness. This resonates with Straker 
and Becker’s (1997, p. 174) finding that “it would seem that understanding begins as an embodied 
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experience in the intersubjective field during a change moment, but it is only symbolically 
represented with the passage of time”. 
 
While Benjamin’s trajectory of intersubjectivity within the therapeutic dyad thus has a definite 
developmental tilt (especially when she uses it in relation to the mother and child),47 it should be 
kept in mind that these clusters do not imply a linear progression of achieved positions with one 
cluster being superseded by the other. This means that a later cluster both preserves and refigures 
earlier ones, making possible a “flexible oscillation between levels of experience” (Benjamin, 1995, 
p. 71). These clusters of thirdness should be thought of as both (often sequentially) developing 
within the history of a specific therapeutic dyad and as being differently (that is, to a greater or 
lesser extent) foregrounded and overlapping at specific moments within the ever-changing and 
evolving trajectory of thirdness that is constellated between the therapist and patient in a good-
enough therapy. 48 
 
The idea of there being different and (in a certain sense) progressing clusters of thirdness also 
pertains to the idea that a viable therapeutic space (that is, in Benjamin’s terms, one where there is a 
sustained dialectic of recognition and negation) is not one-dimensional. The issue of whether it is 
“the reparative-developmental” or the “repetitive” dimensions of the transference-
countertransference matrix that are crucial (and should be emphasised) in bringing about mutative 
therapeutic change has long been debated in psychoanalytic theorising (Stern, 1994, p. 343). Stern 
(Ibid.) attempts to resolve this issue by integrating Mitchell’s (1988) “relational-conflict” and 
“developmental-arrest” perspectives and proposing that in a good-enough therapy the “needed” and 
“repeated” relationships are, while also varyingly foregrounded in different therapies and at specific 
moments within the same therapy, both present and exist in tension with each other. 
 
In this regard the therapist has been thought of as having different functions: both that of the 
maternal order (the therapist’s attunement, affective resonance, receptive reverie; that is, the 
patient’s being held and contained by the therapist) and that of the paternal order (which can be 
seen as a creative search for meanings; that is, the use of interpretation) (Bollas, 1996).  
                                                 
47 Although Benjamin often both refers to mother and child and speaks of the development of thirdness in terms of the 
evolving relationship between mother and child in developing her ideas about thirdness, I shall mostly use her ideas as 
they pertain to patient and therapist/analyst. 
48 Although being somewhat different, there is a resonance between the idea of there being an interplay between the 
different clusters of thirdness constituting Benjamin’s trajectory of intersubjectivity and Ogden’s (1986, 1994, 1997) 
conceptualisation of the dialectical interplay of the different modes of generating experience, such as the depressive, 
paranoid-schizoid and autistic-contiguous positions. The negating and preserving interplay of these positions evolves 
along a diachronic (temporally sequential) axis as well as a synchronic one. Therefore these positions neither follow 
nor precede one another; each rather co-exists with the others in a dialectical relationship. 
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Slochower (1996b) also addresses this issue of the nature of the therapist’s functions, albeit 
somewhat differently. She (1996b, p. 20) relates these therapeutic functions to Winnnicott’s (1966) 
ideas about “the male and female elements of ‘being’ and ‘doing’”.49 She (Slochower 1996b, p. 21) 
then divests “being” and “doing” of their specific genderedness and considers the therapist to be 
“both container and actor”. In describing their experiences of therapy from a “therapist 
perspective”, Straker and Becker’s (1997, p. 175) participants (who were both therapists and 
patients) noted that they had (on reflection) became aware of a “connecting split” or “healing link” 
between their “being” and “doing” therapist selves.50  
 
Benjamin (1998b, p. 44) problematises the idea (which originates from Freud) of separating the 
preoedipal and oedipal along gender lines, which is central to the idea that the therapist is required 
to assume both the “paternal (phallic) and maternal (holding) stances”. Embedded in this is the 
notion of the maternal function (also that of the therapist when working from a maternal stance) as 
being largely passive. The active-passive dimension may indeed be reconciled “in the work of the 
maternal subject” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 29) and therefore in the maternal metaphor of the therapist 
by using the concept of recognition. Recognition is both the “processing of the other’s psychic 
material” and the “intersubjective expression” of this (Ibid.). This intersubjective expression would 
vary according to where the patient and the therapy are at in that particular moment, that is, in 
terms of the foregrounded cluster of the trajectory of thirdness.  
 
While these clusters of thirdness may all be present within the therapeutic dyad, one cluster may be 
more prominent at a specific time. Thinking in terms of such a cluster (that is, the one that is 
foregrounded in the therapeutic dyad at a specific moment) provides a way of depicting and 
thinking about the dialectic of recognition and negation (and how it may break down and be 
restored) and the evolvement of thirdness within a specific therapeutic dyad.  
 
In this study I have endeavoured to gain some understanding of the evolving trajectory of thirdness 
(See Figure 3.2) (in the dyads of research participants and their therapists) in terms of the 
participants-as-patients’ experiences of their own therapies and of the clusters of thirdness that are 
constellated. I have also tried to link these experiences of the participants-as-patients with those of 
the participants-as-clinicians.  
 
 
                                                 
49 Winnicott himself did not link “being” and “doing” with the different functions of the therapist. 
50 Straker and Becker (1997, p. 175) write about the “subsequent integration” of these connecting splits. I would 
consider them rather as being held in tension than as being integrated.  
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Figure 3.2 
 
The trajectory of thirdness 
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3.3.2 Clusters of thirdness 
3.3.2.1   The one in the third 
3.3.2.1.1 The emergence of the dance of thirdness 
Benjamin’s version of thirdness is ushered in by the cluster of thirdness that she describes as the 
“nascent” or “primordial” third (Benjamin 2001, p. 7). This comes about through the therapist’s 
ability to recognise the patient’s “specific needs, gestures, and acts” through being attuned and 
affectively resonant (Benjamin, 2002, p. 52). The therapist therefore surrenders to the patient’s way 
of being and this figures in the patient’s experience of specifically “being known or recognized” 
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(Sander, 2002, p. 39). Benjamin (2002, p. 50n1) calls the therapist’s “attunement and empathy51 
that make it possible to bridge difference with identification” and “to infuse observation with 
empathy”, the one in the third. 
 
This accommodation by the therapist does not mean that the therapist submits to the patient’s 
demands, but rather pertains to the asymmetry inherent in the therapeutic relationship. This 
asymmetry implies that the therapist “recognises and respects the needs, limits, and capabilities” of 
the patient (Benjamin, 2002, p. 49). This is part of what Benjamin (2001, 2002) sees as the moral 
third that underpins any good-enough therapy. The moral third goes beyond ethical rules, that is, it 
concerns a “greater principle of necessity, rightness, goodness” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 10). It has to 
do with the therapist’s both respecting the patient as different and equal, as well as being mindful of 
and taking on the responsibility of the asymmetry of the therapeutic situation.  
 
The moral third is related to what elsewhere has been described as the therapist’s agapaic 
capability,52 an “attitudinal substratum that underlies the transference/counter-transference” 
(Lambert, 1981, p. 24). This capacity has to do with the therapist’s “concern, patience and a 
capacity to remain-in-being for his patient” (Ibid.). “It is a combination of eros, humane feeling and 
respect, together with a freedom from god-almightiness” (Ibid.). The therapist's agapaic attitude is 
not a kind of lofty and idealistic position that arises out of “saintly or masochistic motivations” 
(Ibid., p. 41), but is “an attitude that is benign enough because the malignant elements have been 
made conscious and partly overcome” (Ibid., p. 40).53  
 
According to Coltart (1993b, p. 121), the therapist’s loving attitude towards the patient does not 
necessarily imply (always) liking the patient, but becomes the matrix, the “trustworthy container” 
in which the therapist may with some degree of safety also acknowledge feelings of hatred or rage 
against the patient. This agapaic or loving attitude shows itself in the therapist’s steady and reliable 
presence and his ability to remain empathic towards the patient, even the hateful or attacking 
patient. The therapist may feel himself unfairly provoked or negated by the patient and has to 
contain his own anxieties and anger and not become distant or retaliate. Racker (1968, p. 159) 
                                                 
51 Bach (1994, p. 158n2) usefully distinguishes attunement from empathy: “Empathy implies a sharing and a receptivity 
to another person’s expressed thoughts and feelings; the identification of one ego with another. Attunement implies a 
receptivity to another’s not-yet verbalized wishes through resonance and harmony with his rhythms, gestures, sounds, 
and affect … Although words may be used to express both empathy and attunement, empathy emphasizes their 
symbolic content whereas attunement emphasizes their form and function …” 
52 Agapaic derives from the Greek agape; that is, brotherly love (as distinct from erotic love). Drawing on Lambert’s 
(1981) thinking, the term agapaic capacity was formulated by Chris Milton, a well-known Cape Town psychotherapist.  
53 I could not find such an evocative description of this pivotal aspect of being-a-therapist in a responsible, ethical and 
“moral” way in the psychoanalytic literature. Hence this venture into Jungian thinking, which is, strictly speaking, 
beyond the theoretical scope of this study. 
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reminds us that “behind the negative transference lies simply thwarted love … [Knowing this] 
helps the analyst to respond with love to this possibility of loving, to this nucleus of the patient 
however deeply it be buried beneath hate and fear”. 
 
As the therapist accommodates to the patient’s way of being and the patient therefore also becomes 
able to accommodate to that of the therapist, the individual subjectivities of therapist and patient 
cohere into a oneness, a particular “fittedness” (Boston Change Process Study Group, 2002, p. 
1052),54 which Sander (2002) calls a rhythmicity.55 This shared pattern consists of the “unique 
language, metaphors, rituals, little intimacies” and “particular forms of play” that develop between 
therapist and patient (Frankel, 2003, p. 517). According to Benjamin (2002, p. 49), thirdness is 
therefore constituted by an “attunement both to the other and to some deeper structure”, that is, the 
“dance” of the evolving third between therapist and patient.  
 
3.3.2.1.2 Holding, mirroring, mutual recognition and the therapist’s subjectivity 
If Benjamin sees the therapist as being attuned and affectively resonant, this could appear to mean 
that the therapist is assumed to adopt a holding position. The concept of holding has strong links to 
the maternal metaphor, where “(preoedipal) mothering”, especially as theorised in its “purest” form 
by Winnicott (1960b, 1960c 1963a), is used as a “tool” to understand the therapeutic process 
(Slochower, 1996b, p. 15). Through “identification and empathy” (that is, variants of Winnicott’s 
“primary maternal preoccupation”), the “soothing, all-giving analyst/mother” is able “to efface her 
own needs and concerns in order to attend to or minister to those of the patient/child” (Gerhardt, 
Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 19). 
 
For the patient, the holding metaphor means an experience where the therapist is finely and 
emphatically attuned to his (the patient’s) subjective world and his needs. (Although holding is 
commonly associated with patients’ dependency needs, it is also important for “patients struggling 
with issues of narcissism or rage” [Slochower, 1996a, p. 335].) It also means that the therapist does 
not challenge or question the patient’s experience (especially of the therapist and the therapy).  
                                                 
54 These authors conceptualise this fittedness as arising in the “implicit domain” (Ibid., p. 1052) of therapeutic 
interaction, which they contrast with “the narrative/declarative level” (Ibid., p. 1051). They see this fittedness (which 
results from the intersubjective processes between therapist and patient) as changing the implicit procedural knowledge 
and expectations that patient and therapist have of each other and this “new context” as creating “the potential for 
further elaboration of new forms of shared experience” (Ibid., p. 1059). What they describe therefore appears very 
similar to Benjamin’s nascent or primordial third.  
55 Sander’s studies of early nursing patterns illustrate how, when the significant other is attuned, that is “permeable, 
responsive, recognizing”, a shared pattern of rhythmicity may evolve within the dyad (Benjamin, 2002, p. 48). Within 
the therapeutic dyad this rhythmicity means that rather than “directly striving to match each other”, both therapist and 
patient align with this “fundamental form of the third” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 7; 2002, p. 49). These rhythmic experiences 
are therefore both the early beginnings of thirdness and pivotal in the evolvement of thirdness.  
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According to Slochower (1996a, 1996b), the patient is allowed to remain unaware of his emotional 
impact on the therapist by the therapist’s containing those aspects of his experience of the patient 
that may feel dystonic to the patient. Although the idea that the therapist knows what would be 
dystonic to the patient could certainly be challenged from a relational-constructivist position, 
Slochower (1996a, p. 326) sees the therapist’s “position of certainty” as part of the co-created 
“illusion of attunement”.56 From this perspective, the therapist’s subjectivity is therefore largely 
conceived as being bracketed. In Winnicott’s (1969) terms this means that the therapist remains 
subjectively perceived by the patient and that difference is not introduced. For the patient, the 
therapist therefore remains an object rather than becoming a “like subject” (Benjamin, 1995).  
 
While some theorists57 have included both mutuality and dependence in their thinking about the 
therapist-patient relationship, Winnicott (and others), who highlight the holding aspects of the 
therapeutic relationship (especially as it pertains to the patient’s dependency needs) have been 
criticised (from the relational-constructivist position) for “their positivist quasi-authoritarian 
perspective” (Slochower, 1996b, p. 140). At first glance it seems that the concepts of 
intersubjectivity and mutual recognition cannot readily be reconciled to the “holding trope” and its 
implied maternal tilt (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 21). This consequently requires some 
deconstructive examination and questioning. 
 
Does the idea of the therapist’s holding the patient not by its very nature foreclose the possibilities 
of any real mutual recognition, even when holding is more relationally viewed as an “illusion of 
absolute attunement” that is cocreated by therapist and patient (Slochower, 1996a, p. 326)? And 
does it not (as some of the relational-constructivist thinkers’ criticisms posit) imply that the 
therapist is emotionally “superior” and “all-knowing” (especially as it concerns what the patient 
needs), thereby infantilising the patient and rendering him less than the therapist (Slochower, 
1996a, 1996b)?58 
                                                 
56 “This attunement … concerns the analyst’s capacity to understand and evenly and consistently to respond to the 
patient’s needs or feeling states. It is illusory because its maintenance requires that both parties temporarily bracket 
their awareness of the more complex aspects of the analytic interchange” (Slochower, 1996a, p. 326).  
57 See Bollas (1987), Bromberg (1991) and Casement (1985, 1990). 
58 Slochower (1996a, 1996b) further comments that the relational perspective assumes that collaboration or mutuality 
between therapist and patient is possible, that is, in Winnicott’s (1969) sense, that the patient is capable of object usage. 
However, some patients may initially (or at times) be at Winnicott’s level of object relating (which the holding 
metaphor implies) rather than being capable of object usage. Slochower further emphasises that while holding is always 
an element in the analytic process, it shifts from being foreground to background and vice versa. The patient’s initial 
experience of being held may, in fact, bring him or her to the point where mutuality between therapist and patient is a 
possibility. Aron (1996, p. 149) clarifies this by making a definite distinction between “reciprocal influence and mutual 
regulation” and “mutual recognition”. According to him, “mutual regulation is a conceptual assumption of relational 
theory”, but “mutual recognition may be thought of as one of its primary goals”. 
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There is a fine line between the therapist’s negating of the patient’s experience and subjectivity and 
the therapist’s not just conforming to the patient’s internal fantasy (that is, introducing some 
potential for difference or alterity). But how does a therapy move beyond the therapist’s holding the 
patient in what Grand (2003, p. 473) calls “the limitless maternal gaze”, which could, from a 
Lacanian perspective, mean the therapeutic pair’s being trapped in the seductive reflections of 
sameness found “in the blindly illuminating alleys of the imaginary order” (Bernstein, 1999, p. 
279), without the patient’s subjectivity being imposed on and compromised? 
 
While there is a resonance between the concepts of mirroring and holding, their meanings are 
somewhat different. I understand holding to be broader and encompassing a number of dimensions, 
of which mirroring is a central one. Within psychoanalytic theorising, the notion of mirroring has 
highlighted “the reflective qualities of human relationships” and has provided a way to think about 
the “interactions between self and other”, especially as this concerns developmental processes and 
the therapeutic relationship (Cartwright, 2000, p. 8).  
 
The analogy of the therapist as mirror has been variously conceptualised since Freud (1912) first 
introduced it into psychoanalysis to depict the therapist’s ability to be objective and neutral,59which 
is something that, as Freud acknowledged, can never be completely achieved (Cartwright, 2000). 
Freud’s (1919) later encounter with the mirror image or “double” prefigured the current conceptual 
tension between the mirror function of the therapist as affirming the wholeness, unity, and even the 
omnipotence and grandiosity of the patient’s self versus his (the therapist’s) reflection of the patient 
as also including alterity (Cartwright, 2000). Kohut, Lacan and Winnicott are probably the most 
significant contributors to current theorising in this area and, before returning to Benjamin’s use of 
this concept, their interpretations of mirroring will be briefly considered and compared. 
 
Generally, and used as a basis for Benjamin’s thinking concerning this concept, mirroring is 
understood in Winnicott’s sense of the infant/patient’s image of himself being contingent to what is 
“given back” to him by the mother/therapist. “What does the baby see when he or she looks at the 
mother’s face? I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herself. In other 
words, the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees there” 
(Winnicott, 1967, p. 131). The child/patient’s sense of self is both discovered in the mirror image, 
                                                 
59 “The doctor should be opaque to his patients, and like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him” 
(Freud, 1912, pp. 117-118). 
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which is and should be grounded in the individual,60 and authenticated by the experience of the 
mirror.  
 
The Winnicotian mirror is therefore to be found in the mother/therapist’s face; it implies warmth 
and nurturance and will only appear if holding is sufficient (and has led to a sense of “I” or ego 
integration) (Winnicott, 1967; Cartwright, 2000). There is also a movement from the initial 
“narcissistic mirroring” to a more “mature form of mirroring”, where the mirror comes to represent 
both self, self-as-other and other, so that it becomes an area of transitional experience where 
sameness and difference, other and self, can exist simultaneously (Winnicott, 1971; Cartwright, 
2000, p. 13). This is may be related to Winnicott’s (1969) notion that mature relating primarily 
relies on object usage rather than object relating, which is a distinction that Benjamin (1995) uses 
in differentiating relating to the other as subject and as object.61  
 
This Winnicotian idea of mirroring is quite different from that of Lacan (1949). Lacan’s (1949) 
mirror stage depicts the self-alienation, on which the maternal domain of the imaginary order is 
based, and that comes about through the ego’s misrecognition of itself as the unified and idealised 
specular image (Benjamin, 1995; Evans, 1996). This notion of mirroring has to be understood 
within the context of Lacan’s “relentless privileging of the symbolic function” and his dismissal of 
the sustaining empathy of the maternal as seductive and illusionary (Hamburg, 1991, p. 351). Lacan 
regards holding or nurturing (as represented by the maternal) as insignificant, and although he 
assigns a “critical developmental significance to the mirror function”, he emphasises its 
renunciation as an essential part of entering the paternal domain of symbolic transactions 
(Hamburg, 1991, p. 350). In the Lacanian mirror the subject sees something other (that is, himself 
as seen by the other) rather than himself, but mistakes this image as a model of himself, thus 
becoming alienated from his own subjectivity. Any emphasis on the use of the mirror to affirm and 
bolster the subject’s sense of self is thus based on an illusion of wholeness and cohesion and will 
lead to further self-alienation (Cartwright, 2000).62 Muller (1996, 1999), who writes from a 
Lacanian perspective, therefore sees empathy primarily as involving what he calls “coercive” 
mirroring (sameness) rather than recognition (difference).63 
 
A specific understanding of the notion of mirroring is a fundamental tenet of self-psychological 
thinking (Kohut, 1971, 1977, 1984). Kohut “reinterpreted psychic development in terms of the 
                                                 
60 Otherwise a “false self” organisation could ensue (Winnicott, 1960b). 
61 See pp. 63-64 also. 
62 “Winnicott rejects [this] Lacanian decentring of self” (Rudnytsky, 1991, cf. Carwright, 2000, p. 12).  
63  For Muller empathy therefore seems to be based on identifications that are concordant with self experience. See also 
p. 120. 
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self’s need to find cohesion and mirroring in the other” (Benjamin, 1988, p. 19), who then serves as 
the child’s/patient’s “selfobject” (Kohut, 1971, 1977, 1984). Kohut (Ibid.) describes and explores 
the different forms of selfobject transferences that are constellated in the therapeutic relationship, 
for example, twinship (somebody like me), idealising (somebody that I can look up to) and 
mirroring (somebody that understands me completely) (Hamburg, 1991).  
 
This “mirroring selfobject” (Kohut, 1984, p. 23) responds to the child’s/patient’s being with a 
metaphorical “gleam in the eye” (Kohut, 1971, p. 117). By affirming the value of child’s/patient’s 
existence and his “sense of agency and self-esteem” (Benjamin, 1988, p. 283n43), the 
parent/therapist serves to sustain the “vitality and assertiveness” of the child’s/patient’s self (Kohut, 
1984, p. 23).64 Kohut (1971, p. 117) further describes the central role of the empathic therapist’s 
“echoing, approving, and confirming” responsiveness in the “many instances of mirror 
transference” during the course of a therapy. This engenders a movement from the “stage of the 
fragmented self” to a more “cohesive self” (Ibid.).  
 
Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984) thus sees the work of therapy as taking place within the containing 
matrix created by the therapist’s empathic mirroring of the patient. According to him (Ibid.), 
structural changes or “transmuting internalizations” come about when there is tolerable difference 
(“optimal frustration”). This is seen as happening owing to the therapist’s momentary empathic 
failures as the patient’s selfobject, which are bearable and thus do not re-traumatise the patient.  
 
While Kohut (1971) gives some thought to the implications, the demands and difficulties that being 
the patient’s selfobject holds for the therapist, the therapist’s mirroring role essentially remains at 
the level of sameness, that is, in terms of the patient’s needs and desires. The therapist’s 
subjectivity is therefore not a fundamental part of Kohut’s thinking about difference. Rather than 
being subsumed in Benjamin’s dialectic of recognition and negation and possibly becoming a 
shared aspect of evolving subject-to-subject relating, the “burden of difference” (Hamburg, 1991, 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 The function of selfobject relatedness is quite clear: “Selfobject relatedness is the person’s experience, at any age, of 
a significant human other or attachment figure as support for the establishment, development, and maintenance of 
continuous, cohesive and positive self-experience” (Orange, 1995, p. 177). However, the meaning of the term 
“selfobject” itself is much more slippery. As Hamburg (1991, p. 354) puts it, while selfobjects are defined as “internal 
representations of significant people or parts of people, … the location of this structure seems to wander between the 
intrapsychic and environmental”. What does it actually mean for the therapist to be the patient’s “selfobject”? How can 
this concept include the differences and gaps, additions and subtractions that are so typical of “the creative activity of 
intersubjectivity” (Hamburg, Ibid.).  
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p. 353) thus rests on and remains with the therapist.65 
 
Benjamin’s (1988, p. 251n16) comments that the idea of the patient’s using the therapist as a 
“selfobject”, that is, a ”mirroring object”, misses the “key point” of the “intersubjective view”, 
since it “fails to distinguish between using others as ‘selfobjects’ and recognizing the other as an 
outside subject”. Orange (1995, p. 30), who writes from the contextualist or systems intersubjective 
perspective, contends that Kohut’s metaphor of the mirror, while “apt and evocative, needs 
enriching and complexifying” to make it a fully “intersubjective conception of mirroring”. The 
intersubjective implies there being self, other and an emerging “we”, who recognise in one another 
“a common emotional response to something” (Ibid.). The intersubjective conception of mirroring 
thus implies “both peculiarity and mutuality” (Ibid.). “I recognize you, and you see that it is you 
that I recognize. When recognition becomes fully mutual, we recognize each other” (Ibid.). This 
resonates with Benjamin’s conceptualsation of evolving thirdness and mutual recognition. 
Mirroring is therefore an intersubjectively constituted process, as opposed to a therapist-directed 
technique, and Benjamin (2000b, p. 293) emphasises that she does not subscribe to the “self-
psychological notion of mirroring”. 
 
While coming from different theoretical perspectives, Kohut and Winnicott both give prominence 
to the concept of mirroring as indicating an inherently warm and nurturing experience of relating 
and both explore what ensues from inadequate maternal care or therapist failures (Cartwright, 
2000). While Kohut and Lacan both highlight “disintegration anxiety and put mirroring phenomena 
in the forefront of the processes of identification that shape subjective experience” (Muller, 1989, p. 
363), the Kohutian mirror stands directly opposed to that of Lacan. For Lacan there is a difference 
“between the self and the mirror image”, but Kohut emphasises the experience of similarity and 
affirmation rather than that of the alienating image (Cartwright, 2000, p. 8).  
 
Cartwright (2000, p. 13) makes the interesting suggestion that, rather than dismissing either of 
them, we should think of the Lacanian and Kohutian mirrors as conceptualisations of oppositional 
poles of what he calls the mirror dialectic. He bases this on Ogden’s (1994, pp. 52-53) idea that 
mirroring “is not a relationship of identity; it is a relationship of relative sameness and therefore of 
relative difference”. An intersubjective rendition of mirroring should therefore provide a means to 
take both sameness and alterity into account. The Winnicotian notion of the mirror is 
                                                 
65 It has to be noted, however, that in contrast with “classical” self psychological thinking, and while also using the idea 
of the therapist’s serving as the patient’s selfobject, the contextualist or intersubjective systems approach specifically 
recognises and elucidates the role of the therapist’s subjectivity (Buirski & Haglund, 2001), albeit without Benjamin’s 
emphasis on difference and subject-to-subject relating.   
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unquestionably more comprehensive, and consequently lends itself more readily to an 
intersubjective way of thinking than either that of Kohut (who emphasises sameness) or that of 
Lacan (who emphasises difference), in the sense that it succeeds in portraying “the dialectical 
tension between these oppositions” (Cartwright, 2000, p. 15).  
 
Benjamin (2000b) concedes that Winnicott, whose ideas have played a fundamental role in the 
development of her theorising, is inconsistent when it comes to taking the mother/therapist’s 
subjectivity into account. According to her (Benjamin, Ibid., p. 293), Winnicott’s thinking contains 
“competing contradictory strains, some in favor of maternal subjectivity and others idealizing 
primary maternal preoccupation”. In her thinking she (Ibid.) has emphasised “the side of Winnicott 
that theorized destruction and survival”; that is, the movement towards subject-to-subject relating. 
In this she (Ibid.) has found a strong argument in support of her specific intersubjective perspective 
and, by implication, for the necessity of taking maternal/therapist subjectivity into account. A truly 
intersubjective conceptualisation of mirroring hence has to be clear about not only taking into 
consideration the subjectivity of the child/patient, but also that of the parent/therapist. 
 
Benjamin (1988, p. 24) accordingly problematises the idea of maternal mirroring that is divested of 
the mother’s/therapist’s subjectivity: “The mother [read therapist] cannot (and should not) be a 
mirror; she must not merely reflect back what the child [read patient] asserts; she must embody 
something of the not-me; she must be an independent other who responds in her different way.” In 
the same vein, Muller (1996, p. 65) writes about “a complex doubling that is not a reflection of 
sameness” and Pizer (1998, p. 31) remarks that one should rather think of the therapist as 
“squiggling” (Winnicott, 1964-1968) with a patient than as mirroring a patient. 
 
Benjamin (2000a) disagrees with Gerhardt, Sweetnam and Borton’s (2000, p. 19) observation that 
her above-mentioned critical view of the notion of maternal mirroring also means that she rejects 
the “holding model” in psychotherapy. She (Benjamin, 2000a, p. 48) clarifies that it does not mean 
that she “impugn[s] holding” and, indeed, for Benjamin, “differentiation does not necessitate the 
repudiation of likeness” (Layton, 1999, p. 311). It rather has to do with the fact that in spite of the 
therapist’s being exquisitely attuned to the patient, mirroring will inevitably also mean that the 
therapist is always responding from his own subjectivity, thus changing what has been received 
from the patient, but modulating it sufficiently to be attuned (and unavoidably sometimes being 
misattuned) to the patient. The therapist’s mirroring/holding thus implies interpretation (although 
not necessarily in the sense of the therapist’s actually giving interpretations).  
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Benjamin (2000a) further argues that while the therapist’s subjecthood (that is, independent 
existence or alterity) may be held in abeyance, his personhood (that is, subjectivity) will still be 
conveyed to the patient by the way he expresses himself. She (Benjamin, 2000a, p. 49) therefore 
understands Slochower’s (1996a, 1996b) “holding … as fulfilling the function of initially 
establishing the analyst as someone different who can feel the same”. Before difference is 
confronted, the therapist’s recognition of the patient is therefore put across through the expression 
of his affective attunement and empathy with the patient, which is indicative of the felt, emotionally 
charged connection (the original space of thirdness) between therapist and patient. For Benjamin 
(2000a, p. 49), “holding or attunement should not be opposed to mutual recognition of alterity, for 
the latter is founded in the former”. Mutuality may also be understood in terms of the possibility of 
the therapist’s empathic identification with the patient moving the therapeutic pair beyond the 
power imbalance implicit in the idea of the therapist’s holding the patient.  
 
This still leaves us with the “problem” of the therapist’s subjectivity. Slochower (1996a, 1996b) 
points out that what is not theorised explicitly enough in the maternal model of therapy, are the 
difficulties that the therapist may experience in assuming a holding position.66 Benjamin (2001, p. 
8) comments that the therapist’s identifying with and responding sensitively to the patient does not 
merely signify “submission and self-abnegation” on his (the therapist’s) part. While she (Benjamin, 
2000a, pp. 49-50) concurs with Slochower that the therapist should “change” sufficiently to give 
the patient the attunement and recognition that he needs, he (the therapist) should also be able to 
contain and internally preserve his subjectivity at the same time as tolerating the patient’s “assault” 
(without submitting or retaliating), thus “surviving internally for oneself and surviving for the 
other”. This therefore means the therapist’s holding the tension between his subjectivity/desires and 
the needs of the patient (Benjamin, 2001) 
 
3.3.2.2  The third in the one 
3.3.2.2.1 Alterity and intersubjective negotiation 
This brings us to the next cluster of thirdness, where twoness is transcended (Benjamin, 2001). This 
is underpinned by the third in the one (Benjamin, 2001, p. 11), that is, the therapist’s “ability to 
contain or suspend his immediate need without denying the difference” while doing the “maternal 
work” of “representing, reflecting and containing the [patient’s] mind” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. xv). 
 
                                                 
66 While Winnicott had a rather “poetic perspective on the maternal function” (Slochower, 1996b, p. 17), he (Winnicott, 
1947) also noted that there were good reasons for the mother to hate (as well as love) the baby and, by implication, for 
the holding therapist to hate (as well as love) the patient. This may be seen as a precursor to the later ideas about the 
impact of the therapist’s subjectivity on the patient. 
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Benjamin (2000a, p. 50) suggests that the therapist’s relating to the patient at this point could be 
considered as constituting “neither holding nor interpretation”. The therapist is, in fact, opening up 
the potential space of thirdness by providing the patient with “a very effective form of play” (Ibid.). 
There is an incremental trajectory of thirdness where what one may call the wheel of the dialectic 
of recognition and negation may start turning (forwards and backwards) by the therapist’s showing 
“a small edge of challenging alterity” which the patient may take on and respond to with “some 
tacit bit of recognition”, or from which he (the patient) may retreat (Ibid.). This concurs with 
Pizer’s (1998, p. 64) idea of the therapist as “transitional mirror”, where “mirroring must be both 
empathic (attuned) and inexact (different)”. Thus what Pizer (1998, pp. 3-5) calls the “process of 
intersubjective negotiation” (that is, the largely unconscious “give-and-take of subjectivity, desire, 
stricture, and demand between analyst and patient”) is set in motion. 
 
Here one may think of how a therapist’s interpretations may both introduce alterity and cause the 
patient to feel held by the sense of being understood (Casement, 2002). However, it is when 
interpretations are indicative of the therapist’s negation of the patient’s subjectivity that the patient 
may experience them as attacking, controlling, impinging, and so forth. This happens particularly 
when, rather than being offered as possibilities for mutual consideration, interpretations are given 
as indisputable statements of “facts” that the therapist “knows” about the patient, (Ogden, 1986; 
Pizer, 1998; Casement, 2002). The patient could experience this as the therapist’s not negotiating 
meaning, but being negating by attempting to force him to substitute the therapist’s view for his 
own, and “unassimable difference” (Benjamin, 2000a, p. 44) may follow. What constitutes 
unassimable difference will, of course, be different in each therapeutic dyad and also at different 
points in time within every dyad.  
 
3.3.2.2.2 Containment and complementary twoness 
In her depiction of the third in the one Benjamin (2001) emphasises Bion’s (1962, 1967b) idea of 
the therapist’s functioning as a detoxifying container for the patient's intolerable affects and 
experiences. In further elaborations of the concept of containment, the patient is not only contained 
by the therapist, but also internalises the process of containing and becomes capable of containing 
himself (Hamilton, 1990; Ogden, 1994, Benjamin, 1998b). The question that then arises is how the 
therapist does not become a “negative container” (Grotstein, 1995, p. 489). Becoming a negative 
container means that the therapist becomes “destroyed” in Winnicott’s (1969) sense without 
“surviving” the destruction. The therapist submits to the patient’s demands or becomes emotionally 
absent and/or attacking.  
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The current emphasis on the therapist’s subjectivity means that the certainties of the objectivist-
authoritarian position are no longer there to fall back on or to hide behind. This leaves therapists 
much more visible and vulnerable. The absence of a prescribed way of doing things may set the 
therapist free to work from his or her subjectivity, but it also brings a greater sense of personal 
responsibility, accompanied by anxiety and potential guilt around the awareness that harming the 
patient is always a real possibility in therapy. There are also specific patients (such as those with 
severe narcissistic disturbances, especially those who are hostile and full of rage) and specific 
situations which a particular therapist could find difficult and anxiety-provoking. 
 
Both patient and therapist are usually involved in the creation of impasses and ruptures. These 
“occur most often when both patients’ and therapists’ primary vulnerabilities and defenses intersect 
in unmanageable ways” (Elkind, 1994, p. 3). From an object relations perspective, the concept of 
projective identification is often used to understand how the therapist becomes “enlisted in an 
interpersonal actualisation … of a segment of the patient’s internal object world”(Ogden, 1982, p. 
69) to take up and play the role that the patient has unconsciously assigned to him (Sandler, 1976). 
 
However, using the notion of projective identification in its original sense could give rise to the 
(rather outdated) idea that what the therapist experiences has been “put into him” via projective 
identification and can be understood and used as such (Sandler, 1993). Ringstrom (2003, p. 196) 
points out that “contemporary relational theories about projective identification” (that also take the 
subjectivity of the therapist into account) resonate with the ideas around “double-bind impasses”. 
He (Ibid.) also makes the interesting comment that the idea of the impasse actually goes “a step 
further” in that this may not just be about the patient’s unconsciously inducing the analyst to play 
some part in order to understand some “split-off, disavowed aspect of himself”, but could also be 
understood as the patient’s “flushing out something about the analyst’s authentic identity”. 
 
In this study the emphasis was primarily on the therapist’s contributions to impasses. While 
impasses are inevitably (and sometimes usefully) a part of the process of therapy and are mutually 
created and maintained, the continued existence of an impasse could also point to and highlight 
some negative attribute or particular vulnerability of the therapist’s. One way of understanding this 
specific version of impasse on an intersubjective level may therefore be as the constellation of an 
antitherapeutic dyad between the therapist and a third point of reference and the presence of a 
negative third between therapist and patient (Benjamin, 2001). While only one of these two aspects 
may be evident in a specific impasse, it is more likely that both would be present, but in varying 
degrees. Such a situation is depicted in Figure 3.3. 
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In the “relational knots” (Pizer, 2003; Ringstrom, 2003) that are typical of “double bind impasses” 
(Ringstrom, 2003, p. 193), the therapeutic pair becomes locked in the symmetry of complementary 
twoness (Benjamin, 2001, p. 3) of the negative or subjugating third (Ogden, 1994). When the 
therapeutic dyad is in the throes of complementary twoness (that is, the dialectic of recognition and 
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negation has collapsed), patient and therapist become “frozen” in the dichotomous polarities (“split 
complementarities”) (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 20) of “action-reaction” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 15) where 
neither is “able to think or speak clearly” (Ringstrom, 2003, p. 197). This “see-saw relationship” 
(Benjamin, 1998b, p, xiii) is marked by both therapist and patient feeling that they cannot 
acknowledge the other’s reality without abandoning their own: there is no “co-created reality” 
(Benjamin, 2001, p. 3) and the intimacy between therapist and patient becomes threatened and 
compromised (Ringstrom, 2001b). In object relations language one would therefore say that this is 
a situation where projective identification predominates. 
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The patient may experience his feelings as being denied and himself as being dismissed. The 
therapist may feel invaded by the patient’s “malignant emotional reality” and his sense of self may 
be threatened by the patient’s destructive view of him, so that he (the therapist) can no longer think 
without disidentifying (and withdrawing) from the patient (Benjamin, 2001, p. 22). The 
nonexistence of a space to negotiate meaning may become so palpably present that the therapist 
feels unable to move outside the narrow confines of what is dictated by the negative third: the 
meaning of what is happening cannot be discussed. 
 
This is what Peltz (1998, p. 387) calls “the realm of enactment and coercion” and of “nonmeaning 
in the symbolic sense”. Here one has the power and the other one submits to it; one is aggressor and 
the other one victim; one is subject and the other is object; one is recognised and the other negated. 
The only choice is to submit to or resist the other’s demand (Benjamin, 2001). Patient and therapist 
find themselves locked in opposing and unequal positions, which are reversed through 
identification. One could therefore also understand complementary twoness as being constellated at 
a point in therapy where the fluid process of multiple reciprocal identifications and 
disidentifications between therapist and patient “goes wrong” in the sense that the therapeutic pair 
remains stuck in complementary positions of dominance and submission (Benjamin, 1998b; 
Ringstrom, 2001b). 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Moving along through difficult moments 
For therapist and patient to extricate themselves from complementary twoness requires the 
therapist’s becoming aware and recognising that he is both participating in the creation of the 
impasse and colluding in keeping awareness of the disconnection and collapse of thirdness at bay. 
The more conventional analytic methods, for example, elucidation, exploration, interpretation and 
even negotiation often prove to be insufficient and fail at such a moment of impasse (Pizer, 2003). 
While metacommunicating to the patient about their mutual process may go some way towards 
moving the therapeutic pair beyond the relational knot of the impasse, it may not be enough. 
Ringstrom’s (2001a) improvisational moments and Stern’s (1998) now moments are descriptions of 
the kinds of processes that are involved in the “mutative moments of change” that are particularly 
relevant at these difficult times in a therapy (Ringstrom, 2001a, p. 727). Improvisational and now 
moments also often concern acts of freedom (Symington, 1983) on the therapist’s part, where the 
therapist makes a complementary identification with an (often disowned) part of the patient and 
where the patient feels recognised by the therapist’s response that encompasses the impact of the 
patient on him (the therapist) and offers something new and different (Fonagy & Target, 1998). 
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Ringstrom (2001a, p. 727) sees an improvisational moment as resulting from the therapist’s 
surrendering his stake in the power play of the impasse and replacing it with “imaginative 
intersubjective engagement” with “disparate, often dissociatively disconnected parts of the patient”. 
This imaginative intersubjective engagement may be held in the therapist’s “own state of reverie”, 
and as such inform his interpretations (Ringstrom, 2003, p. 202). It may also lead to the therapist’s 
“changing” by momentarily stepping outside the prescribed “ritual” (Hoffman, 1998) of therapy 
and spontaneously engaging with the patient in a way “that conveys not only a moment of deep 
recognition but also the purest state of authentic engagement”; that is, it may bring about the arrival 
of an improvisational moment (Ringstrom, 2001a, p. 727).  
 
Stern’s (1998, p. 302) unpremeditated now moments (which he sees as “nonlinear leaps” and 
“emergent properties of a complex, dynamic system”) may result in a “specific moment of 
meeting” (on both a conceptual and an affective level) between therapist and patient. Sander (2002, 
p. 13) posits that the arrival of such a moment of meeting may be ushered in by the patient’s 
experience of specifically being known or recognised by the therapist (for example, by the 
therapist’s making an appropriate and meaningful interpretation), which also contributes to a co-
constructed “expanding specificity of recognition”. A moment of meeting creates the potential (“an 
open space”) for “a new and different intersubjective context” between therapist and patient, thus 
altering their relationship (that is, changing their presymbolic implicit or procedural knowledge of 
each other) (Stern, 1998, p. 302).  
 
3.3.2.2.4 The therapist’s knowing recognition of the patient 
These above-mentioned theorists seem to be talking about the therapist’s both being with the 
patient in a very specific emotionally alive way and about his having a measure of intuitively felt 
knowledge of the patient, constituted by some kind of hidden processes that are largely 
“unformulated” (Stern, 1998), as being pivotal at these moments. Coltart (1996, p. 30) describes the 
therapist’s experience of such vital moments: “It is as if one is lived from depths within oneself for 
a brief period, depths that one can trust, and which yield up the nearest thing to ‘inspiration’ that we 
ever experience.”  
 
From a relational perspective, even if the real power asymmetry between therapist and patient is 
taken into account, the therapist is not “the one who knows”. However, the therapist also does 
“know” from a perspective that straddles the paradoxical positions of “knowing” from his own 
subjectivity and “knowing” as a responsible and competent professional.  
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According to Bollas (1995, p. 39), the therapist who works with a patient gradually gathers 
knowledge of and about the patient in the form of “an inner constellation of preconscious ideas, 
feelings, visual images, sonic metaphors, somatic dispositions, and body-ego acuities, a kind of
psychosomatic organization that forms his matrix for unconscious communication with his patient”. 
The therapist’s immediate and intuitive “knowing” of the patient is therefore the result of complex 
and often unconscious (intrapsychic and intersubjective) processes that can be understood as “a 
network of the many different planes of reference that constitute [the therapist’s] subjectivity” 
(Bollas, 1995, p. 39). In terms of Benjamin’s thinking, the therapist’s “knowing” the patient 
(especially at those moments when he seems to step outside his “accustomed position”), constitutes 
a “deep recognition of the patient’s essential being” (Pizer, 1998, p. 4).  
 
One could also understand this deep recognition as indicative of the vital emotional bond, 
potentially generative of new meanings, between therapist and patient. Straker and Becker (1997, p. 
173) found that, from the “client perspective … change moments” were marked by their 
participants finding verbal content and insight (or rather “understanding”) to be backgrounded. 
What was more important at those change moments, was function rather than structure; “the music 
not the words”; that is, the “the emotional tone” of the relationship” (Ibid., pp.173-174). 
 
One of the difficult aspects about being a therapist is to accept that one can never fully understand 
the patient; that is, that to some extent he always remains Other. According to Bollas (1995, p. 20), 
the therapist therefore plays both the roles “of the wise figure who sustains [the] illusion [of 
understanding] and [who] thereby encourages the patient to speak” and “the fool who does not 
know what is being said to him” in the transference. This also pertains to the therapist’s task 
encompassing the contradictory dimensions of both “knowing” the patient (in terms of Bollas’s 
matrix) and keeping in mind Bion’s (1967a) well-known injunction that every session should be 
approached without memory, desire or understanding. According to Bion, patients' mental-
emotional realities should be apprehended directly, rather than being distorted by the therapist’s 
prior memories and “facts” about the patient, expectations of the patient, desires for progress and 
notions of cure.  
 
This therapeutic stance of “slouching towards” (Coltart, 1993a, borrowing from Yeats) rather than 
“arriving at” meaning implies neither a deconstructive watchfulness nor a kind of simplistic 
passivity, but a disciplined steadfastness. “I do not mean that ‘forgetting’ is enough: what is 
required is a positive act of refraining from memory and desire” (Bion, 1970, p. 31). This 
“generative uncertainty” (Ivey, 1999) speaks of therapists’ capacity to wait and to pay attention 
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without putting themselves into patients' experience too intrusively; to lay aside theoretical 
preconceptions (for example, Casement’s [1990] “psychoanalytic clichés”), which may be reached 
for because of the anxiety of not-knowing and to avoid grasping at premature pseudo-knowledge in 
order not to experience lack or absence. In the tension between what is known and what is 
unbidden (Stern, 1998), the therapeutic intersubjectvity may become alive in the “affectively 
resonant communication [which] in some sense precedes the discursive thirdness in which 
symbolic and universal/moral thirds predominate” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 26).   
 
3.3.2.3   The symbolic third and mutual recognition 
The earlier clusters of thirdness and the delicate balance between the patient’s experience of 
seamless and endless attunement and incrementally increasing alterity form the foundation for the 
third cluster of the trajectory of thirdness. Benjamin (2001, p. 16) calls this “the later, interpersonal 
symbolic third, the dimension of recognizing meaning and negotiating differences through speech”. 
Linked to the therapist’s ongoing process of recognition of the patient (even if interspersed by 
instants of negation) is a certain “progression” on the patient’s part: “agency, self-cohesion, and 
ultimately the ability to recognize the other” (Benjamin, 2002, p. 46).  
 
This third cluster is therefore marked by increasing mutual recognition (that is interwoven with the 
necessary moments of negation) between therapist and patient. Here, rather than conceiving 
splitting “in opposition to some normative ideal of the whole self”, it may be viewed “as the initial 
form adopted by the self with respect to contradictions in feelings or apprehensions; it can either be 
transformed in relation to the outside other or reduce the other to the locus of the self’s disowned 
parts” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 97).67 Accordingly ”reversible complementarities” may be broken up; 
the underlying polarities be held in tension and thus the dialectic of recognition and negation may 
be sustained and, when necessary, reinstated (Benjamin 1998b, p. xiv). Therapist and patient 
become increasingly capable of playing both complementary roles (which involve the intrapsychic 
dimension, that is, “subject-object relatedness”) and those roles that involve mutuality (which 
involve the intersubjective dimension, that is, “subject-to-subject relatedness”) (Aron, 2000, p. 
674).  
 
The idea of subject-to-subject relatedness foregrounds the issue of the therapist’s establishing 
himself as being separate and different and also recognising the patient as such. For the patient, the 
                                                 
67 In terms of Ogden’s (1994) analytic third, the third subject of analysis, one could say that at this point experience 
within this (the third) is being generated and organised not just according to Klein’s (1988a, 1988b) thinking about the 
depressive position. There is a dialectical interplay of the depressive, the paranoid-schizoid and the autistic-contiguous 
modes of generating experience rather than a collapse of the dialectic in the direction of any one of these modes.  
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therapist as subject is both “real” and “not real” (and may thus serve as a transitional object) 
(Frankel, 1998b). The therapist is “real” in the sense of his subjective presence in the session, 
where what he does or does not do, and says and does not say, declare and make evident what he is, 
what he feels and thinks. He is “not real” in terms of the mask that the necessary asymmetry of the 
therapeutic relationship lays upon his presence. Being the therapist also means “making himself 
available to becoming everyone in the patient’s life (transferentially) and no one (a person who is 
content not to be noticed, not to be attended to)” (Ogden, 2003, p. 598). While the therapist’s 
concern, caring and even love for the patient may be “real”, the fact of the patient’s paying for this 
and the end of each therapeutic hour signal the limits of the therapist’s involvement (Slavin & 
Kriegman, 1998b). 
 
The therapist’s task is to find ways to communicate with the patient as subject-to-subject within 
this “inevitable asymmetry of responsibility” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 98), that is in a “knowing” 
(Ibid., p. 23), authentic and personally involved way. In this context the therapist’s recognition of 
the patient as a subject could, for example, happen through “controlled communication of the 
patient’s emotional impact” (Ibid.) or through the therapist’s somehow “changing” through his 
experience of the patient (Slavin & Kriegman, 1998b). 
 
In relational/intersubjective theory, it is accepted that the therapist is constantly, inadvertently and 
inevitably, non-verbally and verbally, revealing himself (that is, his subjectivity) to the patient 
(Renik, 1995; Aron, 1996; Benjamin, 2000). He is no longer an “omniscient sphinx” whose 
authority cannot be questioned and as such could contribute to the patient’s unwarranted and 
sustained idealisation of him (Renik, 1995, p. 478). However, the therapist’s “purposeful or 
deliberate self-revelations” are still controversial (Aron, 1996, p. 235).68 Benjamin (2000a, p. 48) 
comments that such self-disclosures on the part of the therapist should not be confused with the 
therapist’s establishing himself as being separate and different from the patient. To do so (self-
disclose) under pressure from the patient would, in fact, be the converse of being “an independent 
subject” and in this case not disclosing may be the best way for the therapist to express his 
subjectivity (Ibid.). 
 
In the symbolic third there is a growing sense of a vital, rich, finely nuanced and co-created 
intersubjective third. The two participants have come to know and trust the familiar reliability of 
this shared space and have also become open to the arrival of the spontaneous and unexpected. 
Boundaries between therapist and patient are less rigid, guarded, defended and more fluid. Things 
                                                 
68 This is beyond the scope of this study. See Aron (1996) for a discussion of this issue. 
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no longer have to be only inflexibly the “this or that” of “alienated forms of complementarity, based 
on the idealization and repudiation created by splitting” (Benjamin (1998b, p. 97). Therefore many 
possible and even contradictory meanings may be simultaneously present in this space where 
difference holds creative potential rather than just being an ominous threat. This is the space where 
symbolic thinking and therapeutic play become possible. 
 
 
 
 
As previously stated, the general theoretical framework set out in the first three sections of this 
chapter ensued from the process of asking the interview text the questions comprising the reading 
or listening guide.69 At the same time certain themes were identified which could be used as ways 
to think about the links between the participants’ therapies and their work. When possible, those 
were conceptually elaborated on by making use of further literature within the existing theoretical 
context. When literature pertaining to the specific topic but outside relational and intersubjective 
thinking was used, an attempt was made to dialogue this with the theoretical framework already 
employed. In the next four sections of this chapter, these themes and some of the thinking around 
them will be outlined. In the textual analysis these four sections became theoretical sensitivities 
through which the interview text was edited, organised and interpreted, and thus focal points for 
further thinking about and discussion of the data. 
 
3.4 THE THERAPIST AS WOUNDED HEALER AND SUBJECT-TO-SUBJECT 
        RELATING 
 
The question of why someone would enter what Freud (1937, p. 248) called one of “those 
‘impossible’ professions in which one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results” is 
still a pertinent one. The nature of the work of doing therapy is often demanding and emotionally 
depleting and may even sometimes lead to the so-called burnout syndrome (Wheelis, 1956; 
Greenson, 1966; Freudenberger & Robbins, 1979; Fine, 1980; Cooper, 1986; Glickauf-Hughes & 
Mehlman, 1995; Sussman, 1995). Glickauf-Hughes & Mehlman (1995, p. 217) summarise some of 
the factors that have been found to contribute to “therapist burnout” (and that are often “related to 
unresolved narcissistic issues”) as “overextending oneself”, “conflicts between role demands and 
needs for personal gratification”, “high aspirations and ambiguous criteria for measuring 
accomplishments” and “nonreciprocated giving and attentiveness”. 
 
                                                 
69 See p. 38. 
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Therapists come to this profession because of conscious and unconscious motivations, each
bringing his own expectations and needs (Sussman, 1992; Glickhauf-Hughes & Mehlman, 1995). 
Doing the work of therapy is often accompanied by a strong feeling of vocation, that is, not in the 
religious sense of being “called”, but rather as “a profound emotional and intellectual conviction 
that one is pursuing a goal that is absolutely right for oneself” (Coltart, 1993b, p. 8). Coltart (1996, 
p. 34) describes the features of such a sense of vocation as “giftedness, belief in the power of the 
unconscious (indeed, in the unconscious itself), strength of purpose, reparativeness and curiosity”. 
There can be deep satisfaction in facilitating change and development in others; in using one's 
intellectual and emotional capacities to solve complex problems. However, patients’ transferential 
love and admiration, as well as the therapist's position of power and authority, can provide potent 
narcissistic gratifications (Stein, 1984; Finell, 1985; Welt & Herron, 1990; Billow, 1999). 
 
The professional relationship between therapist and patient implicitly assumes that the therapist is 
the one who is strong, healthy and in command of the situation. Patients also often cast the therapist 
in the role of “prophet, saviour and redeemer” (Freud, 1923a, p. 50), who is “wise, insightful, 
caring and possessed of healing powers” (Ivey, 1995, p. 356). In such a situation the therapist may 
find it hard not to continue basking in the warmth of this very seductive and satisfactory image of 
himself.  
 
Nevertheless, many therapists are also wounded healers,70 the converse and often carefully hidden 
side of the “healer-redeemer” (Groesbeck, 1975; Miller & De Witt, 1987; Goldwert, 1992; 
Cushway, 1996; Benjamin, 1997, p. 796; Wolgien & Coady, 1997). Coltart (1993b, p. 7) comments 
that it is “almost an idée reçue in our strange world” that “a ‘normal’ person is unlikely to be a 
gifted therapist”, but adds (Coltart, 1996) that there is no final consensus that one has to be 
“wounded” in some way to do the work of therapy. However, the therapist’s own “wounds” do not 
only often play a significant role (usually not consciously) in his desire and decision to become a 
therapist and in making it possible for him to do the work of therapy, but may also sometimes come 
to the fore quite destructively in the crucible of the therapeutic situation (Guy, 1987; Sussman, 
1992; Glickhauf-Hughes & Mehlman, 1995). 
 
The therapist’s “woundedness” is usually understood as the narcissistic injury arising from being 
“extractively” (Bollas, 1987) rather than nurturingly treated in the family of origin and being 
                                                 
70 The term “wounded-healer” was originally used by some Jungian authors, who have noted Jung’s references to the 
Greek myth of Asklepios and who have written about it with specific reference to the constellation of the “wounded-
healer” archetype and its countertransference dimensions in the therapeutic situation (Sedgwick, 1994). The use of this 
concept (if not always the term) is not confined to Jungian thinking.  
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designated the family “caretaker” (Miller, 1979, 1981; Racusin, Abromowitz, & Winter, 1981; 
Sussman, 1992; Glickauf-Hughes & Mehlman, 1995; Cushway, 1996). Miller (1981, p. 22) 
describes the therapist as often having been a “well-behaved, reliable, emphatic, understanding, and 
convenient child, who in fact was never a child at all” and who lived to “enliven” the other 
(Winnicott, cf. Phillips, 1988, p. 29) by means of his “sensibility, his empathy, his intense and 
differentiated emotional responsiveness, and his unusually powerful ‘antennae’” (Miller, Ibid.). The 
“wound” primes the therapist to do the work of therapy by leading to the development of an 
exquisite sensitivity to the unconscious needs of others and the ability to subjugate his own needs 
and desires in order to meet those of others. According to Gabbard (1995, p. 711), the latter may 
serve the dual purpose of “[providing] masochistic gratification and [enhancing] self-esteem”. 
 
McClure and McClendon (1989, cf. Glickauf-Hughes & Mehlman, 1995, p. 215) observe that 
therapists often make “an early decision to be self-reliant, [and] to achieve without needing or 
acknowledging help”. This may become an impediment in the therapeutic situation when the 
therapist’s unmet needs are countertransferentially acted out; that is, when the patient becomes (in 
Benjamin’s terms) negated, rendered an object rather than being a like subject.  
 
This process frequently happens in the guise of the therapist’s becoming “his patient’s patron or 
knight” (Ferenzci, 1919, cf. Berman, 1997a, p. 984) and therapist and patient enact the so-called 
“rescue fantasy” (Greenacre, 1966, p. 760). The “object of rescue” (that is, the patient) is “a 
projected version of the rescuer’s own disavowed vulnerability” (Berman, 1997a, p. 984) and if the 
therapist succeeds in “rescuing” the patient, he himself may be “enhanced, cured, saved” (Hardy, 
1979, p. 70). The “rescuer fantasy” may be further elucidated by reconfiguring Miller’s (1981, p. 
39) notion of the therapist’s woundedness as “grandiosity” and its converse “depression” in terms 
of Benjamin’s thinking as creating an interplay of opposing and reversible polarities within the 
therapeutic dyad. 
 
Although the notion of the therapist as rescuer certainly implies the patient’s being disempowered 
and negated by becoming the “object” that is being rescued, this process is co-created in the sense 
of being underpinned by an unconscious “narcissistic collusion” between therapist and patient 
(Glickauf-Hughes & Mehlman, 1995, p. 217). The therapist becomes the powerful and inflated 
“healer-redeemer” (Benjamin, 1997, p. 796) and the patient the submissive and adoring acolyte. 
This could be part of the version of complementary twoness (quite commonly found in therapist-
patients’ therapies) that is constellated by the collusive folie à deux between therapist and patient 
that marks a prolonged and enduring idealising transference. In this manner what Langs (1975, p. 
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339) calls “therapeutic misalliances” and Ivey (1995) denotes as “positive narcissistic symmetry” is 
created by the intersection of the therapist’s “countertransference fantasy of being a redeemer” and 
the patient’s transference fantasy of “him as the savior” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 22). While the 
patient’s idealisation of the therapist is an accepted and potentially useful part of the therapeutic 
process, which the therapist should be able to tolerate and which should be understood rather than 
suppressed or avoided, such an idealising transference may become counterproductive when 
consciously or unconsciously solicited by the therapist (Renik, 1995).  
 
The therapist’s own therapy could make him aware of the existence and nature of his “unresolved 
and disavowed” issues (Zeddies, 1999, p. 232), and of how his own “blind spot[s]” (Freud, 1912, p. 
116) cast their shadows on the in-between space of therapy. It could also alert him to his own 
“bright spots” (Goldberger, 1993). This term refers to a variety of “blind spot” where the therapist 
identifies with an experience of the patient’s with which he himself is familiar or which is 
particularly meaningful for him (the therapist). He therefore makes the assumption that it has the 
same significance for him and the patient, thus potentially compromising and obscuring the 
particular meaning it has for the patient.  
 
The therapist’s personal therapy could also bring an awareness of what it is like to grapple with 
one’s own issues in the (often disturbing) process of therapy and to be a patient (and of the 
vulnerability and disempowerment that this position brings). The therapist’s experience of being-a-
patient could consequently facilitate his identifications with his own patients. Keeping in mind that 
even the most responsible and conscientious therapist will, at times, unintentionally “use” a 
particular patient for his own purposes, the therapist’s own therapy could contribute towards his 
being increasingly able to be close to his patients without being engulfed by or negating of them by 
(unconsciously and inadvertently) using or disempowering them.  
 
As Benjamin (1998b, p. 103) puts it: “What cannot be mourned, cannot be let go, is held inside as 
abject, repudiated otherness.” She (Ibid., p. 108) continues: “Owning the other within diminishes 
the threat of the other without, so that the stranger outside is no longer identical with the strange 
within us …”. 
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3.5 POWER AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
 
3.5.1 The discourse of power in the therapeutic relationship 
The discourse of power in the therapeutic relationship is foregrounded in postmodern relational 
thinking and particularly in Benjamin’s work.71 As could be seen in the earlier discussions, 
domination and submission, empowerment and disempowerment, are constant themes in 
Benjamin’s thinking about the nature of therapeutic relationships. The distribution of power 
between therapist and patient needs to be continually negotiated to keep the therapeutic space a 
viable one. This is encapsulated in Benjamin’s notion of the evolvement of mutual recognition 
being a central task of therapy. As previously noted in the discussion of complementary twoness, 
thirdness between therapist and patient does sometimes collapse into binary opposites, and these 
“are inseparable from implicit or explicit hierarchies” (Flax, 1990, p. 101). Benjamin’s (1998b, p. 
25) grappling with the question of how these complementaries that are constellated between 
therapist and patient may be dissolved, highlights the presence of the idealisations that are “intrinsic 
to [such] binary hierarchies”. Such idealisations are particularly relevant in the case of therapist-
patients whose idealisations of their therapists often have the added feature of the therapist’s being 
the one who knows how to be a therapist. Such a chosen therapist may be perceived as having 
“discourse specific power-knowledge” (Flax, 1994, p. 6), which resonates with what Benjamin 
(1998b, p. 21) calls the “hidden dimension of power in knowledge”. 
 
Even with the present emphasis on mutuality, the asymmetry of the therapeutic relationship still 
constitutes “an inherent power differential” between therapist and patient (Frankel, 2002, p. 126). 
“The patient is there because he feels he needs help and also love, and he pays for it. There is also 
some shame attached to these facts. The patient’s need and vulnerability put him in a one-down 
position. In contrast, the analyst has power not only by virtue of being the less needy party and 
because the patient’s prospect of getting help depends on him, but also for other reasons. Analysts 
are representative of the authority and prestige of a powerful social institution … The treatment is 
(and is conducted on) the analyst’s turf” (Frankel, 2002, p. 128).  
 
The “ritualized asymmetry” of the therapeutic relationship is indeed what gives mutuality its power 
by making the participation of the therapist “in the spirit of mutuality” matter to the patient 
(Hoffman, 1998, p. 204). However, this asymmetry may combine with a therapist’s defensive need 
to preserve his position of power and as such become problematic in the sense of iatrogenically 
                                                 
71 Benjamin’s (1988, 1995, 1998b, p. xii) theorising about recognition and intersubjectivity originated in her thinking 
about the “problem of how we relate to the fact of the other’s independent consciousness” (in which power is a central 
concern). Her understanding of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic (as set out in his Phenomenology of Spirit) has been a 
fundamental tenet in the development of her work.  
 101
embedding the patient in the role of the lesser, the weaker, dependent one who does not know. 
Slavin (2001, p. 422) comments on the “dark side” of the therapeutic relationship where asymmetry 
may become connected to the therapist’s self-interest and exploitation of the patient. There is also 
the thought-provoking question of how “social or institutional power” figures in the constitution of 
“interpersonal power” in therapy (Harris & Gold, 2001, p. 367), but this is probably of more 
relevance in the case of actual psychoanalytic or Jungian training, which takes place within the 
context of the power politics that seem such an inherent part of psychoanalytic and Jungian 
institutes (Kirsch, 2000; Kirsner, 2000). 
 
The mere fact of the therapist’s bringing and representing separateness and alterity (being and 
occupying the position of a different Other) may contribute to rendering him (the therapist) into the 
one that has the power. If the therapeutic space is to be vital, generative of new meaning and to go 
beyond what is already known, the therapist’s participation is often disruptive (Other) in the sense 
of its being his responsibly “to unseat self-limiting – perhaps self-deadening stability” (Hart, 1999, 
p. 190).72 Bollas (1995, p. 222) writes about the therapist’s “cracking up” the patient’s taken-for-
granted ways of viewing himself, thus “undermining the arrogance of consciousness”. Lacan, who 
“ended his notoriously brief sessions … when the patient’s unconscious fooled him”, is probably 
the most well-known example of the therapist as “embodiment of the unconscious as disruptive 
other” (Bollas, 1995, p. 223). 
 
It is, after all, the therapist’s task to engender the evolvement of an intersubjective space where the 
patient may find a more coherent voice for his mute and inchoate thoughts and feelings. This entails 
a “generative disruption” (Hart, 1999, p. 200) which is only possible within the context of an 
established and safe analytic space. “[S]uch safety is mainly derived from such features of analysis 
as the adherence to an analytic frame, the analyst’s nonretaliatory, reliable presence, and the 
conveyance of an enduring interest in the analysand’s elaboration of his or her experience …” 
(Hart, 1999, p. 200). Safety in the therapeutic space is therefore largely dependent on the therapist’s 
observance of the “analytic attitude” (Ivey, 1999), which should be accompanied by an ongoing 
sensitivity on the therapist’s part for what the patient is actually ready. In this regard the relational 
focus on “the nuances of impersonal impact” is important (Hart, 1999, p. 195). The therapist’s 
deconstruction of the patient’s established ways of being, thinking and feeling has both a creative 
and destructive potential, and is located on the slippery slope between “annihilatory destruction of 
the self and generative disruption of its self-protective wrappings” that therapy entails (Ibid., p. 
                                                 
72 See also Bollas (1989, 1992,1995, 1996); Ogden (1994, 1997) and Winnicott (1971). 
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200). This returns us to Benjamin’s dialectic of recognition and negation and the ever-present 
possibility of breakdown that the therapist’s alterity brings to the space of therapy.  
 
Hart (1999, p. 200) highlights the importance of the therapist’s own therapy in his coming to trust 
and appreciate the multifaceted complexities (including the unsettling aspects) of the process of 
therapy. This comes about through actually having the “experience of [surviving] analytic 
disruption and [seeing] first hand its generative potential, despite its initial destructive threat” 
(Ibid.). It is through this experience of the therapist’s own therapy that his faith (Eigen, 1981) in the 
creatively mutative possibilities of an analytic attitude of openness to experience and a willingness 
to confront the emotional truth of one’s subjectivity may become a lived reality rather than just 
another desired therapist attribute to strive for.  
 
By entering therapy, the patient (even one that is informed and knowledgeable about therapy) is 
taking a veritable leap of faith into the unknown. He is placing himself in the power of a process 
and a therapist in a space where he is without doubt at risk. He will almost certainly lose some of 
his accustomed (even if dysfunctional) ways of being and it is uncertain how much or what he will 
gain. In fact, the patient is (probably unknowingly), in a sense, placing himself in a position of 
disempowerment (although in a good-enough therapy this will not be an enduring state of affairs). 
 
A reversal of the power differential (especially in the case of split complementarities) may also 
sometimes render the patient into the one occupying the position of power. Doing therapy 
undoubtedly also puts therapists at risk and therapists inevitably bring their own vulnerabilities to 
the therapeutic situation. Racker (1968), for example, highlights therapists’ “unconscious 
masochism”, which may lead to submissiveness rather than surrender, and Gabbard (1995, p. 711) 
thinks of this as the repetition of “a pathological childhood situation”. Therapists also need their 
patients to help them feel “secure, useful, competent, fulfilled, recognized” as therapists (Frankel, 
2002, p. 133), and doing psychotherapy may sometimes become a way of regulating self-esteem 
(Gabbard, 1995). This may be exacerbated by the therapist’s own unmet needs and desires, which 
may, at times, tilt the therapeutic situation towards serving the therapist rather than the patient. For 
example, Searles (1981) writes about how patients may unconsciously strive to “cure” their 
therapists in order to enable them (the therapists) to do the work of therapy by secretly taking care 
of them.  
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3.5.2 The relevance of power when the patient is a therapist 
The issue of power is somewhat different when the patient is also a therapist and little has been 
written or researched about this sensitive matter (Bridges, 1995; Gabbard, 1995; Norcross, Geller & 
Kurzawa, 2000).73 The treatment of a colleague or other mental health professional often involves 
the constellation of “vastly complicated relational dynamics, both internal and external” 
(Crastnopol, 1999a, p. 445). Although this is really outside the scope of this study, it is useful to 
briefly consider some of the factors that may come into play in this situation and as such may 
contextualise and influence the therapist-patient’s therapy and his work.  
 
There is the fact (often implicitly understood but explicitly unacknowledged by both members of 
the therapeutic dyad) that therapist and patient are both relating as therapist and patient and in a 
more egalitarian way as colleagues (Berman, 1995; Norcross, Geller & Kurzawa, 2001). In part, 
this is due simply to the fact that the therapist-patient usually knows more about the professional 
(and sometimes the personal) life of the treating therapist than a “lay” patient (Gitelson, 1954, 
Elmhirst, 1982-1983) and that their professional lives may inadvertently cross (therapeutic 
communities are often small and notoriously incestuous) (Gitelson, 1954; Norcross, Strausser & 
Faltus, 1988; Berman, 1995; Kirsner, 2000; Norcross, Geller & Kurzawa, 2000). This means that in 
these therapies the roles of therapist and patient may more easily become confused and that 
boundaries are often more fluid and sometimes blurred than in therapies with “lay” patients 
(Norcross, Geller & Kurzawa, 2000).  
 
The potential for relating as colleagues is probably greater when the therapist-patient is no longer a 
novice therapist. Although the overt and conscious intention of both parties may be to limit their 
interactions to the specified roles of therapist and patient, there will inevitably be shifts to just 
being colleagues. This may (at least partly) just be circumstantial and may actually sometimes be 
useful. Within therapeutic communities this is a sensitive topic with no clear-cut rules and is not 
comfortably or freely discussed. It is obvious that these apparently dichotomous polarities created 
by the therapeutic dyad consisting of both therapist and patient as a therapeutic pair and as 
colleagues need to be acknowledged and to be held in tension. This also begs the question of if and 
how the therapist-patient experiences being recognised by his therapist as being a like subject in 
terms of also being a therapist and if and how this can be linked to his work as clinician. 
 
Working with colleagues (and being “chosen” for this task) is certainly flattering and alluring. 
Being a “therapist’s therapist” will without doubt add to one’s prestige in the therapeutic 
                                                 
73 This could be a worthwhile and challenging topic for further research.  
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community to which one belongs (Greenberg & Kaslow, 1984; Fleischer & Wissler, 1985; 
Norcross, Geller & Kurzawa, 2001). While the work itself is often exciting and challenging, it also 
brings its own idiosyncratic difficulties and burdens, which may sometimes threaten the treating 
therapist’s professional self-esteem (Fleischer & Wissler, 1985; Bridges, 1995; Norcross, Geller & 
Kurzawa, 2000).  
 
According to Bridges (1995, p. 175), psychotherapy with therapists “raises intense and complicated 
countertransferential feelings for the treating therapist and presents unique problems around 
recognition and management of identification issues”. She continues: “Strong, often unconscious 
feelings of envy, competitiveness, exposure, and vulnerability, together with a particularly close 
sense of self-identification and a powerful wish to be helpful, threaten to intrude into the treatment. 
Fears of criticism, issues of therapeutic narcissism, and protection of one’s professional self-esteem 
are likely to accompany any treatment with a therapist-patient.” These “usual countertransferential 
feelings produced by the treatment of therapist-patients” may become problematic when they 
“match or intersect with … [t]herapists’ personal vulnerabilities” (Ibid., p. 178). 
 
If one is the treating therapist, the power conferred on one by such a “disciple” (that is, the 
therapist-patient), who has not only chosen one as the ideal of what he wants to be, but who is also 
emulating one’s way of being-a-clinician by various conscious and unconscious identifications, is 
certainly very seductive. This may productively create grist to the proverbial therapeutic mill, but it 
may also be concretely taken up (and it is certainly tempting to do so) by the treating therapist and 
infuse the intersubjective space with a particular and potentially destructive version of the power 
differential.  
 
In the same vein the treating therapist-mentor may become narcissistically invested in the 
professional performance of his protégé (Gabbard, 1995) and even have an excessive sense of 
responsibility about the therapist-patient’s theoretical knowledge and/or behaviour as a clinician. 
One cannot, however, pretend that the treating therapist does not have a pivotal part (and an 
accompanying responsibility) in the manner of therapist that the therapist-patient becomes 
(Norcross, Geller & Kurzawa, 2001). Then again, it is when the therapist-patient’s way (or 
perceived way) of being a therapist (in this instance usually submissively being a therapist like the 
treating therapist) empowers the treating therapist in the sense of contributing to his sense of being 
a “good” therapist and knowing how to be a “good” therapist, that this process goes awry.  
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3.6 THERAPIST “MISTAKES” AND THE DIALECTIC OF RECOGNITION AND 
        NEGATION 
 
What happens in those instances when the patient perceives and/or feels that the therapist has made 
a mistake? What constitutes a mistake on the therapist’s part would depend on one’s specific 
theoretical viewpoint and is a debatable issue,74 but here I am referring specifically to those 
occasions where the patient, in Benjamin’s terms, feels negated by the therapist. This could concern 
a momentary occurrence or could take place in the more general context of felt recognition largely 
not featuring in the therapy. Most innocuously, this absence could simply pertain to a therapy being 
at the beginning stages and involving a greater degree of idealisation of the therapist. In the case of 
this study, the participants had generally chosen the treating therapists as models to emulate, so that 
those relationships had probably to some extent remained, even when there had been greater 
mutuality, somewhat tinged with idealisation. A patient’s experience of the absence of felt 
recognition may therefore  mean that thirdness and an ongoing dialectic of recognition and negation 
have not yet been established, but are still only incipient. A significant lack of recognition could 
also be a more ongoing feature of a therapeutic relationship. 
 
For the contemporary psychodynamic therapist (and more so for the one with relational leanings), 
those moments of miscommunication and disconnection, when the therapy could be at risk because 
of what he has (or has not) done, could be especially difficult and potentially threatening. What the 
patient feels can no longer “simply be attributed to transferences from figures outside the 
consulting room” (Slavin, Rahmani & Pollock, 1998, p. 199). The therapist cannot hide behind 
authoritative anonymity, but is both professionally and personally “deeply implicated in what 
transpires” (Ibid.).  
 
Uncomfortable dimensions of being-a-therapist (even a good-enough therapist), like 
countertransferentially hating the patient (Winnicott, 1947), or the proclivity of therapists to “trip 
over the big feet of [their] self-interest” (McLaughlin, 1995, p. 435), are explicitly recognised and 
foregrounded. Such a therapist is probably much less clear about what belongs to the patient and 
what belongs to him or if what he is doing is actually fostering the patient’s interests rather than his 
own (Ogden, 1994; Slavin, Rahmani & Pollock, 1998). In spite of subscribing to the reassuring 
idea that it is acceptable (even desirable) not to be an omnipotent authority (that is, in the “old” 
objectivist-positivistic sense), all of this may contribute towards making the therapist’s relationship 
to his position of power an obscure and uneasy one.  
 
                                                 
74 This is beyond the scope of this study.  
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At the moment when the patient feels negated, the therapist’s sense of himself as a therapist may 
feel threatened or become destroyed (in Winnicott’s sense); that is, be negated by the nature of the 
patient’s experience of him. In his (usually unconscious) efforts to defensively preserve his position 
of power, the therapist may not recognise the patient’s perceptions as valid by, for example, making 
a transference interpretation only in terms of the patient’s past relational history. The therapist may 
therefore not “change” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 24) in a way that could convey to the patient that he has 
actually had an impact on the therapist, thus providing him (the patient) with the recognition he 
seeks. The therapist may (even if only subtly) attack the patient or withdraw. In this instance, “mere 
negation” could become a “breakdown of recognition” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 96). 
 
Ferenczi (1949, p. 226) describes how the power disparity in a therapeutic situation may cause 
patients to identify with therapists in a way that effectively silences them (the patients):  
[P]atients have an exceedingly refined sensitivity for the wishes, tendencies, 
whims, sympathies and antipathies of their analyst, even if the analyst is 
completely unaware of this sensitivity. Instead of contradicting the analyst or 
accusing him of errors and blindness, the patients identify themselves with 
him; … normally they do not allow themselves to criticize [him], such a 
criticism does not even become conscious in them … . 
 
What would make it possible for the patient to feel sufficiently empowered to be a “speaking 
subject” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 9) and in so doing risk the therapist’s displeasure, anger or 
withdrawal? Ferenczi (1949, p. 227) comments: 
The setting free of [the patient’s] critical feelings, the willingness on our part 
to admit our mistakes and the honest endeavour to avoid them in future, all 
these go to create in the patient a confidence in the analyst. 
 
It is clear that whether or not the patient will feel sufficiently trusting of the therapist and the 
process to be able to think about and speak of his “critical feelings”, is very much dependent on the 
specific nature of the intersubjective space (both in terms of its evolving history and what it is like 
at that particular moment).  
 
Kelly (1996, p. 53) writes of therapy as a process involving both understandings and 
misunderstandings, where interpretation may be “dialogically engaged in” as “a distinctly 
exploratory activity” and hence become “playful” in Winnicott’s (1971) sense only if the safety of 
the therapeutic space is such that “being misunderstood is not attended by the threat of 
repudiation”. This is what makes it possible for the patient to become able to accept the 
inevitability of sometimes being failed by the therapist’s responses and interpretations (Kelly, 
Ibid.). A good-enough therapy is therefore understood as including these “optimal frustrations” 
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(Kohut, 1971, 1977, 1984) engendered by therapist failures where moments of miscommunication, 
disconnection, misrecognition and negation between therapist and patient do not actually lead to the 
breakdown of thirdness and the dialectic of recognition and negation. 
 
In terms of Benjamin’s thinking (1998b, p. 22), this means that while the therapist cannot (and 
should not) “steer clear” of the “inevitable complementarity that ensues when an attacking object is 
on the screen”, he should also not become entrenched either as attacker or as victim. By the 
therapist’s being able to identify with and disidentify from both these positions, thus straddling 
“both sides of the divide”, the dyad becomes capable of moving from complementary twoness 
towards mutual recognition and bearable paradox (Ibid., p. 19).  
 
The therapist needs to be open to the patient’s criticisms and respond to them in a manner that is 
both authentic and subjective “in a knowing way”, thus giving validity to the integrity of the 
patient’s perceptions (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 23). Therefore the way out of such difficult moments 
engendered by the therapist’s “mistakes” does not come about through the therapist’s sliding into 
submission to the patient’s demands by just being guilt-stricken and taking on the blame for what 
has gone wrong. Burdening the patient with “self-serving confession[s] or defensive apologies” is 
consequently excluded (Chused & Raphling, 1992, p. 111). Neither does the way out happen 
simply through the therapist’s “steadfast interpretation” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 19). Such a use of 
interpretation may mean that the therapist is “struggling to gain recognition from the patient to 
confirm his (the therapist’s) reality” or even that he is “insisting on his reality over that of the 
patient” (Ibid.).  
 
In the findings of his study on the nature of the process of interpretation in psychodynamic 
psychotherapy, Kelly (1994) makes the point that interpretation is a mutual act. Taking into account 
that the patient’s viewpoint has equal value to that of the therapist in arriving at a shared 
understanding of what has happened, various theorists (for example, Bollas, 1989, 1992; Renik, 
1995; Aron, 1996; Benjamin, 1998b; 2000a) discuss the patient’s possible collaboration in the 
meaning-making process.75 Aron, Bollas76 and Renik all describe how they invite patients to do this 
by sharing their own internal processes of thinking and associating (which includes their differing 
from themselves, their ambivalences and conflicts) with their patients and by asking their patients 
                                                 
75 Renik (1995, p. 486) calls this “epistemological symmetry”. By this he means that therapist and patient are “equally 
subjective” and equally responsible for what they disclose of their thinking. He does, however, clearly differentiate this 
from Ferenczi’s mutual analysis and accordingly also retains the idea of asymmetry. The patient communicates his 
reality with the purpose of increasing his self-awareness, while the purpose of the therapist’s self-disclosures is also to 
increase the patient’s self-awareness. 
76 With his (Bollas, 1989, 1995) dialectics of difference. 
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for their reactions to and deconstructions of this.77 Aron (1996) also engages patients in this process 
of generating co-created meanings by asking patients for their experiences and observations of him 
that may elucidate aspects of the therapeutic relationship. Of course all of this should not mean that 
the therapist’s thinking or subjectivity (instead of anonymity) is imposed on the patient nor that this 
should be a defensive collusion between therapist and patient to avoid exploring the patient’s inner 
experiences. It also requires that the patient perceives the therapist as being open to (and not 
threatened by) this kind of feedback. 
 
There are also other ways to understand these kinds of therapeutic interactions. One could see such 
a therapist act as providing the patient with a model of how to engage with, question and reflect on 
one’s own internal processes (which is certainly one of the most important goals of any 
psychodynamic therapy). On a more symbolic level it could be thought of as a meta-
communication from the therapist to the patient about his (the therapist’s) being an independent and 
separate subject.  
 
According to Frankel (1993, p. 242) the “analyst’s temporary and limited loss of bearing is the gift 
that may allow the patient to give up the need for a perfect parent and to regain genuine contact 
with the other … the patient, learning that the analyst also has faults and frailties, may feel less 
different from other people and may gain greater hope that the analyst can understand him or her in 
a personal way”. The patient’s experience of a moment of negation may thus be received and held 
by the therapist and in that way “be revalued as a more equal term within the context of recognition 
itself as the superordinate value that allows negation to have impact” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 96). In 
this manner the therapist’s mistake(s) could actually become part of the ongoing dialectic of 
recognition and negation and contribute towards therapist and patient also becoming like subjects in 
terms of the power differential.  
 
3.7 THE BRIDGE OF IDENTIFICATION 
 
Identification, that “detour through the other that defines the self” (Fuss, 1995, p. 2), originally 
revealed by “Freud’s insight that the ‘shadow of the object fell upon the ego’” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 
xii), is a pivotal concept both in Benjamin’s work and in this study. As Pugh (2002, p. 1383) points 
out, this shadow is “no mere echo of the object … it has the capacity to criticise, to feel, to effect 
                                                 
77 While what Bollas (1989, 1995) and Renik (1995) describe seems very similar, their theoretical perspectives are 
different. Bollas conceptualises the therapist’s subjectivity as a means of understanding the patient (that is, the therapist 
is a container for what is received from the patient and the therapist has to look for the patient within himself). Renik 
(1995), who sees the therapist as irreducibly subjective, criticises Bollas for undertheorising his own impact on the 
analytic process.  
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and alter behaviour”. As well as identification denoting an ordinary and everyday process, its actual 
conceptualisation is far from simple. In this study it was employed to describe and think about 
complex phenomena.  
 
In this section there are brief examinations of identification and the therapist-patient, and of 
identification in general psychoanalytic thinking, followed by comments about some of the 
implications of postmodernism for the use of this concept. The main focus of this discussion will be 
on Benjamin’s intersubjective reconfiguration of identification. This includes a consideration of 
how the changing nature of identification may be linked to the specific quality of the intersubjective 
space (that is, mutual recognition) between therapist and patient, especially as this pertains to the 
therapist-patient.  
 
3.7.2 Identification and the therapist-patient 
One of the givens in psychodynamic therapy is that patients do identify with their therapists in one 
way or another. Meissner (1981, p. 12) comments on how patients sometimes “adopt the 
mannerisms, personal habits of dress and behavior, and even the verbal expressions” of their 
therapists. “Patients begin to act like the analyst, or act as they believe the analyst would act or 
think in certain real life situations. They may even consciously ask themselves what the therapist 
might do or think or say in a given situation” (Ibid.).  
 
Identification is particularly significant in the case of therapist-patients. It has indeed been found 
that “[m]any therapists report that identifications with their therapists constitute the single greatest 
influence on their professional development” (Norcross, Geller & Kurzawa, 2000, p. 204).78 As 
therapists we know (even if just intuitively) about the “lasting internal presence of and 
identifications with” one’s own therapist (Mitchell, 1997, p. 27). This does not just derive from 
what the therapist actually says or does (or, rather, from what the therapist-patient perceives him to 
be saying or doing), but from his “subjective way of being, a sense of what [he] is like, [his] feel for 
life” (Ibid.).  
 
Therapist-patients’ identifications with treating therapists have an added dimension79 (which is 
generally not present in “lay” patients). While the therapist-patient’s therapist may, in a sense, lose 
                                                 
78 In the qualitative studies about how personal therapy affects therapists’ work as clinicians, there is some discussion 
of the findings pertaining to participants’ identifications with their therapists and the different aspects of the manner in 
which this plays a role in the impact of personal therapy on clinical work (Mackey & Mackey, 1993; Macran, Smith & 
Stiles, 1999; Wiseman & Shefler, 2001). Only the study by Mackey and Mackey (1993) has this as a separate domain 
in their findings and as a specific focus in the discussion of their findings. 
79 There are certainly more “added dimensions”, but this one is a specific focus in this study. 
 110
some authority and power because the therapist-as-patient is also knowledgeable about therapy 
(although knowing about therapy may still be very different from experiencing it), he may also gain 
power precisely because the therapist-patient (who also knows about therapy) has chosen him as 
the ideal therapist to be like. 
 
Identificatory processes often become interwoven with the particular discourse of power that is 
constellated in the therapist-patient’s therapy. What identifications purport are consequently very 
much dependent on the nature of the relationship between therapist and therapist-patient at that 
particular point in time and within the broader context of the therapeutic process. They may 
indicate that the therapist-patient is, in his own unique way, experientially learning to do therapy 
and how to be a therapist (that is, developing as a therapist) within the context of a mutually 
trusting and respectful relationship with somebody he has (often both consciously and 
unconsciously) chosen as a model with whom to identify. However, such identifications could also 
signal the therapist-patient’s submission to the powerful and idealised other by “importing” his (the 
treating therapist’s) superior version of being-a-therapist.  
 
Meissner (1981, p. 12) posits that when identifications are “motivated by the need to please, 
placate, or attach oneself to an idealized or feared object, they must be recognized as defensive. 
They may also serve a narcissistic goal of becoming like the powerful object.” Gabbard (1995, p. 
715) warns that the therapist-patient’s identifications may, especially when part of an ongoing and 
pervasive idealisation of the treating therapist, be part of the enactment of “the preconscious or 
unconscious fantasy” that “some of the lustre of this highly respected [therapist] will rub off” on 
the therapist-patient. If identification with the therapist, which Gabbard (Ibid.) sees as “a tempting 
shortcut” to avoid the arduous and painful work of therapy, becomes the goal of the therapist-
patient’s therapy, this could entail the intersubjective therapeutic third of his therapy becoming 
compromised and no longer serving as a useful Third to the dyadic processes and entanglements in 
the clinical thirds of his work with patients.  
 
One of the central questions posed by this study concerned the ways in which the participants’ 
therapists (as well as their manner of working) had become part of the way they (the participants) 
worked as therapists and of their sense of themselves as therapists. This may be conceptualised as 
the participants’ identifying with their therapists and their therapists’ ways of working and of these 
identifications becoming part of the participants’ identities as therapists. However, as Fuss (1995, 
p. 2) reminds us, while identification organises identity and “brings a sense of identity into being”, 
it also “calls that identity into question”. Identity therefore never approximates “the status of an 
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ontological given” (Ibid.). The therapist’s sense of identity as a therapist should therefore also not 
be seen as fixed or final, but as continually changing and evolving 
 
3.7.3 The general notion of identification and some related concepts 
Identification may be understood as referring to “those processes whereby individuals increase their 
felt resemblance to other persons” (Geller & Farber, 1993, p. 167). In general psychoanalytic 
thinking, the notion of identification has contributed significantly to the understanding of the 
constitution of subjectivity and has been variously theorised (Freud, 1900, 1924, 1932; Schafer, 
1968; Meissner, 1981; Sandler, 1988; Perlow, 1995). The main thrust of this is that identification is 
seen “both as a normal developmental mechanism [in ego and superego formation] and a 
mechanism of defense” (Sandler & Perlow, 1988, p. 9). Within general psychoanalytic theorising 
there are numerous debates surrounding the conceptualisation of identification, but these are 
beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Identification is envisaged as an aspect of internalisation, an overarching process that also 
encompasses incorporation80 and introjection81 (Schafer, 1968; Meissner, 1981; Sandler & Perlow, 
1988; Moore & Fine, 1990).  “Internalization … is any process of transformation by which external 
relationships, object representations, and forms of regulation become part of the inner psychic 
structure and thus part of the ‘inner world’” (Meissner, 1981, p. 10). It can therefore also be 
described as a “process whereby intersubjective relations are transformed into intrasubjective ones” 
(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1980, p. 226). While the different processes of internalisation overlap, 
identification is usually seen as the most evolved (mature) form of internalisation (Moore & Fine, 
1990).  
 
Although it may derive from identification, imitation should not be confused with identification. 
Unlike identification, imitation is usually a conscious process and while it implies behaving like the 
other, it does not in itself necessarily involve a deep or significant attachment between self and 
other (Meissner, 1981). Meissner (Ibid., p. 11) further conceptualises imitation as “a form of 
learning”, where “one person can learn from another by a process of behavioral modelling”. 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Incorporation carries the connotation of being the most “primitive” and a relatively undifferentated form of 
internalisation, where the object is taken in as a whole and where there is usually no separateness between subject and 
object (Meissner, 1981; Sandler, 1988). 
81 Schafer (1968, pp. 72-73) sees an introject as an “inner presence with which one feels in a continuous or intermittent 
dynamic relationship”.  
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Mimesis82 is related to imitation, but while it also pertains to behaving like the other, it is not 
imitation (Borsch-Jacobson, 1992; Harris, 1998). Harris (1998, p. 46) calls mimesis “the lived 
practice of identity … a form of identification that involves gesture, the style of being, and external 
patterns of acting … [which] can lead to mutually induced affective experiences”. The concept of 
mimetic identifications (Harris & Gold, 2001, p. 367) highlights that the co-created intersubjective 
space does not only concern a meeting of minds (Aron, 1996), but that it is also forged and vitalised 
at an embodied and affective level (Harris, 1998). The patient may, by adopting the therapist’s 
words or gestures, evoke a “mimetic resonance” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 97) with the therapist’s 
presence and the shared “loving tie” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 7). As Harris and Gold (2001, p. 367) 
point out, the patient’s mimetic identifications “with the voice, and the persona” of the therapist are 
also “all aspects of the unspeakable, unremembered, constituting power of the other”. 
 
3.7.4 Identification in a postmodern context 
In postmodern thinking the notion of identity (and subjectivity) does not refer to a unitary endpoint 
of development, but is rather regarded as a “constantly rewoven web of processes” (Flax, 1996, p. 
578). Corbett (2001, p. 325) points out that according to the postmodern viewpoint, “multiple 
identifications within the same subject can rival one another, overthrow one another, or even 
revive, following their apparent demise” (Ibid., p. 325). Therefore identity is both “founded on” and 
“confounded by” multiplicity (Ibid., p. 327), which Schafer (1968, p. 62) describes as an “implicit 
multiplication of minds within mind”. 
 
Previous theories of identification do not encompass the full complexity of this and Fuss (1995, p. 
39) comments that postmodern theorists tend to regard these theories “only as painful and poignant 
meditations on the possibility of identification’s own impossibility”. However, what is not taken 
into account sufficiently in this way of thinking, is that supporting the notion of multiple 
identifications does not justify peremptorily rejecting the intuitively felt and well-established ideas 
of there being a “force of identity persistence”, accompanied by an ongoing sense of “self-
sameness” (Corbett, 2001, pp. 326). In this regard Benjamin (1998b, p. 93) reminds us that while 
the “intersubjective idea of negation” does lead to the notion of a “nonunified, constructed subject”, 
it does not “leave the subject merely decentered and dispersed”. Self (and identity is not self) can 
be “nonidentical”, but it is possible to postulate a “psychic subjectivity that takes up various 
positions through identification” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 87). 
 
                                                 
82 This concept originates from the theory of drama, where, by assuming the characteristics and actions of the 
individuals that they are playing, actors become able to “live” the role (Harris, 1998).  
 113
Corbett (2001, p. 327) suggests that we circumvent the apparent “dead end” reached by the 
postmodern deconstruction of the subject and identity by thinking about this issue in a different 
way that takes into account both a “multiplicity of self experience” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 105) and 
an ongoing subjective sense of self that is at least somewhat coherent. He (Corbett, 2001, p. 327) 
therefore proposes conceptualising identificatory processes and identity in terms of complex and 
open nonlinear systems “wherein identifications stimulate intricate feedback loops forming patterns 
of exchange and transfer”. Structure and regulation emerge “through the flow, feedback, and 
repetition of such patterns” (Ibid.). 
 
This clearly requires a relational and, more specifically, an intersubjective refiguring of 
identification. In terms of this study it generated the questions of how the processes whereby the 
participant had identified with his therapist could be conceptualised within the (always shifting and 
evolving) particular therapeutic third of the participant-as-patient and his therapist and also how 
this could be linked to the clinical third(s) of the participant-as-therapist and his patient(s).  
 
3.7.5 Identification and mutual recognition 
3.7.5.1   A brief outline of Benjamin's view of identification and some other relevant 
              relational and intersubjective theorising about this concept 
Benjamin and other present-day relational and intersubjective theorists (Frankel, 1993, 1998b, 
2002; Seligman, 1999; Stern, 2002) assume tacit knowledge of the notion of identification and 
make implicit use of its basic tenets in their thinking. Stern therefore (2002, p. 700) comments that 
identification has become “one of the most relied on but undertheorized concepts in current 
psychoanalytic discourse”. 
 
Benjamin’s thinking about the ongoing processes of reciprocal identifications between therapists 
and patients, which are sometimes conscious but mostly unconscious, goes beyond the 
“intrapsychic projective-introjective register” in elucidating both the intrapsychic and 
intersubjective dimensions of identification (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 26). For her 
(Benjamin, 1998b), embracing intersubjectivity does not mean that the intrapsychic is somehow 
transcended, but rather that it is changed and added to. Benjamin also does not just emphasise the 
importance of recognising the other as different, but also “elaborates the inverse trope – the need 
for identification and the experience of ‘being like’ the other, particularly when the other represents 
the ego ideal” (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, Ibid.), which is particularly relevant in the case of 
therapist-patients.  
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One of the central issues in Benjamin’s intersubjective version of identification concerns how 
recognition or negation from a significant other may influence the ways in which one identifies 
with him. The nature of these identifications is pivotal in facilitating or compromising one’s own 
ability to recognise this other, thus contributing to growing mutual recognition (and evolving 
thirdness) or impeding its development.  
 
For her (Benjamin 1998b, p. xiii) it is consequently important to understand “the capacity for 
identification with others” as both furthering and impeding the recognition of others; as both 
bridging and obfuscating differences. Benjamin (Ibid.) therefore, as she is wont to do, attempts to 
work with the tension between these “two distinct tendencies” in psychoanalytic thinking about 
identification. On the one hand there are those theorists who “see the tendency to incorporate the 
other as a mental object primarily in its defensive … or imaginary aspects” (Ibid.). However, 
“proponents of Kleinian analysis, American ego psychology, or self-psychology stress … the 
structure-building or functional aspects of identification or introjection” (Ibid.). In this context 
Benjamin (Ibid.) then endeavours “to elaborate the distinction between kinds of identification: 
those that can help us break up an apparent objectivity based on distance, and those that simply 
draw us into a see-saw relationship … in which we can no longer perceive the other” (Ibid.).  
 
In her thinking about the configuration of intersubjectively constellated identifications, Benjamin 
explores the role of the discourse of power underpinning the therapeutic relationship. She focuses 
particularly on what it means to identify with an idealised and more powerful other (that is, to 
identify with an other in a relationship where there is a significant disparity of power). In 
psychotherapy it is usually the patient who is cast into the role of the less empowered one, but the 
roles may also, at times, become reversed.83  
 
She (Benjamin) accordingly (and as far this is possible) comes to grips with some of the complex 
and multifaceted aspects of identificatory processes in therapy, such as the varying nature of the 
ways in which patient and therapist identify with each other; how such identifications may change 
against the backdrop of “increasing” thirdness and mutual recognition, and also how such 
identifications may be implicated in impasses in the therapeutic relationship.  
 
Extending the notion of identification beyond the idea of becoming or behaving like the other, 
Seligman (1999, p. 141) posits that “identification … is with a dyadic relationship system rather 
than with a single role or … as an orientation of one’s subjectivity within a self-with-other 
                                                 
83 See also p. 102. 
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relationship dyad characterized by oscillation between one position and another”. While 
identification therefore does not mean that one “necessarily takes on the attributes of another 
person”, it could indicate that “one’s experience is derived from, shaped, defined, and limited by, 
the parameters of a particular relational configuration” (Frankel, 2002, p. 106). As such, 
identification could thus be understood as an “appropriation of the total intersubjective experience” 
(Stern, 2002, p. 702).  
 
One may juxtapose Seligman’s (1999, p. 141) ideas of identification being with the “relational 
process” (rather than with an “object representation” of the other), and that this identification 
entails movement between two unequal positions, and Benjamin’s related theorising around the 
split polarities of complementary twoness, where the positions of domination and submission are 
continually inverted through identification. In these kinds of relationships “the parameters of [the 
less powerful] one’s experiential world have not been negotiated” between the two relationship 
partners, but have been “imported from the mind” of the one who is in the position of power 
(Frankel, 2002, p. 106).  
 
Some relational theorists (Frankel, 1993, 2002; Seligman, 1999; Stern, 2002) have also used 
relational/intersubjective reconfigurations of the concept of identification to explore the nature of 
identifications occurring in a relationship where there is a significant and enduring disparity of 
power (that is, an absence of mutual recognition). According to Frankel (1998b, p. 168), 
sadomasochistic “solutions are the alternative to intersubjective relationships” and both he 
(Frankel, 2002) and Stern (2002) therefore see such a power disparity in terms of a victim and an 
aggressor, that is, elaborate an intersubjective articulation of the idea of identification with the 
aggressor.84 Frankel (2002, p. 105) posits that the “victim” concordantly identifies with the 
“aggressor’s experience of himself” (and thus “learns who he expects her to be”) and that her 
complementary identification subsequently guides her submissive compliance to him. This means 
that there are no subject-to-subject relations, but that the “victim” has taken up the role of the 
“attacker’s … inner object, his ‘other’” (Ibid.). 
 
Such concordant and complementary identifications are involved in the constellation of 
unconscious collusions between therapist and patient, which unavoidably form part of therapeutic 
                                                 
84 The original conceptualisation of this most well-known utilisation of identification as a defence is commonly 
attributed to Anna Freud (1936), but it was actually first discussed by (the much-maligned) Ferenczi (who has only 
during the last decade rightfully been reinstated as a psychoanalytic theorist of note) in a paper he presented at the 
Wiesbaden Congress of 1932. Although his paper was published in 1933, it was only published in English in 1949. 
This aspect of identification has been used and elaborated on extensively in work about trauma and abuse (Frankel, 
2002).  
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relationships (Frankel, 1993). A collusion “involves an unconscious deal – a mutual denial, by 
patient and analyst, of some aspect of their relationship that frightens them both” (Ibid., p.228). 
Collusion may be contrasted with intimacy, which “implies the desire to know, and the capacity to 
accept, all that one may find in oneself and the other … therefore also … the acceptance of the 
other … [as] a separate person not in one’s grandiose orbit” (Ibid., p. 229); that is, relating to the 
other as a subject. 
 
3.7.4.2   The therapist-patient’s identifications with the therapist: from “importing” the other  
              to symbolic identification 
 
The patient (who is also a therapist) usually specifically seeks out his therapist as “the magical 
mirror that reflects the self as it wants to be – the ideal in which [he] wants to recognize himself” 
(Benjamin, 1995, p. 100). Nevertheless, the outcome of the therapist-patient’s personal therapy 
should not just be the internalisation of and identification with his therapist as a supposedly 
superior model of being-a-therapist, but should also entail the discovery “of his … own unique 
desire”, that is, his subjectivity (Crastnopol, 1999a, p. 460). As Klauber (1981, p. 175) comments, it 
is very hard “to combine discipleship with originality”. How may the therapist-patient’s 
identification(s) with his therapist therefore both enrich and expand his being-a-therapist and not 
subvert and dominate his own manner of working as a clinician? How may the development of a 
“false analytic self” (Berman, 2000) be avoided?  
 
The therapist-patient’s longed- and strived-for ideal therapist, who is represented by his therapist, 
cannot just be incorporated: identification also means “loving and having a relationship with the 
person who embodies the ideal” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 61). One may therefore ask the further 
question of how this identificatory love that the therapist-patient has for his therapist may become a 
bridge towards “a sense of mutuality and subjectivity” (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 
27), rather than being perverted into “ideal love, the submission to a powerful other who seemingly 
embodies the agency and desire one lacks in oneself” (Benjamin, 1988, p. 100).  
 
Identification is never a “one-way-street” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 153). To become a self-governing 
subject (that is, to be “freed from the axis of submission and defiance”) (Ibid., p. 155), the 
therapist-patient cannot just simply identify with his “self-mastering” therapist (Ibid., p. 153). He 
also needs the therapist’s “loving recognition” (Ibid., p. 155 ), in which is subsumed the therapist’s 
“reciprocal identification” with him (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 26). This pertains to 
the idea that for “identification with the ideal to promote development of the self as subject, the 
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idealized other must find some way to acknowledge and reciprocate the self’s need for an 
identificatory other … ” (Ibid.). 
 
For Benjamin, identification and recognition have an intricate (and sometimes paradoxical) 
relationship. While both identification and recognition are dimensions of relatedness, identification 
implies self and other being like, and recognition implies self and other being separate, 
independent and different (Aron, 2000). For being able to represent oneself as a “subject who 
desires”, one needs both the ”symbolic identification” with and the recognition from the powerful 
other with whom there is an affectively resonant emotional connection (Benjamin, 1995, p. 122). It 
is in this sense that the mutuality of therapist and patient both becoming and being each other’s love 
objects (that is, the “loving tie” between them constellating both of them as subjects who desire), 
could also hold the possibility of them becoming like subjects (Ibid., p. 7). At the point of therapist 
and therapist-patient being like subjects, one could also expect that the therapist would no longer be 
the ideal, but that the therapist-patient would see and experience him (the therapist) as being the 
representative of that ideal, that is, that that “the ideal and its representative” may be differentiated 
(Benjamin, 1998b, p. 71). This further means that the therapist-patient’s identifications with his 
therapist, rather than being literal and concrete, would happen at a symbolic level.  
 
The nature of the connectedness between therapist and patient both contextualises and shapes the 
patient’s identifications with the therapist (and the therapist’s identifications with the patient) and is 
given form by them. The loving tie (between therapist and patient) may engender a shift from the 
therapist being the (intrapsychically cast) idealised object to a position of greater mutuality (that is, 
where therapist and patient are like subjects), where identification at a symbolic level is part of the 
co-created intersubjective space. On the other hand, when the therapeutic relationship becomes 
compromised, idealisation may become entrenched and degenerate into submission (and sometimes 
masochism), where the patient’s literal and concrete identifications with the therapist are both part 
of and signal his being “lesser” and may also be seen as invoking a mimetic resonance with the 
presence of and submission to the more powerful therapist.  
 
3.7.4.3   The therapist’s sustained identification and empathy with the patient 
The idea of identification as being a two-way street encompasses the patient’s identifying with the 
therapist and the therapist’s reciprocal identifications with the patient (Benjamin, 1995, 2001). The 
latter are part of the therapist’s empathically knowing (rather than just intellectually understanding) 
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the patient; thus specifically recognising (Sander, 2002) him (the patient) and contributing to the 
evolving shared thirdness.85 
 
Empathy is an inherent part of the therapist’s identifications with the patient. Since the act of 
identification is facilitated by empathic knowing, and that of empathic knowing by identificatory 
processes, one could understand empathy and identification as being mutually constitutive. As 
such, what could be called empathic identification and identificatory empathy could be useful terms 
to elucidate the way these concepts relate to each other. 
 
Empathy has been considered a substrate of psychoanalytic discourse since its inception (Pigman, 
1995). Nonetheless, traditional psychoanalysts have tended to discount the complexity of the role 
of empathy in therapy and assumed it to be “an easy precondition for interpretive work” (Hamburg, 
1991, p. 351). Writing from a self psychological perspective, Kohut (1959) introduced “the 
empathic-introspective mode of inquiry” into psychoanalysis. Since then self psychological 
thinking has done a great deal to highlight and foreground the importance and usefulness of this 
concept (Pigman, 1995; Bolognini, 1997).  
 
However, although Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984) carefully emphasised that, rather than being “an 
autonomous curative agent”, empathy is the context for therapeutic action and work, being the 
patient’s empathic selfobject has become “the holy Grail in the analytic quest” for some self 
psychological theorists and practitioners (Hamburg, 1991, p. 357). More generally, this has led to 
empathy sometimes being idealised as “a kind of all-purpose philosopher’s stone, potentially 
capable of resolving any clinical difficulty … ” (Bolognini, 1997, p. 279). For example, therapists 
may “overuse” empathy; that is, only respond in ways that are concordant with patients’ 
experiences as a way to deal with their own anxieties and fears of harming patients by introducing 
difference (Hart, 1999). While the vicissitudes of the various ways in which this concept is 
employed and the theoretical controversies surrounding it are mostly beyond the scope of this 
study, some of the aspects of its use within psychoanalytic thinking will be briefly considered 
before proceeding further.  
 
Kohut (1984, p. 82) defines empathy as the “the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life 
of another person”. Within self psychology, and also more commonly, there has been a tendency to 
use the notion of empathy both for denoting the therapist’s responding to the patient with “care and 
                                                 
85 Shared thirdness and mutual recognition could be understood as implying that both identification and empathy could 
be reciprocal.  
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concern” and as way to describe a method whereby the therapist gathers knowledge about the 
patient’s subjective experience (Buirski & Haglund, 2001, p. 22).  
 
The conflation of these two uses of this concept, which also appears in Kohut’s later work, has led 
to conceptual confusion (Stolorow, 1984b). Stolorow (1984b, p. 44) therefore suggests that the 
term empathy be limited to indicate the therapist’s “investigatory stance” and that the therapist’s 
empathic responsiveness, which refers to the “emotional bond” between therapist and patient, be 
described by using the term “affective responsiveness”, also referred to as “affect attunement” 
(Buirski & Haglund, 2001, p. 22).86 For the purposes of this study, the notion of empathy will 
therefore be used to refer to the experiential knowing of an other’s inner state (Berger, 1987), rather 
than being linked to specific emotional attitudes, such as warmth, compassion or acceptance, 
underpinning the therapist’s responsiveness to the patient. That does not mean, however, that the 
necessity and significance of such desirable therapist attitudes are underestimated or dismissed.  
 
Ghent (1994, p. 474), who writes from a relational perspective, defines empathy as “the higher-
level integration of perceptual, affective and cognitive processes that are rooted in an effort to 
understand the quality and meaning of another’s emotional and motivational state”. Empathy 
requires the therapist’s being able to immerse himself in a temporary identification, that is, a trial 
identification (Fliess, 1942; Casement, 1985, 1990, 2002) with an aspect of the patient’s subjective 
experience without “‘drowning’ in the countertransference” (Racker, 1968, p. 132). This means 
holding on to his own subjectivity in such a way that, while he (the therapist) is able to feel his own 
feelings and think his own thoughts, he does not become so overwhelmed or self-absorbed that he 
loses sight of the patient. According to Ivey (1995, p. 355), such an ability to “imaginatively locate 
oneself in the psychological space of another requires a stable and separate sense of self that can be 
temporarily surrendered in the service of entering the other’s experiential world”.  
 
While self psychological theorising has made valuable contributions to the understanding of 
empathy, its focus on “sustained empathic inquiry … [as being] … central in establishing, 
maintaining, and continually strengthening the selfobject dimension of the transference bond” with 
the therapist (Stolorow, 1994a, p. 148) is problematic. As has been discussed before, the notion of 
the therapist’s being the patient’s selfobject tends to privilege sameness and not to take difference 
into account.87 This could lead to a partial understanding of empathy and, as Sands (1997) points 
out, to the therapist’s emphasising “concordant identifications” and neglecting “complementary 
                                                 
86 See also p. 79n51. 
87 See pp. 84-85. 
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identifications” (Racker, 1968, p. 135), that is, the therapist’s identifications with disowned or 
unthought aspects of the patient’s experience. In terms of Benjamin’s theoretical ideas, using 
empathy in this way would therefore exclude it from being part of an intersubjective perspective 
and understanding. 
 
It should therefore be kept in mind that the therapist’s identifications with the patient should not 
collapse difference by just rendering him (the therapist) a participant in the patient’s inner world. 
The therapist’s task does not only concern engaging in trying to locate the patient’s perspective. 
Slavin and Kriegman (1998b, p. 276) point out that a consistent attempt from the therapist “to 
communicate to the patient exclusively from a vantage point within the patient’s subjective world”, 
may be (and/or be experienced as such by the patient) an effort by the therapist to remain 
defensively hidden from the patient. The therapist should therefore also introduce alterity in the 
form of his different viewpoint (Gabbard, 1997; Benjamin, 2000a). Of course a measure of 
otherness already inevitably exists in that the therapist’s empathy and identifications with the 
patient always happen from his (the therapist’s) own subjectivity. 
 
In focusing more specifically on what the therapist identifies with in the effort to understand the 
patient, it is clear that in being empathic, the therapist does not just understand a patient in a way 
that is concordant with his (the patient’s) current self-experience, but also engages in 
complementary identifications”.88 The therapist’s being “on both sides of the divide” (Benjamin, 
1998b, p. 19) and retaining contact with both halves of “split complementarities”(Ibid., p. 20), 
could move the therapy and the therapeutic pair beyond the absolute and literal concreteness of 
oscillating between these two divided positions into the more transitional and symbolic realm of 
shared thirdness, which is “beyond identity” (Ibid, p. 74). Rather than engaging in the kinds of 
identifications that appear in “split complementarities”, the therapist should therefore identify with 
the patient in ways “that retain[s] contact with the patient’s multiple and conflicting positions” 
(Ibid., p. 20). 
 
The therapist’s receptive openness to different and even contradictory possibilities involves his 
running the risk of getting caught up in the criss-cross muddle of reciprocal identifications between 
himself and the patient. At times this could hold the strain of his being treated (in object-relations 
language) like the patient’s (internal) object rather than a subject. This could lead to his (the 
therapist’s) sense of himself as a therapist (as defined by that particular relationship or more 
                                                 
88 Empathy does therefore not mean that the therapist has a “dogmatic, hyperconcordant” attitude towards the patient 
(Bolognini, 1997, p. 279). 
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generally) being threatened, compromised or even destroyed, that is, what Loewald (1979, p. 758) 
calls “emancipatory murder” taking place. 
 
On the one hand the therapist’s empathic identifications with the patient may contribute towards 
bridging difference and redressing the power imbalance of one person’s being the therapist and the 
other the patient. Benjamin (2000a, p. 46) sees this power disparity as “the complementarity in 
which one person has the phallus and the other must be castrated, one subject and the other object”. 
The therapist’s power is also situated in his being able to bestow or withhold recognition of the 
patient’s “true self” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 147). For the purposes of this study, this could be extended 
to the therapist’s recognition of the participant-patient’s being-a-therapist.  
 
Conversely, the therapist’s identification with the patient may touch some problematic aspect of 
himself, which may render compassion into what the author Milan Kundera (1984, p. 31) calls “… 
that sickness … the pain one feels with someone, for someone, a pain intensified by the 
imagination and prolonged by a hundred echoes”. This signifies that for the therapist, at such a 
moment of being subsumed by his own needs and desires, the patient’s subjectivity disappears from 
view (is thus negated) and the patient becomes no more than the therapist’s internal or fantasy 
object. In more conventional psychoanalytic language it could thus be said that the therapist is 
having a countertransference issue. 
 
Benjamin (1995, p. 160n6) posits that it is precisely the acknowledgement of this 
“countertransference identification with the patient [that] distinguishes the intersubjective position 
from the opposing view that the analyst controls himself and holds fast to the mast of reality in 
order to carry the patient through the treacherous waters of the transference”. In this way the 
“inevitable return of the repressed” (in the form of the therapist’s identification[s] with the patient) 
is no longer just a “dangerous breakdown of analytic posture”, but also becomes “a necessary, 
potentially creative part of the endeavour” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. xvi). This is compatible with the 
present idea in more general psychoanalytic thinking that countertransference is ubiquitous and 
could be both an impediment to and usefully inform the therapeutic process (Jacobs, 1999).  
 
3.7.4.4   Identification and moving towards mutual recognition 
Benjamin (1998b, p. 20) highlights that the identifications (and, by implication, the 
disidentifications) that “become useful sources of knowledge” for therapist and patient are those 
that are “mediated by representation” rather than those involving “an unmediated assimilation of 
other and self”. This resonates with Frankel’s (2002, p. 106) idea that being in a disempowered 
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position in a relationship could result in an unnegotiated importation of “the parameters …  of 
one’s experiential world … from the mind of the threatening other person”. Identifications 
developed around “unsymbolized or traumatic experience” (rather than all identifications involving 
unconscious thought) are therefore “nonsymbolic, immediate and also subject to the logic of 
primitive reversibility” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 20n2). For Benjamin (Ibid., p. 20), “a point of 
freedom” is therefore not created by the “act of identification”, which, even for the therapist, is 
inevitable and “unthought”, but rather through “the act of representing the identification”, that is, 
being able to think symbolically about it.89  
This means that instead of remaining coercively embedded in an identification with the patient, the 
therapist, by becoming aware, by containing this awareness, by thinking and reflecting about it, is 
able to extricate himself from the power struggle of the symmetry of twoness into the paradoxical 
position of both identifying with and disidentifying from the patient. This process of stepping back 
should not be primarily based “on internalized thirds, superego contents, such as analytic dictums” 
but rather on the therapist’s subjective experience, that is, “the truth of his own feelings” 
(Benjamin, 2001, p. 26).  
The therapist is consequently both able to surrender to and identify with the patient’s experience 
and feelings towards and about him (the therapist) and the therapy, and to disidentify from them, 
that is, to be both an internal object to the patient and to hold on to his or her (the therapist’s) own 
subjectivity. This concurs with Frankel’s (1998b, p. 165) warning that unless therapists’ 
identifications (and one could add, disidentifications) with their patients remain “playful” (in 
Winnicott’s [1971] sense), they could “constitute impingements” rather than recognition.  
In this way the therapist both becomes the patient’s internal object by identifying with the patient 
and survives this negation (without abandoning the patient or retaliating) by disidentifying from the 
patient. The therapist thus recognises the patient, but does not forsake his own position and in so 
doing becomes and is “the one who entertains the double identification” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 107). 
This also speaks of the therapist’s “ability to stand in the spaces between realities without losing 
any of them” (Bromberg, 1998, p. 186).  
 
The therapist’s subjective experience of and thinking about such a process may be explicitly and 
directly shared with the patient as, for example, Bollas (1989, 1992) does when he practises what 
                                                 
89 Pugh (2002) makes a similar point from the perspective of memory theory (which exists at the interface of 
psychoanalysis and cognitive neuroscience). He (Pugh, 2002, p. 1384) sees identification as a type of memory, that is, 
as part of “implicit or procedural memory”. He accordingly proposes that one way to understand insight in 
psychoanalysis is that the process of therapy leads to identifications becoming available for thought and reflection.  
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he terms dialectics of difference.90 This may also implicitly and unconsciously be communicated to 
the patient (that is, communicated at a meta-level) through the patient’s actual experience of what 
the therapist does. Benjamin (1998b, p. 107) understands the patient’s reciprocal identifications 
with the therapist (which take place in the context of being recognised by the therapist) as also 
being with this capacity of the therapist “to disidentify with any one version of the story and to 
suspend identity”.  
 
3.7.4.5   Being love objects and like subjects in the space of mutual recognition 
According to Pizer (1998, p. 169), Benjamin’s (1995) idea of mutual recognition, which involves 
the “pardoxical juxtaposition” of “like subjects” and “love objects”, concerns a “sustained 
identification with the other even when the subjective interests (needs, desires, affects) of the other 
stand in conflict with the subjective interests of the self”. He (Pizer, Ibid.) considers this “sustained 
identification” as involving a continual process of negotiation where one both identifies and 
disidentifies with the other. This concurs with Benjamin’s notion of what one could call 
“microprocesses” of multiple double positions constituted by the reciprocal identifications and 
disidentifications which take place between therapist and patient as part of mutual recognition. All 
of this adds up to Benjamin’s (1995, p. 75) idea of “replacing the discourse of identity with the 
notion of plural identifications”.  
Such processes of negotiation could be expected to feature prominently in interactions between 
therapist and patient when the third cluster of the trajectory of thirdness is foregrounded. This is 
where the back-and forth flow of (often unconscious) identifications and disidentifications between 
therapist and patient serves to foster the connectedness between them at a subject-to-subject level. 
This is both characteristic of and contributes to a shared sense of being (Benjamin, 1998b; 2001). 
At this point identifications would tend to take place at a symbolic rather than at a concrete level. 
 
3.7.5 Locating Benjamin’s intersubjective version of identification within this study 
Benjamin’s elaboration of identificatory processes in therapy as being constituted by complex 
cycles of multiple mutual and reciprocal identifications and disidentifications between therapist and 
patient, which locates “the self in the fragile, unenclosed space of intersubjectivity” (Benjamin, 
1998b, p. 105), makes identification a “structure that emerges in motion” (Corbett, 2001, p. 327). 
This viable intersubjective rendition of identification brings a postmodern sensibility (along the 
                                                 
90 See also p. 107. 
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lines suggested by Corbett)91 to conceptualising identification by encompassing its multifaceted 
intricacies. In this study it provided a useful and comprehensive means of thinking about (and 
deepening that understanding) of how identificatory processes may be involved in linking the 
therapeutic and clinical thirds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 See p. 113. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RESULTS OF THE TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 THE THERAPIST AS WOUNDED HEALER AND SUBJECT-TO-SUBJECT 
            RELATING  
 
4.1.1 The psychodynamic therapist’s personal therapy  
Although not extensively (and sometimes not even explicitly discussed), the participants and the 
researcher shared the belief and the understanding that personal therapy, even if not “interminable” 
(Freud, 1937), is a fundamental aspect of the psychodynamic therapist’s professional life.  
 
The specific focus on the therapeutic relationship in psychoanalytic (and psychodynamic thinking), 
which currently includes the highlighting of the therapist’s subjectivity, renders the therapist’s own 
therapy particularly significant.92 The same may not be true of a therapeutic paradigm that does not 
have this specific emphasis, for example, cognitive-behaviour therapy.93  
529: Well, my belief about therapy, about working as a therapist is that you
do use yourself as a tool.
534 You're part of a process, you're part of a process happening in the
patient.
535 Not only facilitating that process, you mix with it.
536 Something about who you are and what you are mixes in the third.
537 It is part of the catalyst for your patient's change.
538 And the therapy is just about keeping your tool clean and sharp and
bright and shining (laughter).
262 It just is not possible to be a therapist without being in therapy.
270 Maybe, if you're working with cognitive-behaviour therapy and that's your
model and that's your method and it's a method that doesn't require you
to work with the intersubjective conjunctions and disjunctions and the
intersubjective interaction, maybe then you don't need therapy.
271 Maybe you can do very, very excellent work without your own therapy.
273 I couldn't work like that, but maybe I need to modify that and say that
if you are working in a psychoanalytic therapy, I think that therapy is
absolutely completely part of the work. (F)
 
 
 
                                                 
92 Although the views and arguments presented here are mostly in terms of relational and intersubjective theory, this 
(with variations or different emphases) would also hold true for other psychotherapies subsumed under the rubric of 
psychodynamic psychotherapy. 
93 It is a fallacy to think of such therapies as not containing the same relationship elements as psychodynamic therapies: 
those elements are just not explicitly foregrounded, theorised and taken into account and precisely that holds possible 
limitations, pitfalls and certainly potential danger. By that I am not implying that cognitive-behaviour therapy does not 
have a real place and worth. In some instances it is certainly a more appropriate form of treatment than psychodynamic 
therapy, especially in terms of symptom relief and in terms of what the patient is able to afford in terms of money and 
time. However, if one takes into account that therapists tend to seek therapy from somebody within the same theoretical 
paradigm, the fact that the majority of behaviour therapists opt for nonbehaviour personal therapy (Norcross & 
Aboyoun, 1994) and that most therapists who are (or have been) in therapy are (were) in some kind of variation of 
psychodynamic therapy (Darongkamas, Burton & Cushway, 1994; Macran & Shapiro, 1998; Macran, Smith & Stiles, 
1999) speak about what therapists consider important for themselves when seeking therapy.  
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4.1.2 The nature and origins of the participants’ woundedness 
When asked about their understanding of the reasons for choosing their profession, all eight 
participants described themselves in terms of the wounded healer concept. They depicted the nature 
and origins of their woundedness in a variety of ways. The wounded-healer phenomenon was seen 
as a combination of abilities and vulnerabilities, usually originating in early relationships with 
significant others, which had (often unconsciously) entangled them and which had shaped their 
ways of relating to others and of doing psychotherapy. To get beyond this had been a challenging 
and courageous struggle that had continued for many years, and that was still, to some extent, 
ongoing. 
423 That's where I came from, trying to work out who the hell my mother was;
what was going on; who I was.
424 It started out from a very, very deep desire to understand my mother and
help her.
428 But the ravages and the actual effects of living with someone who is
actually off her rocker in your childhood, is stuff I'm still working
through, still distancing myself from. (A)
135 For me, I went into therapy saying: "I don't know why I'm in therapy,
because I've come from the perfect family."
137 We laugh about it now, because, I mean, as much as I said it's perfect,
it was so dysfunctional that I didn't see that.
141 Ja, of course, that's why I'm working with [omitted], because
my father himself is [omitted] and what came out in therapy is that I
was trying to rescue my dad.
142 In trying to rescue my dad, I'm trying to rescue everybody else. (C)
578 Ja, you see, [omitted], so I learnt through my own parents'
neuroses that the way to deal with life was to take care of people,
because I took care of my parents.
580 I was the regular family therapist in the household.
581 And that spilled over into my peer relationships, where I became a kind
of caretaker amongst my peers and that I think was a natural preparation
for the role of the therapist. (D)
406 I was very much the caretaker in my family and in my peer group, the
listener, the caretaker.
407 I was primed to be a therapist from small, but it was a role that hurt me
and I struggled.
408 I mean, I liked it, but it was a role that in myself was damaging,
hurtful.
409 I couldn't be who I was, I couldn't be me.
410 I was there as an ear for other people, the rescuer, the helper, the
looker-after. (F)
 
One of the aspects of being wounded was becoming prematurely independent and self-sufficient. 
396 Ja, I think I started defending against dependency needs at a very
early age.
397 Those that I depended upon did not feel safe, in a way, to depend upon, so
I think my counter to that from a very young age was to do it myself and
to grow up and to survive (sighs) … (BP)
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These early relational experiences had shaped the participants in becoming caretakers, rescuers and 
prematurely independent, that is, wounded healers. If one reconfigures this concept relationally and 
in terms of Benjamin’s thinking, these participants identified with powerful others by whom they 
were not recognised, for whom they were but inner objects (and hence they became very aware of 
how to be “good” objects). Identification was with these relationships (rather than with the personal 
attributes of those identified with), and accordingly with the split complementarities consisting of 
two opposing and unequal positions.  
 
A therapist who is a wounded healer enters his profession with a profound interest in understanding 
the inner world and behaviour of others and himself, that is, is psychologically-minded 
(Appelbaum, 1973; Farber, 1985), and has an already-developed ability to be attuned others’ 
emotions. However, he also brings his (largely) unacknowledged vulnerabilities and neediness, 
which makes it hard to engage in subject-to-subject relating, especially when his defences and 
anxieties are provoked by what happens in therapy. At such moments the complex combination of 
the facets of the wounded healer could converge into the constellation of a therapeutic relationship 
in terms of the polarities of powerful healing therapist and submissively healing patient.  
 
This makes it likely that therapy will go well as long as the therapist can be the rescuer or helper 
and the patient colludes in being a “good patient” (on the therapist’s terms) who does not threaten 
the therapist’s sense of himself as a “good therapist” unduly. Such a therapist may find it 
particularly difficult to differentiate himself from the patient (that is, not to relate to him as an 
object) when there are similarity and confusion between the “other within” and the “other without” 
(Benjamin, 1998b, p. 108); that is, when what is identified with in the patient is also a disowned 
aspect of himself (the therapist).  
 
Being a wounded healer can therefore be a real liability when doing psychodynamic psychotherapy, 
where the emphasis is so much on the therapist’s use of self and the therapeutic relationship. 
However, the desire to understand oneself also leads to a profound interest in understanding the 
workings of the psyche and human relationships, and the development of the ability (for which 
there is already probably some aptitude) to think about oneself and others.  
834 B: So I had the aptitude for this.
835 *R: What is that aptitude?
837 B: It's the capacity to see process over content; to realise that life
isn't necessarily just about getting things right, but about finding
one's own way and truth.
838 And that's why I think that people who have been injured, more so than
people who haven't been injured, get that; they get that somehow
something has gone astray, because if somehow you'd gone through life in
a rather protected way, with a relatively well structured family, etc.,
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the capacity to try to understand life as a process is not developed, very
strongly developed, because there's no motivation to develop that, because
you're feeling all right, so you just then stay in the moment and live.
839 But when things go wrong, and you can't quite work out why you feel
terrible, then one starts to think: "Well, why do I feel terrible?"
840 You try to understand the relationships in your life, you try to
understand what that means and try to change it.
841 You have some level of success at doing that.
842 Well, then you are a psychotherapist, aren't you?
846 A good therapist is someone who has battled to make meaning when they've
been sore at some point in their life; succeeded to some extent; failed to
some extent, but got that there's something in that process that's
important.
847 If they've had to do that a lot, then they've built the skills of
thinking and feeling things out a lot. (B)
 
Although the ability to think in this particular reflective way may rather inauspiciously begin as 
part of being “wounded”, it certainly is a necessary attribute for the psychodynamic 
psychotherapist. Of course that leads to the interesting question (which I do not presume to be able 
to answer) whether any one who has not to a significant extent experienced being “wounded” will 
really have the motivation and interest to pursue this “impossible profession” (Malcolm, 1980). 
This also emphasises that while the specific circumstances of one’s life may sometimes be 
unambivalently and clearly devastating and traumatic, being “wounded” does not always just 
pertain to those circumstances, but rather to those meanings that are assigned to them and how 
these meanings are lived.  
 
4.1.3 Woundedness, becoming a psychotherapist and the participants’ personal therapies 
Being “wounded” was both seen as being a fundamental part of being a psychotherapist and as 
holding the possibility of impeding the work of therapy. 
436 Oh, I mean, people inevitably become psychotherapists as part of their
way of trying to cope with their own suffering, you know.
437 If I focus on other people's pain, then I avoid my own. (E)
403 We also know well enough that none of us do this work if we've not been
wounded.
404 So you sit with your own wounds and besides which, no human being is
without blind spots.
405 So we're trying to do something that is quite impossible, anyway.
406 To try and be aware of your own blind spots is a bit of a paradox. (A)
 
Some of the participants had entered therapy because of some (usually relationship) problems in 
their own lives, but only B was clear that his woundedness had been the overt and conscious reason 
for his need for therapy. He also made an interesting comment about therapists’ only sometimes 
discovering this aspect of themselves after having entered therapy for more “professional” reasons. 
46 My own personal hurts motivated me.
823 My own personal hurts and the need, the need to resolve them so that I
can be happy, whatever that may mean.
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47 It was not at that stage at all clear that I wanted to be a
psychotherapist.
48 You know, you get two different kinds of psychotherapists.
49 You get the ones that went to therapy because they want to be a
psychotherapist and discover that they've got a whole lot of personal
hurts.
50 And I'm not one of those.
51 I'm someone who wanted to be a [omitted], who was doing [omitted], who was
running into a lot of problems, had a very difficult history, went to
therapy as a typical patient and then was motivated through my own
transformation in therapy to study psychology further and eventually
became a psychotherapist. (B)
 
Becoming a psychotherapist could be an inevitable and necessary part of surviving and moving 
beyond the entrapment of woundedness. 
824 I think (sighs) in some ways I never had a choice: I had to be a
psychotherapist.
825 There was nothing really else that I could have done and survived,
initially.
826 So the strongest part has been motivated by my own attempt to try and
understand the suffering of my own history and my current self. (B)
442 Oh, ja, I mean, it was a way of working through my own stuff, for sure.
(E)
 
This choice of profession was often only retrospectively understood. 
392 F: Okay, the obvious, overt reasons weren't why I became a therapist.
400 Now I understand it very much in terms of unconscious processes that were
happening at that time, positive and negative things.
401 Partly it was about pathology that was happening in me and in my family
that I was unconsciously aware of that I needed to heal, that I needed to
bring out, but I've recently become aware of how really healthy a choice
it was, how I really didn't understand it at that time.
402 I didn't know what I was doing at that time, but I was making a choice, a
choice to change my ways of relating, my ways of speaking, my ways of
processing what was happening or beginning to speak about things that I
was aware of unconsciously and that were happening ...
427 I changed from wanting to spend my life not communicating with people
[omitted] to a profession that was about relatedness, but relatedness in a
different way.
428 I didn't have to look after ...
429 I think that's one of the traps in psychology, to want to rescue and look
after and all of that.
430 *R: Was that something you had to work with?
432 F: Yes, it was something I had to work with, but I think it was an
interesting choice at that age of [omitted] to choose relatedness above
non-relatedness.
433 That's why I think it was a healthy choice ...
434 *R: Maybe it was about a kind of healing?
436 F: Although I didn't know what I was doing at that time. (F)
 
A psychotherapist who is a wounded healer may use his work and patients as a way of having a 
meaningful existence and maintaining his feelings of self-worth. 
456 And the work gives you some meaning and some sense of worth.
459 You know, so I think this can be quite dangerous for therapists, because
why they go into this work often for these reasons, is that they become
dependent on their patients for their own self-worth and for reassurance
that wounds can be healed, for hope, stuff like that ... (A)
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The issues and difficulties that had ensued from being wounded had been such intrinsic parts of 
who the participants were, that change would not have been possible without therapy. This 
realisation had usually only come when looking back (that is, during the course of or after therapy).  
464 And it's retrospectively that I can see the motivations with the
consciousness that comes later, when you're no longer in that place of
need, that you can see that you did have it.
465 At the time that you have it, you don't know it.
466 But it's that, that's basically what all these years of therapy and
analysis have helped me with, is to put it in the right place. (A)
449 F: The unconscious enactment of not being true to myself, because
everything I always was, was about accommodating to make someone else feel
stronger or happier.
450 And it's in you.
451 It just is who you are.
452 It's not like something you can read about to learn about.
453 It's just who you are and that has to shift.
454 *R: You were also good at it?
456 F: I was good at it from this (indicates height of a small child)!
457 And I don't think that can shift in learning.
458 It's had to be a complete shift of who I am and how I relate.
459 Not complete, but I mean, it had to be significant enough, the shift in
who I am and how I relate to ....
460 *R: How did that shift come about?
462 F: For me, that's come out of therapy, no two ways about it, no two ways
about it ... (F)
 
The effects of therapy have been transformative in many ways. 
631 I mean, my experience of analysis has been the most significant thing in
my life.
632 It's impacted every aspect of my life.
644 It's been a deeply life-giving experience ...(E)
 
This has made the effort and expense (in terms of time and money) of therapy seem worthwhile. 
508 I can say to you that my therapy is hard work.
509 I don't just go there.
510 No, it's very hard work; it's very, very hard.
511 But I wouldn't want it any other way.
512 I always say to people, to my friends and they also see the product,
because I'm a stronger person, and they've never gone to therapy: "All
that money; it's now been seven years and I could have taken all that
money and actually bought myself a house; I could have had cash, but
instead I bought a house inside me that is fuller and happier than having
a house standing there that's empty."
513 So that is to me what therapy is, that it's hard, hard work, but I
wouldn't have wanted it ANY OTHER way. (C)
 
Having one’s own therapy may alter one’s motivations for, the meaning, and way of being a 
therapist.  
469 What I was saying just now was that over these many years it's kind of
like I have moved from feeling pushed and shoved into this direction, not
that I didn't feel properly that it was a free choice, it was and then it
wasn't and then it was, you know, to actually really accepting this as
this is what I'm doing and being fully committed to it as a craft also,
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as an art and a craft and something that has become for me, of enormous
interest.
482 But it's not a burden; it's a pleasure, it's interesting, because all of
that becomes part of your virtuoso, your capacity to be with other people
and other people's emotions without feeling frightened of it … (A)
429 But another insight (laughs), I mean, really, when I think that I have
been in therapy for [omitted] years, that has really only just come to
me is that my task is not about alleviating suffering.
432 It is about facilitating the connection with the unconscious; it's about
bearing the suffering; it's about knowing that suffering is part of life;
not trying to avoid it. (E)
224 I think that there is no question about the fact that we as therapists
do therapy because it's gratifying to ourselves in some way or another,
but the INTENSITY of the need to help, that need to save, is vastly
diminished if you've been in therapy.
225 And because it's diminished, I'm far more effective.
226 I am far freer to be emotionally attuned to my patients, but it's because
it is good for them, as opposed to it being good for me. (G)
 
While it is possible to see in retrospect that one’s functioning as a therapist has become enhanced as 
a result of one’s own therapy, there is also the rather humbling realisation that one will never be 
totally free of one’s own issues: that a Third such as therapy or supervision is actually a necessary 
part of doing the work of therapy. 
393 I even know the patients, I can see those patients before and after and I
know who they are and I have like a regret about those patients from
before and it's not deep regret, but some regret that I hadn't somehow
gotten through the issue by the time they came to see me and I failed
them in a way.
394 But, then one can also step into a lot of perspectives about what that
means, because is one ever free from unconscious neurosis?
395 I don't know.
396 So there must be people I am seeing now who are stepping onto things that
I'm unconscious of and that at some point in my therapy in the future I
look back to: "Oh, my G**!"(laughs) ...
397 That's also why the therapist who is not in therapy really has to be
careful, I think.
398 Really has to be careful, has to be in very good supervision, then. (B)
 
4.1.4 Moving towards subject-to-subject relating 
4.1.4.1   Therapeutic experiences in the therapeutic third that engender subject-to-subject 
              relating in the clinical third 
 
Some of the crucial questions in this study were what about the participants’ own therapies helped 
them to work through their own issues and difficulties, as well as rendering them capable of and/or 
enhancing their abilities for subject-to subject relating with patients; what impeded this and how 
these kinds of processes affected their work. What, therefore, were the nature of the relationships 
and the links between the therapeutic thirds and the clinical thirds that the participants described?  
Participant C contemplated this question: 
277 What I am not sure of in terms of your question is, is it my own
experience of therapy that is informing my work or are insights that I've
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gained as the result of being in therapy informing my work, because, in a
way, they are slightly different. (C)
 
In listening to and reading the interviews, one becomes very aware of the loving respect and the 
ability to see the other in his own right (rather than being “perfect” technically) that mark the steady 
and unflagging presence of the kind of therapist that could engender the creation of a therapeutic 
space where such experiences were possible. 
637 It's like you've been taken in by somebody else.
638 Not only understood, but that person has actually taken you in.
639 It's a very intimate experience, encounter.
640 I think that's what's transformative.
645 It's healing, it's containing.
646 It gives you that experience of being contained, which probably you had
as an infant, but you don't usually have as an adult.
647 And it's not like being with a lover, you see, because with a lover
there's not the understanding.
648 Lovers understand you, yes, but this is now a more verbalised
understanding: "This person is actually thinking about me, has taken me
into their mind and they're going to say something about me which is an
exquisite understanding of elements of me."
649 For me, that's what's transformative.
625 Once you've had that experience, there's a shift in the way you think of
things, the way you see things, the way you conceptualise things.
626 You never reverse it. (D)
 
In the following account by BP there are also indications of her therapist’s agapaic attitude 
(Lambert, 1981) or what Benjamin (2001, 2002) called the moral third underpinning the therapist’s 
work. Included in this is her experience of the different dimensions of therapy. 
301 Maybe it's a real experience of being respected, all the things, I
suppose, which is about the woundedness to start off with (becomes
tearful).
302 I suppose there are aspects of the mother, a feeling of complete
dedication to the process, care, being taken care of emotionally mixed
with the guidance and the boundaries of the father.
307 And I think this experience of my therapist being able to contain that
woundedness, I suppose it's the closest to feeling loved and how it frees
one up to actually look at yourself within that environment, to actually
face yourself and how impossible it is to face yourself in an environment
where you don't feel loved by the therapist. (BP)
 
This had not been the case in a previous therapy, where she had to hide her own vulnerability in 
order to “protect” the therapist. 
277 Not allowing myself to really get in touch with my own neediness, my
own dependency needs, so I would present myself as quite together, as
quite under control, not needing anything special, keep it on a quite
superficial level, not being able to get in touch with dependency needs,
basically. (BP)
 
In another therapy, this aspect of hers had made the therapist angry and he had given a harsh and 
punitive interpretation that was negating of her. 
278 Which is what came out of that second therapy when I said: "I'm going
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through [omitted], I really need you to help me."
279 And he got angry, basically saying in quite an angry way: "Do you always
look to other people to solve your problems?" (BP)
 
In the participants’ descriptions of their therapies one finds the different facets of recognition 
(interspersed by moments of negation)94 as set out in the different clusters of Benjamin’s trajectory 
of thirdness, ranging from the therapist’s attunement to and containment of the participant to the 
sharing of a co-created symbolic intersubjective space, where alterity is possible.  
 
For Participant B it had been his first therapist’s recognition of him (64, 66, 67), which had to do 
with her attunement to him (72-74), accompanied by his recognition of her (75-76), and her 
specific awareness of him as somebody who had a certain potential (77), that had led him to 
considering becoming a therapist (78). Another way of viewing his wanting to become a therapist, 
is to consider it as a way of identifying with the powerful and idealised other as a way to become 
more empowered oneself. 
64 Largely it was a kind of exercise in being recognised by her in a way I
felt I hadn't been recognised before or seen properly before, like a
feeling of being special.
65 I remember that.
66 There was this feeling of being special, which I hadn't had before.
67 You know, really, that someone was that interested in me.
72 The therapy room, for me, was like coming home.
73 I could just breathe and relax in the room.
74 I knew, I just somehow felt totally accustomed to this way of being.
75 It made sense to me.
76 I understood what she was doing.
77 In fact, a lot of the therapy was about me and about her seeing that I
could see what she was doing.
78 And that was what started leading me into thinking that I could be a
therapist, because she recognized that as well. (B)
 
Participant A described the distinctive quality that makes the therapeutic relationship a “healing” 
one (282, 284). She also recalled how her own experiences of being recognised in therapy (306) by 
her therapist’s attuned and non-intrusive, non-judgemental presence (309, 316-317) within the 
contained space of therapy (314) had enabled her to develop the capacity to also do this in her own  
work (322, 324). 
282 A: But then there's that other mysterious thing which is the relationship
between yourself and the therapist that I think is probably a lot more
of the healing than anything else.
282 We call it trust, and unless there is trust between yourself and the
patient nothing will happen.
303 *R: What has your experience been of trust in your own therapy and in
your work?
306 A: I think the experience of being listened to for me, in my first
therapy, was the biggest thing, was the thing that moved me.
307 *R: What is being listened to?
                                                 
94 This is further discussed in the section “Therapist ‘mistakes’ and the dialectic of recognition and negation”. 
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309 A: It's mirroring, that's another word for it, but it is having the space
to explore your own feelings without sanction; to say the unsayable and
have it received without judgement.
314 So that container is the most important thing and it has to do with all
the things, you know, the structure of the therapy and your time and
keeping the frame intact and having respect for the frame.
316 And listen to that and be empathetic all the way, not with judgement.
317 So that capacity of the therapist to be able to see; to shut up and
listen.
322 That is part of what I have developed over the years of my own therapy:
the capacity, well to know that being listened to works and gradually
experiencing more and more, getting more words to understand what that
is, the vessel, the trust, the frame, whatever names we have for it, we
all know it's that thing (laughs).
324 And to develop that capacity within myself by having been listened to; by
listening to myself.
336 So that in itself is the growth that I experience in myself of having
more of a sense of my own container, my own feet. (A)
 
These kinds of experiences had taken A beyond the extreme neediness (451) where she had been 
before to where she was able to have her own life in a fuller way (452-453). She was no longer at 
the point of intense vulnerability and dependence where she had been before (353). In this process, 
what she needed from therapy had also changed (352). 
451 I'm not howling in the agony of not having had a mother.
452 I can see the fact of it; I can be more matter-of-fact about it, because
I'm not a mess any more.
453 I can live my life and I can have my life.
352 I think, actually, the need now, is more really for mirroring than for
being listened to, for having the space to talk about all the things I
find growing inside of me.
353 Whereas before it was more like being lost in a fog and needing to hold
somebody's hand while you're walking through that dark valley, where you
don't know where to put your foot next, because you might fall. (A).
 
The evolvement of mutual recognition in a good-enough therapy encompassed surrendering to the 
“music” of a shared sense of being and the existence of difference. This enabled participants to 
work in a similar way. 
402 So the words very quickly recede [omitted], but the sense of BEING, and
the sense of being responded to, heard and seen, remains.
406 And that doesn't mean that the therapy is mushy or mirroring, because
there's a lot of difference in the therapy. I greatly value the
therapist's input, which is different and might shed a new light on what
I'm dealing with.
409 So it's not just a mirroring response that I'm experiencing, but rather a
challenging, engaged response and I find that I can be that too, very
engaged in my therapy with patients and challenging where it is necessary.
(G)
 
Alterity meant the therapist’s not colluding with the participant and not only submitting to the 
participant’s point of view. This could also become a way of working with which the participant 
could identify. 
311 I think, what W would often do, is pick up on a manipulation and throw it
right at my head and force me to actually look at that, when I would deny
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that I was actually manipulating or trying to pull him into an alliance
against [omitted].
313 Once he even said to me: "Oh, D, you are just incorrigible; there you go
again, trying to pull me into an alliance against [omitted]."
314 And I would say: "But, W, that's not true; all I'm trying to do is to get
some sort of support for these difficulties."
315 He replied:" Yes, but look at how you are doing it; you are wanting me to
agree with you that [omitted] and you don't like it when I won't do that.”
326 So I've been amazed at the way that people will fight that and often
the fighting is very useful in the end. (D)
 
Of course there is also the possibility that one’s own therapy, while being transformative may also, 
especially in the intense and idealising beginning phases, assume greater importance than one’s 
“real” life, and that one may become increasingly self-preoccupied. 
117 You know, I think, my own experience of analysis; there have been times
when it has felt absolutely all-consuming, it's been the absolute
central thing in my life.
243 But I can remember quite early in my therapy saying that it felt as
though my therapy, my kind of inner world was happening in technicolour
and the rest of my life was in monochrome.
244 And in some ways that has been the way that it's felt, that my analysis
has been INCREDIBLY important to me.
245 It's completely changed my life. (E)
 
While participants’ descriptions were of (especially initial) experiences of therapy as being 
different from previous ways that significant others had related to them, this should not be 
interpreted as being indicative of their therapies being so-called corrective emotional experiences 
(Alexander & French, 1946), but rather as intricate amalgams of what Stern (1994) called the 
needed and repeated relationships.  
326 So then what she brings alive for me, is that although she is not my
mother in the room, something that is going on, is like my mother.
332 I will pick up that she is distant, whereas she might not be distant,
but I will pick it up and it's important for me to say that to her,
because then she knows we need to work with that, where I might not know
how to work with that, because I'm the client.
333 And she will work with that with me.
334 And I don't know, it's almost as though I can see the mere fact that she
then works it through with me already takes the process of my mother
away, because my mother would never do that. (C)
 
Within the context of such therapeutic relationships, where different clusters of the trajectory of 
thirdness were appropriately foregrounded at different times, the participants were able to, at the 
same time as working through and becoming freer of their own difficulties, move towards being 
able to engage in subject-to-subject relating; that is, being less prone to (unconsciously) using 
patients for the gratification of their own needs and desires and increasingly becoming able to 
differentiate themselves from patients.95 As Benjamin (1998b, p. 103) puts it so succinctly: “Thus,  
                                                 
95 Participants’ identifications with their therapists were also involved in the ways that their manner of working as 
clinicians changed and developed, but this will be discussed in Section 4.4.  
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paradoxically, only inclusion, the reavowal of what was disavowed, in short owning, could allow 
that othernerness a place outside the self in the realm of externality, could grant it recognition 
separate from self.”  
 
These findings resonate somewhat with the results of other qualitative studies about the impact of 
therapists’ personal therapies on their work. Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999, p. 429) write about 
the “specific aspects of personal healing and growth” that contributed to therapist effectiveness. 
Wiseman and Shefler (2001, p. 138) describe how their participants had moved towards 
individuation during the course of their therapies. They (Ibid.) understand individuation in terms of 
Skovholt and Rønnestad’s (1995, p. 74) “individuation stage” of therapist development. For 
Wiseman and Shefler (2001, p. 138) the “central task” of this stage is “to move towards deeper 
authenticity while developing a highly individual and personalized way of functioning 
professionally”. Translated into Benjamin’s thinking, this would mean therapists being able to 
engage in subject-to-subject relations with patients. Some of the other effects of therapy on working 
as a therapist that are described in these studies, such as becoming more attuned and empathic to 
patients; being aware of the space of therapy “belonging” to the patient; becoming more able to 
separate one’s feelings from that of patients (Mackey & Mackey, 1993; Macran, Smith & Stiles, 
1999; Wiseman & Shefler, 2001), may also be understood as aspects of an increased capacity for 
subject-to-subject relating.  
 
4.1.4.2    Woundedness, personal therapy and the changing nature of empathy with patients 
Having their own therapies had made it possible for participants to identify with their patients’ 
experiences of therapy in ways that would otherwise not be possible, thus enhancing the possibility 
of patients becoming like subjects. When a therapist has had his own (often) iconoclastic and (even) 
narcissistically wounding experience of therapy, it becomes harder to write the patient off as being 
one of them, the patients, those who are weak and cannot cope with life and its inevitable 
difficulties, thus contributing to the therapist’s sense of mutuality with patients. Participant B 
discussed this issue (about which he had strong feelings) in relation to therapists without any 
significant own therapy experience. 
186 B: In the [omitted] years or so that I've been working, I can see those
therapists.
187 I am usually able to tell, when I meet them, that they've not really been
in any serious therapy themselves.
188 *R: What do you see?
190 B: That there is no identification with the patient.
192 The patient is part of THEM, and the therapist is part of US.
193 You know, there is an US and THEM.
194 As soon as I see that, then I know that this is s*** therapy, you see,
because the person doesn't know what it's like to sit in the other chair.
(B)
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On a very ordinary and pragmatic level, the actual experience of therapy brings empathy with 
patients in the process of therapy. 
592 I think in the initial stages of therapy, and I REALLY struggled with the
whole notion of what a therapeutic relationship is (laughs) and WANTED an
ordinary relationship with my analyst, you know, and so to have done
battle with that at a personal level makes it that much easier, easier to
kind of hold a person through that process of coming to recognise what
the therapeutic relationship is about. (E)
 
While suffering brings empathy with patients, it is also important to know from one’s own 
experience that therapy brings hope of getting beyond this. 
207 You can't know about suffering unless you've suffered yourself.
208 And you can't know that there is a way through unless you've found one
yourself. (A)
 
Through therapy it becomes possible to acknowledge previously disowned vulnerability. This is an 
important facet of having “true” empathy with patients. 
306 I suppose the one advantage of woundedness is how it affects one's
empathy for one's patients.
308 So I think that is coming into my practice as well, a feeling of deep
care for my patients, which I suppose I always thought was there, you
know.
309 I wouldn't have done the work if I did not think it was there, but
obviously there was space for improvement ... (BP)
 
While being a wounded healer does mean that one is sensitive and attuned to the suffering of 
others, it also holds the real possibility of relating to the other as one’s internal object, that is, in 
terms of one’s own experiences.  So the therapist’s own therapy becomes pivotal in taking empathy 
to a point where the therapist is able to identify with an other who is separate and different.  
294 So I am much more attuned to people's defences and I think that is
something that is absolutely a direct result of my own "stuff" and I
find that I need to be very careful about not identifying with clients
in this regard.
305 I am thinking of a particular young woman that I'm seeing at the moment,
and who, in some ways, reminds me quite a lot of myself and some of the
issues that I've had to grapple with in terms of [omitted].
306 And I need to be careful to move at her pace, not assume things, not feel
that she is like me, because she is who she is, you know.
307 There might be resonances, but I can't assume anything from that and nor
can I assume that I can know where she needs to go, you know, in terms of
changes she needs to make or whatever just because I feel that I have
struggled with similar issues. (E)
 
Participant A described how her therapy had helped her to be less “gripped” by her own issues, 
which had led to her empathy with patients not just leading to the kind of identifications that 
obscures difference and is suffused with “sameness” (127-129), so that she was able to retain her 
connectedness to patients (134-135); recognise them as being separate and different (143-144); be 
reflective of what was happening (146-147); and was consequently no longer so exhausted as in 
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earlier years (162-165) when she could not properly separate herself from her patients (443-444). 
This had left her with compassion for her patients (447). Her own therapy thus functioned as a 
Third that she was able to use for containing and working through problematic aspects of herself 
(448). 
127 In time it started helping me with not being so much in that kind of
identification with the patient's pain, which I operated a lot more from
before.
128 Which, I suppose to some extent is helpful, but one needs to be more
objective and let people carry their own pain in order also to be more
empathetic.
129 Analysis definitely helped me with that, to be more in my own skin and
stand separate as an empathetic observer that trusted that they could do
the work themselves, but being there with an understanding of what it is
taking and helping them walk the road.
134 It's not that I don't feel, but my feelings are more there as tools for
information.
135 It's not that I don't deeply feel for their suffering, but I don't get
floored by it; I don't get overwhelmed by my compassion for them ...
143 If you cannot differentiate whether this feeling that you are having
is coming from your own pain or from the patient's pain, you can actually
really miss what's going on for them.
144 You can project your own stuff onto them and begin to steer them in a
direction that actually has got nothing to do with them.
146 I think that what that also has also helped me with is to listen better,
obviously, to sit back and listen and put on a hook more what I am
feeling and seeing and so it's a process that goes on over there while I'm
engaging here.
147 And waiting more before I would offer an intervention or a comment or a
reflection.
162 With that I have found that the exhaustion that I used to feel in the
beginning as a younger therapist ...
163 It's not that I don't get tired from the work, but it's not that kind of
exhaustion that I used to have when I couldn't properly be separate.
164 I would carry much more ...
165 I suppose I would be much more burdened by their affects, their emotions,
their suffering than what I am now.
443 And I would be far more over-mothering in my attempts to alleviate
people's suffering around such pain.
444 I would get over-involved in the work, which as I'm sure you know, can
have all sorts of catastrophic results and has had...
447 I think what I'm left with is a real compassion for people who have had
that suffering, but I don't feel linked to their suffering.
448 I've got mine, I've got my place where I'm working with it and I have had
a whole lot more distance from it. (A)
 
Participant C also described how she had become more able to differentiate herself from patients. 
597 I've also become stronger about what is their stuff and what is my stuff
and I'm careful not to make their stuff my stuff, so let's say there's
something uncomfortable and I feel bad about it, I then can
sieve through it and I need to get it back to them and they need to
work it through themselves.
598 So I'm able to separate that that's their stuff and that's my stuff.
599 And if it is, then I'll say: "What is it in me?" (C)
 
Being able to differentiate oneself from patients had still meant maintaining a vital connectedness 
with them. 
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299 I think it's a level of differentiation, and separateness as an
intuitive therapist that you develop, without losing your affective
attunement. (G)
 
A therapist’s empathy should not just be with the vulnerable aspects of the patient, but also with the 
patient’s negativity, anger and hatefulness. Participant BP described how her therapist’s capacity to 
retain contact with and keep in mind different and conflicting aspects of her, which included 
defensiveness and negativity (312, 319-320), had enabled her to be reflective (314-316) and to give 
the same kind of recognition to her own patients (313, 318). This excerpt may also be understood 
as BP’s being able to identify with her therapist’s way of working when she herself felt recognised, 
thus becoming able to be “on both sides of the divide” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 19) by having the 
capacity to move between concordant and complementary identifications (Racker, 1968) with the 
patient. 
312 Being able, in my own therapy, to experience my defences against my
woundedness, the negativity and all the different defences against my
woundedness and the therapist not acting out in countertransference, but
being able to allow me to see what it is.
313 I think I've got a lot more patience with my own patients' negative
transferences, negative behaviours, whatever else goes on there.
314 So maybe empathy then goes further than empathy for the vulnerable
patient, but also empathy for the attacking, angry, destructive patient
and not needing to retaliate and seeing the woundedness behind the nasty,
attacking patient.
315 Just to keep in mind what is going on there and to be always bringing
that back into an understanding.
316 To be able to see one's own negative behaviour in context, not as
something to be retaliated against and to be punished, which is why you
go to the therapist in the first place, because that has been your
experience earlier in your life, but actually being able to see what goes
on behind the attack, the wounded person behind that, to see the
defensiveness of that and I suppose to bring those together, to bring the
hateful patient together with the vulnerable patient and to integrate
that.
318 It's the way that, although your, maybe, negative acting out in the
therapy can be seen, can be mentioned, you can see what effect it has on
the patient, he can digest it, you can work with that and then always
bring together with that the knowledge of what goes on behind that
defence.
319 I think it's in the bringing of those two together that it does not feel
like an attack, it does not feel like a reprimand.
320 Whereas I think in previous therapies, like the therapy I described, I
think that there was a counterattack, basically, which then just stops
any understanding and reinforces your belief in the fact that your
dependency needs cannot be met, should not be met, are bad ...
342 I think up to very recently my patients had been incredibly courteous,
nice and well behaved and I find that the more that I feel safe in my own
therapy to also get in touch with anger, I find that my own patients to
also be more free to get in touch with their anger and to attack me … (BP) 
 
Being able to differentiate oneself from a patient does not only pertain to “blind spots” (Freud, 
1912), but also to the therapist’s “bright spots” (Goldberger, 1993). This further highlights the 
fundamental principle that the space of therapy belongs to the patient. 
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156 My main function really is intuition, so I often see pictures while the
person is talking.
157 If they describe a dream, I see the dream or if they tell me events of
their lives, I can see it ...
158 Earlier on in my work that used to excite me, sometimes so much that I
would intrude, whereas now I'd sit and wait longer to see whether
sometimes it actually comes from them then, spontaneously; what I was
seeing over here does come from them. (A)
116 I feel far more aware of the fact that this is for the patient and not
for me.
117 Whereas I think, before I was in therapy, there were certain issues that
intrigued me in myself.
118 I'm almost sure that my own curiosity led the way. (G)
 
The therapist’s task has to do with “following” the patient, rather than his own needs and desires. In 
this regard, the therapist’s therapy may diminish the effects of his own blind spots on his work as 
clinician, something that is often picked up and responded to by patients. 
76 I also find, very interestingly, that the things that I focus on in my
own therapy, very soon, within a week or so of me exploring a certain
area, it will come up.
77 Suddenly my patients seem to have issues and problems in those areas ...
82 I feel that the reason that I can deal with those things, is because they
provoke less anxiety in me now and because I'm more consciously aware.
88 And I also believe that on an unconscious level, somehow, it gets
communicated to the patient. (G)
 
On the other hand, the therapist’s working with his blind spots in therapy, may turn them into 
bright spots and that, even if subtly and temporarily, rather than the patients’ concerns, may 
become what shapes his work. 
343 And sometimes I have to catch myself and hear myself after a really
exciting own therapy session; hear myself working, almost as though I'm
looking for the same thing.
348 And I think I just have to be aware of it, because it's going to happen
anyway. (F)
While both Participant F’s and Participant G’s views, although contradictory, have validity, it is not 
just what is “correct” that is ultimately important, but rather being open to different possibilities 
and the ability to also think about the meaning of an aspect of working. This returns one to the 
importance of the therapist’s own therapy.  
365 BUT maybe where the therapy helps, it does continually ask you to be
self-reflective. (F)
 
4.1.4.3   The therapeutic third as ongoing Third to the clinical third 
The therapeutic third may just be a place of sharing one’s experiences of being-a-clinician (and not 
being so alone with that). 
519 It does still happen where something one of my patients is going
through really touches something deep inside of me that is not
necessarily negative, but I would like to share with somebody who would
understand why it touched me so deeply. (A)
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There are also the demands and ongoing stress of doing the work of therapy. In terms of these, the 
therapist’s own therapy may play a specific role (which may not have been the case for a non-
therapist) as a Third, where there is containment and nurturing. 
473 Well, I think that one of the reasons why I stick in therapy, is
because I think it's such a place to clear out.
475 So I don't know that I'd be able to work the hours I do and to carry the
kind of loads that I carry without having the individual therapy. (D)
497 You know, it's kind of like you can probably go by taking in from people
and playing this role in this chair for a while, and then your system
gets clogged up, and for me, having your own analysis is like cleaning
your system up.
501 I can't see that you can't get blunted if you don't have your own place
to take it to; to go and nurture yourself and to clean up your system; to
breathe again.
506 Because as I said, at this stage in my life I feel a lot more
balanced in myself.
507 I guess if I wasn't a therapist, I would say: "OK, I don't need to do
this any more."
508 BUT this happens.
509 You sit with people with powerful affects.
511 If you open your heart to them to feel who they are and really be there
in an empathetic way, you're going to have to be able to go and cry
somewhere else about somebody else's pain or find some distance, some
breathing space from that in order to come back to it ... (A)
513 I listen to a lot of stories of trauma and it's hard.
514 You're using yourself.
515 You have to be aware of yourself, reflecting on yourself to use yourself
as a tool, so that's also hard ...
516 Patients will evoke feelings in you, sometimes through the things they
are going through that remind you of your own life or through things they
challenge you with or just the way they are that challenges you in a very
personal way.
519 And I don't know how one tolerates that without a therapy space to
contain, to help you process that.
536 Something about who you are and what you are mixes in the third.
537 It is part of the catalyst for your patient's change.
538 And the therapy is just about keeping your tool clean and sharp and
bright and shining (laughter).
539 You can use yourself better if you're in therapy (laughs)! (F)
 
The therapist’s own therapy (just as supervision) becomes part of the work of being a therapist, 
especially when clinical work runs aground because of some vulnerable aspect or difficulty that the 
therapist himself is struggling with. 
147 Obviously I have my own unconscious defences of a particular kind, as
everyone has, as we all do. I work with those.
148 But because they are unconscious, of course you don't just know them.
149 As I went through therapy, I started to become more aware of them.
152 And I remember sitting with a patient who used a very similar kind of
mechanism and I could recognise it; I could see it; I could recognise it
and I could say: "I see what you're doing."
158 Well, we could talk about it intellectually and I could recognise it and
I could know that this was something that I knew about and I knew what
she was doing.
159 I knew that the feeling was cut off.
160 I also knew that the therapy was just going around and around and around.
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177 I knew that I use that mechanism and she uses that mechanism and together
we are protecting each other from an affective experience, a real
experience of what horror feels like.
173 And then in my own therapy working on the kind of way that I use the
mechanism; where I had used it and where it had originated from.
179 And then it moved.
180 The therapy moved on.
181 So I think what I'm trying to say is that I think that therapy is a part
of the whole process of therapeutic work. (F)
111 I find that because I feel more contained as I'm struggling with it, I
can take a very active interest in what is happening in my patient's
life, but I don't feel the desperate need for my own gratification,
because I feel my needs are being met elsewhere. (G)
 
Over time the Third of the therapist’s personal therapy may also play a part in the development of 
his capacity for subject-to-subject relating, and to remain capable of reflective thinking in doing his 
work, that is, to the third in the therapist’s mind (Benjamin, 2001). Just like the Thirds of 
theoretical knowledge and supervision, the Third of the therapist’s own therapy may be therefore be 
thought of as contributing to the evolvement and ongoing existence of what Casement (1985, 1990, 
2002) calls the therapist’s “internal supervisor”.96 
103 And then right in the beginning, the other part that I remember being
very, very important, was just that containment and that I needed my
therapy to help me get through [omitted], as well as the things that are
happening inside you, because of the training you're going through and the
change.
106 It was important to have a place to go.
113 That you can feel contained enough for your attention to be able to rove,
able to flip between yourself and the patient and the interaction and
just be able to work.
115 So that was very important in the beginning.
116 And still is, but to a much lesser degree, because, I suppose, what also
happened, after ten years of therapy (laughs), hopefully it's done
something!
117 I'm a little bit more able to just simply do that for myself, more
easily.(F)
336 So that in itself is the growth that I experience in myself of having
more of a sense of my own container, my own feet. (A)
 
 
4.2 POWER AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
 
4.2.1 Vulnerability in the therapeutic and clinical thirds 
Owing to the nature of the therapeutic process, being a patient is disempowering in the sense of the 
patient’s (to a greater or lesser extent) being made and becoming vulnerable.  
385 I had the experience of my analyst going off for two months every year.
386 That was his holiday time and that's a long time if you're feeling that
dependent to be without and the kind of hell that that drops you into. (A)
                                                 
96 Casement uses this term to denote the therapist’s capacity to both trial-identify with the patient’s experience of him 
(the therapist) and of therapy and to track and reflect on his own feelings and thoughts. According to him (Casement, 
2002, p. 47), the “functions of internal supervision evolve from an student’s experience of his/her own analysis, from 
formal seminars, clinical seminars, and from following the clinical sequence of many sessions”.  
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66 I think it gave me an understanding of the experience of what it could be
like to be in a therapy.
67 The anxiety at the beginning of going in, the anxiety of what somebody
might be thinking of you.
68 Just the experience of being in therapy. (F)
 
The experiences of participants’ own therapies had consequently brought an experiential awareness 
of how defenceless this process can render a patient and this extended to a felt cognisance of the 
kind of responsibility that this places on the therapist.97 
372 I know when a person comes into therapy and they've never had therapy
before; I know that I can expect if it works; if they latch on ...
373 I can expect an enormous need to be constellated, which would be
extremely painful, humiliating and difficult to bear for them.
374 So my own attitude to that would be as respectful as I possibly can be of
that and as supportive without injuring them, without making them feel
less than what they are.
381 So certainly my own work in therapy has made me acutely aware of that, of
the extreme fragility that is potentially there, in particular say in
the first part of the analysis, when the dependency is that of a baby and
the responsibility towards not injuring that is huge and the consequences
of injuring that are huge; they can be catastrophic. (A)
776 You can try to deconstruct it, but the fact is, if you've ever been a
patient, you'll know that largely you are very vulnerable; the therapist
is in the position of strength; you're self-disclosing, they're not; they
control the environment, you know. (B)
 
This gave prominence to the caveat that therapists not abuse their positions of power, especially as 
those positions pertain to being the one who knows. 
649 L gave me some advice, which was actually detrimental, which I followed.
650 I am very careful about giving advice.
651 Advice is a dangerous thing ...
652 And if I am tempted to, at times, and I am at times tempted to give
advice, I always tell them to take it for what it's worth. (A)
708 I respect what people call resistances.
709 I will not go there.
710 I will not break the resistance down.
711 I respect that there's something there that I don't understand and I'm
prepared to wait.
712 If the person doesn't want to go into a certain place that I might think
would be good for them, I won't push them there.
713 If they want to leave therapy, I won't stop them, because they may not be
able to tell me all the reasons why.
714 And it's their right not to.
715 I don't have to know it all about them. (A)
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 According to Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999, p. 429), their participants had “translated” their experiences of their 
therapists’ positions of power into knowledge of “what not to do with their clients”. 
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4.2.2 Power disparity and mutual recognition 
It is important that therapists acknowledge and are sensitive to the inherently unequal positions of 
therapist and patient.  
775 If the therapist is not conscious of that power and kind of theorises
it away, which is what you can easily do, you can theoretically
deconstruct the power differential and say: "Well, there's no real power
differential, because it's two people." (B)
 
Benjamin’s concept of mutual recognition makes it possible to understand that, while there may be 
a power disparity between therapist and patient, there may, at the same time, also be the possibility 
for them to exist as like subjects. Rather than being mutually exclusive, these apparently 
contradictory positions may thus be conceptualised as existing in dialectical tension with each 
other. 
777 So any attempts by them to reveal that they [therapists] are also persons
just like you, trying to manage things, doesn't necessarily change the
power differential, but what it does, is to create safety. (B)
 
Participant B explained what it would have signified if the therapist had acknowledged the validity 
of his experience of what was happening in the room in a situation where he had felt negated. 
750 It would have meant that I felt again seen and heard and that I wasn't
feeling that there is a power differential; that I was having a real
experience of two people; that she wasn't just the therapist there; that
she was also a person like me there, who gets what's going on. (B)
 
4.2.3 The disruptiveness of and faith in the therapeutic process 
Participants had experienced their therapies as “cracking up” (Bollas, 1995) their accustomed views 
and ways of relating to themselves and others. This had been disruptive and disturbing, but was 
also an integral part of the shifts, personal and professional development that therapy had wrought 
in their lives.  
633 It's made me conscious of the fact that, having thought that I lived a
fairly functional, okay kind of life, that I have all sorts of demons
lurking in the closet (laughs), which hasn't been a pleasant experience,
but it's been a very necessary experience for me, as a clinician. (E)
 
In this regard, Participant A described an incident at the beginning of her analysis (116) that had, on 
an experiential level, dramatically (122) changed her way of relating to her analyst and her felt 
understanding of the process of analysis (124). What A described had closely resembled what 
Ringstrom (2001a) calls improvisational moments, as well as Stern’s (1998) now moments.  
116 But then when I started with my analysis with P, I had a COMPLETELY
different experience, which had a profound effect on me.
120 I remember experiencing P as very unemotional and thinking: "No, I don't
think this is going to work for me."
121 And coming back after one session with him and I don't remember how I got
back and the next thing I was sitting in a chair and an hour had passed.
122 And I didn't know what happened in that hour, I was so rattled with
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something that he had said, which touched a deep truth in me, which had
to do with [omitted].
217 I was telling P about an event from childhood when [omitted] and he made
the comment of [omitted] and linked it somewhere [omitted].
221 And it was powerfully right for what I was experiencing [omitted].
123 And, ja, I mean from then on I was completely engaged in that process.
124 And I think that how that kind of work subsequently has influenced my
work has been profound, because it is not just a theoretical
understanding of the structure, of the depth psychology or the roots of
your psyche.
125 It is experiencing it. (A)
Intially A had not felt an emotional connectedness with her analyst (120). However, he had made 
an interpretative comment, which had seemed to be based on his intuitively felt knowledge of her 
(217). This “act of freedom” (Symington, 1983) on his part had made her feel specifically known 
(Sander, 2002) and deeply recognised (Ringstrom, 2001a) (122, 221). This had also changed the 
intersubjective context of the therapy to a vital and authentic level of engagement (123). 
 
Surviving and moving beyond this disruption is an important facet of why actually having one’s 
own therapy is so crucial in developing faith in the process of therapy: for getting to know in an 
experiential way (rather than just theoretically) that, in spite of how hard, painful and initially 
disempowering it is to surrender to the process, something that holds worthwhile transformative 
potential really happens between therapist and patient.  
435 I know what it's like, I know what it takes, which is not always a
cheerful story to tell people and may keep you busy for the rest of your
life, but it's worthwhile doing it. (A)
592 I think in the initial stages of therapy, and I REALLY struggled with the
whole notion of what a therapeutic relationship is (laughs) and WANTED an
ordinary relationship with my analyst [omitted].
603 Then, encountering my analyst in an other than therapeutic situation and
finding it absolutely unbearable, because there now isn't the safety of
the frame and so, in that sense, KNOWING how protective the frame is and
knowing at an ABSOLUTELY fundamental level the value of that, the
containment of that, the protection of it, the liberation of it that
suddenly, face-to-face with my analyst, in a different setting, it feels
incredibly uncontained and unsafe and like I don't know what to say and
neither does my analyst know what to say.
605 And knowing that it's only because of the absolute hermetically
sealedness of the framework that the stuff can happen. (E)
 
4.2.4 The therapist-patient: meanings and dimensions added to the therapeutic third 
Unlike the space of supervision, which they mostly regarded as being there for patients, the 
participants did see the therapeutic third as being there for themselves. 
137: My therapy gives me the permission to be small, to be helpless, to be
vulnerable, to expose parts of me that are not part of my professional
persona. (G)
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However, being both therapists and patients had added particular meanings and dimensions to the 
discourse of power in the therapeutic third.  
 
4.2.4.1   Relating to the one who knows how to be a therapist 
The very choice of therapist had been influenced (sometimes unconsciously and sometimes very 
consciously and explicitly) by the notion of and the longing to become a therapist like the “chosen 
one”, even when the reasons for entering therapy had not necessarily specifically or purely been 
“professional”. As such the idealising transference and its accompanying power disparity had often 
already been set up even before the start of therapy. 
247 I saw in this man a combination of deep intellectual and theoretical
rigour, like he knew what he was talking about way beyond where I was
theoretically, combined with depth, with great depth and feeling and at
the same time, a spiritual trajectory in life.
248 I identified those strong features in him, and so I sought him out.
249 I said: "This is the person I want to go to therapy with."
250 So that transference of "these are the attributes that I want to be,
these are the things that I want to have as a therapist myself" and me
seeking him out as a therapist were there from the start. (B)
 
Idealisation of the therapist was especially evident in the early phases of therapy and was often 
accompanied by identifications at a concrete and direct level, that is, being a therapist just like the 
powerful other. 
350 In the beginning I used to deny that he made mistakes.
351 I would try to hunt down the accuracy of his interpretation.
352 He would interpret that as well as my compliance and my need to find my
identity with him rather than my identity with myself. (D)
 
Idealisation of the therapist was also part of the ongoing process of therapy; something to be noted 
and worked with. 
167 BP: There are differences of opinion; we can't overcome them, but I trust
enough that that will happen.
170 I think I tend to think the therapist knows better and he will eventually
kind of be able to point out to me why there was that difference and how
we can think about it in another way.
171 So I suppose, maybe I have to say, that the therapy still will have to go
some time.
172 I still, at the end of the day, imagine the therapist to know best.
173 *R: What does that mean, "the therapist knows best"?
175 BP: There may still be quite a bit of idealisation going on...
179 So I suppose my feeling is that by the time that is resolved the therapy
will also in a way, maybe, come to its end. (BP)
347 I sometimes have this thing and we discuss it that I put her on a
pedestal and she doesn't like that and she says: "Don't put me on a
pedestal, I'm not a genius person, you know, I'm like you and me." (C)
 
Idealising the therapist was frequently accompanied by the participants’ feeling “lesser”, 
particularly as clinicians. This could mostly be due to the participant’s own idiosyncratic reasons 
for feeling vulnerable and uncertain (such as being a less experienced therapist or having to deal 
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with a particularly difficult or threatening clinical situation)98 or could be mainly ascribed to the 
absence of felt recognition or actual negation on the therapist’s part. It would appear that there was 
often some kind of amalgam of these two factors involved. 
565 And in a sense it's, I think because I feel so vulnerable in the face
of this guru, if you like, in the form of my analyst, that it feels
incredibly risk-taking to take my work there, because finding the words
is something I find difficult and my analyst has words and so to take my
wordlessness around my work, there's been the wordlessness of the infant,
if you like, but now this is the wordlessness of the clinician! (E)
 
Feeling “inferior” was often the case when participants had felt unsure of themselves as therapists, 
and was also associated with identification at a concrete rather than at a symbolic level. 
605 It's quite, quite feelable, in the sense that I would at times of
feeling inadequate think that they [patients] should rather go and see P;
or J would know what to say under these circumstances ...
607 I would actually find myself repeating something that he had said to
me the session before, because it seems to be absolutely the right thing
for that other person as well ...(A)
 
There were fears about not being the kind of therapist (or as “good” a therapist as) these “superior” 
therapists had wanted the participants to be. 
810 But initially I was afraid that he might not think that I'm a good
therapist and that would like affect my reputation in the community. (B)
 
This had changed in tandem with the development of a known, trusted and reliable therapeutic 
third. 
811 As time went by and we established rapport, I got that no matter how "bad"
I was [omitted], he wouldn't have outed me in the community of therapists.
(B)
 
As the therapeutic relationships had evolved (and participants had grown and changed), idealisation 
had lessened. An important facet of this was the participant’s also becoming aware of the therapist 
as a person/subject, rather than of him only being the omnipotent and omniscient one to emulate.  
242 *R: What does it do, when he discloses his feelings?
244 BP: It immediately moves me from that place of feeling attacking to having
empathy for the therapist, knowing what I'm doing, seeing the effect of
what I'm doing on my therapist and feeling regretful, or at least seeing
it for what it is. (BP)
In object-relations language this could be understood as BP talking about being in the depressive 
position (Klein, 1988a, 1988b). As BP (255) later emphasised, it was important that she could be 
aware of her therapist’s subjectivity without her feeling that he needed looking after.  
 
                                                 
98 These are all reasons for feeling vulnerable as a professional. Of course there could also be more personal reasons, 
which are beyond the scope of this study. However, it is also true (even if we would like to believe it possible) that the 
professional and personal lives of therapists cannot really be so neatly separated. 
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Therapists and participants had accordingly moved towards being like subjects. 
653 I think that as one grows up, you can always see blind spots and holes in
your own therapist ...(A)
359: So the need is more a kind of sharing and hearing.
360 Somebody who I trust has also done this work; who knows what I'm talking
about and has respect for that and therefore can help unfold some more of
that; can appreciate what it is that I'm doing; who can, I suppose,
continue to support my own belief in the importance of it.
361 So it's someone who has also been through their own analysis. (A)
353 As that began to move past, I had one of two reactions, depending on the
import of the interpretation.
354 If we were working with something and he'd got something wrong I'd say:
"No, W, that's wrong; I think it's like this."
355 And he would, if he felt I was right, he would correct himself and we'd
just continue.
356 I used to feel that more as an alliance.
357 That it was good to have somebody to work with in that way. (D) 
 
4.2.4.2   Negotiating power: moving from negation to mutual recognition 
Despite all regarding their present therapies as good-enough, some participants described 
precarious moments of misrecognition, impasse and threatening rupture out of which the mired pair 
of participant and therapist had struggled to move. Such moments had often involved the therapist’s 
defensive need to preserve his position of power. What could ensue from this negative therapist 
attribute (which may be temporary or more enduring) may range from a collusive idealisation of the 
therapist to subtle and even crude boundary violations. Even the therapist’s defensively rigid 
allegiances to seemingly necessary prerequisites for and parts of psychodynamic therapy (for 
example, theory, adherence to the frame, lack of therapist self-disclosure, the use of interpretation, 
and so forth ) may form antitherapeutic dyads that collapse the space of thirdness between therapist 
and patient. 
 
Participant C described the power struggle that had ensued when she had not been the kind of 
therapist that her therapist had desired her to be. 
359 I wanted to do the [omitted] course.
362 And I had started the first part and when I came back, I think JJ, I
don't know if she was angry, but we worked at it and she said: "You know,
it's funny, but when I go away, you kind of look for something else to
mother you."
363 I disagreed with this and then she said to me: "Why are you going for
this [omitted] course; it's some Mickey Mouse course."
364 And then, for the very first time, I got angry and I said: "How can you
call that a Mickey Mouse course?"
365 Then she apologised and she said that she didn't mean that it was a
Mickey Mouse course, but it wasn't psychoanalytical. (C)
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However, this moment of negation had not led to an impasse, because what had followed (whether 
in reality or fantasy) had made C feel that she had made an impact on her therapist; had been 
recognised.  
372 C: So there was a lot that was playing out between us and I also could
feel that she all of a sudden became more tuned in with me, because she
went and read up on all my notes.
373 She never told me that, but I just knew.
379 I just knew that, because she brought stuff into the room that
happened a long time ago and I thought (laughs): "JJ, you've read."
381 *R: What it did mean to you that she read?
383 C: It meant that she spent time after hours; she thought about me. (C)
 
This was followed by the evolvement (along the trajectory of thirdness) of an intersubjective space 
marked by mutual recognition, where difference could be negotiated. It is, of course, also possible 
to argue that it is precisely these attributes of the therapeutic relationship (that is, mutual 
recognition and the negotiation of difference) that had led to the development of this kind of 
intersubjective third. The process of C’s anger being validated by her therapist and her therapist’s 
both surviving C’s anger and having her own feelings and viewpoint, had also moved the therapy 
beyond just being a repetition of earlier and dysfunctional relationships to being new and different. 
388 C: That made me feel special, but I realised that there was something
deeper going on.
389 And then I was angry with her.
390 *R: What made you angry?
392 C: It made me angry, because she told me what to do and I wanted to do
the course [omitted] and she's actually brought my thoughts into disarray
[omitted] and for a long time I was confused, but I'm going ahead now
with redoing the course.
395 And it also came in that she often felt that she had to be too much of a
mother to me.
396 So that's what we worked through.
397 And the mere fact that she allowed me to have my anger was just such an
eye-opener.
399 Because I was never allowed to be angry with my parents.
422 And I feel rooted in that, even if she disagrees and I'll then say to
her: "That's my path that I need to walk."
423 And I know that she will walk the path with me and not judge me.
425 She will work WITH me. (C)
 
These excerpts show how a therapy may veer towards becoming deadlocked and could potentially 
run aground because of a power struggle. In the case of this participant, it had concerned the kind 
of therapist she had wanted to become versus the sort of one her therapist had required her to 
develop into. What had happened could be interpreted as ensuing from a “mistake” on the 
therapist’s part. This “mistake” had been the therapist’s temporary lapse into attempting to use her 
position of power to coerce the participant into submitting to her (the therapist’s) needs and desires 
by becoming the version of therapist that she (the therapist) approved of (which was probably the 
kind of therapist that she herself was). This could also be understood as the constellation of an 
antitherapeutic dyad (which, by implication, had negated C) between the therapist and her 
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allegiance to her professional identity and the concomitant creation of a negative third between C 
and her therapist. 
 
Nevertheless, rather than leading to an impasse, what had followed (that is, participant and therapist 
both surrendering to the process between them and negotiating their differences) had rendered this 
a moment of negation (in the overarching dialectic of recognition and negation) and had moved the 
therapeutic pair further along the trajectory of thirdness to a space of mutual recognition. Here 
alterity could exist and the power imbalance could (as far as this is actually possible in the 
therapeutic situation) be redressed. 
 
 
4.3 THERAPIST “MISTAKES” AND THE DIALECTIC OF RECOGNITION AND 
        NEGATION 
 
4.3.1 From non-recognition through negation to breakdown 
Participant experiences of so-called therapist mistakes had ranged from non-recognition through 
temporary negation to irrevocable breakdown of the therapeutic third. Although some therapist acts 
undoubtedly constituted transgressions of the “analytic attitude” (Ivey, 1999), the participant’s felt 
experience of it (rather than just the act itself) occurred within the context of the specific nature of 
the therapeutic third (at that point and historically) and in terms of the degree to which it had 
positioned the participant as being disempowered and negated. Non-recognition and negation were 
often associated with the impression that the therapist had somehow become so involved in his own 
agenda and desires that he had withdrawn from the participant “into a state of solipsistic 
subjecthood” (Slochower, 2003, p. 466), that is, that he had lost sight of and contact with the 
participant as a subject and was relating to him as an object. That is typical of the problematic 
constellation of the therapist-patient dyad which was described in the wounded healer 
phenomenon.  
434 I think it's an insensitivity, where the therapist actually leaves the
therapy room and goes entirely into his own process and reacts entirely
from that process.
438 And then acts out something towards the client.
439 Unfortunately, in this kind of work there is always the danger of that,
because the pulls and tugs are so extreme. (D)
 
Participant A made some thought-provoking comments, by both acknowledging the patient’s 
position as essentially being one of disempowerment and also questioning that notion. 
672: You are in power as long as the patient is dependent on you, for as long
as that lasts, but it is a power imbalance. (A)
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To this she later added: 
706 I think we all have within ourselves the capacity to say no to something
that is really bad for you, even if you do love the person a lot; even if
you do open yourself so completely, there is that.
726 In the final event we are adults seeing other adults.
727 None of us knows it all and certainly no one person can take
responsibility for another person's fate. (A)
 
In terms of this study, a participant’s capacity to think critically about a therapist with whom there 
is a “loving tie” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 7) and to speak about this, needs to be understood against the 
template of him (the participant) as an individual within the context of the particular intersubjective 
therapeutic third. The participants’ also being therapists did empower them in a specific way: they 
were knowledgeable about therapy and they were accordingly (even if sometimes only 
retrospectively) quite aware of and able to describe their therapists’ mistakes. However, the ability 
to use this knowledge as such, varied according to the nature of the (moments or ongoing) 
experienced negation. 
 
There were the unintentional (and probably unavoidable) acts of a therapist (like leaving for a 
prolonged period at a time when the patient was dependent on the actual physical presence of the 
therapist), when a participant would feel that he had been failed by the therapist and the therapy.99 
 
Then there were those instances of a participant’s being disappointed by a therapist, usually when 
the space of thirdness had been established and had evolved to some extent (and there was a sense 
of trust of the therapist and the process), where the participant had not felt significantly and 
“actively” negated, but had rather experienced non-recognition and some disconnection. Those 
momentary failures had usually been felt and understood as part of the therapist's idiosyncratic 
human failings, weaknesses or minor aberrations. Those occurrences could be accepted and 
forgiven. They had, in fact, often served the useful purpose of lessening the idealisation of the 
therapist and fostering the development of a more egalitarian relationship between therapist and 
participant. Because of the relative absence of disempowerment, such moments could also usefully 
inform clinical work. 
358 And then, sometimes W gets on his “pluck” [sic].
359 He starts to deliver this long, rambling interpretation, which is going
nowhere and I have a feeling it's going nowhere and then I just let him
get to the end of it and then move on, because I have a sense that this
is part of his sort of thinking out loud.
360 He's giving it to me, but it doesn't fit anywhere and I don't know what
to do with it and it doesn't feel like the energy is there for a
confrontation about it, you know.
361 So I just let it go past and then I'll move on to something else.
                                                 
99  See A, 385-386, p. 142. 
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362 What I realise in my own therapy is, I have a very distinct feeling of
when I'm going wrong.
363 I think that that's born out of some of these mistakes that W makes, when
he does make mistakes.
364 It's sort of an empty feeling.
365 And I'll say to the client: "I know it's not fitting."
366 Then I either pull it back or see what the client does with it.
367 I think what's been very useful has been the shift from the need for him
to be right and to identify with him to something which feels a little
bit more empathic.
401 With his mistakes and his foibles and his confrontation of me ... (D)
 
Even within these good-enough therapies there had been moments of negation where a participant 
had somehow felt let down by the therapist. This was often accompanied by a sense of insufficient 
attunement, of being “missed” in some way, that is, being misrecognised.100 Recuperation from 
such moments could come about through the therapist’s capacity and willingness to acknowledge 
and recognise the validity of the patient's experience and to change while “surviving” this (even if 
only temporary and momentary) dismantling of his power. This did not necessarily mean the 
therapist’s giving up his own viewpoint, but rather the participant’s becoming aware that he had 
somehow affected the therapist; that is, had been recognised by him. In this context difference 
could be negotiated without its degenerating into an impasse situation. 
529 After about a year of seeing him, I felt that he was focusing very
strongly on my thoughts and was not really providing much kind of
attention to my feeling life.
532 I actually just said that to him.
535 What was interesting is that he didn't interpret that to me as if it was
about me.
539 He took it in and changed the way he was working, ja.
543 That was great, because it meant that he valued my therapeutic opinion as
a patient.
544 And I think that's also why I felt safe enough to say that to him.
545 And I think, in retrospect I was correct, because he's changed his
language.
546 So he'll say: "Do you have any thoughts or feelings about that?"
547 And he used to say: "Do you have any thoughts about that?"
551 When I came in once, he was reading.
557 And there's a chapter in that book "Forms of Feeling" called "Feeling".
558 And he was reading that chapter, like two weeks later.
559 So my fantasy is that he was reading that chapter to kind of remind him,
because it is a really good chapter and it really is just about focusing
on feeling in the room.
560 Now, that is just a fantasy of mine and I have no clue at all whether
that's true, but it's true for me that he did that.
565 He didn't challenge me in any way; he thought about it and kind of
agreed.
566 Kind of said: "Okay, so perhaps there is something about me not looking
at your feelings that we have to think about."
568 And so, actually, the irony is that that's different.
569 I'm different to him in therapy.
                                                 
100 “In the end the patient uses the analyst’s failures, often quite small ones … and we have to put up with being in a 
limited context misunderstood. The operative factor is that the patient now hates the analyst for the failure that 
originally came as an environmental factor, outside the infant’s area of omnipotent control, but that is now staged in the 
transference … So in the end we succeed by failing – failing the patient’s way” (Winnicott, 1963a, p. 258). Self 
psychologists, especially Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984) highlighted the value of “optimal frustration”. 
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570 I focus a lot on how the person's feeling.
619 I can sit here and think that maybe my therapist actually didn't shift in
his focus on my feeling at all.
620 Maybe he just didn't challenge me on it and he thought about it.
621 And that was enough for me to think that he was doing that. (B)
165 He did not own up (laughs), but almost by not owning up, it was like
a silent acknowledgement of what was said.
166 I feel free in the relationship to have a difference of opinion and to
counter and I feel incredibly safe that that's possible and that I can
talk about it and he can hear it and maybe it remains in some instances
an ongoing dialogue. (BP)
422 There was an occasion where I became so hurt and angry with him that I
actually decided to leave therapy.
423 We had some exchanges on the telephone and he persuaded me to come back
to at least resolve something.
424 And when I went back there he said he'd been responding to something
else, not necessarily to me.
425 He is a very cagey man!
426 But I took that as an apology.
427 And I went back to the therapy. (D)
325 Sometimes there will be this jarring feeling of: "I can hear an
interpretation that's come from a book-understanding.”
326 She'll pick it up, she'll say: "Okay, something was wrong there."
327 And we can go back to it and we can talk about it and we can go back to
what is the experience.
328 And maybe she's right. (F)
The participant could come to identify with the therapist’s undefended101 openness in being willing 
to “admit” his mistakes (albeit not in a submissive or self-effacing way) or to at least consider his 
own part (and not just as a transferential figure) in what had gone wrong. This “admission” may or 
may not have been verbal. Sometimes it was inferred from the way the therapist acted, or, more 
correctly, from the way that the participant perceived, imagined and felt that he (the therapist) 
acted.  
 
There could be some relief in having somebody less than perfect to identify with: it could whittle 
away some of the participant’s own unrelenting expectation of himself to be an omniscient and 
omnipotent “perfect” therapist. 
483 My therapist sometimes has made mistakes.
485 Sometimes those have been the most useful part of my therapy.
486 And she's actually been wonderful in that she's ridden through that.
487 She's been able to just sit with that and acknowledge it and talk about
it and that's been with me very strongly.
488 Like sometimes when I have responded to a patient or I've done something
wrong, done something that's been wrong for that person, she's been there
with me.
489 I thought: "You know, I don't have to cover this up, I don't have to,
even though I feel so ashamed of what I've just said or just done or it's
been wrong."
495 And you have those sessions where you know you've just missed the person.
496 I mean, you haven't broken any major rules or had sex with your patient
                                                 
101 As can be seen in the examples, the extent of this “undefendedness” varied. 
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or anything like that, but even a little missing, being unempathic, being
unattuned, saying the wrong thing, you can come out of a session feeling
really awful.
498 I can say to myself: "But it's okay; I don't have to protect myself, I
don't need to be defensive; it's okay, I can survive this; she's survived
making mistakes, she's survived me being disappointed or angry." (F)
 
There had also been the kind of situations where the therapeutic third had become tinged with a 
distinctively destructive, negative quality, and where there had been a fierce, but unacknowledged 
jostling for power about whose reality should prevail. This was typical of what Benjamin describes 
in her notion of complementary twoness. In the participants’ thinking about their therapists’ 
mistakes, this was about the therapeutic pair’s collapsing into the unnegotiable and concrete 
polarities of one being at fault, and one not, where symbolic thinking and difference cannot exist.  
733 She'd let the phone ring and ring and ring and ring and there was a
secretary, anyway.
734 The point was that I thought that it was very disruptive.
737 And again, instead of adjusting the phone, she wanted to focus on what it
was like for me.
738 And again, I don't do that.
740 There is like a power relationship, if you like.
741 And so the therapist needs to be aware of that ... (B)
 
Although the therapist could apparently emerge as victorious aggressor (to the participant’s 
submissive and vanquished victim), the participant could also empower himself by seeing the 
therapist as a weakened and no-longer-to-be trusted transgressor who defensively needed not to 
surrender her position of power. In Partcipant B’s descriptions of the process that had led to his 
terminating a therapy, the reversals of dominance and submission that mark such a continuing and 
intractable impasse could be glimpsed. 
83 I remember terminating very suddenly and the therapist being very angry
with me about it.
504 She was transgressing boundaries.
509 That led me to judge her as having certain weaknesses and failures.
512 Actually, it was basically like it had been unconsciously happening
for quite a while and then it was sort of preconscious and then one day I
just sort of felt like: "I can't do this any more."
514 She was quite angry with me.
515 I didn't think I would be able even to negotiate with her.
516 In retrospect I am not be able to say: "It was about me or it was
about her." (B)
 
Where the therapist’s unacknowledged negation of the participant (usually in the form of frame 
breaks or boundary violations) had been of an enduring and/or destructive nature, this had usually 
signalled the irretrievable breakdown of the therapeutic third and even the precipitate termination of 
therapy.102  
                                                 
102 This had not happened in any of the participants’ present therapies. 
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283 It also felt as if the therapist's own needs were quite clear.
284 For instance, it was part of our agreement that his children could
interrupt a session.
286 So they were allowed to come into the therapy room when they wanted to
show him a photograph or a picture or whatever and that was part of the
therapy (laughs).
288 So it didn't feel like a safe space to really let go and at the time I
didn't really know it.
289 I just thought well, once again therapist knows best and I'll try to
accommodate within those boundaries. (BP)
258 And he was an incredibly quiet therapist, would literally not speak for
weeks.
259 And I remember the first time after two years when I actually got
frustrated with him and said so about his silence, he became very
punitive.
260 And I think that was the end of that.
261 I remained in therapy for a while, but I never trusted to actually speak
again in the transference.
262 So from then on the therapy moved out of the transference.
264 I would not again get close to him to work at that level.
266 It became speaking about things, not about the relationship. (BP)
 
Although it may leave him with the burden of an unfinished process, unilaterally terminating 
therapy is a last-resort choice that a patient always has. It may be an unavoidable way of fleeing a 
situation which seems irrevocably detrimental and/or may be a very effective means of retaliating 
(and thus reversing the power distribution) for what the therapist has inflicted on the patient or has 
not provided him with. Every therapist knows about the sense of failure103 he is left with if a patient 
(especially a therapist-patient) leaves in such a way. 
 
4.3.2 Disidentification and learning from experience 
When a participant had been able to think about these kinds of events as possibly being mistakes 
his therapist had made (that is, had been able to trust his own perceptions of what had happened and 
to reflect on this), a conscious decision about whether or not they were serious and important 
enough to take note of not to repeat, that is, to disidentify from (in the sense of becoming aware of 
their possible existence in his own work and endeavouring to act from this sensibility), thus 
learning from experience (Bion, 1962), was possible.  
713 Because I know that if I had done that in my practice, that I've made a
mistake, that the person's come and I haven't been here or something, I
feel regret about that.
722 If I make a bungle-up of some kind, I will immediately apologise for it
if I feel that way.
723 I don't apologise inauthentically if I'm not sure.
724 Then I'll just say: "Well, I'm not sure how this happened. Let's think
about it, [omitted]." (B)
 
 
                                                 
103 These are, of course, only part of what is felt and will also vary according to the situation. 
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Grand (2003, p. 492-493) makes the interesting comment that regret, in contrast with the “paranoid-
schizoid guilt which operates by the talion principle, … turns us inward in self-reflection and 
outward in recognition of the other”. 
 
A participant could certainly use theoretical knowledge (which a lay patient would more often than 
not lack) to give validity to and back his conviction that his therapist had transgressed or failed him, 
and thus doing, empowering himself. However, even for these therapist-patients, unacknowledged 
negation of an enduring or destructive nature could be debilitatingly disempowering. It was almost 
“easier” not to feel “lesser” (in the sense of knowing what had happened) if what the therapist had 
done concerned some kind of relatively crude and unmistakable transgression (like an obvious 
boundary violation). 
 
In participant E’s hesitant description of a particularly turbulent and disturbing time in her therapy, 
where her therapist had temporarily not contained E’s feelings of disintegration and abandonment 
(and where her therapist had for a time probably been what has previously been described as a 
negative container), E’s disempowerment could be patently sensed and found specific expression in 
her ambivalent feelings about whether or not her therapist had actually been at fault. Although E’s 
relationship with her therapist had recovered and survived that time, E’s account of it was suffused 
with the lingering and painful traces of her identification with that experience (that is, with the total 
intersubjective experience) of feeling so harshly negated.  
 
Fuss (1995, p. 7) makes the thought-provoking point that what may appear to be a “refused 
identification” (that is, a disidentification), may sometimes rather be a “disavowed one”, that is, “an 
identification that has already been made and denied in the unconscious”. This resonates with the 
notion that, just as in the case of identification, acts of disidentification are “unavoidable and 
unthought” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 20).  
 
In the case of E’s therapy there had (at that point in time that she was discussing) not been the 
constitutive elements of the first and second clusters of thirdness (affective attunement, holding and 
containing) on which symbolic thinking is predicated. In the interview E had therefore uneasily 
grappled with reflecting on what had happened in her therapy and with not feeling so compelled, in 
her work, to do exactly the opposite to what her therapist had done (and thus perpetuating the 
renounced identification with her own experience of therapy); that is, to shift beyond just 
“unthoughtfully” disidentifying from that experience. 
127 E: [Omitted] I really feel that I've been through the fire [omitted].
128 I'm also aware that I'm terrified of my clients' disintegration [omitted].
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129 I think that one of the problems is that I don't know if I was
particularly well held in that place.
130 *R: It was quite a frightening experience for you?
132 E: Absolutely terrifying.
136 I think that something very destructive was constellated in the space.
139 I think I needed reassurance, which I didn't get.
141 And I think that, in a sense, that in itself informs my work, because I
think that I err on the other side.
142 I think that I am too reassuring as a result of having had the experience
of not being reassured.
144 I think it's in the place of disconnection that I felt utterly abandoned
and I think that, maybe, in my work, I'm sometimes not able to be
sufficiently kind of distant, because I don't want my clients to feel
abandoned and I think that sometimes that's anti-therapeutic, but I am
conscious of it and I have begun to work on it.
149 I think that my analyst feels that it was a place that I had to go and I
think that in hindsight, I would agree with that.
150 In a sense, there was no other way, but I think it was a place I could
have gone to with a greater sense of feeling connected or held or
understood or something ...
154 I think there's been an acknowledgement that my feeling abandoned was not
just my stuff.
155 *R: So afterwards the two of you actually discussed this?
157 E: Oh, ja, at GREAT length.
158 *R: You're talking about a difficult experience in therapy; maybe of a
mistake made by your therapist?
160 E: Ja, I don't know that I'm in a place where I could call it a mistake.
161 It felt like a mistake and I am aware that I have a diffidence about
this. (E)
 
This can be contrasted with Participant F’s description of how, within the context of feeling 
recognised and empowered, it had been possible to use her therapy, including her therapist’s 
momentary failures, as a Third to think about her own work. F’s description speaks of the kind of 
symbolic therapeutic third described in the third cluster of the trajectory of thirdness, which is 
characterised by mutuality and a fluid back-and-forth movement of reciprocal identifications and 
disidentifications between therapist and patient. 
78 There was a model of how sometimes to respond to people in a positive way
as well as kind of the other side.
79 I remember sometimes hearing her say things and thinking: "I don't like
that; why don't I like that?"
80 And then being aware of how I was responding to my own patients and trying
to imagine how it might be sounding to them.
82 Just thinking about what it might be sounding like.
93 The easiest example to give you is kind of those times when you sit there
and you hear an interpretation coming at you.
94 And it just doesn't, it just sounds as if it's out of a book, doesn't
just quite make it.
95 I mean, I've heard those and I've said them to people.
96 It just made me like stop a little bit more, not always, not easily,
because it's always a process of struggling, but just made me stop and
think: "Okay, hang on, I've heard this and I know how false this sounds
or how far from my experience this sounds when I hear it in my own
therapy. Hold on a minute. How is this going to sound to this person?
Is there any other way I can say it?" (F)
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Iatrogenic (or even just disappointing or indifferent) therapy experiences had certainly contributed 
to participants’ knowledge about what not to do in therapy and what therapy should not be like.104 
428 Those are things that I wouldn't like to repeat in my own therapy.
429 And I'm sure I do it.
430 I'm sure we all do it.
431 But, you know, it is something I would like to guard against. (D)
484 I have OFTEN, often confronted my analyst on feeling that there's been a
lack of responsiveness.
485 I have often said that it feels as though I talk into the air and my
words just hang in the air (laughs).
488 I do think that one needs to be very conscious of one's responses, but to
not respond, I think, is just inhuman...
490 So lack of responsiveness is something that I think I don't want to
repeat. (E)
 
However, these kinds of experiences had sometimes wrought real losses, which had left participants 
with regrets for forgone opportunities and a sense of mourning for what could have been different 
in their lives.  
408 There were [omitted] occasions when W lost it with me.
409 And I believe that had he reacted differently, the consequences to my
life would have been different.
410 I think he missed something at the time.
414 And he got very angry with me for [omitted].
415 And I rebelled.
416 So I went RIGHT into [omitted].
417 And I think if he'd been more gentle, if he'd been more empathic at the
time, I wouldn't have [omitted].
418 And I'm always sorry I did. (D)
 
In contrast to these negative and even harmful therapy experiences, participants had also 
emphasised the abundance of goodness that they had received during the course of their therapies 
and how this had enabled and motivated them to share this with their patients.  
626 I think my own experience of analysis has been a deeply respectful
attitude to my faith and journey and defences, and that has been a
very powerful model, I think, for me. (E)
175 I think that I largely feel incredibly respected in my therapy; I feel
contained and I feel I'm not being rushed and because it feels so good
for me and because I feel contented within that, it's almost like the
contentment spills over and it's not an effort to give what I'm
receiving. (G)
 
 
4.4 THE BRIDGE OF IDENTIFICATION 
 
The participants’ accounts contained descriptions of what could be understood and interpreted as 
identificatory processes which were present both in their therapies and in their work. While 
examples of these identifications were primarily found in the manner in which participants thought 
                                                 
104 This is similar to what Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999) found in their study. 
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about and understood their experiences of the processes whereby aspects of their therapies were 
transposed to their work as clinicians, they also described identifying with their patients.  
 
In their findings, Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999, p. 428) conceptualise personal therapy as being 
linked to clinical work via processes that they denote by using “the metaphor of translation”. 
According to them (Ibid., p. 429), “much of the translation seemed to involve tacit or procedural 
knowledge”. They contrast this with the imitations which also sometimes took place. Although they 
do not use the term “identification” in this part of their discussion, they do seem to imply the 
presence of processes of identification. More explicitly they (Ibid., p. 429) do write about “two 
important mechanisms that contributed to the translation”. In the first place, “the translation 
involved exploring and gaining insight into [the therapists’] personal problems and personal 
growth” (Ibid.). And secondly, “the translation involved the learning of reciprocal roles”; that is, 
what it is like to be both therapist and patient and using the knowledge of the patient role in 
working as a clinician. In this latter instance they also seem to be writing about some kind of 
involvement of identification, although, again, the term as such is not used.  
 
Identification is often described by Benjamin as it pertains to parent and child. For the purposes of 
this study, identification was only considered as it concerned participant-patient and therapist, 
participant-therapist and patient(s), and this was done in terms of “ungendered” dyads. This means 
that the “gendered angle” of the participant-therapist and participant-patient dyads was not taken 
into consideration. That would have required specific questions in the interviews and a much longer 
and more complex analysis, which could be the topic of further research. 
 
The desire and need to choose a therapist to emulate and to idealise were already evident in some of 
the participants’ descriptions of how they went about selecting a specific therapist. The participants 
described their experiences of identifying with their therapists: they noted similarities between 
themselves and their therapists, as well as between their own experiences of therapy and their work 
as therapists, and were also sometimes aware of their therapists’ internalised presences when they 
were working. As was previously discussed, they also described disidentifying from their 
therapists. The participants had also retained identifications (and disidentifications) from previous 
therapies and from earlier times in their present therapies. This supports the ideas of plural 
identifications (Benjamin, 1995) and of sustained identification involving both identifications and 
disidentifications (Pizer, 1998). 
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Benjamin’s thinking around identification and mutual recognition was dialogued with the interview 
material. This made it possible to conceptualise the nature of the participants’ identifications as 
varying between being more concrete and taking place at a more symbolic level. This had happened 
alongside the evolvement of the therapeutic third and/or according to the specific cluster of 
thirdness that was foregrounded at a particular time, and also in terms of where and how the 
participants had felt located in terms of the power differential between themselves and their 
therapists. 
 
4.4.1 Choosing the therapist to emulate 
Participants had been aware of the serious implications of their choice of therapist for their work.  
257 And perhaps there was a certain degree of conscious modelling because I
knew, I knew the therapist I was going to go to, I'm going to absorb that
way of being in the room. (B)
182 I think that I will become and I will do therapy very much like my
therapist. (G)
 
The significance of the choice of therapist had become more prominent as they themselves had  
gained experience and developed professionally: 
254 So out of the three therapists, the first therapist was just on
recommendation that I went to, because of my own personal hurts.
255 There was nothing there about me being a therapist that chose her.
256 But the second two were chosen in part because of the kind of therapist I
want to be. (B)
 
Often the participant-as-patient’s therapist had been circumspectly and variously scrutinised and 
evaluated before the participant had felt ready to take the plunge into therapy: 
101 I went to a conference and I watched senior people contributing and doing
workshops and having talks and this particular therapist, there was
something in the way that he was so incredibly clear about what he was
saying and he was incredibly clear when he countered anybody in
discussions.
102 So I suppose I was quite impressed with his intellect, but there was
something in his clarity that also felt very containing.
103 It felt as if there were not too many grey areas.
104 He felt like a very containing, stable person.
105 So I think I felt safe to go to him as a therapist. (BP)
 
As expressed by Participant B, this often meant that an idealising transference had been set up even 
before the start of therapy. 
247 I saw in this man a combination of deep intellectual and theoretical
rigour, like he knew what he was talking about way beyond where I was
theoretically, combined with depth, with great depth and feeling and at
the same time, a spiritual trajectory in life.
248 I identified those strong features in him, and so I sought him out.
249 I said: "This is the person I want to go to therapy with."
250 So that transference of "these are the attributes that I want to be,
these are the things that I want to have as a therapist myself" and me
seeking him out as a therapist were there from the start. (B)
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The assumption that the therapist has had or is having his own therapy, is one of the “givens” when 
one chooses to go to a psychodynamic therapist. The participants had found it meaningful and 
reassuring to think or to “know” that their therapists had also had the experience of analysis or 
therapy. That meant that they (the therapists), as well as knowing what it is like to do the work of 
therapy, could also identify with the participants’ experiences of being-patients and that also made 
them more equal partners in the therapeutic endeavour. 
519 But it does still happen where something one of my patients is going
through really touches something deep inside of me that is not necessarily
negative, but I would like to share with somebody who would understand why
it touched me so deeply.
361 So it's someone who has also been through their own analysis. (A)
 
As has been previously discussed in the section on therapist “mistakes”, the therapist’s 
identifications with a participant could also sometimes become problematic and compromise 
subject-to-subject relating within the therapeutic third. 
 
4.4.2 The participants’ experiences of identifying with their therapists 
The participants described their experiences of identifying with their therapists and how these had 
become links between their being-patients and being-therapists. 
130 *R: So what do you do with what you experience in your own therapy?
132 B: I internalise it and I model, I model. (B)
90 I think I'm very consciously aware of going to my own therapist,
seeing how he is able to contain me and allow me to get in touch with
certain feelings or issues; not allowing me to veer off.
91 I would say that I model that behaviour when I go back to my own therapy,
in my own practice.
94 I think it gets processed; gets internalised; it becomes mine. (BP)
306 Because of my experience with her, I watch her; I see how she does
it and I like what she does, so I kind of internalise it.
307 I mean, it's not like I go to the next session and do that.
308 It is something that I have then internalised.
309 Then it just becomes awake again; one day in a session when a person may
bring up something and then quite all of a sudden it flows out of me, as
if I've internalised it.
310 So my learning has not been theoretical, it has been experiential. (C)
248 The way you were looked at and the way you were taught to look at
yourself becomes the way that you begin to look at other people and look
at yourself with other people. (D)
98 I've always thought of it like the parenting thing.
99 It's like a model of parenting.
100 You take on parts of it, you reject parts of it, you reflect on it and it
becomes part of who you are.
101 My therapist is very different from me, but in a way she's become part of
me.
469 Sometimes it's her words or I hear her way of phrasing. (F)
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They were aware that this had happened in the context of their relationships with their therapists. 
691 If the trust happens; you are much, much more open.
692 So I think it is almost like a kind of imprinting that happens, like with
a baby.
694 And to make that process more conscious is a lot more difficult than
maybe with supervision.
695 Therefore, again, the delicacy of that relationship is quite huge, the
power ... (A)
240 But if I just want to sit here and be myself I'd say that I look at and I
exist in relationship with this person, my therapist, and I find myself
doing what he does.
241 He is a role model for me. (B)
 
The participants considered their identifications with their therapists as a fundamental part of 
learning “to do” therapy, rather than learning “about” therapy, that is, “learning from experience” 
(Bion, 1962).  
178 In fact, I would say that my functioning as a therapist is ninety per
cent due to the modelling that I have had on my three therapists that I
have had and ten per cent due to my training ... (B)
 
Participant B further elaborated on what “doing” therapy would be like for a therapist who had not 
had a sufficient experience of his own therapy. 
204 It's like saying you get your driver's licence, but you've never been in
a car until you've got your licence and then you can get in the car, but
you've read an incredible amount about what it's like to drive.
205 So you know everything about the car.
206 You can name all the things; you know how they work.
207 You might even know how the engine works, but it's COMPLETELY F******
IRRELEVANT, totally irrelevant, until you've been in the car behind the
wheel and your body, your body has had to function there, what you know
is really just fleeting, it's fleeting bits of knowing and huge amounts
of information.
208 Whereas I've a huge amount of knowing and oftentimes fleeting bits of
information (laughs). (B)
 
4.4.3 Identification at an unconscious/non-conscious level 
Generally the participants had not consciously or deliberately “imitated” their therapists. One could 
expect that the conscious and purposeful imitation of the therapist would be more common in 
paradigms (such as cognitive-behaviour therapy) where the emphasis in bringing about change is 
less on the therapeutic relationship than on the use of specific techniques which need to be 
theoretically and practically taught and learned. 
 
Although the participants had an awareness that that what they were doing as clinicians was related 
to what they had experienced in therapy and to what their therapists had said or done, these 
identifications were often unconscious/non-conscious.  
134 It's sort of preconscious and partly unconscious, I think.
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135 Or largely unconscious and partly preconscious and on the odd occasion
it's conscious. (B)
 
In their work as clinicians, participants had found themselves doing or saying what they had 
experienced as their therapists’ acts or words and had realised that that was what was happening, 
but they usually had no awareness of a conscious intention to repeat their own experiences in 
therapy in their work. This “awareness” may be seen as being constituted by the many and different 
occasions when a participant had noticed what he or she had done or said or thought during or after 
such an event. Wiseman and Shefler (2001) also mention this in the findings of their study. 
92 So I do find myself using similar ideas, words, it's true, definitely,
and they're very useful. (BP)
 
Sometimes, although a participant would find himself repeating something deriving from his 
therapist (like a gesture or a sound), he would struggle (or find it impossible) to repeat this 
consciously and deliberately. This type of non-conscious identification seems to be more based on 
procedural knowing or memory and less on declarative or explicit knowing or memory.105 
155 She did this with her head, it's a kind of lift of the head.
156 There's not a day that goes by that I don't do it in the therapy room at
some point.
153 I actually can't do it consciously but it happens unconsciously. (B)
 
4.4.4 What participants identified with within the context of recognition 
Put into rather simplistic and colloquial terms, one could say that when a participant had 
experienced his therapist as recognising him (and this could happen in different ways and on 
different levels) and/or what his therapist did as ultimately beneficial and in his best interests, this 
was frequently identified with and used in his (the participant’s) own work. The benefits the 
participant would experience from such a process would also often include becoming freer of the 
difficulties that had been addressed in his therapy. 
615 Whatever makes sense to you, you pass on.
616 And that's the process of integrating ... (A)
133 So if I see my therapist doing something and it works for me, I model it.
(B)
360 Sometimes I might hear myself saying something that my analyst has said
and then I recognise it and I am very conscious of using interpretations
and insights gained from my own process.
364 I am very aware that, interpretations, insights that have made sense to
me, they kind of wake me up to something new that I will use. (E)
                                                 
105 These are concepts deriving from attachment theory: within that context their use represents an attempt to integrate 
cognitive science and psychoanalysis. According to the Change Process Study Group of Boston (Fonagy, 1998; Lyons-
Ruth, 1999), attachment research has recently provided consistent support for the idea that significant dimensions of 
relational behaviour are grounded in relational history. This process results in meaning systems that include procedural 
forms of knowing or memory (which include implicit relational knowing) that do not rely on verbal forms of thought. It 
is, of course, a controversial issue whether or what aspects of infant functioning, as depicted by infant research, should 
or could be extrapolated to adult functioning (Flax, 1996; Wolff, 1996; Green, 2000; Ryle, 2003).  
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Mackey and Mackey (1993, p. 108) describe how personal therapy had helped their participants “to 
nurture knowledge, values and skills by way of identification with psychotherapists who became 
models of professional practice”. According to them (Ibid., p. 103), this modelling has to be 
understood as happening within the context of a “mutual and collaborative” therapeutic 
relationship. This resonates with Benjamin’s ideas around the kind of therapeutic relationships 
characterised by mutual recognition.  
 
In the following excerpt Participant B described his use of a specific interpretation made by his 
therapist (96-97). This interpretation had both been accurate (or “fitted”) and had been presented in 
such a way that he had felt recognised (104-119). It had also led to a shift “out in the world”, so it 
was obviously something that worked and made sense on an experiential level (121–122). 
96 And I still, actually, now in my own therapy, when I see that dynamic in
someone, use the exact same words that she used to me ...
97 And so I don't know what's that about, but there's no question that that
was directly picked up, that I use that as a therapist, that particular
interpretation of being discovered.
104 She didn't say "you get caught" or something like that.
105 It changed it for me.
106 It described it perfectly, but in a way that I could accept as being
okay.
112 It described the experience accurately, but described it with words
that had a positive connotation and indicated that she could see me.
119 So I had that experience in the room by virtue of her making the
interpretation and just being fine with it and just waiting for me now,
you know.
120 And, secondly that meant to me that, actually, maybe there was nothing to
discover, that it was an anxiety itself.
121 Then so out in the world, when I felt those feelings, [omitted] somehow
that insight shifted the anxiety.
122 And I don't have that anxiety any more, at all. (B)
 
In this excerpt it seemed that Participant B had used his therapist’s interpretation directly (“the 
exact same words”) without really making it his own, but he qualified this: 
129 The way it worked, or the way that it does work is when I recognise
the neurosis, my own neurosis of that time in a patient I am working
with, when I get that sense of, okay, I know this, because I've been in
this, okay, then I'll offer the same interpretation, obviously adjusted
for the uniqueness of that relationship, but basically the same
interpretation that my therapist offered to me, now it would be six years
ago. (B)
 
The existence and nature of what has previously been denoted as the moral third (Benjamin, 2001, 
2002), or the therapist’s agapaic attitude towards his patients, may often be traced back to his 
experience of his own therapist’s steady, reliable and concerned presence (Lambert, 1981). What a 
participant identified with therefore encompassed both the actions of the therapist, as well as the 
therapist’s attitudes towards the participant and the values held by the therapist that the participant 
perceived those actions to be embedded in.  
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113 I think maybe the most important thing for me has been - what I've picked
up is a sense of complete respect, interest in the patient.
114 It feels as if I'm working with somebody who is completely there,
completely interested, completely respectful of the process.
127 I think his immense patience in therapy has taught me something about
respect for the patient. (BP)
449 *R: Having had that kind of experience of trust in your own therapy, I
wonder what of that you take to your work?
456 C: I'm able to portray to my patients trust and patience and a non-
judgemental attitude and being aware that it's OK, if you've got a secret
and you're not ready to tell me yet, then don't, but it will come out if
you want to.
457 So, in other words, I don't say that, but that's psychologically what I
bring across to them.
462 If somebody had given this to me theoretically, it wouldn't have come as
alive to me as the therapy way. (C)
626 I think my own experience of analysis has been a deeply respectful
attitude to my faith and journey and defences and all of that, and that
has been a very powerful model, I think, for me. (E)
 
These experiences of his own therapist and the therapy process could therefore, in an experiential 
and very personal way, significantly contribute to the participant’s own ideas and convictions about 
what kind of therapist behaviour, attitudes and values are useful, ethical, responsible, creative and 
so forth. This consequently pertains to what it is that is required of the therapist, both in overt 
behaviours and implicit attitudes and values, to render therapeutic space both safe and generative of 
new meanings for the patient. In its turn, disidentification would (as previously discussed) often 
happen in the converse way. 
 
4.4.5 The “presence” of the participant’s therapist in the clinical third 
At times, especially when feeling uncertain or doubting his own abilities as a clinician, a participant 
would, either unintentionally or more deliberately, evoke and use his therapist’s presence in a way 
that was reminiscent both of what Casement (1985, 1990, 2002) calls the “internalized supervisor” 
and what he denotes as the “internal supervisor”.106 Ogden (1988, p. 652) comments on how 
analytic and psychotherapy trainees unconsciously identify with an idealised version of their 
analysts/therapists (“an omniscient internal object”) as a defence against their own anxieties of “not 
knowing”.  
                                                 
106 When the evoked therapist presence was used quite concretely and directly, this would be similar to what Casement 
(2002, p. 47) calls the “internalized supervisor” (which in this case would be the “internalized therapist”). The notion of 
the “internal supervisor” refers to the therapist’s own capacity to be reflective (that is, to sustain his own autonomous 
thinking) when doing the work of therapy (also see p. 142). When the participant, rather than making concrete use of 
his therapist’s presence (for example, the therapist’s actions and words), employed it to inform his own thinking, that 
would thus be more comparable to the notion of the “internal supervisor”. Casement (Ibid.) comments that both the 
“internalized supervisor” and the “internal supervisor“ are important: the former plays a pivotal role in the development 
of the latter and the “internalized supervisor” is often drawn upon at moments of uncertainty. He (Ibid.) describes a 
dialogue between these positions as being essential in order to process and make appropriate use of the “internalized 
supervisor’s” thinking in the immediacy of doing the work of therapy. This is similar to what these participants 
described in relation to their use of their therapists’ presences in their work. 
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A participant would find himself imagining what his therapist would have thought, said or done in 
a similar situation and use this as a directive for his own actions. Such a participant might also have 
become aware that because what he was doing was similar to (or even “exactly like”) his therapist’s 
words or actions, he was creating what one may call a “mimetic resonance” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 
97) with his therapist’s actual presence. 
621 Sometimes I will find that I will laugh, not laugh, I will smile a
certain way and I'll sit in a certain way.
622 And I'll think to myself: "Why am I sitting like this, what is it that
I'm doing?"
623 Then I catch myself wanting to be like JJ. (C)
254 I've actually heard myself using some of the same kind of grunts.
255 He has a particular thing, I don't know what it means for him, but if
you're talking and he's obviously thinking or he's writing, he'd say
something like: "Hmmm" in about that kind of tone.
256 And I find myself actually saying: "Hmmm" (laughs)!
257 And then I think: "That's W!"
258 So that's one of the ways that I experience him present, almost as an
identity, which I have taken on. (D)
 
When the participant’s anxiety was linked to a feeling of his being, to a greater or lesser degree, not 
as competent a clinician as his therapist, the “internalised therapist” could, on the one hand, be 
experienced as a benignly helpful and supportive figure whose clinical expertise and thinking the 
participant could attempt to emulate. This idealisation would usually diminish when a participant 
was (or became) aware of and able to think about what was happening. 
629 Sometimes I will think: "What will JJ do now?"
630 But then I'm just like: "But why am I thinking what JJ would do, what
would I do?" (C)
 
However, participants had also sometimes experienced a critical “inner voice” about not being as 
capable as their therapists. 
605 It's quite, quite feelable, in the sense that I would at times of
feeling inadequate think that they should rather go and see P; or J would
know what to say under these circumstances ...(A)
632 She [the therapist] also sometimes is there: "You know, maybe this patient
should rather go to JJ, because she can do a better job than I can do."
(C)
One way to think about this critical “inner voice” would be in terms of its being an unmediated 
merger between an internalisation of the therapist’s (real, perceived or fantasised) critical attitude 
towards the participant’s abilities as a clinician and the participant’s own critical and punitive 
“inner voice” (that is, in Freudian terms, a punitive superego, or, in Jungian terms, what Participant 
E, 403, called a negative animus). 
 
This raises the important issue of how a therapist may be self-critical without being paralysingly 
judgemental of himself. The therapist often moves on the slippery slope between being responsibly 
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self-scrutinising and reflective of his own work and being unproductively and harshly judgemental 
of it. While it has been found that more effective psychodynamic therapists are more self-critical 
(Najavits & Strupp, 1994), Benjamin (2001, p. 14) also cautions that when there is a conflation of 
self-observation with submission “to a person or an ideal”, judgement of oneself (rather than a 
Third to use for thinking) ensues. While such a person or ideal may serve as a Third that structures 
the dyad, the therapist’s submission renders this an antitherapeutic dyad rather than a “true” Third. 
Not only does this submission expunge the therapist’s subjectivity, but his ablity to engage in 
subject-to-subject relating with the patient also becomes compromised. Frankel (2003, p. 513) 
remarks on how the therapist’s attempts “to salvage some feeling of psychic existence” in such a 
situation may actually lead to misdemeanours on his part.  
 
As previously discussed in Section 4.3, the participants had, within the context of not feeling 
significantly negated by and/or feeling disempowered in relation to their therapists, identified with 
the (their therapists’) attitudes, thinking and acts that had accompanied and followed such 
therapists’ “mistakes”. This had provided a reassuring and useful way to think about surviving 
being less than perfect and had placed therapists and participants on a more equal level. 
 
To return to the participant’s evocation of his therapist’s presence: it was also a means by which a 
participant could employ the emerging therapeutic third as a Third to contain disturbing affects, 
such as anxiety, which had originated in the clinical third. 
266 I've experienced him present when suddenly something a client is doing, is
quite similar to something that I've done or he's interpreted.
267 You know, actually feeling him present.
268 I had a case today, in fact.
269 A guy is [omitted], as I am.
272 Which was the process that I had with [omitted].
273 And then as this was sort of becoming clearer and I could see the
similarities.
274 I could actually feel myself back in my session, and remembering some of
the things that W had been saying, you know, around that.
275 And that was then very useful to be able to formulate interpretations for
this guy.
276 I felt contained still by W in working with this chap. (D)
 
Such identifications could, when “played” with and made the participant’s own, be a useful way to 
think about his own work and could thus be conceptualised in terms of the therapeutic third being a 
Third to the clinical third. 
626 What I like about JJ, is that she can be in the room and she trusts the
process and she does it with her beingness, her presence and I use that
with my clients, but not that I'm JJ.
627 I've internalised that and I've made it my version. (C)
478 It was just these odd little experiences, every now and then of,
particularly, I think, sometimes when I was lost.
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479 Like: "Okay, I can draw on something I've heard somebody else say."
480 Like it broadened my repertoire rather than changed it or captured it or
closed it down.
481 I could still use all of who I was and how I would respond, but sometimes
when I was stuck I could borrow a phrase from her. (F)
 
The participants’ accounts had therefore depicted identificatory processes marked by specific 
experiences of evoking, becoming conscious, or making use of the internal representations of their 
therapists in such a way that the therapists became actual imagined presences in the participants’ 
own therapist-patient dyads. Such a therapist presence could be a useful Third to participant-patient 
dyads or form an antitherapeutic dyad with a participant.  
 
This phenomenon could pertain to the “presence” of one therapist or to an awareness of the 
availability of a composite figure, constituted over time by identifications with various therapists. 
The participants recounted retaining identifications with their present therapists, as well as with 
therapists from other and previous therapies. This is similar to Wiseman and Shefler’s (2001, p. 
138) finding that there may be an “internalization of a number of therapists … at different stages of 
professional life”. 
 
For example, Participant B described how his inadvertent identifications with his therapists had 
caused the actual physical space of his own therapy room to become permeated with the echoes of 
the presences of his current and past therapists and therapies. 
150 They are always present in the room; all three of my therapists are
present in the room in every session that I do and that I'm conscious of.
137 I mean, even the room, even my therapy room here, when I look at it, I'm
amused, because I can see, I can see my first therapist in this room,
like this here (points) is my first therapist, the candle is my first
therapist.
138 I can also see my current therapist strongly in the room.
139 All the figurines, even this carved bookcase, the couch, even the
covering on the couch, to some extent.
146 And here with the physicalness of the room, I'm literally internalising,
even the leather chairs. (B)
 
This had extended to words and gestures. 
155 She did this (moves head) with her head, it's a kind of lift of the head,
I can't even do it, but I do it ...
157 And when I do it, I know that that's S.
159 And I know that I do things that work, because when she used to do that,
I used to feel like: "Okay, she's got it."
160 I've said something and she's understanding me because of this particular
kind of nod of the head.
166 Like my current therapist, he uses certain words.
167 He uses the word “tricky”.
168 Now, I never used that word “tricky” before.
169 So that is quite tricky or this is tricky.
170 And it's a very good word, because again, it's like a non-judgemental,
descriptive term that is incredibly useful, because it indicates a
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struggle and some difficulty, but it also indicates the possibility of
resolution, at the same time and an acknowledgement of complexity ... .
173 I use that word all the time, now.
174 That's my therapist's word. (B)
 
The cumulative effect of this phenomenon could be described as the participants’ over time having 
gathered a kind of reservoir of useful identifications (and disidentifications), deriving from previous 
therapies, as well from their present therapies. 
279 So over time you collect a lot more of those experiences.
280 And I actually have in fact experienced several different therapists with
different approaches and different natures, so that also broadens my own
experience base of different kinds of relationships that can work ...
608 Ja, so they become a constant presence in me.
609 The longer I work, I've got more than one person to call on. (A)
97 And in earlier therapies that I've been in, at times things happened that
were profound for me and which would still be part of what I would do in
my own therapies. (BP)
 
This forms a central part of the therapist “tool kit” (A, 281), which consists of the various 
resources on which a therapist may draw during the course of the work of therapy.  
 
4.4.6 The changing nature of participants’ identifications with their therapists 
Participants described identifying with their therapists in a variety of ways. These different kinds of 
identifications may be considered by first taking into account their contents. These had ranged from 
being quite concrete and simple to abstract and symbolic: from attributes of the therapist like 
clothes, the furnishings of the room, to gestures and sounds made by the therapist, to specific words 
spoken and specific interpretations given by the therapist, to dealing with certain situations or 
issues in therapy in the same way as the therapist. Finally there was a sense of sharing a state of 
being with the therapist. 
 
Even when participants had repeated the actual acts and words of their therapists, this had not 
seemed like conscious imitations, but rather as deriving from identification at a concrete level. This 
differs from the results of the other qualitative studies (Mackey & Mackey, 1993; Macran, Smith, 
& Stiles, 1999; Wiseman & Shefler, 2001) in that they described their participants as both imitating 
and identifying with their therapists. Although the participants in this study had sometimes 
apparently imitated their therapists, this was usually not done consciously or deliberately, and had 
often involved therapist acts that they would find themselves spontaneously and easily replicating 
in their work, but would struggle to repeat intentionally. As Benjamin (1998b, p. 20n2) points out, 
the “act of identification” is not deliberate, but “unavoidable and unthought”. These participant acts 
had furthermore appeared to be based on procedural rather than declarative memory, which would 
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also be indicative of the involvement of identification (Pugh, 2002) rather than imitation. I think 
that one needs to be careful not to conflate imitation and identification, nor to confuse imitation 
with imitative acts deriving from identification at a concrete level.  
 
Participants had found themselves engaged in or had become aware of speaking or acting in ways 
in which they had recognised specific words, acts or characteristics of their therapists. 
141 And interestingly enough, that wall hanging there, which I unconsciously
bought when I was overseas ...
142 When I went and I put it up, when I went back to my therapist's room, I
noticed that he had that same wall hanging. (B)
227 There is a pair of shoes that I bought.
228 I didn't even realise, but they're the same shoes as those of my
therapist.
229 And then when I went to therapy, I could see that he was wearing them,
and I clicked.
230 And I speak about this in my own therapy. (B)
92 So I do find myself using similar ideas, words, it's true, definitely,
and they're very useful. (BP)
73 I remember those first couple of years, being in my therapy and hearing
my therapist say things and hearing her respond in certain ways and then
doing it myself and hearing sometimes my own, you know, her words coming
out. (F)
These could also be thought of as mimetic identifications whereby a sense of the therapist’s 
presence and the shared affective connectedness, such as the “loving tie” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 7) 
between participant and therapist or the participant’s relatedness to the therapist as the literal 
embodiment of the ideal other, may be invoked. 
 
There were also those instances where a participant’s identifications with his therapist were marked 
by the feeling of sharing a state of being, that is, the same particular co-created intersubjective 
space, with the therapist. This appeared to indicate a more evolved level of identification than the 
more concrete identifications. 
145 It's like I'm internalising a way of being. (B)
638 I mean, JJ will sit, and I've learned that from her, to be comfortable,
and her whole manner, the way she sits.
639 It's not the way she SITS, it is the way she IS, that's what I've adopted
from her [omitted], because I feel comfortable with it, so I'm not in the
room wanting to be JJ, I've internalised her being, but through me, if
that makes sense? (C)
192 I would say that it's the way of being that I have experienced and that
way of being comes through in the way of being in my own therapy room and
I think I give permission to my patients to be in a different way to
before. (G)
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These kinds of identifications would be typical of what one could expect when the quality of the 
emerging therapeutic third is like that described in the symbolic third, that is, the third cluster of the 
previously described trajectory of thirdness. This is where reciprocal identifications and 
disidentifications between therapist and participant would be taking place in the natural and fluid 
rhythm of the therapy. At such times participants were able to think reflectively about what they 
had experienced in their own therapies in relation to clinical situations, rather than specifically just 
repeating what they had experienced themselves. There was also the feeling that if what a 
participant did or said in his work, was linked to his therapy, this no longer just “belonged” to his 
therapist and had been appropriated as such, but rather that it had become part of the shared 
thirdness that is “beyond identity” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 74) between participant and therapist, as 
well as becoming uniquely his (the participant’s) own. The idea that what was identified with, 
paradoxically both belonged to and did not belong to the participant, could furthermore be 
understood as these identifications serving as transitional objects in the potential space (Winnicott, 
1971) between participant and therapist (where symbolic thinking becomes possible) and also 
bridging the therapeutic and clinical thirds. 
 
The ways in which a participant had identified with a therapist at a particular stage of therapy, 
appeared to depend on both the participant’s sense of his own worth and competence as a therapist 
in relation to that of his therapist, and on the quality and stage of emerging mutual recognition or 
thirdness in the therapeutic third. 
618 In the beginning you're like a sponge; you take it all in and pass it on.
619 Later on, when you get your own shape a bit more, you become a bit more
discriminating around what you take in and pass on.
620 You become more sure of how you would do things as opposed to how this
person would do things.
621 In the beginning you think that nobody should see you; everybody should
go and see somebody else rather than you: some wiser, older person. (A)
375 D: So there was an idealisation of W and there was the introjection of him
as an identity, as an entity that I would then piggyback on.
376 *R: That piggybacking would appear in your work?
378 D: Yes, yes, less and less now, but certainly back then, quite a lot.
379 Even my initial using the couch and I've had a couch for years, but my
initial using the couch was part of that introjection.
380 Initially I used the couch in exactly the same way as he does.
381 Then I wanted to put everybody on the couch.
382 Now I am very circumspect about whom I have on the couch. (D)
390 When I first came into it, I just sort of grabbed it and gobbled it.
391 Now I sort of say: "Do I really want to do this; does it make sense to do
it?" (D)
469 Sometimes it's her words or I hear her way of phrasing.
470 That was much more in the beginning, when I was a beginning therapist and
tried to find my own identity as a therapist.
471 And I think I'm secure enough in that now that it's my words ... (F)
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In these descriptions of how the nature of their identifications with their therapists had “developed” 
over time, it is clear that the participants had often experienced the more concrete and less evolved 
identifications as entailing a sense that aspects of the therapist or the therapist as a whole had been 
indiscriminatingly incorporated and had been merged with rather than becoming their own in a 
more thought-through way.  
 
In further reflecting on the ways in which the participants had identified with their therapists, one 
may therefore consider the contents of identifications against the backdrop of the power balance 
between participant and therapist. This, in its turn, could be connected to where the therapy was (in 
its history and at that particular moment) in terms of the (earlier and later) clusters in the trajectory 
of thirdness. When the participants were feeling “lesser” than their therapists as therapists, 
identifications tended to be more concrete in nature; when there was more mutuality, identifications 
would move towards being increasingly abstract and symbolic.107 How a participant had 
experienced the distribution of power within the therapeutic third, was therefore a central factor in 
the constitution of the nature of identifications with his therapist at particular times.  
 
The participant’s identifications with his therapist could be understood to have different functions 
within the therapeutic third. It could be the participant’s “lived practice” (Harris, 1998, p. 46) of the 
longing to be like and to be closer to the one who knows how to be a therapist and/or a way of 
submitting to this ideal other. Identificatory processes could also be ways to become closer to and 
forge the emotional connection with this ideal other within a process where recognition by the one 
who knows how to be a therapist had gradually transformed the participant’s ideal love (Benjamin, 
1988, p. 100) for this powerful other to an increased “sense of mutuality” (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & 
Borton, 2000, p. 27). Within this context of growing mutuality, the nature of these identifications 
would, in its turn, also tend to move from being concrete to more symbolic. 
 
These identifications with their therapists were evident in and became part of the participants’ 
manner of relating to patients in the clinical third. How these identifications were used by 
participants in the clinical third, was not just determined by the therapeutic third, but rather by an 
intricate interweaving of the therapeutic and clinical thirds. For example, a participant could, when 
feeling unsure of himself as a therapist, attempt to manage his anxieties by unthinkingly and 
concretely using his therapist to shore up his sense of himself a therapist. This holds the danger of 
the therapeutic third forming an antitherapeutic dyad with the clinical third. On the other hand, 
                                                 
107 This is somewhat similar to Mackey and Mackey’s (1993) finding that students and novice therapists are more 
inclined to imitate and idealise their therapists.  
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evoking a sense of his therapist’s presence by (sometimes even concretely) identifying with him, 
may render the therapeutic third into a containing Third for the participant’s anxieties and, as such, 
instead of his being subsumed by these, enable him to become free to engage with patients in a 
subject-to-subject manner and to recuperate the ability to think about what is happening in the 
clinical third.  
 
If the nature of the participant’s identifications with the therapist is regarded against the template of 
the evolving trajectory of thirdness and the accompanying (intrapsychic and intersubjective) 
changes that are wrought during the course of this process, I would further propose that the 
“earlier” identifications are generally108 qualitatively different from “later” ones. In this I differ 
from Wiseman and Shefler (2001, p. 138) who describe their participants moving “through 
complex processes of imitation and identification towards individuation”. I would rather not put the 
participant’s identifications with his therapist and his individuation as the beginning and 
culmination of the participant’s progression towards individuation, but would see the identifications 
themselves as being located on a continuum ranging from being more concrete to symbolic,109 and 
changing in tandem with a movement towards individuation (or the participant-therapist’s 
becoming increasingly able to engage in subject-to-subject relations with patients).  
 
4.4.7 Identification in the space of mutual recognition 
There were examples of how the subtle interplay of reciprocal identifications and mutual 
recognition could free a participant from his own issues, thus enabling him to work from his own 
subjectivity without losing sight of his patient’s subjectivity and to usefully draw on his 
identifications with his therapist (by whom he felt recognised) and his (the therapist’s) way of 
working in doing his (the participant’s) work as clinician.  
291 *R: Could you say more about aspects of your work that ensue from your
therapy? You have told me about some of this.
293 B: Well, the way my therapist deals with my ...
294 There was a period in therapy in which I was doing the kind of push me
pull you, in and out.
295 Like I want to come, but I don't want to come.
296 Then I used to think: "Oh, I don't want to go today."
297 And then go and then think: "Oh, well it's worth going."
298 I was struggling, for a long time, actually.
299 And the way my therapist dealt with that was that he let me go.
300 He didn't hold on at all.
301 He didn't say: "Don't come to therapy."
302 He just refused to get attached to me being there or not.
303 That's how I got it.
                                                 
108 I use the term generally, because, as previously discussed in the section “The trajectory of thirdness and clusters of 
thirdness” (p. 75), although the process of therapy and evolving thirdness implies a certain developmental progression, 
this is not linear or sequential.  
109 This resonates with Casement’s (2002, p. 47) distinction between the “internalized” and “internal” supervisors and 
the ongoing dialogue between these two positions. See also p. 142 and p. 165. 
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304 He just offered some observations about it ...
306 But I could feel that he was not, I could feel that he was not trying to
make me come.
307 And up until that point I used to fall into that trap in therapy if I had
patients that were doing that kind of push me pull you.
308 I'd confront them; I'd feel a little bit angry.
309 I would be attached to whether they were coming on not.
310 I'd be invested in them coming or not in a neurotic way ...
311 The reason that changed was not because of supervision, although I was in
supervision.
312 It wasn't because of anything.
313 It was because I somehow got through something in my own therapy and that
stopped that whole thing of like not wanting to go, wanting to come, that
whole struggle, you know, just spontaneously just sort of dissolved into
a different place, never to return since then.
314 And that's been about three years.
315 And in my own therapy, I mean, when I was doing therapy, then patients of
mine that were doing this, I'd just let go of right away INSIDE.
316 I let go INSIDE in the same way that he did.
317 And that was not a verbal thing.
318 That was more like a feeling thing.
319 That's been great.
320 *R: Something very important happened there.
322 B: That was critical.
323 And when I look back at my early days of working, I just see endless
mistakes of that.
324 Endless mistakes of losing, of patients terminating when they actually
wouldn't have, because I was holding on too tight and they had to
actually get away.
325 *R: What is that holding on too tight about?
327 B: It's an anxiety ...
328 For me, it's partly about abandonment.
329 It is a bit of a theme in my life, in my early history.
330 My patient wants to leave, so they are abandoning me, you know ...
339 There were a number of reasons.
340 But it didn't actually matter, because in the end I simply modelled on
how my therapist works, even though those issues are still there.
341 It's not as if I don't have abandonment issues, I don't have financial
anxiety, or I don't feel that the person's work is not complete yet.
342 I still might have all those, but because of the way he was with me
around that and I saw how that worked out, because I saw what happened to
me as a patient, I choose that way to be.
374 *R: One could say that you had some kind of issue of your own that came
alive when you were working.
376 B: Exactly.
377 I had a neurotic matrix, if you like.
378 There was a little abandonment neurosis, you see, of my own, which I
hadn't finished working through and all the patients that I saw, until I
had finished working through, had stepped into that matrix with me
and those therapies failed.
379 And once I had worked through it in my therapy, since then, when most
patients step into that neurosis with me, when I get into that
countertransference, if you like to use that term, I succeed largely,
because I'm not stuck to it, I can see it and I hold it and I can move
with it.
380 *R: So it's not that it's not there ...
382 B: It's totally there.
383 Those things come up for me but I'm not attached to them; I'm not in
automatic mode; I'm in manual mode.
384 I hold them and I don't allow them to ...
385 I don't take the bait, even though I can see the part of me that wants
to.
386 I can say: "Just hang on here one second."
387 I can contain my own anxiety.
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388 For me, that particular little neurosis means grief work.
389 It means that I have to let go of the person, that's what I have to do.
390 That's MY work, which was modelled by my therapist, who used to let me
go.
391 And so I didn't then have to push him away.
392 That's crystal clear for me.
 
This is the kind of situation that Russel (cf. Slavin & Kriegman, 1998b) aptly called a therapeutic 
crunch.  It could easily have degenerated into a power struggle between participant and therapist, 
which could have propelled the therapy into the complementary twoness of an impasse leading to a 
collapse of thirdness. As B himself indicated and had himself experienced (307-310), what B did 
could threaten his therapist's feelings of worth as a therapist and evoke issues of abandonment. 
However, the therapist did not get caught up in his own desires (299-302), but was attuned to B 
(317-318), held and contained him. That is, the therapist recognised B and even introduced some 
difference (304). The accommodation by the therapist (306) meant that B did not need to resist and 
oppose him (391). The therapist’s recognition of B (and, by implication, his identification with B), 
also made it possible for B to think and feel differently about his own “dim spot” or “wound” (327-
330, 377-378), to be less consumed by it (313) and to become able to contain it himself (379, 382-
387). In his turn, B was able to recognise (303) what the therapist had done, to identify with that 
(316, 340, 390), and to think about this identification in relation to what he was doing in his work 
(341-342). Thus the therapeutic and the clinical thirds had become linked (390). 
 
This extract contains many of the elements constituting the unique way of “learning to do therapy” 
(rather than “learning about therapy”) that the therapist's personal therapy offers. It is also about 
becoming enabled as a therapist. This becoming is an ever-continuing process of growth and 
development in the face of one’s own limitations. The Third provided by the clinician’s personal 
therapy in this way is different from the third perspectives provided by theoretical knowledge or 
supervision, but is also linked to those Thirds, and is as such both informed by them and informs 
them.  
 
This is the point in the therapy of a participant (usually when the nature of the therapy is as it is 
described in the third cluster of the trajectory of thirdness) who is both patient and clinician, where 
one may conceptualise identifications as fluid processes linking the therapeutic and clinical thirds 
which continually shift together and move apart in a rhythm that is constituted by the many 
complexities involved. In this instance, the participant’s therapy was a Third that opened up a space 
for thinking and reflecting, rather than forming an antitherapeutic dyad (which, by implication, 
could have excluded the participant’s patient) with the participant.  
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4.5 THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND UNCONSCIOUS AS 
             EMERGING THERAPIST SKILLS 
 
During the course of the data analysis it became evident that it was necessary to create a theoretical 
context in which the therapeutic skills that the participants had developed owing to their therapies 
could be described, understood and thought about. These skills specifically concerned the ways that 
a participant was increasingly able to use his own subjectivity as a basis for knowledge that could 
inform the tasks set by the endeavour of psychodynamic psychotherapy. The use of the existing 
notions of a psychoanalytic consciousness and unconscious110 to denote such therapist skills 
therefore ensued from the nature of the results of the earlier phases of the data analysis. In this 
section the conceptual elaborations of these notions were dialogued with the data to make sense of 
the way that the participants were thinking and talking about their therapies and work during the 
interviews and also to understand certain aspects of their descriptions of their therapies, work and 
the links between those. Because the theoretical background used in this section is based both on 
relevant literature and the prior discussions of theory and interview material, it is presented here 
rather than as part of the previous chapter about the conceptual underpinnings of the textual 
analysis. 
 
4.5.1 Personal therapy and the notions of a psychoanalytic consciousness and unconscious  
In psychoanalytic theorising there has been and is an emphasis on the notion of the therapist’s 
engendering the creation and continued existence of analytic space. Analytic space, the variant of 
potential space (Winnicott, 1971)111 that emerges between therapist and patient,112 is an 
“invitational space” (Ivey, 1995, p. 367), which is initially established by the frame or ground rules 
of therapy (Langs, 1982). The frame demarcates the world of symbolic communication from 
ordinary life; establishes the unique quality of patient-therapist relating and provides a bounded 
space in which it is safe enough for patient and therapist to do the work of therapy and for thirdness 
to emerge. Therapeutic space113 can be viewed as “an extension of the maternal body container” 
(Benjamin, 1998b, p. 26), where holding (Winnicott, 1960b, 1960c) and containing (Bion, 1959) 
give “coherence to the self” (Benjamin, Ibid.) and consequently make reflective and symbolic 
thinking possible.  
                                                 
110 See also p. 56. 
111 In this case potential space (Winnicott, 1971) is usually considered as the interpersonal and transitional area of 
experiencing, a shared “state of mind” located between individuals “based upon a series of dialectical relationships 
between fantasy and reality, me and not-me, symbol and symbolized, etc.” (Ogden, 1986, p. 231). “Potential space 
furthermore refers to that kind of mental organization in which the precursors to symbolization find their shape – where 
‘me’ is barely differentiated  from ‘not-me’ …” (Freedman, 1994, p. 99). 
112 Although the notion of analytic space resonates with that of co-created thirdness, it is not exactly the same. It is also 
part of more general analytic thinking, while thirdness is a concept that is usually found in intersubjective theorising. 
Analytic space could further be understood as a prerequisite and container for emerging thirdness. 
113 I am using the terms analytic space and therapeutic space interchangeably for the purposes of this study. 
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A viable therapeutic space is marked by a sense of generative creativity: it is an intersubjective as-if 
place of difference and motion, where both therapist and patient come into being as subjects 
(Ogden, 1994),114 and are free to roam metaphorically. It is “the space between certain knowledge 
and unthinking action, the space of negative capability115 that is thought” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 34). 
Here “meanings can [imaginatively] be played with, considered, understood” (Ogden, 1986, p. 233) 
without the “constraints of some objective reality” (Bram & Gabbard, 2001, p. 693). It involves the 
“deconcretizing” of meaning (Bromberg, 1998, p. 253), becoming able to entertain “contradictory 
intentionalities” (Freedman, 1994, p. 99), and the acceptance of paradox (Winnicott, 1971).  
 
Like thirdness, therapeutic space is never finally established, but is continually being lost and 
found. While generated by both therapist and patient, the asymmetry of the therapeutic relationship 
holds the moral and ethical implications that the therapeutic space belongs to the patient and that 
both its creation and its continual coming into being is ultimately the therapist’s responsibility. And 
if working as a therapist means “that you use yourself as a tool” (A, 529), this foregrounds 
the part that the therapist’s own therapy plays in keeping this “tool clean and sharp and
bright and shining” (A, 538). 
 
Some of the findings concerning the ways in which personal therapy enhances the therapist’s 
being-a-clinician have already been discussed in terms of the participants’ increased capacity for 
sustained subject-to-subject relating with patients and how this changes the nature of their empathy 
and ways of identifying with patients. The nature of the Thirds that therapeutic thirds had formed in 
relation to clinical thirds in the participants’ management of the ongoing demands of actually doing 
the work of therapy, has also been considered. In this section the focus is more specifically on how 
the participants’ therapies had facilitated the development of what one could call therapist skills, 
that is the “tool kit” (A, 281) that is needed for undertaking the tasks set by psychodynamic 
therapy. Within the psychodynamic paradigm such therapist skills particularly concern the 
therapist’s ability to make use of his own subjectivity in such a manner that his presence could 
become a “third mediating voice” (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 8) that triangulates the 
dyadic encounter and opens up possibilities for further analytic work. 
 
One could expect the potential for these therapist capacities (to a greater or lesser extent) to already 
be present in the trainee or novice therapist. Their evolvement also concerns other aspects of the 
therapist’s professional development, such as supervision and theoretical knowledge. As 
                                                 
114 According to Winnicott (1971, p. 152), “‘I am’ must precede ‘I do’, otherwise ‘I do’ will have no meaning.” 
115 Bion (1970, p. 125) borrowed the term “negative capability” from Keats (1817). It refers to the capacity to tolerate 
uncertainty and ambivalence without prematurely “reaching after fact and reason”.  
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supervision and theoretical knowledge are largely outside the scope of this study, they will only be 
discussed as they relate and may be compared to personal therapy. 
 
And since they pertain to psychodynamic psychotherapy, these therapist skills do not concern mere 
technical abilities or could be considered as being finally established, but are situated and come 
alive in a variety of ways within the complexities of many different and ever-changing therapist-
patient relationships. This begs the question of what the “frameworks” (Flax, 1996, p. 590) are that 
psychodynamic therapists draw upon in their day-to-day operation as clinicians. Experience is 
generated, perceived and interpreted, and meaning and “truth” are created through these “frames” 
that are sometimes evident and explicit, but more often than not preconscious or unconscious 
(Ibid.). Each therapist-patient dyad mutually and newly creates and determines the nature and 
“frames” of each individual therapeutic intersubjectivity. However, the intention of this study was 
to unravel some aspects of the therapist’s contribution to this. In addition to considering how the 
organising principles underpinning and guiding the clinician’s functioning may change as a result 
of his personal therapy, the aim of this study was also to explore how the therapist’s therapy may 
provide a space in which these (often unarticulated) assumptions may be examined and questioned.  
For the purposes of this study, the already-mentioned therapist skills are conceptualised in terms of 
a psychoanalytic consciousness and a psychoanalytic unconscious. These are intricately linked, 
because, as Ogden (1994, p. 14) points out, the subject of psychoanalysis is not constituted by 
either consciousness or unconsciousness, but is rather to be found in the relations between 
consciousness and unconsciousness; that is, in the “dialectical interplay of consciousness and 
unconsciousness”.116 Although the psychoanalytic consciousness and unconscious are, for reasons 
of clarity, discussed separately, they are interwoven, with the one informing and defining the other. 
These therapist capacities, while not exactly the same as the previously described increased 
therapist ability to engage in subject-to-subject relating, are also underpinned by that.  
 
In this section I have therefore considered some of the ideas that may be usefully employed to 
describe and understand both the participants’ reflective thinking about their work and their use of 
the more opaque and intuitive aspects of their experience in engaging with clinical work. This was 
employed to explore how being-a-patient had “cultivated” and changed these aspects of the 
participant’s being-a-therapist. Although the main theoretical focus of these discussions was on 
                                                 
116 This resonates with Loewald’s (1978, p. 31) suggestion: “The richer a person’s mental life is, the more he 
experiences on several levels of mentation, the more translation occurs back and forth between unconscious and 
conscious experience. To make the unconscious conscious, is one-sided. It is the transference between them that makes 
a human life, that makes life human.” 
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relational/intersubjective theory, I have not confined myself to these perspectives and did, when 
necessary, also include more general psychoanalytic thinking. Some of the aspects of the 
psychoanalytic consciousness and unconscious have also come to the fore in the earlier discussions 
of data and those, as well as relevant excerpts from interviews, have also been referred to in this 
section. 
 
4.5.2 Personal therapy and a psychoanalytic consciousness 
One of the expectations underpinning the idea that a therapist’s personal therapy has an impact on 
his work as a clinician is that this (his own therapy) would have an effect on the way he thinks-in-
action during the course of his work and on how he thinks in reflecting on his work. This 
foregrounds the question of how a therapist needs to think in order to be able to do the work of 
therapy. “What are the qualities of thought [especially on the part of the therapist] that allow patient 
and [therapist] to think their way through transference and countertranference interlocks, impasses 
and stalemates?” (Benjamin & Aron, 1999, p. 1). In terms of this study, one could therefore ask 
what role the therapist-patient’s personal therapy plays in his becoming and remaining capable of 
“thinking-in-action” (Aron, 2000, p. 675) at these turbulent and taxing times when the negotiation 
of difference has become fraught with impending or actual breakdown. Further relevant questions 
would be about how the Third of the therapist’s own therapy could also become a space of 
thirdness in his mind (Benjamin, 2001) within and across the varying and shifting relational 
configurations of the different therapist-patient dyads of his being-a-clinician and also about how 
this contributes towards what is commonly thought of as the therapist’s reflective and symbolic 
capacities. 
 
4.5.2.1   The role of theory within the context of the acknowledgement of the therapist’s 
              subjectivity 
 
As previously discussed, contemporary relational and intersubjective theory supports the idea that 
the influence of the therapist’s subjectivity should be acknowledged and even embraced (Mitchell, 
1997). According to Renik (1993, p. 565), the therapist is “someone who allows himself or herself 
to be acted upon by powerful forces, knowing that they are to be managed and harnessed, rather 
than completely controlled”. The therapist is indeed always both subject of and subject to the 
process of therapy (Kennedy, 1998). Anonymity, abstinence and neutrality have consequently 
become viewed as impossible (and even undesirable) ideals (Mitchell, 1997). But what about the 
therapist’s deployment of theory in his thinking about his work? Does this not (at least to some 
extent) imply an “objective” stance? 
 
 180
Theoretical knowledge is certainly an indispensable part of the therapist “tool kit” (A, 281) and 
may usefully inform the therapist by providing a framework for what is experienced in the space of 
therapy. Any “facts” that the therapist “knows” about the patient will inevitably be “soaked” in the 
therapist’s theoretical perspectives (Stein, 1991, p. 326). However, the therapist’s allegiance to a 
specific theoretical orientation is often based on highly subjective considerations that are far from 
being primarily cognitively based or “objective”. The therapist’s very choice of a specific 
theoretical perspective may be linked to his personal life (for example, with the nature of his early 
relationship configurations) (Spence, 1993). Aron (1999, p. 20) accordingly suggests that many 
therapists use theory “as a form of self-regulation”. A particular theory may fit a specific therapist 
because it is concordant with or because it complements whom the therapist is. “Analysts with a 
propensity for exhibitionism may choose a theory that encourages self-disclosure because it 
matches their own personal proclivities; other analysts with the very same proclivities may choose 
a more conservative theory of technique precisely in an effort to modulate those tendencies” (Aron, 
1999, p. 21). 
 
The therapist’s choice and use of theory may therefore sometimes have more to do with meeting his 
own needs than with facilitating his thinking and understanding. Lindon (1991) points out how 
theory is at times used defensively to contain the therapist’s anxiety at not “knowing”. The way that 
the therapist relates to theory may also locate it within the discourse of power between him and the 
patient. In this case theory may form a Third that contributes to the therapist’s “privileged relation 
to interpretation” to which the patient may feel obliged to submit (Benjamin, 2001, p. 6). Here 
theory is not necessarily a “true” Third that opens up a space for thinking, but may form an 
antitherapeutic dyad with the therapist. An example of this may be found in an interpretation given 
by Participant C’s therapist.117 
 
In the case of the therapist-patient, the treating therapist’s theoretical knowledge and the therapist-
patient’s lived experience of the well-considered and fine-tuned application of this in clinical work 
could provide a useful model to emulate. As was described by some of the participants, the treating 
therapist’s real or imagined theoretical “superiority” may also feature prominently in the therapist-
patient’s idealisation of and submission to the one who knows how to be a therapist.118 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 See C, 362, p. 148. 
118 For example, see B, 247-250, p. 146; BP, 101-105, p. 160. 
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4.5.2.2   The therapist’s capacity to sustain paradoxical and dialectical thinking 
Incorporating the idea of the therapist’s subjectivity therefore means accepting that whatever 
knowledge the therapist has of the patient is refracted through his (the therapist’s) intrapsychic 
prism and the therapist’s having “entered into a realm of knowledge based on identifications” 
(Benjamin, 1998b, p. 25). What is asked of the therapist, is to engage in the play of multiple 
identifications and disidentifications with the patient, to tolerate the ambiguity and uncertainty of 
moving among and straddling many different and often contradictory subjective positions and not 
to remain identified with any one of them. This means the therapist’s being able engage with and 
entertain the experience of multiple self-states, while preserving a subjective sense of his own 
“going-on-being” (Winnicott, 1963b, p. 86), and consequently implies his being able to think 
paradoxically. The idea of the “accommodating asymmetry” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 22) of the 
therapist’s recognition of the patient as a different other ushering in and being fundamental to the 
development of mutual recognition (Benjamin, 1988, 1995), also highlights the importance of this 
therapist capability  
Paradox is inherently heuristic: it takes the mind beyond the familiar and invites us to transcend 
that which is already known (Ghent, 1992). This capacity of the therapist to have many “voices” 
rather than one (Kennedy, 1996) and to “engage in the internal dialogue of the multiple voices of 
subjectivity” (Aron, 2000, p. 672) has been variously described as sustaining paradox (Winnicott, 
1971); movement through opposition (Benjamin, 1998b, p. xix); standing in the spaces between 
realities (Bromberg, 1998); tolerance of multiple gaps within and between subjects (Flax, 1996, p. 
588); building bridges (Pizer, 1998); and thinking dialectically (Hoffman, 1994; Ogden, 1994, 
1997, 2001; Benjamin, 1999b). In Kennedy’s (1998, p. 82) words: “In this sense, the analyst is 
poised at the point at which the paradox of human subjectivity arises.” 
 
When the terms paradox and dialectic are used to describe the process whereby the tension 
between opposites is sustained rather than resolved, there does not appear to be an essential 
difference between them. However, dialectic does elucidate the relationship between polarities 
further: as well as the idea of the oscillating movement between polarities, it also pertains to the 
interactive dynamic between opposites. 
 
The therapist’s own therapy could render him freer to both move among and become immersed in 
different vantage points or positions; that is, to allow a kind of free play and a holding of the 
tension between different ways of being-a-clinician, such as being open to his own reveries and 
being consciously self-reflective; practising analytic restraint and being spontaneous; focusing on 
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what emerges from him as an individual and what arises from the intersubjective dimension, and so 
forth. This enhances the possibility of the creation of new and generative intersubjective third 
spaces where thinking and self-reflection are possible at a meta-level. 
 
An example of these kinds of therapist thought processes may be found in the therapist’s efforts to 
represent “a double-sided perspective” (the patient’s and his own) by engaging in the “play” of 
identifications and disidentifications (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 25). This is fundamental to the 
establishment of the “dialogic space of the third position” (Benjamin, Ibid.). Presenting the patient 
with the thought processes involved in this (or even being perceived to be thinking in this way), 
conveys the therapist’s intent to recognise the patient. This may be just as useful as the therapist’s 
getting it exactly “right” and is an invitation to the patient to (even if just in fantasy) collaborate in 
the meaning-making process. In the section “Therapist’s ‘mistakes’ and the dialectic of recognition 
and negation”, participants had described how they and their therapists had survived moments of 
negation in this manner.119 
 
4.5.2.3   Aron and Benjamin’s intersubjective rendition of reflective thinking 
If misrecognition is an inevitable part of the therapist’s efforts to “know” and recognise the patient, 
it does not follow that “anything goes”. Mitchell (1997) consequently warns against simplistic 
relativism and absolute subjectivism. This returns us to his previously mentioned suggestion120 that 
the therapist’s methodology be shaped by a “self-reflective responsiveness of a particular 
(psychoanalytic) sort” (Ibid., p. 193).  
 
This could be considered a central component of the psychoanalytic consciousness. For the 
purposes of this study, this term is used as an overarching concept for the thought-related processes 
in which the therapist engages when participating in the mutual and asymmetrical creation of 
evolving thirdness. These processes are also sustained by the values and attitude that the therapist 
brings to his work, that is, the previously discussed moral third and agapaic attitude.121 “This kind 
of analytic participation is neither simple nor naive … [but] a highly cultivated skill … The analyst 
… learns to track and engage in, simultaneously, different lines of thought, affective response, self-
organization … There are, therefore, in the same analyst, many kinds of analytic minds” (Ibid., p. 
194). This emphasis on “the conceptual power of multiplicity” brings contemporary 
relational/intersubjective theory in line with postmodern thinking (Harris, 1996, p. 537). 
 
                                                 
119 See B, 529-621; BP, 165-166; D, 422-427; F, 325-328, pp. 152-153.  
120 See also p. 50. 
121 See BP, 113-127, p. 165; BP, 301-307, p. 132; D, 637- 648, p. 132; E, 626, p. 158. 
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Contemporary psychoanalytic thinking highlights the importance of the patient’s developing a 
capacity for reflective thinking, that is, of becoming increasingly able of “making meaning of [own 
and] interpersonal experience and of thinking of self in relation to others” (Bram & Gabbard, 2001, 
p. 686). Rather than just being a new term “for what have heretofore been called insight and 
expanded awareness”, this concept represents “an incremental advance in the precision by which 
the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis is understood” (Aron, 2000, p. 671). Aron (Ibid.) points 
out that while psychoanalysis may be “uniquely suited” to improve this “self-reflective capacity”, 
this is not only true for those severely disturbed patients who are usually lacking in this respect. In 
the case of “healthier patients” (and one hopes that this would include therapist-patients), their 
reflective function may also be impaired in areas in which they have difficulties (for example, when 
therapist-patients’ own “woundedness” and/or desires for power are evoked).  
 
One of the fundamental issues that psychoanalytic theory has long grappled with is how therapist 
and patient may both become involved participants in and observers of the analytic process 
(Benjamin & Aron, 1999). The traditional approach saw these stances (participant and observer) as 
complementary positions that were respectively taken up by patient and therapist (Ibid.). Sterba’s 
(1934) further “solution” is to conceptualise a dissociation of the “experiential and observational 
aspects of the ego” between which it is possible to oscillate (Aron, 2000, p. 672).122 Through 
identification with the therapist’s observing ego, the patient also becomes capable of moving to and 
fro between these experiencing and observing positions. However, this idea of oscillation is still not 
a real double-sided perspective and holds the possibility of complementarity, splitting and 
projection (Benjamin & Aron, 1999). A further deconstruction of the opposites of feeling and 
thinking is therefore necessary. 
 
Aron and Benjamin’s (Benjamin & Aron, 1999; Aron, 2000) notion of self-reflexivity highlights the 
capacity to transcend the dichotomous thinking involved in complementary relations and thus 
pertains to the ability to simultaneously hold multiple and even contradictory perspectives in mind, 
that is, to be able to sustain the tension inherent to paradoxes or dialectical relationships. Aron 
(2000, p. 668) emphasises that his use of this concept refers both to “an experiential and affective 
function” and “an intellectual observational function”. These functions are conceptualised as being 
linked via a dialectic or a “higher integration of the oscillating function, characterized by the 
capacity to move back and forth smoothly” (Benjamin & Aron, 1999, p. 4). This dialectic is 
therefore between “experiencing oneself as a subject [the ‘I’ of subjective self-awareness], as well 
as reflecting on oneself as an object [the ‘me’ of objective self-awareness]”, that is, between 
                                                 
122 Ferenczi (1919) and Freud (1932[1933]) had similar ideas about this. 
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experiencing and observing oneself (Aron, 2000, p. 668). However, self-reflexivity does not just 
mean being able to think about one’s own experience, participation or point of view, but also to 
think about the other as subject and object and keep his point of view in mind. 
 
“Reflexive self-awareness is [therefore] both an intellectual and emotional process; involves 
conscious and unconscious mentation; draws on symbolic, iconic, and enactive representations; and 
involves the mediation of the self-as-subject with self-as-object, the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, the verbal and 
the bodily selves, the other-as-subject, and the other-as-object” (Aron, 2000, Abstract).123 This 
consideration of the relationship between perspectives of self and other may be further expanded to 
include “thinking about thinking”, that is, to think at a meta-level (Benjamin & Aron, 1999, p. 2). 
 
The therapist’s reflexive or reflective capacity124 offers a way out of the dyadic entanglements 
involved in identificatory processes and complementary twoness, where the therapist could 
otherwise be “destroyed” (Winnicott, 1969) by either submitting to or resisting the patient. It could 
therefore function as a third in the therapist’s mind (Benjamin, 2001) and could also contribute to 
the “expansion of triangular mental space in which self-reflexivity is possible”, both in the co-
created third and in the patient’s mind (Aron, 2000, p. 675).  
 
Reflexive thinking clearly has both intrapsychic and intersubjective dimensions. However, in 
relational and intersubjective theorising, the Cartesian belief that “one could know one’s own mind 
via introspection, without the mediation of dialogue with an other” is largely rejected (Auerbach & 
Blatt, 2001, p. 436). Aron (2000, p. 668) further sees introspection as being based “on the dubious 
assumption that the self has privileged access to its own internal states”. The development of 
reflexive thinking is therefore seen as being intricately connected with mutual recognition and 
evolving thirdness; that is, it concerns “a triangular space emergent from within an interpersonal 
dyad” (Aron, 2000, p. 672) where meanings are exchanged and thinking becomes possible. 
Reflexive thinking is consequently fundamentally intersubjectively based.  
 
 
                                                 
123 Although her theoretical perspective is somewhat different, Coltart (1996, p. 28) also writes about the “inherently 
paradoxical … psychic manoeuvres” of the therapist, who is “intricately related to the patient and his inner-object 
world, yet … also detached in order to be able to reflect on them, and on [him]self both as subject and as the patient’s 
object”. 
124 According to Aron (2000, p, 668), he speaks about a self-reflexive rather than a reflective function, because, for him, 
the latter connotes only examining oneself in a more intellectual and distant way, that is, as an “object of thought”. I 
prefer to use the terms reflective or reflexive (rather than self-reflexive), because these seem to encompass the notion of 
the capacity of reflecting both on self and other and I shall use them as such (except when quoting text in which the 
term self-reflexive is used).  
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Benjamin and Aron (1999, p. 6) further suggest that we denote “two distinct [but linked] features of 
intersubjectivity”, both involving the idea of a triadic structure. Epistemological intersubjectivity 
pertains to the relational viewpoint of multiple and even paradoxical perspectives being present. 
Affective intersubjectivity concerns mutual recognition and identification (which may be contrasted 
with projection and splitting). One way of conceptualising the collapse of the third space is not only 
as a failure of these two intersubjective dimensions, but also as the loss of their connectedness. In 
the case of enactments or impasses, “observation and participation typically are split apart” (Ibid.). 
The therapist may become so submerged and entrapped in his own experience of the interaction 
that he can no longer think or can only think by becoming detached from the patient (that is, by 
disidentifying from the patient) (Ibid.).  
 
4.5.2.4   The therapist’s symbolic capacity 
Within the therapeutic context symbolisation is generally understood as the process whereby 
unthought or unintegrated experience is transformed “into communicable, understandable, 
‘thinkable’ thought” (Frankel, 1998b, p. 157). Ogden (1986, p. 213) conceptualises the potential 
space constellated by the symbolic function as arising out of the triangular relation between the 
thinker (who is an “interpreting subject … generating his own thoughts and interpreting his own 
symbols”), “the symbol (a thought)” and that which is being symbolised (being thought about).  
 
For triangularity to be a feature and to have symbol formation proper rather than symbolic equation 
(Segal, 1957) taking place, it is necessary that the mediating subject, symbol and symbolised be 
differentiated; that is, that symbol is not seen as being the same as symbolised, but as standing for 
that which is being symbolised. This process of symbol formation makes thinking about feelings 
and understanding them possible, “because understanding involves a system of layering of 
meanings” (Ogden, 1986, p. 217). For example, experiences like the past, the present, dreams 
transference and so forth contextualise one another and have meaning in terms of one another. 
Understanding the other by having empathy also becomes possible within the context of the 
potential space generated by “a dialectic of being and not-being the other” (Ogden, 1986, p. 227). 
This resonates with the previously discussed notion of the therapist’s empathy with the patient 
involving his identifying with as well as disidentifying from the patient. 
 
The therapist’s ability to think symbolically is related to (and overlaps with) his functioning 
reflectively and is also linked to his capability of generating therapeutic space. The meaning of the 
term symbolic capacity, specifically used as it concerns the therapist, is complex, multifaceted and 
cannot be reduced to a simple definition. Intrapsychically the therapist's symbolic capacity pertains 
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to the therapist's having something of a stable ability for “playing” and “to-ing and fro-ing” (in the 
Winnicotian sense); for thinking metaphorically and for tolerating the anxiety (and sometimes 
guilt) of the Kleinian depressive position (Klein, 1988a, 1988b). It also concerns the therapist’s 
remaining reflective of himself, the patient and the process; responding rather than reacting 
reflexively and engaging in “tension-dissipating action” (Ogden, 1997, p. 25); when necessary, 
being able to be “actively passive” (Freedman, 1994, p. 105); and allowing meanings to accrue over 
time rather than foreclosing the meaning-making process with premature certainties. 
 
The idea of the therapist’s having a certain “symbolic capacity” does not mean that everything that 
happens in the therapeutic space will (or should) be seen as being symbolic: the therapist can 
collapse the space both by taking everything as symbolic or by naςvely assuming the literal. There 
needs to be an openness to both possibilities; that is, the tension needs to be held between what is 
literal and what is symbolic. 
 
Reflective thinking about self and others is primarily deployed by using words. Because words 
“carry the capacity for abstraction”, “they allow us to consider experiences in the framework of a 
past and a future and to imagine categories, hypotheticals, ideals and alternatives” (Frankel, 1998b, 
p. 159), that is, to enter the symbolic play with meanings.125 While the patient may not be lacking 
speech as such, Benjamin (1998b, p. 26) points out that the patient’s “symbolic capacity”, that is, 
his ability to “use” the therapist (Winnicott, 1971) and the space of therapy for symbolic thinking, 
cannot be taken for granted. This often only develops within the context of the therapeutic 
relationship and space, that is, within the previously described trajectory of thirdness. Benjamin 
(1999a, p. 206) further posits that although “symbolic capacities are associated with thirdness”, one 
cannot say that the one results from the other, but rather that they are both the “effects of the mental 
work of containing and communicating affect”; that is, they result from the nature of relating within 
the analytic dyad. 
 
The literal concreteness of complementary twoness is often constellated through the enactment of 
that which cannot be represented and thought about. Symbolisation may emerge when the therapist 
survives his “inevitable involvement” in this “by making use of identificatory responses that bypass 
or dissolve it” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 25). In this way the apparently irreconcilable and dichotomous 
                                                 
125 Ogden (1986, p. 219n3) refers to the interesting point (made by Lacan) that while the capacity for symbolisation 
frees the individual from being imprisoned by “unmediated sensory experience”, he then becomes subjected to the 
symbolic order. Here “language provides us with symbols that long preexisted us and in that way determines our 
thought, even though we labor under the illusion that we create our own symbols” (Ibid.) 
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polarities of twoness may incrementally be transposed into metaphor and symbolic thought 
(Benjamin, 1998b).  
 
The therapist’s symbolic capacity and his (the therapist’s) ability to think reflectively invite the 
patient to function in a similar manner and provide him (the patient) with a powerful model (with 
which he may identify) of how to think “analytically”. This is especially important in the case of 
the patient who is also a therapist. Examples of this phenomenon may be found in some of the 
excerpts already used in the earlier discussions of the interview material. The excerpts that had 
specifically pertained to these kinds of identificatory processes had concerned those instances when 
participants had felt recognised by their therapists being and remaining finely attuned,126 even when 
this had been in the face of their (the participants’) negative and contradictory aspects.127 The 
participants had also experienced some therapist alterity128 and occurrences of momentary 
misrecognition by the therapist being recuperated and subsumed in the dialectic of recognition and 
negation rather than leading to rupture.129 Participants had accordingly also become more able to 
tolerate and recognise their patients’ otherness and to work with that.130 
 
4.5.2.5    Britton’s notion of triangular psychic space 
Benjamin and Aron’s ideas about reflective and symbolic thinking and the nature of the symbolic 
third resembles Britton’s (2003, p. 98) notion of triangular psychic space. For Britton (1998, p. 
42), who writes from a Kleinian perspective, this triangular space refers to “the mental freedom” 
where a third position comes into being from where it becomes possible to observe object 
relationships, to envisage oneself being observed, interacting with others and ideas, to contemplate 
other points of view while retaining one’s own, and to reflect on oneself while being oneself. 
 
Britton (1989, 1998, 2003) sees the establishment of this symbolic space as resulting from the 
resolution of the Oedipus complex. In the therapeutic situation this concerns the therapist’s taking 
up a third position by linking his subjective “empathic understanding” (the maternal container) and 
the more objective otherness of his “intellectual comprehension” (penetrating phallic knowledge) 
(Britton, 1998, p. 43). This can only happen successfully (as when the therapist makes an 
interpretation) if the maternal containment is adequate enough so that the feared catastrophe of the 
patient’s subjectivity and reality being obliterated or replaced by that of the therapist does not take 
place. 
                                                 
126 See B, 96-122, p. 164. 
127 See BP, 312, 316, p. 139. 
128 See D, 311-326, pp. 134-135. 
129 See F, 483-498, pp. 153-154. 
130 See A, 127-448, p. 138; E, 305-307, p. 137; B, 291-392, pp. 173-175; BP, 312-342, p. 139. 
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Benjamin and Aron (Benjamin & Aron, 1999; Aron, 2000; Benjamin 2001) conceptualise the way 
towards symbolic space somewhat differently. They emphasise that the symbolic third is founded 
on the earlier clusters of thirdness marked by the therapist’s attunement and affective resonance 
with the patient. The therapist’s use of interpretation does therefore not necessarily institute or 
signal the presence of a symbolic third unless it is predicated on the existence of those clusters of 
thirdness. In their absence the therapist’s “holding on” to interpretation may subvert the very 
“thirdness it aims to preserve” (Benjamin, 2001, p. 21). The therapist therefore becomes “a 
persecutory invader rather than an instigator of symbolic functioning” (Ibid., p. 14), that is, he 
brings about Britton’s (1998) dreaded catastrophe. This is similar to Britton’s (1998) notion that the 
therapist’s third position of “paternal” interpretation could threaten or usurp the connectedness 
within the therapist-patient dyad when “maternal” containment is already shaky. An example of 
this was previously discussed in Participant C’s131 description of her therapist’s interpretation of an 
act of C’s which had not been in line with what the therapist as “one who knows” had wanted her to 
do and to be. 
 
Aron and Benjamin give Britton credit for his thinking (Benjamin & Aron, 1999; Aron, 2000; 
Benjamin, 2001), which, although couched in somewhat different terminology, is very similar to 
their own. As they (especially Benjamin) do, Britton (1998) describes grappling with holding on to 
his own subjectivity through and together with the differing degrees of alterity that the patient is 
able to tolerate. He further writes about the reversible hierarchical binaries that get constellated in 
the power struggle about whose feelings, perspective or reality should prevail. This was also 
depicted by Benjamin (1998b, 2001) in her previously discussed notion of complementary twoness.  
 
However, Benjamin and Aron (Benjamin & Aron, 1999; Aron, 2000; Benjamin, 2001) also 
comment that as in the case of Lacan,132 Britton is too insistent on an Oedipal “solution”. They 
contest the idea of the Oedipal as the “singular metaphor for the triadic structure”, but rather “value 
it as one way of conceiving of that structure” (Benjamin & Aron, 1999, p. 4). According to them, 
thirdness is not just instituted through the third position of the symbolic father, and Britton 
therefore “bypasses the important forerunner of triangular space that emerges from within the 
[therapist-patient] dyad” (Ibid., p. 5). Britton’s descriptions of his clinical work should 
consequently also be conceptualised as the triadic being generated within the dyadic, that is, in 
terms of evolving thirdness. There the “paternal” is seen as emerging from and based on the 
“maternal”, rather than as an Oedipal link bringing these aspects together and integrating them. 
                                                 
131 See C, 362, p. 148. 
132 See also pp. 69-70. 
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4.5.2.6   Reflective and symbolic thinking and metacommunication 
The therapist’s capacities for reflective and symbolic thinking both feature in and facilitate his use 
of metacommunication in relating to the patient. Metacommunication “consists of an attempt to 
disembed oneself from the relational configuration that is being enacted by taking the current 
interaction as the focus of communication” (Safran, 2002, p. 181). Metacommunication plays a 
prominent part in the relational therapist’s attempts to dissolve the impasses created by the 
oppositional binaries of complementary twoness. The therapist communicates from his own 
experience of the paradox about it (Ringstrom, 1998).  
 
Metacommunication on the part of the therapist may involve countertranference disclosure, but this 
concept is broader than just that and may also include other ways of sharing the therapist’s 
thinking, for example, the therapist’s speculating, making observations and asking questions in the 
presence of the patient (Safran, 2002). Metacommunicating has the potential of restoring collapsed 
thirdness “and in so doing lends itself to increments of new intersubjective structure formation” 
(Ringstrom, 1998, p. 287). Metacommunication features in the previously described, 
improvisational moments (Ringstrom, 2001a), now moments (Stern, 1998) and dialectics of 
difference (Bollas, 1989, 1992). Such metacommunications may locate the communications of 
therapist and patient at “a metalevel of discourse” (Ringstrom, 1998, p. 291) where they “are able 
to relate in a more subject-to-subject manner” (Ibid., p. 287).  
 
4.5.2.7   Discussion of interview material 
4.5.2.7.1 Personal therapy and some facets of an evolving psychoanalytic consciousness 
As could already be seen in some of the excerpts used in previous discussions, the participants’ 
manner of engagement with thinking and talking about their therapies and their work in the 
interviews was indicative of their (to a greater or lesser extent) being able to reflect on and think 
symbolically about their work. Participants also understood both their thinking-in-action when 
working and their thinking-in-reflecting on their work as having changed and developed as result of 
having been in therapy. What had started off as the psychologically-mindedness (Appelbaum, 
1973; Farber, 1985) of the wounded healer had accordingly evolved into a powerful therapeutic 
tool. 
 
Personal therapy had offered a containing Third which had allowed the participant-therapists’ 
thinking to move towards including themselves and patients, both as subjects and as objects. This 
had been especially useful when the participants had been novice therapists. Their own therapies 
had made it possible for them not becoming submerged in their own feelings and to shift between 
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their own experience of the clinical third and that of patients’, that is, their therapies had facilitated 
the prospect of a triangular thinking space (Britton, 1998) or thirdness in their own minds 
(Benjamin, 2001). 
113 That you can feel contained enough for your attention to be able to rove,
able to flip between yourself and the patient and the interaction and
just be able to work.
114 I don't think it's about taking your feelings about what's happening in
your life and packing them away and hiding them somewhere, but just that
you're not so caught up in it that you can't kind of be responsive to
the patient or the process that the two of you are going through.
115 So that was very important in the beginning. (F)
 
In time the initial containing Third of therapy had also become a relied-on space of thirdness in 
participants’ minds, that is, an accustomed way of engaging with the process of doing therapy or 
part of the participant’s implicit or procedural knowledge of therapy. 
542 So initially it's a bit like you're hanging onto those tools,
concentrating like mad on everything and trying to keep a hold on
everything, whereas later you really can let go of that stuff, put it
there and be there for the person; be available completely, because this
other conversation is going on more by itself and when needed you can go
and tap into that one. (A)
 
The participant’s being contained by his own therapy had meant that the space of therapy could 
actually belong to the patient rather than being suffused with the participant-therapist’s anxieties, 
needs and wants. For the patient this had offered the presence of the participant-therapist as 
“someone available, someone present without making demands” (Winnicott, 1958, p. 34). It had 
further meant the participant-therapist’s not having to take refuge in premature certainty and 
closure, but being able to “slouch towards” (Coltart, 1993a) the making of co-created meaning.  
This had been underpinned by his being able to continue thinking about the patient, with his own 
experience of and feelings about the shared third informing the process of therapy. 
146 A: I think that what that [therapy] also has also helped me with is to
listen better, obviously, to sit back and listen and put on a hook more
what I am feeling and seeing and so it's a process that goes on over there
while I'm engaging here.
147 And waiting more before I would offer an intervention or a comment or a
reflection.
149 *R: It's a bit like listening and thinking or reflecting at the same
time? What were you doing?
152 A: That thing that Winnicott talked about of being alone in the presence
of another.
153 It's a bit like that.
154 There is an internal dialogue going on with myself, which is on the back
burner.
155 It's not in the forefront ... (A)
169 My therapy gives me much greater tolerance for matters that are
unresolved, for spaces in therapy and it allows me to move far deeper
within each therapy session. (G)
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Thinking about patients had also meant keeping different (and sometimes contradictory) aspects of 
them in mind. 
552 What I'm finding more and more exciting is where I can begin to
see the pain and the growth happening together and so I keep my one eye
on the pain, so I'm there, but with the other eye you can see the face
beginning to break open or you hear that there are other things happening
behind the pain that is new growth, it's new something and ... (A)
730 The paradox is in that the one eye is on the child side of the patient and
the other eye is on the adult, the capable adult.
731 And if you don't keep your eye on both, you are going to injure
something.
732 You will injure the adult if you only keep your eye on the child.
733 And that will become really offensive, eventually, to both, I think.
734 It's patronising to just look at the vulnerability and ignore the
strengths. (A)
 
The determination to sustain self-observation and “thinking about feelings” (Shuttleworth, 1991, p. 
6) had marked the capable and responsible participant-therapist who had valued and respected the 
patient as an equal but different other. 
481 You become an observer of your own emotional life virtually constantly ...
482 But it's not a burden; it's a pleasure, it's interesting, because all of
that becomes part of your virtuoso, your capacity to be with other people
and other people's emotions without feeling frightened of it. (A)
130 So I think that everything just feels more rigorous in terms of thinking
about how many patients, how often, why have they cancelled, why am I
getting irritated, can I see a patient or am I too tired, can I take on
another patient or not, selection processes, all of that.
131 It just feels like a much more serious business to me and with that I can
see the benefits to my patients and to myself, because I am enjoying my
work more, a lot more. (BP)
 
Sometimes the attempt to think about oneself in the process of doing the work of therapy had 
resulted in what Benjamin (2001, p. 14) sees as the conflation of self-observation with submission 
“to a person or an ideal” or grappling with what Participant E (403, 406) described as a “negative
and destructive Animus”. 
415 And that destructive voice can be very undermining of my work.
419 I think, as I reflect on my work, I often feel that I don't have enough
understanding of what's going on.
420 In the face-to-face space I don't often experience that, but as I
reflect, I feel that I don't have enough understanding and that, I think,
sometimes is absolutely valid, but sometimes there is this destructive
voice.
428 I mean, obviously there is a place for being critical of my work, but
it's not that kind of objective critical, it's the laying waste, you
know, of stuff that is of value, as well. (E)
 
The establishment of a triangular psychic thinking space had meant the participant-therapists’ 
scrutinising and questioning their own work in terms of themselves, patients, transference, and 
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especially, countertransference; that is, thinking about the nature of and their own contribution to 
the clinical third without being so persecutingly judgmental of themselves. 
339 One of the things that I want to talk about in having my own therapy
and working as a therapist is that one of the things I have been aware of
and that I think that I watch out for and just am aware of is that I think
sometimes therapy can negatively influence your work in that when I'm
sometimes going through a process in my own therapy and I'm excited about
it: "Wow, you know, gosh, look at how I'm doing that" or: "Oh, yes,
you're right", my therapist has picked up on that or: "Oh yes, gosh, I
hadn't realised I do that or feel that way or think that way!"
340 I will be sensitive to it and maybe looking out for it unconsciously.
344 I don't think it's about whether it is or isn't here in the patient,
because I think there's often so much there, but maybe what I have been
aware of sometimes is when a patient gives me six cues to things, rather
than picking up on the one that is foremost for that patient at that
moment, I'll pick up on the one that is foremost for me, because I've
just had a wonderful therapy session (laughs)!
348 And I think I just have to be aware of it, because it's going to happen
anyway.
366 It [therapy] brings into your life a general attitude of self-
reflectiveness that enables you then to, in therapy, out of therapy,
actually say: "Hang on a minute; why am I seeing that issue in the last
three patients; why am I picking up on this aspect of experience in all of
my patients today?" (F)
Participant F had been discussing the possibility of seeing the patient in terms of her own desires, 
that is, as an object rather than a subject who is a different other. She had been considering how her 
impinging use of the patient’s therapeutic space might potentially come about as a result of her own 
therapy. Without F’s having and clinging to the certainty of being the one who knows exactly what 
the truth was, this had become a playing with ideas and meanings around this issue. 
 
This may be contrasted with Participant G’s discussion of the same topic. While both F and G’s 
ways of understanding such a situation could have been be valid, G showed a certain lack of playful 
reflectiveness and much more of a sense that her interpretation and understanding had been the 
correct one. 
76 I also find, very interestingly, that the things that I focus on in my
own therapy, very soon, within a week or so of me exploring a certain
area, it will come up.
77 Suddenly my patients seem to have issues and problems in those areas ...
82 I feel that the reason that I can deal with those things, is because they
provoke less anxiety in me now and because I'm more consciously aware.
88 And I also believe that on an unconscious level, somehow, it gets
communicated to the patient. (G)
 
The frame is a fundamental aspect of psychodynamic therapy and needs to be respected as such. 
However, the participant-therapist’s being reflective had also meant his having the confidence and 
the openness to think beyond the reassuring certainty of just “following the rules”. 
630 B: I have to admit that I break the rules.
633 And I think that any therapist who doesn't ever break the rules, doesn't
ever, I mean, is missing something.
634 Because they're not really rules.
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635 I think they're more like guidelines.
636 But they are important guidelines, very important guidelines.
637 The frame is a very important guideline.
638 But it's not a rule, it's a guideline.
639 *R: What does that mean, not a rule but a guideline?
641 B: It means you don't have to follow it.
642 It's only a guide, but you follow your own path.
643 *R: So you interpret it, basically?
645 B: Ja.
646 It's the map, not the territory.
651 And the territory and the map are not the same.
652 But the map is a good guide for traversing the territory.
655 Therapy happens in the psychic space of the room.
656 The frame is a kind of synthetic guideline that needs to be translated
into lived experience in the room to be helpful. (B)
 
This translation of the notion of the frame into the “lived experience in the room” had 
involved some “hard thinking” rather than just “correct actions” (Mitchell, 1997, p. 268).  
599 I had a patient, two weeks ago, who challenged me, directly challenged me.
600 Said something like: "I'm not one of your average patients and basically
I'm a special boy."
602 "I'm a special boy and if you want to work with me, you are going to have
to pull finger; you're going to have to change; you're going to have to
give me something of yourself."
605 I think that any good therapist can work with that.
606 It's lovely material to work with.
607 It's not easy, but it's great when a patient offers that kind of
narcissistic fantasy and one can step into vulnerability about that.
608 What I did with him, I was able to, at the same time as interpret the
importance that he not be seen as just a regular patient; talk about what
that might mean if he was just a regular patient and how that might feel
to him.
609 At the same time that I did that, I was also able to think about some of
his criticisms of my lack of self-disclosure.
611 As a therapist I could say: "Now, I'm not supposed to self-disclose" or
something like that.
612 But I actually thought about it and I offered him self-disclosure, but I
offered it therapeutically.
613 So I offered self-disclosure about how it felt to be in the room with
him, for me, which was self-disclosure, but was not historical or factual
self-disclosure about me.
614 It was still really about him.
616 And he really took to that very well, because ...
618 And I don't think I would have done this if my therapist hadn't had
taken my feedback.
619 I can sit here and think that maybe my therapist actually didn't shift in
his focus on my feeling at all.
620 Maybe he just didn't challenge me on it and he thought about it.
621 And that was enough for me to think that he was doing that.
622 I don't know, because it's a fantasy.
623 But there was definitely a connection there. (B)
This patient’s “challenge” had been both an expression of his narcissistic grandiosity (and implied 
hidden vulnerability) and an invitation for B to enter into a power struggle about what therapy 
should be about, whose reality should prevail, who should dominate and who should submit (599-
601). B’s surrender (rather than submission) to this had started off by exploring what this had 
meant to the patient (605-608). If this had been all that B had done and he if had also “refused” to 
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self-disclose, the patient could have felt that B was distancing himself, attempting to force him (the 
patient) into submitting to his (B’s) theoretical loyalty, and an antitherapeutic dyad and negative 
intersubjective third could have ensued. One may, of course, interpret this therapeutic “tale” 
differently. But what does stand out with indisputable lucidity is that, rather than just keeping to the 
rules (611), B had been able to remain thinking about what was happening (609, 612). B had 
consequently responded in a way that had reflected the patient’s impact on him; that is, his 
identification with and recognition of the patient and his (B’s) holding on to his own separate and 
different subjectivity (612-616). B had further connected his ability to do this to his own experience 
of therapy. One could therefore understand B’s actions in the clinical third as his identification with 
his therapist’s way of thinking and working when he (B) had felt recognised in the therapeutic third 
(618-623).  
 
The significance of the therapist’s holding on to his subjectivity by thinking reflectively and 
symbolically is highlighted at such uneasy times when impasse and breakdown loom. This is when 
the therapist’s only choices seem to be giving up his own version of what is happening or 
compelling the patient to submit to his authority, for example, by means of making only a 
transference interpretation. And any therapist would be sorely tempted to do just that if his own 
idea of himself as a therapist were sufficiently threatened and the wounded healer constellation 
with its impaired capacity for subject-to-subject relating came to the fore. 
 
In the following excerpt, Participant B described his thinking in and about such a challenging 
situation (781) where he had not hidden behind a transference interpretation (782-783), but had also 
recognised the validity of the patient’s experience (784) without submitting to her demands. This 
had taken the therapy beyond the possibility of potential collapse into the concrete polarities of 
complementary twoness to the level of the symbolic third (786) 
781 I have one patient who has a very strongly erotic transference with me,
who challenges the boundaries here; directly challenges the boundaries.
782 I don't interpret to this person like ...
783 I don't sort of volley the challenges away, like throwing it back at
them.
784 What I say is: "Look, there is something very frustrating and synthetic
about the relationship here: that I'm getting from you. We meet at a
certain time and it is all controlled and structured. Here you are having
these feelings and meanwhile we are stuck in a therapy relationship. I
mean, that is F****** frustrating and B***** hard."
785 So I get that.
786 It works extremely well, because the person gets that they actually don't
need to break the boundaries to get intimate. (B)
 
Thinking had also been part of participant-therapists’ engagement with those aspects of the clinical 
thirds that were non-conscious or unconscious. This did not pertain to the rather archaic and 
 195
simplistic notion of making the “unconscious conscious”. It rather had to do with the participant-
therapist’s thinking being brought into his encounters with the shadowy adumbrations of what is 
generically described as the unconscious. By implication this had also involved the participant-
therapist’s developing awareness of, open receptivity to and ability to sense and experience the 
unthought, unarticulated, unformulated and intuitive aspects of experience. There had thus been a 
movement between thinking and experiencing, with one informing the other. Experience had 
illuminated, opened up and disseminated thinking, and thought had organised and brought 
understanding to experience.  
315 E: I am aware that I can sometimes be extremely intolerant of
fundamentalist kinds of viewpoints and need to be very conscious of that
intolerance and walk very respectfully around what other people come with,
because I think that triggers a kind of complex reaction in me.
316 And ja, so to come back to how my own therapy informs my work, I am SO
much more aware of my own complexes and what to watch out for.
317 *R: It's brought that kind of awareness?
320 E: I am much more attuned to affective changes in myself in the
therapeutic setting and know when, I can't say it's absolutely, but I'm
much more attuned to when a complex has been triggered in me.
321 That is absolutely a result of having been in therapy.
322 *R: What does it mean in your work to have an awareness of a complex that
has been triggered?
325 E: I maybe feel an increase in my pulse rate or I'm aware that there's a
visceral response to something that's been said and I need to be very
conscious of, I mean, even though my client may pick up something in me,
in my body language or whatever, I need to be very conscious of anything
I might articulate at that point.
326 I need to be very careful of how I respond rather than react, you know,
as I might in just an ordinary conversation.
327 *R: You seem to be saying that you cannot just react, but that you need
somehow to reflect on or have an awareness?
329 E: Ja, you know, I think, Casement's "supervisors" ...
330 Ja, for sure, I am more, as a result of having worked with my complexes
and shadow and inferior function or whatever, much more conscious of when
those sorts of responses are evoked in me in therapy.
331 I mean, not that they are evoked, you know, endlessly, but when they are.
332 And it often is with, it's always where there is more of an intensity of
connection with clients ... (E)
208 Sometimes a patient's face will be in a dream and then, in talking about
that, I might say; "Who is this patient? What is she representing to me?
Who is she to me? What are my feelings about her? Did she say something
that connects with what I'm talking about?" (F)
 
4.5.2.7.2 Personal therapy and the interplay of identification and disidentification, reflective 
and symbolic thinking in the clinical third 
 
The following excerpt highlights some aspects of the role of Participant F’s personal therapy in her 
moving towards thinking reflectively and symbolically about her work. She described the presence 
of identificatory processes that had involved both identification and disidentification. The excerpt 
also shows how F’s therapy had formed a containing Third to her work, and as such had also been a 
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Third from which to think symbolically and reflectively, and had contributed to a triangular psychic 
space or a space of thirdness in her mind (218). 
218 F: But the other kind of place that I've really appreciated the therapy
is, it's really helped me sometimes to work with some of my patients; just
to be more responsive to them and to hear what they are saying and hear
the symbolic part of it; to hear their story in an open way and kind of
understand, kind of more metaphorically, what they are meaning.
221 I am thinking of a man whom I found difficult to like, initially ...
222 He was, he just represented things that I didn't, I just didn't
appreciate, I didn't like.
223 It was hard to listen to him.
224 I thought him to be quite callous and self-centred and very patronising
towards women.
225 I thought that he treated women very badly.
227 I found it difficult to like him in the first two sessions.
228 And wondered if I should be working with him or referring him …
232 I really found my therapy at that point to help me just to not assume
that that was who he was or all he was, but that was where he was at that
point in time and what he needed to project at that point in time about
himself, what he felt like in relation to me or to women at that moment
in time.
233 *R: What about your therapy enabled you to do that?
235 F: Part of it was just being able to use the therapy as a container in a
way for some of my own feelings about men in general, which I might have
had at that time with that man and could have used that to kind of push
him away, because at that time I was [omitted] and I was angry at men.
236 And here is this man coming in telling me about abusing his wife and
being incredibly thoughtless and he had no sense of who she was.
237 The way he was talking, he had no sense of who she was or no
consideration for her whatsoever.
238 It might have been very easy, because at that particular point, I had my
own set of issues around relationships and men and it might have been
very easy just to see him as another thoughtless man who kind of paid no
attention to his wife and had no idea who she was.
239 So part of it was containing.
241 But another part of it was just my own experience of having sometimes
said things or held strongly to views that I changed later.
242 Or being a person, being in a kind of way that I changed later, because
it was about where I was at that time.
243 Even from one session to the next sometimes I've had that experience.
244 Of course you change over the years, but I've had that experience even in
one session, coming here, I remember having an experience like that, at
the time of this man, coming to one session and feeling very strongly one
way and talking about that.
245 And then two sessions later, suddenly catching hearing myself feeling
very different.
246 I suppose it's that experience of also realising that you are who you are
in a moment and you're saying something about who you are and where you
are in a moment, but that's not all of who you are.
247 It's representative, it's symbolic.
248 You need to listen to it, but you don't need to take it so literally that
it's fixed and it's the only ...
249 Yes, I'm talking about the experience of the first two sessions with a
man who I came to really enjoy and appreciate and came to see other sides
of quite soon after those first two sessions of really, REALLY wishing he
wouldn't walk into my room at all (laughs)!
Initially F had had found herself disliking this patient intensely (221, 227). It had been almost 
impossible to be attuned and responsive to him (223), and she had doubted that she could work 
with him (228). This may be understood as F’s having made a complementary identification with 
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the disempowered victim “pole” of this patient’s negating way of relating to women and herself 
(which was probably also a disowned part of himself) (236-237). This had echoed and intersected 
with an aspect of her own life that she was struggling with, and about which she had strong and 
disturbing feelings (235). There had consequently been some confusion between the “other within” 
and the “other without” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 108) (238) and the patient had come to represent a 
hated and incensing “object” (222). This had evoked F’s anger towards and judgement of the 
patient himself (224-225) and had pulled her towards relating to him as a despised other/object that 
she desired to distance herself from rather than as a subject (235). At that time F’s negation of the 
patient had seemed certain and the derailment of the therapy had appeared to be a strong possibility. 
 
However, because her therapy had contained her feelings (235, 239), F had managed not to drown 
in (Racker, 1968) or to react reflexively to her countertransferential feelings towards the patient and 
was able to use them to inform the therapeutic process. She had consequently been able to 
disidentify from the “abused victim” pole of the patient’s relating to women and the “as-if” space 
of therapy could be restored (232). F was able to use her own experience of therapy to identify with 
the patient’s being in therapy (241-245) and to move towards a more empathic knowing and 
recognition of him; that is to use identification as a “bridge” towards greater connectedness with 
this patient. One could also speculate that she had probably been making use of and identifying 
with her experience of her own therapist’s acting and thinking towards her in similar situations.  
 
At this point F had clearly been able to be “on both sides of the divide” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 19), 
to represent a “double-sided perspective” (Benjamin, Ibid., p. 25) and to keep both herself and the 
patient in mind. She was therefore being reflective in the manner described by Aron and Benjamin 
(Benjamin & Aron, 1999; Aron, 2000). Her thinking had also moved to a more symbolic level 
(246-248). The patient was no longer just concretely what he was in a moment: she had come to 
understand her experience of that period of almost hating him as only representing an aspect of 
him. Different and contradictory identifications with the patient and a variety of meanings could 
now be entertained and played with. Her connectedness with the patient could also become an 
authentic “loving tie” (Benjamin, 1995, p. 7) at a more subject-to-subject level, so that thirdness 
between them and the real work of therapy became possible (249). 
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4.5.2.7.3 Personal therapy and the Thirds of theory and supervision 
As in the “pure” psychoanalytic and Jungian paradigms, the triad of personal therapy, supervision 
and theoretical knowledge is also considered essential in the training and ongoing development of 
the psychodynamic psychotherapist. Just as Wiseman and Shefler’s (2001) participants, the 
participants in this study had considered their therapies as having been more fundamental to their 
development as therapists than either theoretical knowledge or supervision, and also that their 
therapies had enabled them to make better use of those. Of course the kinds of Thirds provided by 
theoretical knowledge and supervision are also essential aspects of being-a-therapist, inform 
personal therapy and are also informed by that. However, as Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999) point 
out, personal therapy has a unique place in the development of the therapist that cannot be filled by 
knowledge or supervision. In the following sections there is a discussion of the participants’ views 
and experiences of how the Thirds offered by theoretical knowledge and supervision had related to 
those of their therapies and how this had influenced their thinking, both about and in doing therapy. 
 
4.5.2.7.3.1   Personal therapy, thinking about clinical work and theoretical knowledge 
The term “psychodynamic psychotherapy” is understood as encompassing a variety of therapies. 
While there are different ways of viewing and describing the same psychological phenomena 
within this paradigm, psychodynamic psychotherapy is theoretically grounded, rather than being 
technique-driven.  
268 I am strongly located within a theoretical discourse and so what I'm
saying comes from that.
282 It's like you cannot have a conversation without using language.
284 It's there, it's embedded in every single thing you do, it's embedded in
every thought you think.
285 Even if you're not using terms like countertransference or projection or
whatever your terms might be, you're coming from a model of understanding
human beings and relatedness and how we function.
579 One of the things it's particularly clarified for me today, which is
interesting, I know where I come from, I know that I come from a very
strong belief that therapy is important and one of the things that I've
just had to acknowledge is that is where I come from, it's about my
theoretical model. (F)
 
The participants had viewed their own therapies as being more fundamental than their theoretical 
knowledge in constituting their functioning as therapists. 
8 In my opinion, actually, one's own therapy is the core of the
effectiveness of your own work. (A)
212 The theory is always secondary in my judgement and each year that I've
worked, that realisation has been amplified exponentially.
213 I mean, I wouldn't have said theory is secondary three years ago.
214 I would have said it's a balance between theory and authentic knowing of
yourself in the room and relating.
215 And there is a relationship between them that's a kind of give and take.
216 And each year that has passed, that scale has tipped totally. (B)
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Taking conceptual knowledge to one’s work as a psychodynamic psychotherapist means thinking 
about and responding to patients in specific ways that are based on “a frame that you are
bringing into the therapy” (D, 232). What is meaningful is therefore not so much “based on
a perception and that's what captures me in the field right now” but rather on 
“thought-through understanding … that may only become relevant after a fair
amount of dialogue and a fair amount of sensing where that actually fits into” 
(D, 232).  
 
According to the participants, theoretical knowledge could only become a “living phenomenon” 
(D, 220) in the context of the therapeutic relationship, where the “anchorage for the
therapist is in the transference and countertransference” (D, 208). The actual 
experience of personal therapy renders theory “alive” in a way that goes beyond the limitations of 
just having cognitive understanding. 
114 I can't see that you can actually help anybody from a theoretical
place.
115 You can give them words, but I think that is just so many words, it's not
really going to help.
124 I think that how that kind of work subsequently has influenced my
work has been profound, because it is not just a theoretical
understanding of the structure, of the depth psychology or the roots of
your psyche.
125 It is experiencing it. (A)
242 That is the experiential side: then I can see it, I can feel it, and
it's not just the theory. (C)
 
The connection between theoretical knowledge and personal therapy had been especially important 
when participants had been trainees or novice therapists. Over time theory had become part of 
whom they were as a clinicians.  
855 We'd be in a lecture and there would be a theory; or I'd be in therapy
and there'd be a process happening in the therapy of some kind and I
would just absorb it and just get it. (B)
300 I think you've got to have the theory, you've got to learn, you've got to
have it there at the beginning and it's then nice when you can then just
let it go, but understand where you've come from. (F)
208 So I think I work a lot harder in therapy, but it's different from when I
was a young therapist, where one almost felt that you had to prepare and
you had to come with the answers.
209 It's not that kind of thing.
210 It's much more processing it in myself.
211 Ja, ja it's not an intellectual thing.
212 It's that, too, but it's a proper processing of countertransference
issues, of feelings that patients elicit in me, what it means, and really
having to think about it properly. (BP)
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Theory had therefore not been “objective”, but also part of whom the participant had been, that is, 
his subjectivity. 
209 And it does not really matter what method, I think, but it has to be
something that's compatible to one's own nature. (A)
858 It never felt really like I was learning something that I never ever knew
and now this is the first time I'm learning it.
859 And when it does feel that way, I've come to realise for myself that is
not valuable to me, that information.
860 Because if I can't feel like I'm remembering it, it's not really about
me.
861 And if it's not about me, it's not about anybody, really, because I'm a
human being and I have a psyche.
862 And so if it's not connecting it to my psyche somewhere, well, then
that's not really about the psyche. (B)
252 I think that my theoretical orientation helps me and guides me in
creating boundaries and creating structure and a frame within which I
work, but ultimately it is me who is the therapist and I don't think
I'm going to be like Jung or like anyone that I have studied.
253 There's going to be an interface between me and my theoretical
orientation, which is uniquely me and cannot be replicated by any
other therapist. (G)
 
Participant E found being able to relate to and identify with the experiences and thinking of other 
therapists particularly useful to make sense of her own processes. 
263 *R: Do you sometimes use theory, somebody else's writing, to get an
understanding of your therapy?
265 E: Oh, absolutely, I have an absolutely driving need to understand what
I'm experiencing in therapy and at the time of all this kind of
disintegration I was much more immersed in psychoanalytic stuff and
Francis Tustin I found very meaningful; Winnicott I found very meaningful.
267 I read a lot of kind of biographical stuff.
268 I read Coltart and Nini Herman, I think and then there's psychoanalytic
writers who wrote of their own kind of disintegration ... the woman who
saw Winnicott, Little, I think.
269 So those I also found kind of thoughtful in terms of trying to make sense
of my own process.
 
The therapist’s perceived intellectual prowess and conceptual proficiency had often played a part in 
the participant’s choice of him as therapist. This had partly been based on the reality of the 
participant’s being knowledgeable enough about therapy to look for a therapist who was known as 
being competent, preferably excellent, in the community of fellow therapists, that is, a “therapist’s 
therapist” (Norcross, Geller & Kurzawa, 2001). On the other hand, such a view of the therapist’s 
supposed intellectual superiority was also suffused with the idealisation of the one who had been 
chosen to be like. 
247 I saw in this man a combination of deep intellectual and theoretical
rigour, like he knew what he was talking about way beyond where I was
theoretically, combined with depth, with great depth and feeling and at
the same time, a spiritual trajectory in life. (B)
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Nonetheless, it had also been important for the participants to know that the chosen therapist had 
had his own experience of therapy or analysis. 
181 I, myself, wouldn't go near a therapist who hasn't been in therapy
themselves.
182 I can't see how they can be working in the room.
183 They'd be working through a textbook ... (B)
 
Participant A described how theory had provided names and concepts for what she had experienced 
in therapy. 
264 A: Well, it's a combination of experience and then the naming of it.
265 The theory for me would come after, more as a description of what you
experienced.
266 And then it really becomes a tool.
267 If you then have a name for that experience, you know what's inside the
box, whereas if you just see the name and you can read what is inside the
box, you still don't know anything about the experience and you can't
really use it.
268 *R: So you can then go to theory?
270 A: Yes, theory for me would have to come after experience, but it's also
as necessary as the experience, because the theory gives you a label. (A)
 
Therapy had also informed conceptual understanding. 
540 But then you would read about something and really can't quite get your
head around it until that particular pattern has slotted into place in
your own psyche and you can really see it: "Oh, okay, now I understand
that particular pattern." (A)
 
Sometimes the experience of therapy had led to a change in theoretical paradigm.  
239 D: I think it's about a shift in a paradigm.
623 There's been a shift; it's like a quantum shift.
624 I think that's what happens in therapy.
625 Once you've had that experience, there's a shift in the way you think of
things, the way you see things, the way you conceptualise things.
626 You never reverse it. (D)
 
Participant D gave an account of how his “personal therapy resulted in a change in the
way [he] thought about clients” (D, 175), as he had found it “increasingly difficult to
work in the [omitted] framework” (D, 136) from where he had come. 
240 I think one should have been through the experience of a particular kind
of therapy, which has been well done.
242 The way that you look at information is different.
243 It's hard for you not to look at information in that way; or if you are
not looking at information in that way, it means something about what's
happening in the room.
244 So I think that's what happens for the therapist in that sort of analysis
or therapy.
245 And there is actually a shift in your paradigm, in the way that you
gather data, in the way that you look at data.
246: *R: So something about your own experience changes...
248 D: The way you were looked at and the way you were taught to look at
yourself becomes the way that you begin to look at other people and look
at yourself with other people. (D)
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In the following excerpt Participant D emphasised that theory had not been foregrounded in his 
reflecting on the patient he was talking about. But his thinking about her, whether or not one agrees 
with his specific understanding of the patient or the relationship, had certainly been psychodynamic 
in nature in the focus on the transference-countertransference and unconscious communications and 
meanings. What D described could also be understood as his identification with his therapist’s way 
of working. This had not remained at the level of concretely repeating words or actions, but had 
included the more abstract level of coming to share a way of thinking about doing clinical work. 
178 What I found is that I began to reflect a lot more during the therapy
and my reflections would not be of a theoretical nature.
179 Occasionally I would sort of break into theory if I was really confused:
"What on earth is this person trying to say," but generally it would be,
as I said, more of a reflection.
180 And out of that reflection I would be reflecting on what I was feeling
and what I was understanding was coming through.
181 Then what would happen, is meaning would start to emerge out of the way
certain things that the client had said in coming into therapy later on
in therapy.
182 Through those reflections I'd be able to gather them.
183 So, to give an example.
184 A client came waltzing in one day and she says: "Those bottles you've got
on the lawn, are they supposed to stop the dog s******* on the lawn?"
185 And I said: "Yes."
186 I couldn't quite understand what that was about.
187 She flounced in and sat down and then she began to talk about a
relationship she was having and the difficulties in this relationship.
188 And then she began to talk about anxieties she had around her therapy,
because she wanted to travel to the place where this relationship was
taking place.
189 And then it became clear what this meant, with the bottles.
190 What she was anxious about was whether I was going to s*** on her for
wanting to leave the therapy to go to the relationship.
191 And I could make that interpretation for her, but that wasn't the end of
it, and because as we explored that a little bit more, what became
another level was in fact her being the dogs, s******* on the lawn of the
relationship and the lawn of the therapy, and because she was very angry
with this man for living so far away and not being available to her, as I
wasn't always available to her.
192 But those kinds of thoughts wouldn't have happened for me as a [omitted]
therapist.
193 So what I learnt in my therapy was the way something I said here and
something I said there and something I said then could be collected by
the therapist into the meaning that I was bringing to the therapy on that
particular day.
194 It's a particular way of thinking, which I think was one of the first
things that actually influenced me in my actual therapeutic work. (D)
 
In a similar vein, Participant BP described how her own experience of feeling contained by her 
therapist’s “theoretical rigour” had led to her making this part of her being-a-clinician. 
64 I think that he is extremely rigorous in terms of his theoretical
background; he is extremely containing in terms of boundaries and I think
that that is what is helpful.
148 And in the process feeling myself more contained, because there is more
of a theoretical rigour, which immediately contains me more and helps the
therapy.
147 So I think as part of that, since I have been in therapy, I've done a lot
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more theoretical reading, courses, support, because I am becoming much
more aware of my responsibility as well, I suppose.
187 The theoretical rigour which I've experienced in my own therapy, I'm
bringing into my practice, and it's very helpful. (BP)
 
The experience of therapy and the gaining of further theoretical knowledge had mutually 
influenced, informed and enriched each other and as such had contributed to the participants’ being 
able to keep on thinking about their work. 
482 I do a lot of thinking about things that have come up that are
meaningful, and, I suppose, from my reading as well.
483 I often have one mind on my practice when I read and one mind on my own
individual therapy when I read. (D)
 
Participant F highlighted the importance of examining and questioning the place and use of one’s 
actual theoretical framework. The therapist may use theory defensively, for example, by 
dominating the patient from the position of being the one who knows and as such attempting to 
replace the patient’s version of reality with his own. 
293 So I think you have to examine your theory.
294 I think that it can be a hindrance.
295 You know, I think it's very easy to hide behind your theory or to use it
in things like interpretations and it doesn't take you to understanding
the experience, the phenomenology of something. (F)
 
The therapist’s theoretical knowledge is a necessary background frame to his responses to the 
patient. For Participant F it had been important not to be aware of her therapist’s theory, but rather 
to feel recognised through being heard and understood in a way that had conveyed authentic and 
vital connectedness. She could then take this way of working to her own work. 
313 My therapist and I are both psychoanalytic, but we're from fairly
different sides and very different theoretical viewpoints.
315 But that's not an issue.
330 But it's the experience that is important and understanding it in the
human way that's important.
331 Ja, the theory is in there.
332 Your theory is in there the whole time.
333 I need my therapist to use it, but I need her to hear ME.
334 I don't want hear her theory, although I know it's in there.
335 And I suppose I try and do the same thing. (F)
 
Participant F accordingly described how she had used her own experience of her therapy and 
therapist as a Third to listen to herself responding in a session with a patient and to think about the 
possibility that she could be using theory in a negating way. 
81 And trying to imagine whether it was sounding very theoretical or whether
it was sounding very kind of coldly analytical.
82 Just thinking about what it might be sounding like. (F)
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4.5.2.7.3.2   Personal therapy and supervision 
Just like personal therapy, supervision had been one of the Thirds that had enabled the therapist-
patients to continue doing the work of therapy. 
502 I think the burnout that happens in this work is quite well known, and
can be remedied by your own therapy, by supervision, by frequent holidays
and by not having too many people in a day, by balancing your year with
holidays in between. (A)
 
In conjunction with therapy and the gaining of theoretical knowledge, the participants had also 
considered supervision to be one of the continuing necessary requirements for being an effective 
and dedicated professional. 
431 I think the more I experience therapy, the more I know of therapy,
the more I believe in the work of therapy, but the more I'm also aware of
the need for intellectual application, for supervision, and that one has
to be completely dedicated and you have to remain in a training kind of a
situation where you can keep on kind of sharpening your pencils.
432 And I think when the therapist becomes too secure in her own knowledge
and doesn't make use of these support systems like therapy and
supervision and discussion, I think that will always be a danger, because
it's an ongoing effort.
433 It's like having exercise every day of your life.
434 It's not something that you can learn and you've got the tools now, now
you can ride on that.
435 You have to keep on working at it all the time you are a therapist.
436 Maybe it's like exercise.
437 You can't actually get fit and then think you can ride on that.
438 You have to stay fit ... (BP)
182 One's own therapy is part of the whole process of therapeutic work.
183 It's the therapy with a patient, it's the supervision, and it's the own
therapy.
184 It's all of those kind of things that enable you altogether to actually
do the therapeutic work.
185 What you do with it in your hour or your fifty minutes with your patient,
that's not the whole of the therapy. (F)
 
They had also considered supervision to be part of their ongoing development as therapists. 
375 But I really do think it's an inch-by-inch process that happens in
therapy, whereby one, both as a result of the reading and the supervision
that one is exposed to and one's own process, there is a process of
transformation and I am a completely different person from the person
who started therapy [omitted] years ago. (E)
 
In contrast to supervision, the participants had seldom used the space of personal therapy to talk 
about patients. At earlier stages in their professional lives they had been more inclined to do this.  
191 I actually very rarely talk about patients in my therapy.
194 I talk about aspects of patients, I suppose.
195 I talk about what they represent for me.
196 Maybe what the patient has made me reflect on. (F)
154 Having supervision helps me to use my therapy time for myself.
155 So very seldom do I talk about my patients. (G)
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The participants had also pointed out the different but overlapping emphases of personal therapy 
and supervision. 
531 You would still talk about how it has affected you, but you won't go into
the tale that hangs on that.
532 You would say: "It has touched me" and maybe say how, but then focus on
the story of the patient and how best you can position yourself towards
that ... (A)
361 It was a theoretical, mostly intellectual process, with occasionally, I
suppose, one would touch on unworked-through emotions in oneself, but
mostly that was not the pitch of it. (BP)
467 I talk about my clients to my analyst when there has been some kind of
impact on me.
468 My supervision is about their process.
469 Ja, so talking about them in analysis is about my process; in supervision
it's about their process. (E)
200 I see them very differently.
201 I suppose I would go to supervision with my patient very much in the
foreground.
202 I would talk about the patient's narrative.
203 I would talk about my thoughts and my feelings and my responses to that
narrative.
204 Occasionally I would touch on how the patient's narrative and my
responses to the narrative touch, things I know about myself or unusually
strong or disturbing responses in myself.
205 When I go to therapy, my feelings, my experiences, are in the foreground.
206 That's mainly what I'm thinking about.
207 That's where my energy is.
208 Sometimes a patient's face will be in a dream and then, in talking about
that, I might say; "Who is this patient? What is she representing to me?
Who is she to me? What are my feelings about her? Did she say something
that connects with what I'm talking about?"
209 I'm not talking about what it means for her; I'm talking about what it
means for me.
210 It's not completely separate.
211 They overlap, but I suppose it's just a different emphasis ... (F)
 
An important difference between therapy and supervision had been that the supervisory relationship 
had more of a sense of being one between two professionals. The participant’s relationship with his 
therapist had been one where he could be less of a professional and be known in a more personal 
way, but also one in which he had been in a more vulnerable and disempowered position. 
690 Analysis comes closer, because you do open yourself if you do.
691 If the trust happens; you are much, much more open.
694 And to make that process more conscious is a lot more difficult than
maybe with supervision.
695 Therefore, the delicacy of that relationship is quite huge, the power ...
(A)
570 And learning from somebody who really knows me and I think that that's
the difference between taking my work there and taking my work to
supervision, because taking my work to analysis, my analyst REALLY knows
my shadow and REALLY knows my vulnerability and my complexes and can see
where they interface and so it really is very helpful. (E)
137 My therapy, by contrast, gives me the permission to be small, to be
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helpless, to be vulnerable, to expose parts of me that are not part of my
professional persona.
138 And there's been a very clear division there, so that in both I've been
able to keep my dignity, the one as a professional, enhancing my
professional curiosity and the other as an individual ...
141 And supervision has never become too intensely personal so that it
becomes humiliating.
142 I'm sure it could if my supervisor felt the need to explore certain
areas that I was battling with, because it was my own personal issue.
143 I believe that it would become humiliating. (G)
4.5.3 Personal therapy and a psychoanalytic unconscious 
4.5.3.1   The notions of unconsciousness and a psychoanalytic unconscious 
One of the principal underlying notions of psychodynamic psychotherapy is the idea that human 
experience involves more than “meets the eye”. Therefore the “idea that the self can have 
transparent access to and be the master of its own processes is no longer tenable” (Flax, 1993, p. 
96). There is “an unconscious” which influences our perception and experience of the world, that 
is, of ourselves and others, and that informs the ideas and organising principles by which we live. It 
could indeed be said that the unconscious has to do with that which is lived, but not known or 
thought. There is also the assumption that understanding the unconscious meaning of human mental 
activity offers a powerful potential for change (Stokoe, 2000). Since what is unconscious is by 
definition “outside conscious awareness and control” (Flax, 1993, p. 96) and our knowing is subject 
to the vicissitudes of the same unconscious that we are trying to understand, we have to accept that 
our understanding will always be partial and provisional (Flax, 1994). 
 
Part of the therapist’s task is help the patient to have more awareness of and confidence in his 
internal processes. This makes the “collaborative inquiry into the patient’s unconscious life” central 
to the therapeutic endeavour and requires that therapist and patient mutually create “a language” for 
experience that is “unsymbolized, disavowed or otherwise repressed” (Zeddies, 2000b, p. 468). The 
therapist therefore has to be open to and able to trust the deeply intuitive aspects of his own 
experience in therapy, for example, of the nonconscious or unconscious processes constellated 
between him and the patient. 
 
This brings us to the kind of working model of “the unconscious” (both their own and that of 
patients) that therapists hold. Exactly what is meant by the term “unconscious” has become more 
diverse and controversial in the present-day psychoanalytic and analytic world of post-modern 
thinking and many and ever-evolving paradigms. Thinking about what is meant by “the 
unconscious” is indeed very much a “work in progress” (Renik, 2000, p. 4). Things have changed 
radically since Freud introduced his notion of the dynamic unconscious, by definition the seat of 
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repressed instinctual drives, a structure (rather than a process) consisting of “a dynamic collection 
of timeless fantasies and wishes” sealed off within the individual mind (Zeddies, 2000a, p. 61). 
 
For example, theorists from the contextualist or systems intersubjective approach write about “the 
organizing principles that unconsciously shape and thematize the person’s experiences” (Stolorow 
& Atwood, 1992, p. 33) and about “emotional convictions that operate automatically”, which may 
concern relatedness or one’s sense of self (Orange, Atwood & Stolorow, 1997, p. 7). This is 
compatible with the relational view of the unconscious, with which the contextualist approach 
further shares the notion that unconscious processes arise out of and are shaped by the person’s 
intersubjective experience with significant others, especially those early experiences in the family 
of origin (Zeddies, 2000a). Both the relational view and that of the contextualist intersubjective 
approach emphasise that what is unconscious and hence “unformulated” (Stern, 1997), “refers not 
only to an individual’s mental processes, but is also considered to be an inalienable property of 
interpersonal relationships and dialogue” (Zeddies, 2000a, p. 62). These ideas therefore depict “the 
unconscious” very differently from when it was first thought about within psychoanalysis. 
 
In conceptualising what he calls the “relational unconscious” as it pertains to the therapeutic 
situation, Zeddies (2000b, p. 467) posits that it includes the idea that “meaning and understanding 
are coconstructed and not universal, absolute and performed”. The patient’s “unconscious” is 
therefore no longer viewed as a “thing” to be excavated, but as “intersubjectively mediated” (Ibid.). 
Whatever approach the therapist uses to explore the patient’s unconscious material will 
consequently play a role in how that comes to be understood. Instead of Freud’s repression barrier, 
there is also “a fluid boundary with consciousness” (Zeddies, 2000a, p. 61).  
 
What the individual therapist expects the “unconscious” to be (both in form and content), and what 
he infers from this expectation, will depend on the analytic subculture the therapist belongs to and 
will also inevitably be part of his or her subjectivity (Renik, 2000). Renik (2000, p. 4) suggests that 
we should think of unconsciousness as a concept or idea that organises our clinical experiences 
rather than of the unconscious as “an immutable thing-in-itself”. He consequently usefully 
discusses unconsciousness from a phenomenological perspective in experiential rather than in 
purely theoretical terms and distinguishes the following ways in which unconsciousness is 
commonly experienced in the clinical situation:133 
                                                 
133 Although Renik suggests this differentiation as a potential heuristic device in an actual clinical situation rather than 
as an indication of the existence of separate phenomena, it is likely that even in a clinical situation these aspects of 
unconsciousness would not be quite so clearly differentiated.  
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 Experiences and thoughts that are being kept out of conscious awareness because of 
psychological reasons; that is, experiences and thoughts about which the individual is 
motivated to remain unconscious. Both Freud, and Stolorow and Atwood’s concepts of a 
dynamic unconscious could be included in this. However, Freud’s dynamic unconscious 
would be the result of repressed instinctual drives and that of Stolorow and Atwood would 
pertain to emotional information that “was ‘sequestered’ because it jeopardized needed ties 
to caregivers or threatened the psychological intactness of the potential knower” (Stolorow 
& Atwood, 1992; Orange, 1995, p. 80; Renik, 2000). According to Renik (Ibid.), a criticism 
that can be levelled at Freud is that he overemphasised the importance of the domain of the 
dynamic unconscious in clinical analysis.  
 
 Experiences that remain unconscious because they were never verbally represented. This 
happens primarily because of circumstantial reasons (for example, because of a lack of the 
necessary linguistic or conceptual skills) and/or sometimes also because of defensive 
reasons. Examples of this would be Freud’s descriptive unconscious; Stolorow and 
Atwood’s prereflective unconscious and unvalidated unconscious; Bollas’s (1987) 
unthought known and Stern’s (1997) unformulated experience.  Implicit or procedural 
knowing or memory could also be seen as being nonconscious or unconscious in this sense 
(Fonagy, 1998; Lyons-Ruth, 1999).  
 
 Thoughts that the patient has never before entertained; that is, attitudes, ideas and ways of 
experiencing that the patient becomes conscious of as these are created in the therapeutic 
intersubjectivity. Mitchell (2002, p. 24) points out that the “Freudian revolution” has asked 
that one gives up “a certain kind of hubris”; that is the “vision of the human mind as 
transparent to itself and ruled by conscious reason”. Freudian and Lacanian thinking about 
the unconscious further means that “the subject is always internally divided” (Flax, 1993, p. 
96). Rather than just thinking of these more opaque areas of experience as being limiting, 
they may also, if one is willing and open to the idea of somehow engaging with this 
complex and multifaceted dimension, hold the potential of deepening and enriching 
experience. Therapy is therefore not just about discovering what is already there and 
becoming freer from limitations, but also about creating new possibilities. (Renik credits the 
Jungians for being more comfortable with the idea of the analyst’s adding something from 
his or her perspective in their conception of the clinical methods of analysis.)  
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Some psychoanalytic thinkers such as Ogden (1997, 2001) and Bollas (1992, 1995, 2001) give 
evocative accounts of the creative use of the analyst’s unconscious processes and how this informs 
and shapes the therapeutic process. Using Freud’s ideas around the unconscious as a starting point, 
both of them have (in their different ways) opened up theorising about the unconscious to include 
intrapsychic as well as intersubjective processes. They further describe how the therapist’s “active 
use of countertransference” alters his role from that of “careful observer/listener” of the patient’s 
unconscious productions to that of “active coshaper/coholder” of the therapeutic pair’s unconscious 
processes (Bernstein, 1999, p. 280). The therapist’s task of being open and receptive to the patient’s 
“intrapsychic productions” is accordingly extended to include his (the therapist’s) own “internal 
free associations” (Ibid.) to his experience of the intersubjective third, and these, for example, the 
therapist’s fleeting thoughts, intuitions and reveries, are transformed into “intersubjectively 
generated scripts” for further analytic work (Ibid., p. 282).134 
 
Ogden (1997, 2001) explains how, together with the conversations with the patient, the therapist 
also has other and private conversations with himself about what is happening and being 
communicated unconsciously between him and the patient (that is, about the analytic third). He 
does this by being attuned and open and by associating to his own reveries or waking dreams 
(Ogden, 2001, p. 5). Those are experienced in the form of mundane, everyday thoughts, feelings, 
ruminations, daydreams, bodily sensations and so forth, which may, at times, appear to be no more 
than rather self-absorbed narcissistic musings. The therapist’s “reverie state involves a withdrawal 
from the logic, demands and distractions of external reality” (Ibid.).135 Reveries drift in and out of 
the therapist’s mind intermingled with and shaping self-reflective consciousness.136 The openness 
to unconscious experiences and the therapist’s use of his own reveries requires tolerating the 
drifting and uncertainty of not knowing and being able to bear the anxiety of letting meanings 
accrue rather than imposing premature certainties.  
 
Ogden (2001, p. 6) imaginatively uses Freud’s metaphor of the unconscious, preconscious and 
conscious minds and locates reverie experience on the border between the unconscious and the 
preconscious. This “frontier” (Ibid.) is the place where playing and creativity originate,137 where 
                                                 
134 Bernstein (1999, p. 280) warns that we should keep in mind that this could provide theoretical leverage for the 
therapist’s becoming preoccupied with his own ”internal echoes at the expense of [the] patient’s intrapsychic conflicts”. 
135 In this regard Freud wrote to Lou Andreas-Salomé (Freud & Andreas-Salomé, 1966, p. 45) as follows: “The analyst 
must cast a beam of intense darkness into the interior of the patient's associations so that some object that has hitherto 
been obscured in the light can now glow in that darkness.” 
136 Ogden (2001, p. 10) calls this “symbolically mediated self-consciousness” and also underlines (Ibid, p. 107) that “it 
becomes necessary that the analyst recast his reveries into a more highly organized, verbally symbolized form of 
talking to himself (and eventually to the patient) about the affective meaning of the reverie experience”. 
137 According to Ogden (2001, p. 9), it is “crackling with the impulse toward symbolic expression”. 
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Bion’s ß-elements,138 the incoherent “things in themselves” (Bion, 1962, p. 6) may accrue into 
meaningful thoughts that become available for self-reflective thinking and the “it-ness” may 
become the subjective “I” which may become the self-reflective “me”. There is no linear 
progression: these ways of being ebb and flow and interweave and one has significance only in 
terms of the others.   
 
Just as reflective consciousness exists in dialectical tension with productions from the 
unconscious,139 the unconscious productions from the therapist as an individual (and those of the 
patient as an individual) are also in a dynamic tension with those that ensue from the unconscious 
intersubjective analytic third. While the analytic third (partly) shapes the analyst’s reveries, reveries 
also feature prominently in the analyst’s efforts of “catching the drift” of the unconscious third 
(Freud, 1923b, p. 239; Ogden, 2001). Ogden (2001) further emphasises that the therapist’s reveries 
do not indicate that aspects of unconscious experience are being brought into conscious awareness: 
reveries are newly-created reflections of what unconscious experience is like or metaphors for 
unconscious experience. This resonates with Bollas’s (2001, p. 96) notion: “This is less often the 
return of the repressed and more often the evocation of the received.”  
 
Bollas’s ideas about Freudian intersubjectivity (Bollas, 2001) and the therapist’s 
countertransference dreams (Bollas, 1995) are similar to those of Ogden. However, encountering 
his beautiful and elegant prose is like entering the “dreamier frame of mind” (Bollas, 1995, p. 1) of 
the unconscious, which rather obscures a systematic rendering of his theoretical perspectives. 
 
In his earlier work Bollas (1987, 1992) highlights the intrapsychic aspects of the therapist’s task in 
this regard. He envisages the creation of a receptive space (in this instance belonging to the 
therapist) that is open to and sustaining of the spontaneous arrival of unconscious derivatives (such 
as the therapist’s shifting states of mind, fantasies, affects, thoughts, bodily sensations, ruminations, 
preoccupations, feelings, daydreams, and so forth) that will allow unconscious development 
without consciousness intruding. This is made possible by the therapist’s receptive capacity, which 
is marked by the evocation of a certain frame of mind (the therapist’s being actively quiet and 
meditative),140 and which is indeed a “mode of deflected attention” (Gerhardt & Sweetnam, 2001, 
p. 45). Bollas (1987) contrasts this being and experiencing with being self-reflective (and knowing 
and interpreting).  
                                                 
138 Unthought emotional experiences and sense impressions devoid of meaning (Bion, 1962). 
139 See pp. 194-195 for the discussion of interview material pertaining to this. 
140 Bollas (1987) hopes that the patient will internalise this through identifying with the therapist. 
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Bollas (1992, p. 103) also describes how the therapist brings his “disseminating subjectivity” (a 
kind of unconscious deconstructive activity) to bear on the patient’s material, making it both his 
own and part of the therapeutic intersubjectivity; that is, belonging to patient and therapist. What is 
received from the patient is transformed (and not just contained) by the therapist from being β-
based to α-thinking (Bion, 1962) and provides material for further analytic work. The therapist’s 
conscious reflective capacity becomes foregrounded in the process of organising and conferring 
meaning on what ensues from this, although the dialectical processes between141 “the two separate 
yet deeply involved unconscious subjectivities” remain of primary importance (Bollas, 1992, p. 
99).  
 
In his later work Bollas (2001, p. 93) conceptualises the figurations of unconscious 
communications and processes between therapist and patient as a distinct kind of unconscious 
intersubjectivity, a “Freudian intersubjectivity” constellated by the “Freudian pair” constituted by 
“the patient’s free associations and the analyst’s evenly suspended attentiveness”. The analyst 
listens in such a way that the patient’s speaking “becomes open speech, a discourse driven by the 
unconscious speaking in the presence of an other newly arrived on the scene” (Bollas, 1999, p. 
184). Just as in Ogden’s work (although not so clearly described), there is an interplay of individual 
subjectivities and intersubjectivity (the “third”) on an unconscious level (Bollas, 1992, 2001).  
 
In Benjamin’s (1988, 1995, 1998b) innovative work on intersubjectivity, where mutual recognition 
is conceptualised as an essential aspect of the development of the self and intersubjective 
relatedness, there is a focus on the processes of mutual, reciprocal identifications between therapist 
and patient as mostly taking place on an unconscious level.142 Although Benjamin appears to 
theorise about a “more interactive axis” in psychoanalysis, “the unconscious world is enriched 
rather than replaced” in her thinking (Gerhardt, Sweetnam & Borton, 2000, p. 40).  
 
Since the unconscious can never be encountered wilfully or directly, cannot be predicted or 
controlled, our experience of it is only a dim and fragmented outline of its presence. This is true for 
both patient and therapist and makes therapy a difficult and dangerous undertaking for both of 
them. Bion (1990, pp. 4-5) speaks of therapists’ and patients’ inevitable anxieties in this regard: 
“[W]hen approaching the unconscious – that is, what we do not know, not what we do know – we, 
patient and analyst alike, are certain to be disturbed … In every consulting room there ought to be 
                                                 
141 For example, between the patient’s transferences and the therapist’s countertransferences; the patient’s narratives 
and the therapist’s associations, and so forth (Bollas, 1992). 
142 See pp. 162-163 and pp. 195-197 for examples of interview material pertaining to this. 
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two rather frightened people: the patient and the psycho-analyst. If they are not, one wonders why 
they are bothering to find out what everyone knows.” 
 
The asymmetry of the therapist-patient dyad is based on the formal and contractual aspects of their 
relationship and on the special expertise and professional training of the therapist (Broucek & 
Ricci, 1998). By implication the therapeutic space belongs to the patient and the therapist is 
understood to be the “expert” who is available to facilitate the exploration of the patient’s inner 
world. This means that therapists should be both intellectually and emotionally receptive to what 
patients communicate not only consciously, but also unconsciously. Freud (1912, p. 116) therefore 
warns that a precondition for the analyst’s use of his unconscious as “an instrument in the analysis” 
is that he “may not tolerate any resistances in himself which hold back from his consciousness what 
has been perceived by his unconscious” and that every unresolved repression constitutes a “blind 
spot”. 
 
According to Zeddies (2000a), the therapist’s ability to allow his unconscious to resonate with a 
patient’s fantasies, conflicts and fears, is crucial in enhancing the therapist’s understanding of 
patients and in promoting his analytic responsiveness. This implies the therapist’s being sufficiently 
emotionally available to the patient to be able to listen with the “third ear” (Reik, 1948),143 and to 
be open to even the more obscure and intuitive aspects of what is evoked in himself as a result of 
his experiences in and engagement with the intersubjective third (Bollas, 1992, 2001; Ogden, 1994, 
1997, 2001). The evolvement of this kind of “therapeutic” emotional availability was previously 
described as part of the participants’ increased capacity for subject-to-subject relating, and the 
concomitant ability to empathically identify with the patient as a dissimilar and separate other and 
to engage in the play of identifying and disindenifying with the patient and different and 
contradictory aspects of the patient.144 
  
As in all individuals who seek therapy, the therapist’s own therapy brings both the possibility of 
increased self-knowledge and personal growth, but there is also an added dimension that makes it 
different from other therapies: the role it plays in the therapist’s development as a professional, 
which is so inextricably entwined with self-knowledge and personal growth. What the therapist’s 
personal therapy offers him is also different from the contributions that theoretical knowledge or 
even supervision makes to his professional development. 
 
                                                 
143 “[T]his third ear works in two ways. It can catch what other people do not say, but only feel or think, and it can also 
be turned inward. It can hear voices from within the self that are otherwise not audible because they are drowned out by 
the noise of our conscious thought-processes” (Reik, 1948, p. 146). 
144 For example, see A, 127-448, p. 138; BP, 312-342, p. 139; B, 291-392, pp. 173-175; F, 218-249, p. 196. 
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The therapist’s own therapy could provide him with the awe-inspiring but also humbling 
experience that he is not omnipotent and omniscient and that, just as in the case of “lesser” mortals, 
there is “an unconscious” at work in his life and in his therapy. As Racker (1957, p. 306) remarks, 
“we are still children and neurotics even when we are adults and analysts”. According to 
Silverstone (1979), the therapist’s experience of the existence of his own unconscious entails 
suffering a real narcissistic wounding; that is, the acknowledgment of the existence of his own 
conflicts and psychological limitations.  
 
Some examples of this may be found in the participants’ descriptions of how their therapies had 
“cracked up” and dismantled what Bollas (1995, p. 222) calls the “arrogance of consciousness”.145 
They had also come to understand their choice of profession in terms of the wounded healer 
phenomenon146 and retrospectively it had become clear to them that their becoming therapists had 
been for very different reasons than their original conscious motivations for choosing their 
profession.147 The experience of their own therapies had subsequently changed their motivations for 
doing the work of therapy.148 
 
Personal therapy could lead to therapists’ becoming more aware of those unconscious desires that 
may “push and pull” and sometimes even overwhelm them and more able to contain these so that 
their own needs are less likely to become enacted in the therapeutic space. Many of these blind or 
dim spots, may, in fact, never ultimately be resolved with any kind of finality.149 Therefore, this is 
not just about therapists becoming diminishingly gripped by and freer of their own issues that are in 
the process of becoming less powerful, but it is also about their awareness of their own limitations 
as therapists. Gill (1996, p.132) reminds us that the therapist “should be ready to recognize that 
while his unconscious may have been explored in some measure, it cannot be expunged”. The 
therapist’s own therapy therefore does not bring either a “psycho-analytic purification” (Freud, 
1912, p. 116) nor a “Husserlian cleansing of pre-suppositions” (Orange, 1995, p. 14). 
 
In the therapist's quest to enhance the patient's self-understanding, there is also a limit to the extent 
to which this can be informed by thought-related factors or the verbal contents of the encounter. 
The therapist’s task has to do with working on the edge of what is known; making what is 
embedded explicit; providing a verbal window on those covert presences which structure the 
patient's experience, but are obscure and not thought or spoken. The therapist’s therapy should 
                                                 
145 See E, 633; A, 116-125, pp. 144-145. 
146 See A, 423-428; C, 135-142; D, 578-581; F, 406-410, p. 126. 
147 See F, 392-436, p. 129; A, 464-466, p. 130; F, 449-462, p. 130. 
148 See A, 469-482; E, 429-432, G, 224-226, pp. 130-131. 
149 See B, 393-398, p. 131 for Participant B’s comments about this. 
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therefore not just be seen as rendering him more conscious of and less entrapped by his own issues, 
but also as enabling him to become more attuned to and comfortable with the “deeper”, subjective 
and more intuitive aspects of his experience in the therapeutic intersubjectivity; to become more 
able to engage in and facilitate “the dialogues of the unconscious” between him and the patient 
(Ferenczi, 1915, p. 109). 
  
This can be related to the therapist’s experience in his own therapy of being listened and responded 
to from beyond immediate and explicit consciousness, and at some level knowing that this is what 
is happening, even if what is occurring is not yet verbally mediated. This kind of interpenetrating 
simultaneous knowledge and experience may converge into a different and vital way of being that 
alters and expands the therapist’s  “idiom” of working as a clinician (Bollas, 1992).  
 
Spezzano (1993, p. 212) suggests that every psychoanalytic psychotherapist’s “unconscious” (and 
consequently the way that therapists treat their own unconscious material as well as that of their 
patients) is transformed into “a psychoanalytic unconscious” through the combination of his own 
analysis, supervision and theoretical knowledge. As the therapist’s experiences of being immersed 
in psychoanalytic language and thought accumulate, the “psychoanalytic unconscious” develops 
and becomes something he can rely on and use automatically.150  
 
This “interpretive template” (Zeddies, 2000a, p. 63), which may also be understood in terms of the 
therapist’s “professional” procedural memory or knowledge, underpins the clinician’s work. It does 
not just reflect the therapist’s personal history, but also contains the therapist’s preconscious and 
unconscious knowledge and recognition of the therapeutic space and task. It is therefore saturated 
in psychoanalytic meanings and values; that is, it also mirrors the ways in which the therapist 
relates to his therapy and supervision, theoretical knowledge, and the therapeutic community. 
 
The therapist’s relating to the psychoanalytic unconscious and the resulting dissemination of the 
conscious surface into the rich and multifaceted depths of this dimension of experience, can be 
thought of as one of the vantage points of his being-a-clinician. From this perspective the 
psychoanalytic unconscious becomes a filter though which the therapist listens, a lens through 
which he perceives, and a template from which he thinks and interprets.  
 
                                                 
150 This resonates with Sachs’s (1947, p. 165) much earlier and rather grandiose idea that the aim of the training 
analysis is “to make the understanding of the nature, language and the mechanisms of the unconscious sufficiently 
intimate, profound and intense that it becomes a permanent fixture in the mind and will be fully available when it is 
needed for sounding the unconscious of future analysands”.  
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This plays a significant part in the constellation of the meaning-making “frameworks” (Flax, 1996, 
p. 590) operating between patient and therapist, which both makes possible and constrains the 
generation of understanding and “truth” in the therapeutic intersubjectivity. Rather than being 
primarily “objective” or cognitively informed, the therapist’s attachment to certain ways of 
approaching and thinking about his work is often suffused with intense and unconscious desires and 
investments. Personal therapy may help the therapist to be more open to the idea of exploring and 
even questioning the taken-for-granted and embedded epistemological and ontological assumptions 
according to which he works.  
 
Another aspect that should also be considered at this point is what the therapist actually does with 
the experience of what comes from the deeply intuitive “psychoanalytic unconscious”. Here one 
may think of how beginning therapists often identify with a favoured theory, a supervisor or a 
therapist quite concretely, unthinkingly and “unconsciously”, and directly transpose these to his 
clinical work. In more mature therapists, what comes from the psychoanalytic unconscious often 
appears to be part of their subjectivities, their way of being, in quite a smooth and seamless way; 
opening up possibilities for thinking and meaning rather than foreclosing them with premature 
certainties.151 
 
The nature of such therapist acts should not be seen just as a function of the therapist’s level of 
development as a clinician, because the therapist may become more self-absorbed and less 
available for free symbolic play for many reasons (some may be only temporary and others more 
enduring) such as countertransference issues, difficult life events, and so forth. It also does not 
mean that the therapist should not make concrete and literal use of his own therapy, theory or 
supervision, but rather that it should not happen continually, inappropriately or for defensive or 
narcissistic reasons and if it happens because of such reasons (which is probably just as inevitable 
as countertransference enactments), that there is some awareness and conscious scrutiny of the 
event.  
 
4.5.3.2 Discussion of interview material 
The Interview Guide contained no direct questions about those therapist capacities which have been 
termed the psychoanalytic unconscious and consciousness. The use of these concepts had been 
suggested by the interview material itself and that had again deepened the understanding of these 
therapist skills that are so pivotal in doing psychodynamic psychotherapy. Generally, it could be 
said that the participants’ thinking about their therapies and work had been quite evident in their 
                                                 
151  See the section “The changing nature of participants’ identifications with their therapists”, p. 169.  
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accounts and had showed itself in the way that they had talked about many different aspects of their 
therapies and their work. As has already been referred to in the previous theoretical section, there 
were unconscious aspects to the participants’ original choice of profession, and their therapies had 
given them some awareness of this and of how their own unconscious processes had shaped and 
organised their manner of working. Through their therapies, the participants had developed more of 
a sense of the “pushes and pulls” of their own unconscious desires and needs in the space of clinical 
work, but because of their own therapies they had also become less prone to enact these with 
patients and more able to relate to patients as subjects.  
 
The participants’ reflective thinking was quite apparent in the interviews. However, by its very 
nature it had been much more difficult to tap into the psychoanalytic unconscious “at work”. In this 
section there is some further exploration of the rather scanty gleanings of further interview material 
where the participants had described or specifically referred to unconscious processes in their 
therapies and work. An aspect of this was previously discussed as part of the way that the 
participants’ thinking and their openness to the more unarticulated, and intuitive aspects of 
experience had mutually informed each other in the clinical third.152 
 
Participants BP and G’s accounts of how their own “freeing up” as therapists through their own 
therapies had been unconsciously communicated to their own patients, had highlighted the 
importance of unconscious communications between therapist and patient. 
342 I think up to very recently my patients had been incredibly courteous,
nice and well behaved and I find that the more that I feel safe in my own
therapy to also get in touch with anger, I find that my own patients to
also be more free to get in touch with their anger and to attack me, ja
346 I think it's quite an unconscious thing and I see that just in terms of,
as I say, how therapies are beginning to develop, my therapies with my
patients, how they are beginning to go further, how I see more anger
coming from them, but constructive in terms of the therapy.
347 I see more emotion; I see more tears in my patients.
348 So I think my capacity to hold them is increasing as I am learning or
experiencing my therapist's capacity to contain. (BP)
91 I believe that something gets communicated to the patient, who is very
often very, very much more in tune to us therapists than we ever
acknowledge.
99 I believe that, I see that over and over again that somehow, through
not such direct means of communication, somehow cues must be coming from
me to the patient, to indicate to the patient to bring up the material.
100 So it's not just my awareness that I can focus on.
101 I almost feel it's on another level: that my readiness to deal with the
issue gets communicated to the patient. (G)
 
 
                                                 
152 See pp. 194-195. 
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As Participant B pointed out, the foregrounding of the “the dialogues of the unconscious” between 
therapist and patient (Ferenczi, 1915, p. 109) holds the potential threat that the therapist may 
become entangled in and overwhelmed by the hidden complexities of the transference-
countertransferenence matrix or Benjamin’s (1998b, p. xv) web of identifications. This makes the 
Third of therapy (or that of supervision) crucial as a container that could render the therapist 
capable of continuing thinking about what is happening. The Third of the therapist’s own therapy, 
as well as that of supervision, may therefore be thought of as contributing to the development and 
continuing existence of what Casement (1985, 1990, 2002) calls the therapist’s “internal 
supervisor”. 
427 There's just you and the patient and you need to have a therapist or
supervisor in your life at that time, otherwise you might be possessed,
possessed by the unconscious at work, because the other person creates a
polarity that allows you to become conscious of that which you cannot see.
(B)
 
Personal therapy had deepened Participant E’s self-understanding and had brought some 
consciousness to aspects of herself that she had been largely unaware of. 
634: It's made me very conscious of how unconscious I was of other people's
shadows; not least of all some of my intimate others and it's made me
IMMENSELY conscious of how I project, I think, particularly positive
stuff, out there, to an extent that in the past I idealised people,
particularly intelligent men. (E)
 
Participant F described how her therapy had contributed towards her growing awareness of her own 
unconscious processes and how they had affected her presence in the space of the clinical third, as 
well as influencing the nature of the clinical third. 
147 Obviously I have my own unconscious defences of a particular kind, as
everyone has, as we all do. I work with those.
148 But because they are unconscious, of course you don't just know them.
149 As I went through therapy, I started to become more aware of them.
134 It's been part of the work, part of understanding the unconscious
processes in me and how they are influencing who I am in my life and in
my work and actually in the therapy sessions. (F)
 
Participant C’s experience of coming to trust the process of therapy had enabled her to do work 
around a particular issue (without necessarily “resolving” it) and also to become able to, when 
working, to be more open to and aware of her own feelings that were evoked if that matter did arise 
in a therapy situation. Because of this she had become more able to contain her own feelings and 
less prone to enact them. 
211 Well, to give you an example, I've always had an issue with silences,
so when a client is silent, in the past I would have always wanted to
fill that time and then in my own therapy, when we've had a silence
between me and JJ and then I'd say to her that I'm uncomfortable about
it, then we would look at it, what does it mean and as I became more
trusting of that process, I have become able to do that with my clients,
because I've became a deeper person, more trusting within myself, so now
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I can sit with silences and work with it and be comfortable with it.
221 I've become much more comfortable with silence and I would say that I'm
more rooted, definitely more rooted and I do know that if I do feel more
uncomfortable, I think it's something deeper, more unconscious,
and I can take it deeper to whatever comes out. (C)
 
Through her own experience of therapy, Participant F had become increasingly able to listen with 
the “third ear” (Reik, 1948). She had become more receptive to and could make imaginative use of 
her own experience of the intersubjective third, while also being able to “track” the patient both on 
a verbal and on a more intuitive, unarticulated level.153 This resonates with the previous discussion 
concerning Bollas’s and Ogden’s conceptualisations of the therapist’s capacity to be attuned to the 
unconscious dimension of intersubjectivity and how this may inform and shape the therapeutic 
process. In F’s account there was also a sense of her moving between experiencing the unconscious 
intersubjective third and more consciously reflecting on that.  
137 Things like I'll listen to a patient speaking in therapy, I'll be
responsive and I will be able to understand and hear some of what they
are saying, but some of it I'll be hearing at a different level, maybe
unconsciously or something.
138 Because I'll go, afterwards, I'll think and sometimes even things they
say will come into my dreams.
139 So I think that the communication is working in me at an unconscious
level, at a symbolic level.
140 And I think it's important to be able to work with that as well.
141 And that's sometimes where therapy has helped as well, to be able to make
sense of what the patient's saying about themselves and what it's evoking
in me, what I am using that for to represent something of myself.
214 The therapy helps me to uncover, to keep on uncovering my unconscious
constellations and to be reflective about who I am and how I'm responding
to different people, and how I'm responding to my patients.
215 And there are intersubjective conjunctions and disjunctions.
216 It helps me to sort those out and the transference and
countertransference and all of that. (F)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 Some of Macran, Smith and Stiles’s (1999, p. 427) participants also described how their therapies had resulted in 
their feeling “able to work at a deeper, more unconscious level with their clients”. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
5.1.1 An intersubjective reconfiguration of the therapist as wounded healer 
The participants’ descriptions of themselves as wounded healers cohered into an account wherein 
the future therapist’s woundedness had originated in early experiences marked by the want of felt 
and specific recognition by significant others. This lack could also be conceived in terms of the 
absence of a sustained dialectic of recognition and negation or the evolvement of the trajectory of 
thirdness between the child and primary caretaker(s). Owing to their own neediness and/or 
narcissistic involvement, these parents were unable and/or unwilling to take care of the child’s 
needs and primarily related to him in an extractive manner as the object of their own needs and 
desires. In an attempt to gain some recognition, the child (who probably had an aptitude for this) 
became sensitive and attuned to being the object of the powerful other's needs and desires in a 
relationship that lacked any real intimacy and emotional sustenance.  
 
In developing this “picture” from the participants’ descriptions of their early relational experiences, 
their accounts were taken at face value, that is, as being factual or “historical” truths (Spence, 
1982). However, it needs to be considered that the participants’ descriptions should rather be 
regarded as constructed or “narrative” truths (Ibid.). One may therefore speculate about the role and 
significance of something like a poor “fit” between parents and a particular child rather than just 
seeing woundedness simply as an indication of parental failure. 
 
To return to the future therapist: the relationship between caretaker(s) and child thus became 
marked by a splitting into the polarities of the dominant but needy caretaker(s) and the submissive 
but caretaking child, who functioned as a prematurely pseudo-independent “false self” (Winnicott, 
1960a). In relational and intersubjective theorising, identification is understood to be with the total 
intersubjective experience, rather than with specific attributes of the other. It is therefore with this 
relationship, with its movement between two unequal positions, that the child and future therapist 
identified and that featured prominently in his relating to others. 
 
The would-be participant-therapist was thus left with the ambiguous (and mostly unconscious) 
ability to be sensitive and attuned to the patient (thus seemingly recognising the patient) so long as 
the patient played the “good” patient to his role of rescuer or helper, a role which would make him 
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(the therapist) feel recognised as a therapist and met his needs (rather than those of the patient) in 
this manner. This meant that he probably was unable to recognise a patient as an other, different 
and separate from himself, and that problems would arise when a patient threatened his sense of 
himself as a therapist: for example, by being negative and hostile, by not becoming “better”, and so 
forth. Because he would have difficulties in differentiating himself from a patient, such a therapist 
could, when a patient had issues similar to his own, and the “other within” came to be located in the 
“other without” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 108), identify with the patient in a manner that obscured what 
belonged to whom, thus also constellating a subject-to-object rather than a subject-to-subject 
relationship with the patient. 
 
Together with the more benign and useful desire to understand himself and others, to think about 
and to make sense of his world and his relationships, his unacknowledged vulnerabilities and 
neediness also attract the therapist who is a wounded healer to his profession. Being a clinician 
offers him an unparalleled opportunity, condoned and even sanctioned by his being the therapist, of 
helping and rescuing that which is disowned in himself in the patient. Such a therapist’s 
contradictory attributes of being both “sensitive” to others and being prone to becoming unable to 
engage in subject-to-subject relating when his own needs and anxieties feature too prominently, 
enable him to do the work of therapy and are potentially dangerous. This is foregrounded at those 
difficult and precarious moments when the therapist’s identification with the patient is not 
indicative of empathic connectedness, but rather signals “the inevitable return of the repressed” 
(Benjamin, 1998b, p. xiv). 
 
5.1.2 Personal therapy facilitating the therapist’s capacity for subject-to-subject relating 
The participants understood their therapies as having been (and in some instances as still being) 
transformative of their professional lives. This also pertained to their personal lives, but that was 
unconnected with this study. While they did not feel that they had to be in interminable therapy, 
they also understood that this transformation was no final “psychoanalytic purification” (Freud, 
1912, p. 116), but rather concerned the evolvement of a specific sensibility that they could bring to 
their work.  
 
Through their therapies they had become aware of the existence of their entrapment in their own 
issues; of how this had become a distorting prism through which they had viewed and done their 
work and related to their patients. On a professional level, the work of personal therapy had 
concerned the participants’ unravelling the different strands of their own “blind spots” in their work 
and becoming able to relate to their patients in a different manner. 
 221
A fundamental question in this study was what about the participants’ therapies had brought about 
these transformative changes. Their accounts of their therapy experiences should not be understood 
as descriptions of therapy as a so-called corrective emotional experience (Alexander & French, 
1946), but rather as an intricate interweaving of the needed and the repeated relationships (Stern, 
1994). This resonates with Benjamin’s notion of there being different dimensions or clusters in the 
evolving trajectory of thirdness.  
 
Within the context of the development of sustained and increasingly trusted co-created thirdness, 
the therapist’s attuned recognition of and affectively resonant connectedness to the participant were 
signalled by the appropriate foregrounding of the various clusters of thirdness at different times. 
Rather than leading to rupture, moments of negation were subsumed in the dialectic of recognition 
and negation. The participant accordingly became increasingly capable of relating to a different 
other (as represented both by his own therapist and by his patients) as a subject. These processes 
were underpinned by the participant’s awareness of the therapist’s loving respect and steady and 
unflagging presence, that is, the therapist’s agapaic attitude and what Benjamin calls the moral 
third. 
 
Some of the aspects of the participant-therapist’s augmented capacity for subject-to-subject relating 
with patients were: 
 Being open to and able to contemplate his own experiences, of and about the therapeutic 
intersubjectivity between him and a patient: for example, his thoughts, feelings, 
ruminations, bodily sensations, dreams and so forth.  
 Being able to engage in the play of thinking about and reflecting on his experiences and 
acts in a meaning-making way without being unduly self-judgemental. 
 Having an adequate sense of being in his “own skin” (A, 129), thus being able to 
differentiate himself from patients so that the “other without” was less likely to become 
confused with the “other within” (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 108) and the participant therefore 
being less prone to negate patients by using them in the service of his own needs and 
desires or disempowering them. 
 Linked to the above was the participant’s ability of being sufficiently able to decentre 
from his own experience and feelings to engage in processes of both identifying and 
disidentifying with the patient. This meant the participant’s empathically recognising 
the patient while holding on to his own subjectivity. 
 Being able to think and reflect by keeping both his own and the patient’s perspectives in 
mind. 
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 Making his thinking available to the patient in a manner that is sensitive and appropriate 
to where the patient and the therapy are at in a particular moment. 
 
The participants’ experiences of their therapies had thus allowed them to become aware of, to work 
through and to distance themselves from their difficulties and issues and to become capable of 
working differently and developing as therapists.154 The therapeutic third had also served as a 
container for the difficult and painful affects that were sometimes evoked by doing the work of 
therapy, thus enabling participants to use it as a third vertex from where they could think about 
their work. In time this had resulted in the participants developing what has been described as a 
triangular psychic space or a space of thirdness in their minds. 
 
5.1.3 Relating power and therapist mistakes to negation and mutual recognition 
It was evident that even if the “dance” of thirdness between therapist and participant had been co-
created and mutual, the asymmetry and accompanying power disparity that characterised the 
participant-therapist dyads were such that the therapists had ultimately been both in charge of and 
responsible for “inviting” participants to take part in and to keep the “dance” going (or allowing it 
to break down). Entering therapy had indeed placed the participant in a position of vulnerability in 
a relationship where there was an inherent disparity of power. Having some knowledge about 
therapy had not changed the essential nature of the process, and there was also the added factor that 
the therapist was generally seen (and had even been chosen) as the one to be emulated; as the one 
who really knew how to be a therapist.  
 
Therefore the therapist’s (real and perceived) transgressions had the potential of being (and were 
sometimes) devastating, especially when the therapist had had a need to hold on to his position of 
power and was negating of the participant’s subjectivity and reality. Sometimes a participant had 
had no choice but to flee from a previous therapist or therapy. While negative therapy experiences 
were not the focus of this study, the accounts of such experiences that did emerge during the 
interviews underlined the vulnerability of patients (even informed ones), the destructive potential of 
therapy and the enormous responsibility that therapists need to assume. Having such iatrogenic 
experiences had made participants more aware and sensitive to all of this, but they had felt that this 
knowledge was not worth the destruction that had been wrought. 
 
 
                                                 
154 This is similar to the findings of other qualitative studies (Mackey & Mackey, 1993; Macran, Smith & Stiles, 1999; 
Wiseman & Shefler, 2001) on the effects of therapists’ personal therapies on their work as clinicians. See also p. 136. 
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However, sometimes the therapist’s mistake had constituted a rectifiable moment of negation, 
rather than breakdown or rupture. It was not always clear whether or not such a “correction” by the 
therapist had actually happened in “reality” or only in the participant’s fantasies, but that had not 
seemed very important. What had mattered was the participant’s sense of being recognised through 
what was perceived as the therapist’s silent or spoken acknowledgment of the impact of his (the 
participant’s) different perception of what had happened and the therapist’s not becoming 
threatened and defensive. At times the therapist’s “mistake” was also not experienced as negating 
of the participant, but rather deemed to be due to the therapist’s idiosyncratic foibles which could 
be accepted and forgiven. Such incidents had actually served as a means to redress the power 
disparity and to move the therapeutic dyad towards mutual recognition; that is, towards therapist 
and participant becoming like subjects. 
 
Precarious moments in a therapy that had included the participant’s sense of somehow having been 
missed or failed by the therapist that took place in the more general context of the participant’s 
feeling recognised and empowered, had therefore meant something very different than those 
instances that had signalled the therapist’s negation of the participant. Such more benign 
experiences of the therapist’s being “at fault” had often included the therapist’s implicit or explicit 
acknowledgement of his own contribution to the situation, as well as his being open to the 
participant’s version of reality and his critical feelings towards the therapist. Sometimes this had 
been followed by therapist and participant engaging in a mutual consideration of what had 
happened. These kinds of events had tended to put participant and therapist on a more equal level 
and had also provided the participant with a useful way of thinking about surviving being less than 
perfect as a therapist. At times this had meant the participant’s disidentifying from those acts of his 
therapist which he had considered as being inappropriate or counter-productive, but these 
disidentifications had been done in a thoughtful manner and were often accompanied by the 
participant’s identification with the therapist’s attitude, thinking and acts of “rectification” or 
reparation. 
 
5.1.4 Identification bridging personal therapy and clinical work 
The participants described identifying with their therapists' ways of working and with the attitudes 
that they (the participants) had perceived as underpinning those. As the participants indicated, the 
processes of identification had often been unconscious: that is, they had mostly taken place at a 
nonconscious or procedural level. The participants also described how their identifications had 
ranged from being concrete and literal to being more symbolic. The nature of these identifications 
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had  changed over time and as a therapy had progressed, as well as according to the nature of the 
relationship with the therapist.  
 
When there was a significant power disparity between therapist and participant, identifications had 
tended to be more concrete. Although it was not possible to find a kind of one-to-one correlation, it 
was clear that this was related to the participant’s own sense of self as a therapist in relation to his 
therapist. When feeling “lesser”, which had either been due to the power disparity in the therapeutic 
third, or to feeling unsure of himself in the clinical third, or to a combination of these, he had been 
more inclined to use the attributes, acts and words of his therapist directly and concretely. When 
there had been more of a sense of therapist and participant being like subjects, identifications had 
been at a more symbolic level.  
 
If the role of identification was just about (or just stayed at the level of) the participants directly 
“importing” the idealised and powerful other’s supposedly “superior” version of being-a-therapist 
and using it as such, it would have meant their subverting rather than developing their own unique 
abilities as therapists. This is not to say that there is anything inherently detrimental about using 
identification in this manner at certain points. When identification had been used more concretely, 
it had often been a means of shoring up the participant’s flagging confidence in himself as a 
therapist. However, optimally enriching and expanding one’s being-a-therapist does require that 
identification goes beyond this.  
 
The participants described such optimal moments when more evolved forms of identification had 
specifically linked what had happened in the therapeutic third to events in the clinical third. This 
had usually taken place when a participant had experienced a significant shift in himself owing to 
what he had perceived as a useful and helpful act on the therapist’s part. Such an act would also 
have been felt to occur within the context of mutual recognition, that is, when the therapist had 
been both recognising of the participant and also more of a like subject rather than the idealised 
other. The therapist’s act having been designated as being “useful”, had not always meant the 
therapist’s getting it exactly “right”, but had also pertained to how he had dealt with those instances 
when things had gone wrong.  
 
Although such identifications had also been experienced as just “happening”, this had no longer 
just consisted of the participant’s, during the moment or retrospectively, becoming aware that 
specific words, gestures, acts or interpretations that he was using or had used had actually been 
those of his therapist or that he was or had been invoking his therapist’s critical or helpful presence. 
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The more abstract and evolved forms of identification had often been accompanied by a shared 
sense of being with the therapist, which was indicative of intersubjective thirdness having 
developed into there being an “interpersonal symbolic third” between therapist and participant 
(Benjamin, 2001, p. 16). At this point that which had been useful or helpful in the participant’s own 
therapy had become part of the in-between transitional space of neither belonging to and belonging 
to both participant and therapist. It could therefore be thought about, be made the participant’s own, 
and be appropriately used when needed. 
 
The participants’ accounts were therefore used to gain some understanding of how “a loving tie” 
(Benjamin, 1995, p. 8) and recognition from the initially idealised therapist could start off the 
movement towards mutual recognition and participant and therapist becoming like subjects. As 
described, this was accompanied by changes in the ways that the participants had identified with 
their therapists: their identifications with their therapists had changed in tandem with their 
becoming like rather than lesser than their therapists. Rather than making the participants primarily 
and often submissively therapists just like their therapists, those identifications had become integral 
parts of themselves, thus adding to, augmenting and deepening their own “repertoires” as 
psychodynamic therapists. 
 
5.1.5 Personal therapy making a unique contribution to clinical work 
While all the participants in the study could be described as wounded healers, this has to be 
understood as being meaningful within the context of this specific group of therapists and can 
therefore not be interpreted as signifying that all (or most) psychodynamic therapists are wounded 
healers. However, it also needs to be considered that although I have, for the sake of clarity, 
described what could be called “the wounded healer phenomenon” starkly, definitely and in a rather 
oversimplified way, as though it is or is not present, it should actually be seen as existing in degrees 
on a continuum. After all, it is only human to have hidden vulnerabilities and unmet needs, and we 
can never know or control ourselves as much as we would like to think we are able to. Unlike in 
some other professions, such vulnerabilities and needs are “highly relevant” to the way that 
therapists engage with and relate to patients and do the work of therapy (Wiseman & Shefler, 2001, 
p. 137). 
 
Wiseman and Shefler (2001) therefore comment that the personal and professional selves of 
therapists cannot readily be distinguished from each other and should consequently not be regarded 
separately. Four of the participants in this study had originally entered therapy for mainly personal 
reasons and the other four for more professional reasons, but this had not made any significant 
 226
difference to the nature or focus of their therapies, because those two domains were essentially 
interwoven. This was similar to Wiseman and Shefler’s (Ibid, p. 137) participants who “viewed 
training reasons for entering personal therapy as inseparable from growth and personal reasons”.  
 
As also expressed by the participants in this study, therapists themselves are the “tools” that they 
use in doing the work of therapy. Currently there are fewer rules and more emphasis on 
independent thinking as well as on authentic engagement with patients. Therapy can therefore help 
any therapist to become freer of his own inner entrapments, which may exist to a greater or lesser 
extent. At the same time it could also strip him of the arrogance of thinking that he is necessarily 
more “healthy” or “insightful” than the next person.  
 
Doing psychodynamic psychotherapy is also demanding in a very specific way. The interpersonal 
dynamics typical of the therapeutic dyad when the therapist functions in the “wounded healer 
mode”, such as the collapse of thirdness and mutual recognition into the power struggle or 
collusion of complementary twoness, are also what one finds at difficult moments in any good-
enough therapy. At such moments the therapeutic third provides a Third outside the interpersonal 
entanglements of the dyad in the clinical third. The therapeutic third is the therapist’s own space 
where there is containment, nurturance and where he may regain the ability to think about what is 
happening in the clinical third. Those features of their therapies had been clearly described by the 
participants. Of course helpful Thirds may also be formed by the therapist’s theoretical knowledge, 
supervision, the wider therapeutic community, and so forth, but according to the participants, their 
personal therapies had played a more fundamental role in enabling them to develop as therapists 
and had potentiated their capacity to make good use of those other Thirds that sustain and 
contribute towards the development of a therapist. 
 
To survive the strain of doing the work of therapy and to keep a therapy going, requires, apart from 
the necessary knowledge and skill, a certain amount of emotional resilience and resourcefulness on 
the therapist’s part. Personal therapy is therefore pivotal even for the therapist who would not have 
or who would no longer have deemed personal therapy necessary if he had not been a therapist. 
Further aspects of the unique contribution of the therapist’s own therapy to clinical work were also 
discussed by the participants: one cannot do this work unless one has faith in the process of 
therapy, and this faith can only come from experiencing it oneself; one can also not know what it is 
like to be a patient and to be disempowered in that specific way without experiencing it. 
. 
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Taking into account that therapist and patient mutually influence each other and that every event in 
the therapeutic space is co-created by both of them, one could also, for heuristic purposes, isolate 
and focus on the nature of the therapist’s contributions to a good-enough therapy. Seen in this light, 
every act of the therapist arises out of a complex and multi-faceted combination of aspects such as 
his capacity to engage in subject-to-subject relating, his attitudes, values, theoretical knowledge and 
professional allegiances, a certain inner freedom, resilience and resourcefulness, and what may be 
called therapeutic “skills”.  
 
During the course of their therapies the participants had augmented and developed skills which are 
particularly important for the psychodynamic psychotherapist. The psychoanalytic consciousness 
concerns the kind of reflective and symbolic thinking that the therapist brings to bear on his work.  
The psychoanalytic unconscious is about accepting nothing as a given: this implies the therapist’s 
being open to and capable of deconstructing the more implicit, unformulated and opaque aspects of 
his experiences of himself and the patient in the therapeutic space and also being willing to explore 
and question the actual frameworks that he uses to engage in these processes. These two aspects of 
the therapist’s functioning are not independent: they exist in relation to and inform one another. 
 
In fact, all these elements that constitute being-a-therapist are intricately linked and cannot be 
separated. For example, the therapist who is so threatened by a patient’s rage that he withdraws into 
the fortress of being the one who knows and attempts to regain his position of power by subduing 
the patient in this manner and is therefore relating to the patient as an object rather than as a 
subject, is unlikely to be able to use the skill of thinking reflectively. However, the therapist may be 
open to and become aware of his own uncomfortable or disturbed feelings, and manage to right 
himself sufficiently to regain some ability to think about what is happening, so that his own 
feelings become adequately contained for him to again relate to the patient as a different and 
separate other and to continue thinking about what has happened. 
 
It is also hard to imagine how the actual praxis of even the obvious characteristics (for example, the 
analytic frame) and, particularly, the more subtle features of psychodynamic therapy (for example, 
the therapist’s “living” the knowledge that the therapeutic space is there for the patient and not for 
himself by keeping the patient in mind and not following his own needs and desires) could actually 
come about through only theoretically knowing about them. “Learning from experience” (Bion, 
1962) therefore is highlighted. Another way of thinking about this, which is similar to the notion 
suggested by Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999), is to posit that the kind of knowledge and skills that 
is asked of the psychodynamic psychotherapist exists on a verbal and declarative level and on a 
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more procedural and implicit level which cannot be separated from each other. This makes the 
actual experience of therapy an indispensable part of being-a-therapist.  
 
Although the participants had been requested to give their accounts in terms of their own 
experience rather than from a theoretical perspective, what they had spoken about had inevitably 
been steeped in theory. They had evidently known a great deal about therapy and had easily been 
able to put theoretical meaning to the words, actions and attitudes of their therapists and of 
themselves. In terms of doing therapy, they were very clear that, within the context of the 
therapeutic relationships in which they had felt recognised, they had taken over and identified with 
what they themselves had experienced as being useful or helpful, or had disidentified from what 
they had experienced as being inappropriate, counterproductive or potentially harmful. These 
identificatory processes, consisting of identifications and disidentifications with a good therapist 
who actually does know, were experienced as a pivotal part of gaining knowledge and skills and in 
developing as a therapist. This does not imply that such skills are entirely absent in the novice 
therapist; they are probably already present in an incipient form as an aptitude for this kind of work, 
but they need to be developed and honed for the task at hand. 
 
5.2 AN INTERSUBJECTIVE MODEL OF PERSONAL THERAPY  
        AND BEING-A-THERAPIST 
The research participants had provided accounts of their therapies, as well as of their work as 
clinicians, and had related these to each other. From that it became clear that although initial 
training may confer the sense of being-a-therapist, the therapist’s continually being present to his 
patients with integrity, steady dedication and in an emotionally alive and sensitive way, involves a 
lifelong task of walking the tightrope of both having some awareness and acceptance of his own 
vulnerabilities and limitations and also striving to develop and reach beyond those. An ongoing 
identity as a therapist may further be conceptualised as existing in dialectical tension with “the 
multiplicity of subjective experience[s]” that constitute being-a-therapist (Seligman & Shanok, 
1995, p. 558n2). The participants’ accounts had offered a vivid portrayal of the unique role of 
personal therapy in promoting and sustaining these kinds of therapist attributes and processes. 
 
Very soon into the research process it became apparent that any theoretical paradigm used had to 
take both the intraspsychic and intersubjective aspects of the participants’ experiences into account. 
Benjamin (1998b) does precisely this by distinguishing the intrapsychic and intersubjective 
dimensions from each other, but deeming them as being of equal purport in psychoanalytic 
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theorising. This is encapsulated in her notion of “the double-sidedness of the relation to the other”, 
that is, relating to the other both as object and as subject (Benjamin, 1998b, p. 90).  
 
The use of the “lens” of relational/ intersubjective theory, with a particular focus on Benjamin’s 
work, subsequently led to the emergence of a tentative model, Figure 5.1, that represents the multi-
dimensional processes involved in the ongoing development of a psychodynamic therapist.  
 
Figure 5.1 
 
The multi-dimensional processes involved in the development of a psychodynamic 
psychotherapist 
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This model aims to articulate both the intrapsychic and intersubjective dimensions of the 
participants’ experiences and the way in which subjectivity and intersubjectivity are inextricably 
interwoven in the linked therapeutic and clinical thirds. From this perspective, that which occurs on 
an intrapsychic level, illuminates that which is intersubjectively constellated, and vice versa.  
 
As Figure 5.1 indicates, the development of a psychodynamic therapist concerns much more than 
just his personal therapy. This model only includes those developmental aspects that appeared 
generally important; there may be others that are also significant in the development of a specific 
therapist. Figure 5.1 is a simplified and two-dimensional version of very complex processes that 
ebb and flow and intersect in three-dimensional dialectical interplays of different positions and 
where developmental trajectories (and not development in the sense of a current or finally achieved 
position) spiral and recede along diachronic as well as synchronic axes. 
 
These processes take place in the dynamic context and form part of what may be described as an 
open and complex non-linear system. By conceptualising psychological phenomena simultaneously 
as emerging at the experiential level constituted by intrapsychic and intersubjective events and in 
terms of a more comprehensive system (Coburn, 2002), thinking about the therapeutic and clinical 
thirds may be expanded to encompass a wider spectrum of what is actually involved in being-a- 
therapist. But does this not constitute a somewhat haphazard mixing of different theoretical 
viewpoints and models? In this regard, Coburn (2002, p. 657) makes the useful comment that the 
apparent “conceptual tension” between “understanding psychological phenomena through a one- or 
two-person model one moment, and then through a systems or contextualist lens the next” is largely 
due to the “conflation of phenomenological and explanatory levels of conceptualising key 
concepts”.  
 
In terms of the model in Figure 5.1, this had meant moving from the perspective of the participants’ 
descriptions of their experiences through those experiences being interpreted via the prism of 
theory and that leading to a deeper understanding in terms of the interpenetrating therapeutic and 
clinical thirds. This was followed by yet another and more distanciated viewpoint, which is 
represented by the model in Figure 5.1, where the therapeutic and clinical thirds may be seen as 
part of a wider system that includes more facets of being-a-therapist. In the manner typical of the 
circular, iterative nature of the interpretative processes deployed in this study, the model could then 
be taken back to the participants’ descriptions and used to inform the way in which those were 
understood and interpreted. 
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Thirds are constellated in the dialectics between different points of reference within the system 
depicted in Figure 5.1 and also between the participant and these vertices. This may open up or 
truncate possibilities of meaning. Some Thirds may be envisaged as primarily emanating from the 
therapist, and in this study that had pertained to both the treating therapists and, especially, to the 
participants-as-therapists. Thirds may be formed, for example, between the therapeutic dyad and 
the therapist’s relationships with his own needs and desires, his issues and concerns about power, 
the values held by the wider therapeutic community, different theoretical positions, his supervisor 
and supervision. This study also highlighted the kinds of Thirds that were formed between the 
therapeutic dyads consisting of participants and their therapists, and participants and their patients; 
that is, the Thirds that therapeutic thirds had formed to the clinical thirds. 
 
Such triangularities always involve “a relation of relations” (Muller, 1999, p. 471) or “shifting 
vectors of relations” (Aron, 1999, p. 8). One could, for example, consider how the therapist’s 
theoretical stance could become a Third to the therapeutic dyad. But the therapist’s theoretical 
position is not just that. It is often permeated by conscious and unconscious desires, allegiances and 
values. It may form part of the psychoanalytic unconscious or the therapist’s reflective 
psychoanalytic consciousness may be brought to bear on it; it may be transformed by (and be 
transforming of) the therapist’s supervision, professional affiliation and own therapy. And all of 
these vertices also relate to one another; create and negate one another. A third point of reference to 
a therapist-patient dyad does also not necessarily facilitate the evolvement of co-created thirdness 
between therapist and patient. When such a third vertex forms an antitherapeutic dyad with the 
therapist, therapeutic space and thirdness may become compromised and might even collapse. 
 
While indications of these processes represented in Figure 5.1 did appear in the participants’ 
accounts, this study did not attempt to encompass all of these. As shown in Figure 5.2, the focus of 
this study was limited to, as well as highlighted, the evolvement of the participant-as-patient in the 
dialectic of the recognition and negation (Benjamin, 1990, 1995, 1998b; Ogden, 1994, 1999) 
between the participant and his therapist in tandem with what happened, changed and developed 
within the participant, as well as between the participant-as-therapist and his patient(s).  
 
From a systems perspective and as indicated in Figure 5.2, the therapeutic and clinical thirds 
mutually influence each other, but the effects of the clinical third on the therapeutic third were, for 
the most part, outside the scope of this study. Figure 5.2 therefore facilitated thought about how 
facets of the participant’s being-a-patient could be conceptualised as significant in his work with 
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Figure 5.2 
 
The development of a psychodynamic psychotherapist with a specific focus on the therapeutic 
and clinical thirds 
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patients; that is, how the therapeutic third affects the clinical third and how the links between these 
thirds may be understood. In this way this study framed (Coburn, 2002) a part of the larger 
perspective of the development of a psychodynamic therapist. However, this does not mean that 
other aspects that are involved in developing as a therapist, such as theory, supervision and the 
therapeutic community, were totally excluded, and when appropriate, they were taken into account 
and referred to. 
 
5.3 SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS AND FINDINGS 
The purpose of this study had been to gain some understanding of what happens when therapists 
are in therapy and how this changes their being-therapists. This led to an exploration of the nature 
of the participants’ therapies and particularly of those aspects of their own therapies that they had 
considered as being relevant to their own work as clinicians. The participants’ accounts had also 
included descriptions of the ways that their therapies had affected their ways of working and being 
therapists. From these descriptions a “picture” emerged of how the participants had developed as 
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professionals as a result of their therapies. Although “professional” and “personal” cannot be 
readily distinguished in the development of a therapist, the emphasis was on participants’ 
professional development. Of course this had not only been due to their therapies, but the focus was 
specifically on how their therapies had contributed to their development. In considering the ways in 
which personal therapy had affected both participants’ manner of working and their development as 
therapists, and linking these, this study has been different from those by Macran, Smith and Stiles 
(1999) and Wiseman and Shefler (2001). The Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999) study specifically 
focuses on how personal therapy affects therapists’ practice and Wiseman and Shefler (2001) 
explore the impact of personal therapy on therapists’ personal and professional development. 
 
Although the main focus of this research was on the participants’ present therapies, they perceived 
both present and past therapies as fundamental aspects of their ongoing development as therapists. 
Participants had been limited to therapists presently both practising psychodynamic psychotherapy 
and being in their own therapies. In retrospect, I am not sure whether this limitation was really 
necessary, because it may be that including therapists who have terminated therapy during the last 
few years may not have made much of a difference. The participants seemed to have ongoing 
narratives of their own therapies that ran through their lives over many years and in which the 
significant events remained embedded even after a considerable passage of time. Because of this, I 
did not confine the excerpts from the interviews to the participants’ accounts of their present 
therapies, but when appropriate, also used those descriptions which pertained to past therapies. 
 
I have clarified that I was working within a relational and intersubjective model in this study. While 
I did ask the participants to speak from their own experience rather than giving theoretical 
explanations of what had happened, their theoretical positions were inevitably part of their 
accounts, since experience takes place within and from the understanding that one already has. 
While the participants were all psychodynamic therapists, they did not all come from exactly the 
same theoretical background. Their theoretical perspectives were also not necessarily purely in one 
theoretical paradigm. Only one came from an (primarily) intersubjective perspective. In Cape 
Town, Kleinian theory is probably the predominant theoretical discourse among psychodynamic 
psychotherapists, and I would imagine that the participants' (even those who described themselves 
as, for example, “Jungian”) ways of speaking about their experiences would in some ways be 
influenced by this. Even my own way of asking questions was probably also informed by this. This 
meant that in thinking about and interpreting the interview material (especially when using the 
“lens of relational/intersubjective theory), I attempted to “translate” the participants’ accounts into a 
relational/intersubjective way of understanding. 
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I have found this research process an exciting, but also a very taxing and demanding one. This was 
especially true of the process of developing an understanding of the interview material in a manner 
that was satisfactory in the sense of being coherent and theoretically consistent and comprehensive. 
When reading about research, there is the rather misleading impression that concepts and theory 
arise from the data quite easily and spontaneously. In reality I have to agree with Ayres’s (2003a, 
2003b) comment that “we tend to write that something ‘emerged’ from the data, which is of course 
ridiculous because we clawed it out kicking and screaming … ” 
 
There were pivotal moments in the research process, turning points when enlightenment and insight 
dawned and when some “truth” became evident (often seemingly just by chance). For example, 
quite early on I conducted an interview with one of the participants in his/her consulting room. As I 
entered that room, it felt vaguely familiar, but I knew that I had never been there before. Later on, 
even though the participant never told me the name of his/her therapist, I knew what this familiarity 
was: I had actually been in the participant’s therapist’s room. Although the two rooms were not 
exactly the same, there was a subtle but uncanny resemblance between them. This set me 
wondering what this could mean and I began to listen to this participant (and the others) with a new 
sensibility, not exactly knowing what it was that I was listening for. This incident led me to issues 
that are present in all therapies, but that are specifically foregrounded in therapists’ therapies: 
power, idealisation and identification. Trying to make sense of this took me to Benjamin’s thinking 
around these matters. 
 
Despite my previously discussed reservations about using Computer-Aided Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS), I did employ QRS N6 in the analysis of interview material. Since 
there were no local training programmes and also no available individual with the necessary skills 
and knowledge who could help me, my use of N6 was largely self-taught, with the help of the 
manual, tutorials and by following the QSR e-mail forum. QSR support was ready to lend a hand in 
providing help with technical problems and did so on a few occasions. Notwithstanding my 
computer skills being relatively limited, I found the program quite user-friendly and I was able to 
master its basic use without an undue input of time and effort.  
 
One of my concerns had been whether the use of N6 would lead to a kind of glib and superficial 
data analysis. This reservation proved to be unfounded, but neither had N6 been much of an actual 
“theory-builder”. The latter may have been partly due to my lack of training for that purpose, but I 
would rather ascribe it to the actual and previously described method of data analysis that I used. 
That had required my repeatedly going back and re-listening to and re-reading the entire interviews. 
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I had consequently kept in touch with the original interviews throughout the research process. 
However, N6 did prove itself invaluable in the actual storing and organising of the interview 
material, that is, the coding and retrieving of excerpts from the interviews and the organising of 
excerpts into categories (or “nodes”, as this is called in N6 terminology). In the initial stages of the 
data analysis the use of N6 had also given me a measure of confidence that some order and clarity 
could be possible in what seemed like an bewilderingly incomprehensible and overwhelming 
amount of material.  
 
The passion with which the participants had regarded both their personal therapies and their work 
was something that had struck me quite early in the process of interviewing. This played a role in 
the emergence of the question of who this group (of mostly self-selected) participants was. They 
were evidently a particular group of psychodynamic therapists in whose lives their own therapies 
and their work were of central importance. Subsequently this was used in exploring the further 
question of why the wounded healer trope had featured so prominently in the participants’ 
accounts. 
 
I do not think that the emphasis on the participants’ woundedness, which had emerged during the 
interviews, had simply been the result of my search for confirmation that the idea of therapist as 
wounded healer is more than just a commonly believed myth among therapists. The participants’ 
understanding of this aspect of their becoming and being therapists had certainly been given form 
and meaning by their awareness of this notion, which is generally known among psychotherapists 
(including myself). However, the participants’ accounts cannot merely be described as stereotyped 
“press releases” (Wiersma, 1988) which were constructed around their familiarity with the idea of 
the therapist as wounded healer. The emphasis on the wounded healer trope probably mostly had to 
do with the nature of this specific group of participants. 
 
While it is possible to be somewhat cynical and to think of the therapist as wounded healer as a 
rather hackneyed, romanticised and overvalued idea, it was apparent that most of the participants 
had, in differing ways, indeed come to their work from places of hurt and pain. I found myself 
moved and touched by their accounts of how they had (sometimes for years) courageously 
struggled to get beyond their difficult early beginnings, as well as by their generosity in sharing 
such personally revealing material. They did make the effort of actively engaging in being 
reflective about both their therapies and their work, but there were times when I could sense a 
participant’s defensiveness around an area that was particularly sensitive. Some of the participants 
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also commented on finding themselves giving accounts that were more “personal” than they had 
anticipated and, probably, had intended. 
 
While the participants’ accounts were not just tales of their “redemption” from being “bad” 
therapists, it was also clear that their therapies (and also their work) had been pivotal in their 
becoming “healed” and in coming into their own as human beings and as therapists. This was 
probably (as was indicated by some of them) the greater part of their motivation for taking part in 
this study. While the findings of this study may, to some extent, not be true for all psychodynamic 
therapists, it did mean that what the participants described had “painted” a picture of their therapies 
and their work in brightly-hued rather than in subdued pastel colours.  
 
This particular group of therapists was somewhat similar to those that participated in the study done 
by Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999). Just as in the Macran et al. study, these participants were “a 
self-selected group of therapists who were interested in reflecting on their personal therapy and 
how it [had] affected their work” (Macran, Smith & Stiles, 1999, p. 430). The two participants in 
this study who had not volunteered had appeared sufficiently interested in the research topic for me 
to feel that I could approach them to take part. However, the wounded healer phenomenon did not 
emerge in the Macran et al. study. That may be indicative of the nature of that particular group of 
therapist-participants. On the other hand, it may simply mean that the researchers did not enquire 
about it, as I did, for example, by asking about the participants’ understanding of their reasons for 
choosing their profession and their motives for entering therapy for the first time.  
 
According to Macran, Smith and Stiles (1999, p. 430), it was more likely that therapists with 
“relatively positive therapy experiences” had volunteered for their study (even though they had not 
been sought on that basis) and that this could account for the absence of descriptions of “any 
substantial negative effects on their practice”. This could indubitably also partly be true of the 
participants in this study, whose experiences of their present therapies were not just “relatively 
positive”, but were seen as being transformative of their personal and professional lives. The fact 
that the participants in this study had experienced themselves as wounded healers could also have 
contributed to the emphasis they had placed on the importance of their own therapies and to their 
taking the risk and making the effort to volunteer. They had an awareness of what they could have 
been like (and had often initially been like) as therapists without the personal change and 
professional development that had come about as the result of their therapies. They all took their 
work seriously and were aware of the responsibility that it entailed. 
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Macran, Smith and Stiles (Ibid.) also raise the questions of whether their participants had presented 
their therapies in such a positive light because of wanting to please the researchers and/or because 
of wanting to present their chosen profession positively. These issues did not seem to apply the 
participants in this study. They did talk quite freely of negative and harmful experiences in previous 
therapies. Even if there had been negative moments, precarious times and “mistakes” on the 
therapist’s part in their present therapies, they all emphasised that these took place within the 
context of therapeutic relationships that were, on the whole, beneficial. This foregrounds the 
question of the eventual fate of the idealisation of the chosen and, in this case, seemingly benign 
treating therapist, in a therapist’s personal therapy. While accepting that the participants were 
actually in good-enough therapies, it has to be considered that their very favourable views of their 
therapists and therapies may also be indicative of some traces of the initial idealisation of the 
treating therapist always remaining part of the therapist-patient’s therapy. 
 
This study had commenced with the assumption that personal therapy is a necessary part of being a 
psychodynamic psychotherapist and this had later also been supported by the findings. However, 
this idea should not be unreservedly and naively embraced, but warrants and requires further 
deconstruction and qualification.  
 
Potentially there are negative aspects to the therapist’s own therapy. There could be the possibility 
of the therapist’s own therapy becoming a kind of initiation rite into an exclusive “elitist” group. 
Notwithstanding therapists’ being knowledgeable about therapy, there is, as research has indicated 
(Grunebaum, 1986) and as some of the participants have also described, just as with anyone else, 
the risk of harmful therapy experiences.  
 
While supporting personal therapy as a prerequisite for doing therapy, Coltart (1996) concurs with 
Symington (1993) that the therapist’s own therapy could also lead to a greater degree of inward-
looking narcissistic involvement, to the detriment of what is outer and other. The outcome of a 
study by Garfield and Bergin (1971) suggests that personal therapy with trainees or inexperienced 
therapists may lead to a preoccupation with their own issues as patients and have a deleterious 
effect on their work with patients. Garfield and Bergin mostly ascribe the occurrence of this to their 
participants’ inexperience, but that aspect did not feature similarly in this study. Nonetheless, the 
phenomenon of therapy at some stages being “all-consuming” (E, 117, p. 135) was specifically 
described by one of the participants and referred to by some of the others. Rather than being 
ongoing, it seemed to have been part of the intense and often disruptive early phases of therapy, 
which were also marked by feelings of vulnerability, a significant power disparity between 
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participant and therapist and evident idealisation of the therapist. It appears that this preoccupation 
with one’s therapy and oneself could just be part of the process of the therapist’s personal therapy, 
especially in the initial stages of therapy and more so for the novice therapist or for the therapist 
who enters therapy for the first time. However, the possible drawbacks of such a temporary “lapse” 
into self-preoccupation, which could perhaps have some negative effects on the therapist’s work, 
are far outweighed by the other and more long-term contributions of personal therapy towards his 
being a sensitive, effective, responsible and ethically aware therapist. 
 
On the other hand, the possibility also needs to be considered that personal therapy may provide an 
opportunity for this particular variety of narcissism that is sometimes found in therapists to become 
more entrenched, as well as allowing it to persist in a more “underground” and subtle manner. 
Whereas an intense interest in personal relationships is often one of the primary reasons why 
psychotherapists are drawn towards their profession, they are frequently (much to the dismayed 
surprise of “lay” people) woefully inadequate at “human relations” in the “real world” (Coltart, 
1996, p. 32). This is seldom willingly or openly acknowledged or discussed by therapists, but on a 
professional level the tussles for power, the envy, the petty rivalries and schisms that are often such 
integral parts of interpersonal relationships and group dynamics within and between psychoanalytic 
or therapeutic communities, speak of this issue (Kirsner, 2000). One does therefore need to take 
note of the fact that there may be a connection between personal therapy and what Coltart (1996, p. 
32) calls a “redolent possibility of inadequately matured narcissism” in psychodynamic 
psychotherapists, but this matter and the questions that it raises are beyond the scope of this study.  
 
In a more general sense and specifically pertaining to this study, this redirects us to the question of 
what kind of effect the therapist’s therapy has on his relating to the patient as a subject rather than 
in terms of his own needs, desires and interests; that is, how therapy impacts on both the therapist’s 
“blind spots” and “bright spots”. Does therapy free the therapist from the shackles of his “blind 
spots” so that when therapeutic work touches on such an area, he remains able to keep the patient in 
mind as a different other, rather than vanishing “into his own process” (D, 434, p. 150)? Or 
could the therapist’s therapy also render “blind spots” into “bright spots”, so that the “blind spot”, 
which had once ensnared him, becomes an area of particular interest that he picks up on, rather than 
staying with and following the patient when he is working? While there could certainly be truth in 
both possibilities, this is where the therapist’s capacity to be aware and reflective and to keep such 
contradictory options in mind, would be foregrounded. 
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5.4    EPILOGUE 
Although it has enriched the detail of the process, this research has also led the way to more 
questions and potential areas for further research. For example, one could investigate this topic 
from the “other side”, that is, from the perspective of the experience of the therapist whose patient 
is also a therapist. In terms of the co-created intersubjective third, one could explore how thirdness 
would be influenced if therapist and patient came from different cultures, social classes, histories 
and value systems. How would such diverse and often contradictory Thirds affect the nature of 
thirdness between therapist and patient? This would be particularly relevant in the multi-cultural 
South African society. This research has also highlighted the importance of the particular 
discourses of power and nature of the kinds of power disparities that get constellated within the 
therapeutic setting. One way of investigating such power-related issues would be to do so 
according to their variations within different kinds of therapist-patient dyads, for example, a 
therapist and a fellow therapist, a therapist and a patient of the same or different gender, a therapist 
and a patient from very different cultural or economical circumstances, and so forth. While being 
interesting and certainly worthwhile, any research involving the balance of power in therapy would 
be a complex task requiring great sensitivity. The same could be said about the exploration of 
negative and harmful therapy experiences, especially if these involved therapists’ own therapies. 
 
Whatever else may follow, this is the end of this particular research journey that was sparked off by 
my curiosity about my own experience of being both therapist and patient. The research net has 
been swept and the catch is there to see. I am aware that the yield has been a very specific view of 
how the therapist's personal therapy impacts on his work and that somebody else may very well 
have found something different. Despite the inevitable limitations and flaws of this endeavour, I 
feel reasonably content that, to whatever extent that is possible, I have finished what I had set out to 
do. Some of the properties and complexities of that perplexing and thought-provoking mix of being 
both therapist and patient have been explored and unpacked and I do have a more comprehensive, 
deeper and richer understanding of the phenomenon that had intrigued me sufficiently to take the 
leap into the research process. I can only hope that other colleagues will also find this useful to 
think about and to make sense of their own experiences of being-a-therapist and being-in-therapy. 
 
If (as the grounded theorists suggest one does) I could go back to the participants with further 
questions at this point in time, those questions would probably be very different from the ones that I 
had originally asked. Of course, the idea of doing this is nothing but wishful thinking, because it 
would take this study far beyond the scope of what is an acceptably adequate answer to the research 
question and, especially, of what is practicable. Then again, during the research process, I 
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sometimes found myself inadvertently glimpsing some of the more unexpected and most 
challenging aspects of the findings on the fringes of participants’ answers to more obvious and 
straightforward questions. I would have appreciated an opportunity to explore some of those facets 
further and in more detail. For example, how is the experience of therapy and nature of thirdness 
shaped by therapist and patient’s sharing the same profession and how is the power differential 
between treating therapist and therapist-patient influenced by this? I would also have liked to know 
more about how the therapist-patient’s manner of thinking about his work and his way of engaging 
with the unconscious intersubjective therapeutic third are changed by his own experience of 
therapy. However, I also realise that such questions, which now seem so obvious, have only come 
to the fore because of what I have actually learned through engaging in the meaning-making circle 
of this research process.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
LETTER/E-MAIL INVITING PSYCHOTHERAPISTS TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY 
 
 
Dear Colleague 
Research on the influence of therapists’ own therapies on their work as clinicians 
As part of the Rhodes PhD in Psychotherapy I shall shortly be starting a research project about the 
impact of psychotherapists’ own psychotherapies on their work. Is analysis or therapy really 
necessary in order to be a competent clinician? The thesis aims to explore how therapists’ clinical 
work is influenced by their personal therapies. I am therefore looking for participants who are 
concurrently in therapy and working as psychotherapists. If you fall into this category, I should like 
to ask you to give serious consideration to participating in this study. 
 
I shall briefly address two issues that may be of concern to possible participants. The first is that of 
time (which is a very precious commodity for every psychotherapist!). There will be two semi-
structured interviews of one-and-a-half to two hours. These interviews will take place at a time and 
venue to suit participants and will be about six months apart. 
 
The second issue is that of confidentiality. The data gathered will necessarily be sensitive in nature: 
participants will not only be talking about themselves, but also about their own therapists and their 
patients. Therefore, apart from participants’ anonymity and their details being disguised, no actual 
protocols will be published in the final thesis. These will be kept separate and will only be seen by 
the researcher, the supervisor and the examiners, all of whom will be apprised of the confidentiality 
clause. On completion of the thesis, protocols will be shredded, or, if requested, returned to 
participants. 
 
There is a paucity of research in this area and participants will be contributing to training in 
psychotherapy, especially in South Africa. The interactive process of the research interviews will 
afford participants the opportunity to learn more about themselves, both on a personal level and as 
clinicians. At the end of the study each participant will receive a copy of the thesis. 
 
I should appreciate your help in this matter. Please contact me if you are interested (even if you 
would just like to know more about the study). 
 
Yours sincerely 
Ester Haumann 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 
“WARM-UP” QUESTIONS 
 
Do you have any questions before we start? 
 
 
Why did you agree to participate in this study? 
Or 
What motivated you to take part in this study? 
 
 
Before we proceed to the main question, there are a few details about your present therapy that 
I’d like to clarify:  
 
(If you want to, you could also fill me in about your previous therapies). 
 
How long have you been in your present therapy? 
 
What is the frequency of your therapy sessions? 
 
What is your therapist’s theoretical orientation? 
 
Does your therapist offer the use of the couch? 
Yes / No 
If yes: 
Could you describe your experience of using the couch? 
 
 
What were the reasons you had for entering personal therapy? 
Or: 
What was your motivation for seeking therapy? 
Prompt: If it was a formal requirement, ask what other reasons there were. 
 
 
How did you go about choosing your present/this specific therapist? 
 
 
Would you like to tell me something about your previous therapies? 
Or: 
Is there anything specific about your previous therapies that you’d like to share? 
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PERSONAL THERAPY < WORK AS A PSYCHOTHERAPIST 
 
Could you describe as fully as possible how your own therapy or analysis influences your work 
as a therapist? Please try to describe this in terms of your own experience rather than just giving 
a theoretical explanation of what happens. Where possible, could you also try to describe specific 
instances of this? 
Prompt: How does your personal therapy relate to and impact on your clinical work? 
 
 
Could you describe experiences that you have had in your own therapy that you do not want to 
repeat in your work? 
 
 
Please describe how you talk about your patients in your own therapy.  
 
 
How do you experience the difference between therapy and supervision? 
Prompt: When are countertransference issues part of your therapy and when do you deal with  
               them in supervision? 
 
 
It is often said that doing this work may place a burden on therapists. I wonder what your 
experience has been in this regard? 
Or: 
Could you describe the ways in which your work as a clinician affects you personally? 
 
Could you describe the role your own therapy plays in assisting you to deal with these issues? 
 
 
Could you say something about your experience of the process whereby what you experience in 
your own therapy is carried over or transferred to your work? 
 
 
PERSONAL THERAPY 
 
Could you describe the experience of your own therapy? 
Prompt: What has been helpful and what are the difficulties and disappointments? 
 
 
You have talked about what it is like when things go well in your therapy. Could you also 
describe your experience of the difficult times in your therapy, that is, when there are 
misunderstandings or disagreements or when you are aware of your therapist making 
“mistakes”? 
Prompt: What is your experience of your therapist’s approach to countertransference issues? 
 
 
Could you describe how, during sessions, it sometimes happens that you do not always share that 
which comes to mind with your therapist? 
Prompt: Your own feelings to and reactions about what is happening in the session; aspects 
               of yourself and of your life. How do you understand this? 
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PERSONAL THERAPY < SELF-ANALYSIS 
 
How do you continue the work of therapy outside of your own therapy? 
 
 
THEORY 
 
Could you say something about the role that theoretical understanding plays in your experience 
of your own therapy and your work? 
 
 
PARTICIPANT’S  “OWN STORY” OR REASONS FOR BECOMING A 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST 
 
Could you describe how it happened that you became a psychotherapist; that is, came to do this 
work? 
Or 
Could you talk about what led you to become a therapist? 
Prompt: Please tell me about your family of origin and other circumstances, events and issues in 
your life, and also about role models/mentors who were important in both your becoming and 
developing as a psychotherapist. 
 
 
IN CLOSING 
 
Is there anything else you would like to elaborate on further or comment on? Is there anything 
we have touched on that you would like to return to? 
 
 
I wonder how this experience of talking about your therapy and your work has been for you? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
PRE-INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Some basic information about yourself                                               Date.................................. 
 
You do not have to answer every question.  Please feel free to omit any question you are not 
comfortable with answering. 
 
Personal details: 
Name: 
 
Title: 
 
Tel. no.: 
 
E-mail: 
 
Age: 
 
Gender: M / F 
 
Professional details: 
Profession: 
 
Qualifications: 
 
Please describe the theoretical orientation(s) you use in your work as a psychotherapist: 
 
 
 
 
Number of years you have been working as a psychotherapist: 
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Treatment setting(s) you work in as a psychotherapist: 
Private: Yes / No 
Other (specify): 
 
 
Nature of psychotherapy practice  (% of modalities worked in): 
Individuals: 
Couples: 
Families:  
Groups: 
Other (specify): 
 
 
 
Age groups of patients worked with (% of those worked in): 
12 years and younger: 
13-19 years: 
20-49 years:  
50-64 years: 
65 years and older: 
 
Other areas of work apart from practising psychotherapy: 
 
 
 
 
Supervision 
Do you have supervision? 
Yes / No 
 
If yes (please mark what applies to you): 
Peer supervision: 
Supervision with another psychotherapist: 
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If yes (please mark what applies to you):  
Only when needed: 
On an ongoing basis: 
 
If ongoing, how regularly (please mark what applies to you): 
Once per week: 
Every two weeks: 
Once per month: 
Other  (specify): 
 
 
Personal therapy 
Have you (apart from your present therapy) had (a) previous experience(s) of therapy? 
Yes / No 
 
If yes, could you briefly describe your experience of this/these (keeping in mind when this took 
place, your reason(s) for entering therapy, the duration of therapy, etc.), and how you felt about the 
outcome of therapy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research process 
How do you feel about entering into this research process? 
 
 
 
 
What do you expect the difficulties and satisfactions may be? 
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